U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #117, 98-10-27
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1055
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Tuesday, October 27, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
SERBIA (Kosovo)
1 Schedule of NATO Activities Today/Expected Statement by
Secretary Albright
1-5 Assessment of Serbian Compliance: Force Withdrawals /
Movement of Police / Dismantling of Checkpoints /
Movement of Military and Police Equipment / Movement of
Monitors / Displaced Returning Home / Humanitarian Access
3 Ongoing Diplomatic Activities
5-7 KLA Activities / Ceasefire / Security Situation
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
7-8 Timetable for Agreed Actions by Parties
7 Secretary Albright's Calls to Chairman Arafat and Israeli
Foreign Minister Sharon
8,9 US Opposition to Unilateral Actions
8 Types and Amount of US Assistance
11-14 Reported Private Assurances Given to Parties to Wye River
Negotiations
13 CIA Role / Reporting
16-17 Regional Participation in the Peace Process
AFGHANISTAN
9-10 Taliban Offer to Try Osama bin Laden
IRAQ
10-11 UNSCOM Report on VX and Iraqi Missile Fragments
RUSSIA
15 State of President Yeltsin's Health
SPAIN
15 Secretary Albright's Meeting with Spanish Foreign Minister
15 --Discussion of Kosovo / Balkans / Pinochet Extradition
COLOMBIA
16 State Visit of President Pastrana
TURKEY
16 Turkish Restrictions on Bosporus Transit
BURMA
16 Situation in Burma / EU Sanctions Extended
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #117
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1998, 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing.
Let me give you at the top a description of what I expect the schedule to
be. With respect to Kosovo, as you all know, the North Atlantic Council is
now meeting. That meeting is expected to break shortly. After NATO
officials have spoken to the results of that meeting, I would expect
Secretary Albright to come here to the briefing room to talk to you about
that. I suspect others in the Administration will be talking as well. But I
wanted to let you know that at the outset; tentatively, that could be in
the next hour, hour and a half to two hours.
With that announcement, let me go to your questions.
QUESTION: You may have seen reports where Yugoslavia claims they have
complied and made all the necessary withdrawals. Is that correct; have
they?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't want to prejudge the decision that NATO is about
to make. But let me say that clearly, the message that NATO has been
transmitting to Milosevic appears to be translating into concrete changes
on the ground. There have been major efforts towards compliance that have
occurred overnight, significant force withdrawals underway including the
dismantling of checkpoints, the movement of our monitors. I just spoke to
Shaun Byrnes, the leader of our monitoring mission who indicated they have
counted over 4,100 police personnel moving out of Kosovo or into established
garrisons late yesterday.
They also recorded major movement of military and police equipment out of
Kosovo, including the dismantling of police checkpoints. The military has
moved many tanks out of hardened positions. In short, the disengagement
procedures discussed by Generals Clark and Naumann over the weekend with
President Milosevic are now underway in force.
In addition, we are seeing a change in the villages where the police have
left in substantial numbers some of the key villages and villagers are
returning to their homes. As Shaun Byrnes put it to me, instead of seeing
black smoke from burning houses, he is seeing white smoke from people who
have returned to their houses. That doesn't mean that in any sense that the
situation is over. There are still many thousands of people in the hills.
But in terms of the humanitarian side, humanitarian organizations
are getting the access they need. The police presence is drastically
reduced; checkpoints are gone. The people that are going to make the
ultimate judgment whether they come home are starting to come home in
larger numbers. There have been, as I said, thousands of police that have
left and major movements of military equipment, pursuant to the specifications
laid down by Generals Clark and Naumann in their meeting with President
Milosevic.
NATO obviously has to assess this information, and will be making a
judgment with respect to the question of the use of force and where we go
from here. I would expect them to be in a position to describe that
decision to the world in a relatively short period of time.
QUESTION: Just a technical point - the State Department is able now to
speak to the precise number of policemen moving. Is that because you have a
monitoring system or because there was - are there other reasons you
couldn't do this in the past?
MR. RUBIN: What I am providing to you is real-time information that is
observed by the verifiers. The monitors are making judgment of what they
can see. I am not giving you a complete order of battle or giving you a
snapshot of where every Serb unit is. I am providing you, as you ask each
day, for information as best we can assess it. So, the head of our
monitoring mission, Shaun Byrnes, has been providing this information to
some of your colleagues on the ground, and I wanted to give you the same
information that he has been providing.
That doesn't mean that we are in the position of giving an exact snapshot
in this forum; but I am trying to give you examples of things they have
been able to observe and estimate, essentially with their own eyes. Let's
bear in mind that what is happening here is that Kosovo is becoming a place
that the West, NATO, and the rest of the world is involving itself in in
such a way that President Milosevic can no longer say it's his own province
and he can make his own decisions there. The monitors are coming into
place; the mission is going to get up to some 1,500, pursuant to the
pledges; the overflights are taking place; people are in the field;
humanitarian workers are there. Kosovo has been internationalized, and that
is something that President Milosevic has sought to avoid.
I would also point you to the accounts of your colleagues which specify the
deep concern on the part of some of the Serbs there who can see the
difference between what is going on today and what's been going on in
recent weeks.
QUESTION: It was slightly figurative but Kosovo is still Yugoslavia's
province, and indeed --
MR. RUBIN: Internationalized in -
QUESTION: Before that you said it was not his province; well, it
is.
MR. RUBIN: First of all, I meant province in the figurative sense. Thank
you for correcting me. What I am describing there is that he is not in a
position to do whatever he wants in Kosovo any longer.
QUESTION: What is it you all are asking NATO to do?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let's wait to see. NATO is about to act. At a minimum I
think I've said before that we want to make sure that the pressure is
maintained on President Milosevic -- the military pressure that has played
such a constructive role in getting a change in the situation on the ground
and moving from a situation where there was a humanitarian catastrophe to a
situation where those risks have been eased. But as Ambassador Holbrooke
is fond of saying, this crisis is not over because there is a political
crisis in Kosovo that will be with us for a long time.
With respect to how NATO will choose to organize itself in the air, on the
ground, and with respect to the use and execution of air strikes, I will
prefer to leave that for the NATO authorities to specify; and then we will
have plenty of time to comment on it.
QUESTION: Looking ahead a little bit, you just said that the crisis is
linked to the political crisis. How do the verifiers and all the various
overflyers and other monitors that you have and the military set-up there,
how long do they sort of stay deployed?
MR. RUBIN: For a long time. Let's bear in mind what we're talking about
here is moving to a intensified shuttle diplomacy that Ambassador Hill will
conduct, where he will work on an agreement from both sides on an interim
solution so that Kosovars control institutions important in their daily
life -- including police, schools, health care and other matters. The
agreement would also include early elections for a Kosovo Parliament and an
executive. These are things that we do envisage the OSCE being involved
with. We don't expect those to happen overnight.
QUESTION: So until the interim agreement is signed or initialed, the
current posture remains?
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: That is, the pressure posture remains.
MR. RUBIN: It's possible and likely that the verifiers will be around for
quite some time upon signing of an interim agreement. This won't end. This
is going to be an ongoing process where we'll move from international
monitoring and verification of the compliance with the international
community's resolutions that is being assessed by NATO right now to a
situation, ideally, where an agreement were achieved on an interim solution
so that the political crisis that underlies all these problems can
begin to be resolved so that we can - the people of Kosovo can look
forward to a better life for a long time to come rather than just a
temporary halt to the humanitarian catastrophe they were facing.
QUESTION: Jamie, you mentioned our colleagues reporting on the ground,
quoting Mr. Byrnes, one of the stories that's coming in several newspapers
at least is that the Serbs will be allowed to have more forces in certain
places than were there in February; for example, in the border areas. NATO
has decided to sort of allow for some changes there. Is that accurate?
MR. RUBIN: I am not in a position to comment on the specific details laid
down by General Clark and General Naumann. But let me say what the goal of
Resolution 1199 was; and that was to stop the repression, to stop the
marauding, to stop the killing and to stop a situation that was making it
impossible for people to live in their villages and sending them off to the
hills.
It was not to prevent Serbian authorities from protecting their border.
With respect to whatever detailed units were agreed upon, I will have to
leave it to NATO authorities to specify. But I certainly can describe the
intent of the resolution that was involved.
QUESTION: Another thing - clearly in the last ten days there have been
violations of NATO's initial demands. Have you tallied them in any way? I
mean, do you have some overview of the extent to which the Serbs were not
complying? I don't mean just numbers, but police checkpoints, destroyed
villages, attacks and things like that.
MR. RUBIN: I'm sure that our monitors have recorded in their daily
reports what they've seen and what they know. We are describing to you a
general trend; we are not providing to you every specific piece of
information, good or bad, that we know. We're seeking to provide you a
snapshot of what we can assess as best we can assess it at a given
time.
Clearly, there's been major movement in the right direction. The message
that NATO has sent to President Milosevic has translated into substantial
changes for the people living on the ground - meaning police out, troops
out, displaced persons back into their villages and a better climate for
people to live in.
I do not have a tally for you of every good or bad action pursuant to the
resolution that has been provided.
QUESTION: There's an organization that calls itself the Society for
Threatened Peoples in Germany, which is a human rights group. They've done
a compilation, which I've got a copy of today, that says that up until
today the Serbs had 200 police or army checkpoints or positions out there.
I was just wondering, is that at all within the ball park of what's
happened?
MR. RUBIN: I would have to check with Mr. Byrnes on that. I can tell you
that he told me just a few minutes ago that there has been a major
reduction in checkpoints; particular checkpoints, he said, that were at a
place called Komorane, which had been one of the most well-known and
focused-on checkpoints is gone. The police units have pulled out of
Malesavo, where they had a number of checkpoints. Police stations are gone
from two villages at Dragobilje and Ostrozub - the police stations are gone
from those places; so presumably, their checkpoints are gone as well.
I cannot tell you how many total checkpoints they had. I have no way of
assessing the reliability of the information you've asked about.
QUESTION: A lot of that has probably happened today, then. Another point
that they mention is that in Baice, apparently there was an attack even
this morning at about 8:00 a.m. in which three houses were burned down.
Does that --
MR. RUBIN: That would be consistent with the information I'm providing
you. None of what I am saying to you is that the situation in Kosovo is
peachy keen. On the contrary, it remains tense. This is a crisis situation
for Kosovo and will remain so for a long time to come, until we are able to
get the parties to the negotiating table and resolve these political
conflicts as best we can.
QUESTION: In the phrase that you've been using for the past few weeks, is
the trigger still cocked?
MR. RUBIN: Well, NATO will be making a decision as how to describe the
current state of the authority to use military force; and I don't want to
prejudge that. Prior to its decision, of course, it is.
QUESTION: Any attempt to quantify the extent to which displaced people
have returned home?
MR. RUBIN: My understanding of those numbers is that there still remain
something like 30,000 people; although Mr. Byrnes said he's had trouble
getting enough resources to go in and count all of them. Something like 30,
000 is our best estimate who remain without shelter; 15,000 or so in the
recent weeks have returned home. Let me just see if I can find the specific
reference to that here.
It appears that only 20,000 to 25,000 internally displaced persons out of
an estimated 50,000 to 70,000 last month are still in the hills with little
or no shelter. The humanitarian workers and the observers and verifiers are
enjoying full and unfettered access to IDPs.
QUESTION: I thought those numbers were much higher in terms of numbers of
displaced.
MR. RUBIN: Well, you need to distinguish between displaced within Kosovo,
refugees outside to the other countries. The numbers go into the hundreds
of thousands when you talk about people displaced internally who were not
in the hills without shelter and when you talk about refugees in other
areas, other than Kosovo.
QUESTION: We had some information earlier about Malesavo -- that the
police had moved out of their checkpoints and out of their positions there.
That is or that was always a pretty much Albanian ethnic area, with almost
no Serbs living there. That's where the KLA set up its positions long ago
this year and basically took over. How do you avoid a recurrence of that
very thing - essentially another security force going in there, namely
the KLA?
MR. RUBIN: We would be surprised if the KLA didn't seek to move into
areas where the Serbs left. That's simply a reality of Kosovo; that's part
of the continuing crisis of Kosovo - that there are too many guns and too
many people willing to use those guns.
Let's bear in mind what we were trying to do here. Resolution 1199 was
designed to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe. In order to resolve the
problems of Kosovo, we need to get a political solution at the negotiating
table.
We have had very strong contacts with the Kosovar Liberation Army and made
very clear to them that they cannot use this opportunity to start the
fighting all over again. So far they have not interfered in the process of
Serbian withdrawal. The commanders of the UCK are encouraging IDPs to
return to their homes in areas being vacated by the Serbs.
We continue to have contact with UCK representatives and are pressing them
to maintain the cease-fire; to guarantee the safety of international
personnel; and to cooperate in efforts to gain Serbian compliance with
Resolution 1199. So we're very aware of the complexity and difficulty of
this situation. But again, we are trying to urge them in the strongest
possible terms not to take action that will redound to the great disadvantage
of their fellow Kosovars and also prevent the Serbs from leaving and put us
in a situation where there are provocations and violations and retaliations.
We're trying to avoid that. But we are quite - we're not sanguine about the
possibility that there will be such actions. But we are trying to minimize
them to the extent possible.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - hostile actions against the Serbs. Just simply
setting up checkpoints, taking over roads, closing off regions, which is
what they did essentially.
MR. RUBIN: Right, that would be inconsistent with -- they've made clear
to us in our contacts with monitors and diplomats and verifiers who are in
regular contact with the UCK, if that were to happen, humanitarian
organizations would not be able to do their jobs. So we are going to be
looking for freedom of movement for the verifiers, the humanitarian
organizations and others, and that means freedom of movement from
checkpoints by both sides.
QUESTION: Serb civilians were blocked from going from one town to another
by KLA checkpoints throughout the whole spring and summer.
MR. RUBIN: We want freedom of movement for the people of Kosovo, for the
humanitarian organizations and the verification units.
QUESTION: Just to clarify, do you mean you don't mind if the KLA assume
the functions of the local police as long as they don't, for example,
restrict the movements of people coming in and out --
MR. RUBIN: Well, it's not a question of what we mind or what we don't
mind. I'm trying to be realistic --
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - the reality that they will act as the local
police force --
MR. RUBIN: I didn't say local police. I think we accept the reality that
in the absence of the presence of Serbs, there are going to be the presence
of Albanians in some of these towns. But let's bear in mind, these towns
didn't have a security problem before. The security problem came about when
the Serbs came in and started marauding and slaughtering people. So they
don't need to be protected, nor were they able to protect the people
from that when it happened.
The protection is the deterrence provided by verification units in Kosovo
that will let the international community know if Milosevic reneges on the
direction he's been moving. So I think the people of Kosovo should
recognize that the UCK or the KLA wasn't able to protect them before from
what happened, and aren't going to be able to do so in the future. What we
need is a political solution so that an agreement can be struck where the
Kosovar Albanians are permitted to have their own police force as well as
their own institutions in the area of healthcare and education and
other aspects of self-government.
QUESTION: Another subject? About the Middle East, of course - has there
been filed either with Israel or with the CIA an action plan by the
Palestinians on arresting terrorists and all? Because an action plan - some
even call it a time table - was promised during the talks.
MR. RUBIN: Do we have the agreement here? My understanding is that the
agreement envisages that being done in the first week --
QUESTION: That's right.
MR. RUBIN: Today is Tuesday. I would not be in a position to answer the
question as to whether some discussions hadn't begun or not. But again, the
time frame is by Friday.
Secretary Albright has been in touch with Chairman Arafat yesterday; she
spoke to Foreign Minister Sharon earlier today. I would expect her to be in
touch with the Prime Minister during the course of the day to talk about
implementation and how we can be of assistance in facilitating implementation.
It will be hard for me to give you each day an update on what steps have
and haven't been taken; other than to tell you that would be required, I
believe, in the first seven days.
QUESTION: Maybe it's in the agreement, but is it supposed to go to Israel
- the plan, do you know?
MR. RUBIN: Whatever the agreement says on that, I'll have to check for
you.
QUESTION: Do you think you could take one more swing at me for - is it a
hard deadline, is it a goal? Is it you'd like to see it met but it may not
be practical? What's the current --
MR. RUBIN: Well, the goal is to get the permanent status talks started as
soon as possible -- pursuant to the agreement, they'll start ten days from
last Friday - and then to be of assistance, the United States will be of
assistance where we can to try to bring them towards agreement on these
excruciating issues that will require painstaking negotiations.
The President has committed to bring the parties together at the appropriate
time to see if we can be of assistance. I would expect the Secretary to be
involved in this; I would expect Ambassador Ross to be involved in this;
Aaron Miller, Martin Indyk, the other members of the Middle East peace
team. We'll have to see exactly when we play what role.
With respect to the completion, what we are looking for is the parties to
make a good faith effort to negotiate. I don't want to speculate on what
will happen if they're unable to finish the work, despite such a good faith
effort, by May 4.
QUESTION: But I mean, you are willing to say something, are you, about -
well, maybe I ought to rephrase the question. You have said something about
unilateral declarations of statehood. What if they don't meet the May 4
deadline. I know that's hypothetical; but it's also likely. If they don't
make the May 4 deadline, would Arafat then be free to make any kind of
declaration he feels like?
MR. RUBIN: As regards the possibility of a unilateral declaration of
statehood or other unilateral actions by either party outside the
negotiating process that prejudge or predetermine the outcome of those
negotiations, the United States opposes and will oppose any such unilateral
action.
QUESTION: Irrespective of May 4, or May 5 or May 3?
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: Speaking of assistance, in a more precise sense the President
mentioned that the United States would be willing to provide financial
assistance to both sides. Has this building or any other part of the
government begun putting together an estimate about how much money would be
involved eventually?
MR. RUBIN: Work is going on in that area; people are assessing it,
talking amongst themselves - perhaps some consultations with Israel and the
Palestinians. At the appropriate time, we would want to consult with
Congress about any such assistance. Clearly, it will be substantial. But I
don't think there is an American number at this point.
QUESTION: The Israelis were quoting a figure of something like $1 billion
to finance the further redeployments. Is that in the ball park?
MR. RUBIN: Clearly, this would be substantial, but we don't have an
American figure at this time. Clearly, the numbers are going to be
substantial, but I don't want to confirm or deny any particular figure
until we've developed one.
QUESTION: To go back to unilateral acts, I may have missed this, but I
haven't yet seen any clarification of whether you see the ban on unilateral
acts as covering Israeli settlement activity. It's really become a point of
dispute.
MR. RUBIN: We have made clear that unilateral actions, including in the
area you specified, that prejudge the outcome of the negotiations is
something the United States will oppose. The memorandum itself recognizes
the necessity of a positive atmosphere of the permanent status talks. Both
parties are aware of our view on this subject. So we've made quite clear,
whether it's a unilateral declaration or a unilateral action, when it
prejudges the outcome of what are expected to be very difficult permanent
status negotiations, we're opposed to any such measures.
QUESTION: When you say opposed, do you mean opposed beyond merely saying
that it's unhelpful as you've said in the past?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we're against them is what I mean.
QUESTION: Does that go further than saying they're unhelpful?
MR. RUBIN: You'll have to make your own judgment about that.
QUESTION: Could that have a - settlements, for example, supposing they
decide to risk your displeasure, would that have an impact on the financial
aid eventually to be turned over?
MR. RUBIN: Can we come up with a number first and then we'll worry about
what --
QUESTION: No, regardless of the number.
MR. RUBIN: I don't intend to make any new policy on that subject.
QUESTION: I understand that the US will oppose any unilateral action. The
question is whether the Israelis and the Palestinians promised the United
States that they will not do these unilateral actions.
MR. RUBIN: We've provided you a copy of the agreement; we've specified
publicly our interpretation of the agreement. Both sides are aware of our
views on these subjects. With respect to any private conversations we had
with either side, I don't intend to discuss them publicly.
QUESTION: Regarding the offer from a leader of the Taliban, Mr. Muttmayan
to have Mr. bin Laden tried or have his case reviewed in the Supreme Court
of Afghanistan, I take it is this a satisfactory step that the United
States would agree to provide some kind of information or evidence; or is
that too risky or what?
MR. RUBIN: We understand that the Taliban issued a decree on October 25
empowering their Supreme Court to accept evidence concerning Osama bin
Laden and review it within the framework of Islamic Shari'a law.
As we have stated previously, we prefer not to respond to a hypothetical
question, which we regard this to be at this time, regarding a possible
trial of Osama bin Laden. We believe that bin Laden should be brought
swiftly to justice for his crimes. We have made it clear to the Taliban on
several occasions that it must stop harboring terrorists such as Osama bin
Laden.
With respect to the US providing evidence, we consider that wildly
premature speculation at this point. With respect to any bill of indictment
in the United States of Osama bin Laden, that would have to be referred to
the Department of Justice.
QUESTION: So basically this Department is panning this offer from Mr.
Muttmayan at this point; is that correct? Saying no thanks?
MR. RUBIN: You can draw your own conclusions from what I just said.
QUESTION: Jamie, do you have anything on the VX gas report?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, on the VX let me say - and then I gather we're going back
to another subject or clarification with assistance of all those necessary?
According to the report UNSCOM delivered to the UN Security Council after
discussion in New York by 21 experts from seven countries on the results of
tests of Iraqi missile fragments, all tests in all countries are conclusive
and valid. The tests prove the existence of degradation products of the
following: VX; VX stabilizer; a nerve agent of either the G or V series of
chemical weapons; and an undeclared decontaminant which is most effective
against chemical weapons.
The experts agree that there is evidence that Iraq loaded nerve agents -
some of the most horrible weapons in the world - including VX into its
missile warheads. The experts unanimously concluded that the existence of
VX degradation products conflicts with Iraq's declaration. It is time for
Iraq to provide a full and accurate account of their weapons of mass
destruction -- particularly the deadly nerve agent, VX. The onus is on them
to reverse course, to fulfill their obligations and to give a true
accounting of its weapons of mass destruction programs and to resume
cooperation with UNSCOM and to allow inspections to continue.
In short, these findings make clear that Saddam Hussein did produce VX
weapons contrary to what he said; that he produce these most horrible
weapons, even though he said he didn't. It shows the urgency and necessity
of Iraq coming clean on what they built, what they have, so that the
international community can confirm disarmament of those provisions,
without which sanctions cannot be lifted.
QUESTION: Where do you see this going from here, Jamie?
MR. RUBIN: Well the Council is going to be reviewing these findings. I
would expect there to be further discussion on it. This can't but hurt
Iraq's case that somehow it's up to the international community not Iraq to
take the next step. We have made clear that in the absence of renewed
cooperation by Iraq with UNSCOM that we are not going to allow this
comprehensive review that they want to go forward; but with renewed
cooperation it can go forward.
QUESTION: Jamie, with this evidence that you say is conclusive and valid -
or that all tests were conclusive and valid, is it your impression or your
view that Saddam Hussein's Iraq poses a greater or same danger to the
region or to the world?
MR. RUBIN: We had no doubt that he had produced such weaponry; it was
just he was the only one that said it wasn't so. So it's not changed our
view of the danger of Saddam Hussein.
QUESTION: And that view is that --
MR. RUBIN: That until Iraq is disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction,
until Iraq complies with international Security Council resolutions that
demonstrate its peaceful intentions, that sanctions must remain on
indefinitely because he is a threat to the region and a threat to the
world.
QUESTION: The focus has been on (inaudible) assurances to Israel. The
Internet has a letter that Secretary Albright purportedly gave or wrote to
Prime Minister Netanyahu. I wondered, are there assurances to the
Palestinians in print, too? Are there written assurances to the Palestinians?
And will these letters - or letter -- be made public and given an official
government stamp of veracity?
MR. RUBIN: Certainly I am not going to be in a position of responding to
every piece of information that appears on the Internet or any other
source. We are providing you the information that we have decided to
provide, pursuant to the Wye River negotiation. I will try to answer your
questions as best as I can on American positions. If there are private
exchanges, they are designed to stay private; and therefore, they wouldn't
be provided to the public.
QUESTION: I'll try to break this down. Have there been letters of
assurances --
MR. RUBIN: I will try to get an answer for you on what private assurances
exist - either topics or a number -- for the record. But I don't have any
ability to answer your question right now.
QUESTION: If they are private, which is another way of saying secret,
that sort of amends the notion that everything transacted at - I almost
said Camp David - at the Wye would be made public.
MR. RUBIN: I don't remember anybody ever saying that.
QUESTION: Well, all right, I don't want to get into it. (Inaudible) -
Kosovo and time is running. I mean, I thought that what we heard -- there
will be an agreement, there will be letters, there will be understandings,
et cetera, et cetera - all would be a package and sort of implicit in that
is that's what we're doing and it's no secret --
MR. RUBIN: -- to each other and there may be letters that are exchanged
that aren't public. Governments are allowed to have private communications
with each other.
QUESTION: Are they part of the agreement?
MR. RUBIN: I don't understand.
QUESTION: Well, are they a part of the agreement complex? In other words,
do they support the published part of the Wye agreement?
MR. RUBIN: We certainly wouldn't say anything privately that was
inconsistent with the agreement publicly.
QUESTION: Well, it could be irrelevant?
MR. RUBIN: Sorry?
QUESTION: Letters could be irrelevant to the agreement itself. I'm asking
a simple question: do they support the agreement?
MR. RUBIN: They're consistent with them; I don't know how to state it any
more than that.
QUESTION: Anyhow, if you do hear, at least the fact, if you can tell us
whether there are assurances to the Palestinians, because --
MR. RUBIN: I'll try to get an answer. I'm sure that they'll be published
all over the place, but that doesn't mean we'll necessary want to comment
on them.
QUESTION: Well, they're a little less inclined to find reporters to tell
things to than the Israelis are. So the letter from Albright --
MR. RUBIN: I haven't found that.
QUESTION: Well, it's pretty true. By the way, their press office was
never occupied throughout all the nine days. It was an interesting
situation. But Albright-Netanyahu letter is getting circulated --
MR. RUBIN: I have no comment on it.
QUESTION: I'm not asking you to comment. I'm asking you if you could tell
us at least, if not now, is there an assurance to the Palestinians as
well?
QUESTION: Jamie, I don't know if you've answered this in the past about -
is the CIA determinations on compliance, is that going to be made public
during the course of the 12 weeks? Who's done what --
MR. RUBIN: There are no limits to your appetites. No, I would expect
not.
QUESTION: Do you have anything on the state of the --
MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry, let me amend the answer in the following way. There
has been a misperception that I think Mr. Tenet sought to clarify in
today's newspaper. The CIA doesn't make judgments; the CIA provides
information and facilitates cooperation - provides the facts and the
information and reports to the State Department and other agencies of the
government for judgments to be made about compliance with the agreements
and making political judgments.
So there's been a slight misperception on that. But the information that's
provided by our experts has never been provided publicly before. I wouldn't
expect it to be now.
QUESTION: Forget them making it public. The question, which you had to
wrestle with yesterday and which Congress is making an issue of - and we
both know they've always had a role, so we don't have to go over that
again. This agreement is bottomed on the notion that the CIA will have an
enlarged verification role. The CIA, hey, Israel, you can do this stuff
because the CIA's going to be on the job making sure this stuff is done.
Now, whether they make the judgment or provide the information for
someone else to make the judgment, you're not disputing the CIA will
be far more active than it ever has been in the past.
MR. RUBIN: I would point you to the article and the view of Mr. Tenet, as
this is fully consistent with things it's done before. Experts will
obviously play a role in fighting terrorism; that's a greater and greater
priority for the United States - that is, fighting terrorism and particularly
in this region. So I would expect there to be more activity to fight
terrorism.
QUESTION: Do you have anything on the state of President Yeltsin's
health?
QUESTION: In this discussion of letters that have been sent, some of
which are being revealed, you didn't seem to want to exclude the possibility
that there are secret assurances contained in letters. Now, I don't suppose
you just want to let that impression sit out there, do you?
MR. RUBIN: If I look back at the transcript about the letters, I'll have
no clue what you said or what I said. All I'm telling you is, I'm not
commenting on any letters.
QUESTION: My question is, are there secret assurances in letters? Can you
tell us --
MR. RUBIN: If they were secret, I wouldn't want to comment on them.
QUESTION: So there could be secret assurances in letters?
MR. RUBIN: We can go back and forth and it will end up with me saying, no
comment. But if you'd like to continue, that would be fine with me.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: I don't want to comment on the question of private communications.
QUESTION: No, but in the past, government spokesmen have been able to
tell you what they said or they say we can assure you what you see is what
there is - there are no secret assurances to the parties.
QUESTION: There were letters of assurances after the Hebron agreement,
and we're in the same position today as we were then, which is that the
Israeli one leaked within five minutes and the Palestinian one, until this
day, is unknown.
MR. RUBIN: Well, some countries or some entities have different
approaches to their dealings with the media. I don't know whether that
applies in this case or it doesn't apply. What I know is that I am not now
in a position to tell you what private assurances were made, what subjects
were dealt with, whether there were secret assurances. I'm just not going
to address the question in any meaningful way.
QUESTION: Well, you can still pick from a variety of other options. I
mean, this didn't begin with Hebron; it began in 1973.
MR. RUBIN: Do you enjoy this?
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: No, I don't enjoy this, but I'm waiting --
MR. RUBIN: Because I don't; I definitely don't.
QUESTION: No, I'm waiting - it's all right, it will be the last from me
anyhow. But I'm waiting for the familiar, and if I don't hear it then I
know I haven't heard it; so I've got to ask the question.
MR. RUBIN: I'm trying to provide no meaningful information on this
question.
QUESTION: You're doing very well so far.
(Laughter.)
But I'm waiting for the familiar statement that nothing was told to one
party that wasn't told to the other party. And if you can't say that,
that's significant; because if there are secret agreements or if you're not
going to reveal whether there are, then the next question is, did one side
hear things that the other side didn't?
MR. RUBIN: I will take this elaborate exchange and I will read through it
and try to ascertain what questions in it I will approach the authorities
with, and try to get you answers best I can.
QUESTION: Fair enough.
MR. RUBIN: But maybe afterwards we can decide more specifically what the
questions are that are likely to yield answers - other than what is our
secret assurance to one country or another or another entity.
QUESTION: Do you have anything on the state of the health of President
Yeltsin?
MR. RUBIN: With respect to President Yeltsin, let me say that on October
26 President Yeltsin canceled a planned trip to Austria for health reasons.
President Yeltsin's spokesman said that doctors advised against travel and
that the Russian President needs more time to recover from bronchitis which
allowed asthenia to develop.
We understand President Yeltsin is now in a Moscow sanitarium. We wish
President Yeltsin a speedy recovery. Prime Minister Primakov has a full
mandate to move forward on an economic policy. We do not believe, therefore,
this development will or should get in the way of the economic decisions
that are going on there to put Russia back on a firmer financial footing.
President Yeltsin remains Russia's popularly-elected president. We will
continue to work with him on that basis.
QUESTION: On another subject, the Secretary is seeing the Spanish Foreign
Minister today. Does that involve the Pinochet business?
MR. RUBIN: They will discuss topics of concern, primarily Kosovo and the
situation in the Balkans. I would be surprised if it didn't come up in some
way, but in our view, Pinochet's extradition is a legal matter for Spain,
the United Kingdom and Chile to resolve.
QUESTION: Is the United States ready or planning to investigate the
assassination of American citizens during Pinochet's regime?
MR. RUBIN: I indicated yesterday that we have provided information to -
there has been contact and cooperation between the Spanish judges
investigating General Pinochet and the US Department of Justice for over
one year, pursuant to a 1990 US-Spanish Legal Assistance Treaty, in
connection with their investigation of General Pinochet. The Justice
Department is the designated central authority of the United States under
the treaty. Any questions you have about what we may be doing should be
directed at the Justice Department.
QUESTION: Can I ask a question? Do you have any comment on the upcoming
visit of the President of Colombia?
MR. RUBIN: With respect to the visit of President Pastrana, let me say
that this is a state visit and questions should naturally be directed
toward the White House. But let me say that we see this as a strengthening
of our relations with Colombia. This is the first state visit of a
Colombian president to the US since 1975.
Since President Pastrana's electoral victory this June, we have discussed a
broad range of subjects with him, including the combating of narcotics
trafficking, the protection of human rights, Colombia's peace process and
economic development. We are sure that these issues will continue to be
discussed in the visit.
QUESTION: Maybe you don't have anything on this. The Turkish Government
has announced restrictions on oil tanker traffic through the Bosporus --
MR. RUBIN: I gave a lot of information on that yesterday.
QUESTION: Oh, you did.
MR. RUBIN: And I'll get you the transcript for that.
QUESTION: Jamie, with regard to Burma, apparently sometime in the past
couple of days there was a meeting in Chilton, England, among certain US
ambassadors to discuss our strategy toward Burma. I was wondering whether
you could comment - is there any new policy toward Burma emerging from
that? Have we made any approaches toward the SPDC?
MR. RUBIN: Well, with respect to Burma, I know it's something that
Secretary Albright feels very strongly about and worked very hard on in her
last trip to Asia and in New York when issues arose with respect to Aung
San Sui Kyi and the restrictions she was facing.
As you know, the European Union just announced a decision to continue their
present sanctions and to widen their visa ban to encompass transit visas
and to cover senior Burmese officials in the tourism section. The US and
the EU have similar policies, including banning the issuance of visas to
senior officials.
What I can say is that we are certainly looking for ways to step up the
pressure - have been doing so for some time. But I have no specific new
program of action to offer you.
QUESTION: Can you give us any more about the Arab reaction to your
appeals that they engage in the peace process?
MR. RUBIN: The Secretary strongly believes that the Arab-Israeli peace
process is not a spectator sport. It is important that all those who
support the peace process, especially those in the region, do their part
for peace and not remain on the sidelines.
The Wye River memorandum marks an important breakthrough in the peace
process. Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu have taken considerable
risks for peace and they need our support. Implementing this memorandum
will require the help of all states in the Middle East. We ask that our
friends and allies in the region now come forward to support this process
and help us in our ongoing efforts to reach a comprehensive peace.
What we are looking for, in the first instance, we expect the Arabs to lend
their political and financial support to the Palestinians, who obviously
need to see a greater and greater peace dividend if the peace process is to
stay strong.
We also believe that Arab re-engagement in the normalization process with
Israel would lend vital support to the Israelis and the Palestinians as
they carry out this agreement. This is extremely important - that the
Israelis see greater and greater engagement with their Arab neighbors as
they make the tough decisions for peace.
With respect to various comments that some countries have adopted as
skeptical or a wait-and-see attitude, clearly we have concerns in this
area. We intend to work closely to promote greater and greater support from
Arab countries for the steps that I outlined.
But as we move ahead, we look forward to the cooperation of our friends and
allies such as Egypt, in helping to mobilize the political and financial
support necessary to make this process a success.
So in short, there's a lot of work to do; a lot of people have a lot of
work to do. There are steps the Arabs can take to increase normalization
with Israel, increase support for the Palestinians that will redound to the
advantage of all the peoples of the Middle East peace. Everyone needs to
get off the sidelines, get into the game and do their part.
QUESTION: When you refer to wait-and-see attitude, were you referring to
before you started this initiative or since you started this initiative?
MR. RUBIN: We are aware that the current public posture of some of the
countries is a wait-and-see posture. We are trying to move quickly to move
forward on these steps that I described to you. Secretary Albright will be
in touch with her counterparts and other diplomats will be in touch with
their counterparts to try to push on this front.
I don't have any new actions -- this just started a few hours ago - to
report to you.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:35 P.M.)
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