U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #116, 98-10-26

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U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Monday, October 26, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

STATEMENTS
1		A/S for African Affairs Susan Rice Travel to Africa
SERBIA (Kosovo)
1		North Atlantic Council Ambassadors to Meet Tomorrow
1,2,4,6		Assessment of Compliance by President Milosevic/NATO Action
1,4		Pledges for Verification/Monitoring Missions
1		Number of Internally Displaced Persons returning Home
1-2,3		Numbers of Police in Kosovo
2,3		Advice to Americans and Others on the Ground in Kosovo
4-5		Shooting During Funeral in Kosovo
5-6		Activities/Purpose of Observers
8		Secretary Albright's Calls to Several Foreign Ministers re
		  Kosovo
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
7-8,11-12	Permanent Status Talks/Wye Memorandum/Timeline
8		Violence in the Region
9-10		US View Regarding Unilateral Actions
12-14		Security Issues/CIA Role
14-15		The Issue of and the Publication of A Map
18-19		Costs Associated with the Wye Conference
TURKEY
15		Turkish Government Request for Extradition of PKK Leader
LIBYA
15-17		Secretary Albright's Meeting with the Pan Am 103 Families
CASPIAN SEA
17		Caspian Pipeline Consortium / USG Meetings / Negotiations /
		  Concerns
17		Ambassador Morningstar's Visit to Ankara
CHILE/SPAIN
17-18		Documentation Requests Regarding General Pinochet
CUBA
18		Visit to US by Orlando Hernandez Family

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #116

MONDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1998, 12:45 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. Today is Monday.

I have one statement on Susan Rice's trip to Africa-that is Assistant Secretary Susan Rice -- that we will post after the briefing. With that let's us go to your questions.

QUESTION: Jamie, the Kosovo deadline -- can you address that situation?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, as I understand what is going on now is that the North Atlantic Council ambassadors have been meeting today; I expect them to be meeting tomorrow. Clearly, the credibility of NATO's threat to use force and its preparedness to do so continues. As a result of meetings yesterday with General Clark and others from NATO--General Naumann--we've made quite clear what is required. We're looking to see a clear intention and very substantial compliance by President Milosevic.

There has been a lot of movement on the ground -- some in the right direction. But given the nature of the deployments and the difficulty of giving you a precise snapshot, all I can say is that we are going to be watching this extremely closely. It's an extremely import and urgent matter, and in the next 24 hours or so we will know what the conclusion of NATO is on is subject. So we are going to monitor it as closely as we can with the addition now of a combination of air verification and ground verification that is gradually getting up to speed.

In that regard, let me tell you that there are now pledges for 1,500 persons for the verification mission on the ground. The monitoring missions there now have received full and unfettered access to internally displaced persons. The humanitarian workers continue to be able to do their job. There continues to be a trickle, and we hope will grow, of internally displaced persons returning to their homes. What has been the focus in recent days is the police. There were police in Kosovo, and we don't expect all police to leave Kosovo but what we can have -that is, there were police in Kosovo prior to this crisis. What we can't have is the police there performing in the way they performed during the worst periods, where their very presence and their specific actions make it unwise in the extreme for people to return to their homes. So we are trying to focus on that issue which is the way to ensure that this humanitarian crisis does not materialize into a catastrophe.

As far as what NATO will do, General Clark has the authority to act and all I can say as to whether he will act is that we are going to be watching this very, very carefully in the next 24 hours.

QUESTION: This business about the police what you say is to be the critical issue at the moment? Are you insisting on numerical precision -- that they get back to the precise number of police? Is there some leeway? And in a larger sense, how much do you factor in - frankly, I've got to say, at this late date - it's been a long time since he talked to Holbrooke -- the logistics of on the ground, of moving people? Is this part of the problem? Have we passed the point where you can really just count heads and say, that's it and you fallen short?

MR. RUBIN: Let me answer the first and let's go back at the second, because it escaped me ever so slightly.

On the first question, what we're looking for is to have those police that were not in Kosovo prior to this crisis leave; and those that are there not be marauding across Kosovo, shooting and killing and maiming innocent people and creating an environment that is impossible for the people to return to their homes or certainly unwise in the extreme to do so.

That is what the Security Council resolution lays down in a more general way of speaking about this.

With respect to your second question, maybe you could try it again.

QUESTION: Sure. How much of a factor - is it negligible now - is logistical difficulty? If you appraise their part - the Serb's part - are you appraising their compliance or non-compliance?

MR. RUBIN: I don't think it will turn out to be a question of logistics. It's going to turn out to be a question of intent and action, not logistics.

NATO will be reviewing very carefully this subject in the next coming hours today and throughout tomorrow to make clear that we are ready to act, we're prepared to act and that General Clark has the authority to act, and be evaluating and reviewing the information we get from this combination of air verification, ground verification and our own assessments and the discussions that President Milosevic had with the two generals yesterday.

QUESTION: Are you asking American citizens to stay out of Kosovo for the time being?

MR. RUBIN: Our standing action, as I understand it, is we've drawn down the embassy; we have a standing order about the dangers of going there and that hasn't been revoked. But there's no new order.

QUESTION: The humanitarian workers you're encouraging to stay there I take it.

MR. RUBIN: Well, they are making their own decisions. They are being able to do their work better in recent days. As I indicated, it's our understanding that the humanitarian workers did have unimpeded access to the displaced persons they're trying to help. We want them to be able to do that.

QUESTION: Obviously there's a danger that in a couple weeks or a month down the road, some of these police units that are pulling out or that do pull out could come back. How long - is there a limit to the effects that this strategy of possible use of force, threatened use of force can have? I mean, at some point is it no longer an effective way to conduct diplomacy with Milosevic?

MR. RUBIN: On the contrary, we believe that it was the very real prospect of force being used against President Milosevic that led him to make an unprecedented set of concessions on Kosovo.

Remember what we're dealing with, now. We're dealing with a place that President Milosevic used to say was his own province, his own problem, his own issue and everyone else should just stay out. Now we're in a situation where thousands of people are in there on the ground, there are humanitarian capacity and diplomatic observers. Planes and un-manned vehicles are flying over that territory regularly, and major concessions were made on the political front where he accepted the idea of greater self-government for the people of Kosovo, including their own police force.

These are the steps that President Milosevic took under the pressure of the very real possibility of force being used. It is our intention to keep the pressure on, because we don't want to be in a position where the movements become show movements and then they're returned; or the change in practices of the police are for show or to get past a certain deadline. We have a lot of experience with this man; we know how he tries to maneuver; and we are going to keep the pressure on.

QUESTION: But doesn't it get more difficult each time?

MR. RUBIN: No.

QUESTION: Given that you may have an extra 1,500 or 2,000 observers on the ground, just as one example.

MR. RUBIN: I've heard this argument, and some of your colleagues., and I have talked about it here in the briefing room; and I expect that we will continue to do so. But our view of it is that we are very concerned about the security of the humanitarian workers as well as the safety of diplomatic observers.

I don't want to prejudge what we're going to do tomorrow or what might follow. Let me just say we keep American and other officials advised on safety factors. We issue travel warnings; we update them frequently. The safety of these official and non-official Americans is of paramount interest to the United States. But it's not going to hinder us if the decision is made that President Milosevic is not in compliance. We are going to operate with the knowledge of what transpired in Bosnia and the attempts made to use international officials as hostages. We are going to do our level best to avoid that situation.

QUESTION: Of the 1,500 pledges that you received, does that include Americans?

MR. RUBIN: I would think so, yes.

QUESTION: And how many of those are Americans?

MR. RUBIN: I will see whether I could get you a number; but I think it's a significant number. As I understand it, the American Ambassador Walker has been accepted as the head of the mission. Americans will be a significant part of this operation.

QUESTION: Jamie, are you willing to say whether a percentage for their compliance to date - 60 percent, 70 percent, 50 percent?

MR. RUBIN: Right, what I think I'd prefer to do - given the difficulty of making such a snapshot - is say that there's a lot of dust in the air. There's a lot of movement, and we're going to wait until it settles and make a judgment tomorrow.

QUESTION: On that same point, you mentioned earlier that there were show movements and you were alert to that occurring.

MR. RUBIN: The pattern and the history exists.

QUESTION: And to what extent would you say the movement of the last ten days - up until, let's say, this weekend - have been show movements?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't want to decide what each particular movement has been. But I can certainly say the trend had been in the right direction - that forces did leave. We identified specific units that did leave, that left Kosovo. That wasn't show; that was real. We identified the fact that the Serb authorities are continuing to maintain, relatively speaking, a cease-fire. We talked about the change in the willingness of internally displaced persons to go back to their homes, which is partially a function of the behavior of the police.

So there was real compliance, and it was significant enough to extend the Activation Order until tomorrow night. As far as what will happen today as a result of the meeting that General Clark had and General Naumann had and what this movement of the last 24 hours is, I don't want to make a judgment as to whether it's for show or for real until others are prepared to do so tomorrow - make that judgment.

QUESTION: On the issue of the cease-fire, I wonder if you could address the event yesterday that was very widely reported, where a family was burying a child that had been killed the day before and the US observer refused to shield the family when they came under attack - both the attack itself and also the behavior of the US person.

MR. RUBIN: Well, the attack is obviously condemnable. Shooting people during a funeral is outrageous in the extreme.

With respect to the activities of the observers, let me first say that these are unarmed people and they are taking great risk on their own for being in these places to try to advance the interests of the West, the United States, as well as the people of Kosovo. So they're not armed observers; they are unarmed observers. So let's make that the first point.

With respect to what did and didn't happen on the ground at that particular event, I know there are people in the field who are authorized to talk to you or your colleagues about the specific incident, and I would prefer to leave the details of that to them, because I do not know the details other than what I read in the newspaper.

QUESTION: Can we establish that observers are not there to protect people? And could you consider the notion that distraught and - well, more than distraught - (inaudible) - people would look to outsiders for help? Might they make a mistake and think those observers are there to help them?

MR. RUBIN: Well, the verifiers are there to help them in the following way. Clearly, the presence of the international community there helps deter violations by the Serbs of the agreements that they've laid down; and so that is for their help. The more deterred the Serbs are by the presence of these verifiers, the less danger the people of Kosovo are going to be in.

But with respect to the specific mission of these people, I certainly wanted to point out that they are unarmed. Obviously, they are there to verify and observe on what's going on. But I'd rather have the people on the ground who have the information that can draw generalizations from this incident make those in the field.

QUESTION: There are some policy implications there, one of which is the whole appearance which occurred in Bosnia all the time of standing by and watching atrocities. Then there's the second, which is, how do they follow up? Is there some instruction that's gone out from here or that will go out from here on how to deal with cases like this, which are going to happen --

MR. RUBIN: Yes, the observers on the ground are in touch with their respective governments. The respective governments are going to be working through several channels to try to develop credible information about what transpires on the ground, to what extent it's a violation and to what extent that violation requires action through the means specified.

With respect to your point, I think one could just as easily flip it around - that is, to the extent that the UNPROFOR soldiers were there to protect, they found themselves in positions to be held hostage.

QUESTION: Jamie, is that what you're saying could happen to these observers as well?

MR. RUBIN: I'm just - we're into a debate here. You're using references into the past to make certain points. I would just say the obverse is equally as true.

QUESTION: But the broader question is how do you avoid them coming into this situation, and how do you avoid --

MR. RUBIN: Who's them?

QUESTION: The observers, because now you're going to have thousands of them. And how do you actually arrange that this doesn't happen?

MR. RUBIN: Well, first of all, we are not in a position to dictate that every event that happens on the ground doesn't happen. We are not all- powerful, all omnipresent or omniscient.

QUESTION: Just a clarification - as you say, General Clark has the authority, up until midnight tomorrow to act. But are you nevertheless saying that the decision on whether Milosevic has complied is the Council's to make or is it his alone to make or how will he make that judgment?

MR. RUBIN: He has the authority to act, unless the Council changes that authority. So in the real world - I understand the motivation of the question, and it's a good one. In the practical world, what will happen is tomorrow Council members - that is the North Atlantic Council members - will be reviewing and evaluating information they get.

If they don't change his instructions, he's in a position to act. So what I would expect to happen is them to be discussing whether the political authority provided to him will be adjusted depending on events as existent at the time they make that decision.

In any case, our view is that the military pressure has worked to create unprecedented concessions on the part of Milosevic in terms of allowing international observers, internationalization and new guidelines to his negotiators on Kosovo.

This is a man who said Kosovo is his own province to do whatever he wants with, and now it has been internationalized in the clearest sense of the term, including with people on the ground, people in the air and this very real prospect of the use of force, as well as the concessions he's made on the political side.

But regardless of what happens on compliance, this crisis is not over. This crisis is a political crisis, generated by the repression Milosevic has caused in the region for the last ten years - in this region of Kosovo - and will only be resolved in the long term so that each of the problems that are identified, whether it's civil strife, whether it's shootings by policemen, whether it's sniper fire, all of these issues can only be resolved in the long term politically.

QUESTION: On the political issue, though, you were earlier mentioning that Milosevic has made a major concession toward greater self-government. But you did not use the word "autonomy" and certainly not "enhanced autonomy." I'm just wondering, what is the - there's a spectrum there and it seems he's coming on the lower end of the spectrum.

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't see it that way.

QUESTION: Well, maybe you could explain - what is the --

MR. RUBIN: I'll try to get you the official legal distinctions between greater self-government and autonomy. Those are two words that don't necessarily have a different meaning; they intersect.

QUESTION: Well, are you saying, then, that he has authorized the return to the autonomy that he lifted --

MR. RUBIN: I don't have any new words to offer you on this issue. I'm describing the statements that he made about greater self-government for the people of Kosovo and the police that were announced a week ago. I'm merely including them in the list of reasons why we think, in response to the question, that military pressure has helped advance the West's interests and the interests of the people of Kosovo in this area.

With respect to your question of what the outcome will be -- how much greater self-government the people of Kosovo will get -- that's what will be discussed at the negotiating table.

QUESTION: Did you already discuss the reports of compliance of the progress?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, we did all that that.

QUESTION: We did all that already - confirmed that some of that has been done?

MR. RUBIN: I did the best I could on that.

QUESTION: I yield to Charlie.

MR. RUBIN: Thank you.

QUESTION: Jamie, on a subject we haven't touched on in at least 30 minutes -- the Middle East peace talks -- can you talk about final status talks and where and when they might begin and which US representative might be there, if any?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, on the subject of the permanent status talks, with Friday being day one -- day zero -- they are scheduled to begin ten days from that pursuant to the memorandum, which I know you all studied very carefully this weekend. So my expectation is that these will be at a lower level. That will be up to the parties to decide.

Our involvement will be only pursuant to the desire of the parties to have Americans involved. We do expect to be involved - including, in particular, the President's involvement in getting leaders together as indicated by statements that he made, I believe, at the signing ceremony; and the Secretary will surely be involved in this. But in the initial stage we would expect it to be at a lower level and then at the appropriate time, others brought forward to try to assist.

QUESTION: Will the medium-level American be involved with the lower-level job?

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't think that would be necessary the first time out.

QUESTION: Do you know where this will be?

MR. RUBIN: I'll try to get that for you, but since the goal is for it to be their bilateral discussion without the United States necessarily involved, I may not be able to be the first to tell you where it will happen.

QUESTION: In anybody's mind -- the US or Israel's, I guess most likely -- is this the start of this conditional on any action on the ground pursuant to the Wye agreements?

MR. RUBIN: Well the Wye agreements spell out a very clear time line; and I can certainly point to that time line for you, which I know well.

Upon entry in to force, the committee on the third further redeployment starts; the Palestinian security work plan is shared with the United States; full bilateral security cooperation occurs; trilateral security cooperation occurs; the interim committees resume an accelerated permanent status negotiations start. Those are all things that have to happen prior to a week two.

QUESTION: All right. Now, of course, the situation on the ground today -- a couple of people have gotten killed already. Mr. Netanyahu is having his hands full. Do you have any observations on either of those situations?

MR. RUBIN: With respect to the killings, let me say the United States condemns this kind of extremist violence in the strongest possible terms. As the President and the Secretary have indicated, the extremists will always try to take the opportunity to destroy the process that has been created, and will try to make it harder for the leaders to go forward with the tough decisions that they have now made and implement those tough decisions.

With respect to Prime Minister Netanyahu, I would be reluctant to make too many comments about his domestic political situation; other to say that Secretary Albright has been on the phone with him over the weekend.

Just let me throw in for the last subject just what I can remember - I know she spoke to several foreign ministers over the weekend on Kosovo, including Foreign Minister Cook, Foreign Minister Vedrine -- I'll get you the rest of the names. But there are least those two - and I believe there were four or five called.

We have confidence that Prime Minister Netanyahu, having taken the tough and courageous decisions that he has taken, will be able to secure agreement from his cabinet and his government for this important step forward for all the peoples in the Middle East.

QUESTION: Are you comfortable going down this road - the road is charted already - with the Netanyahu Government?

MR. RUBIN: Sorry?

QUESTION: Are you comfortable going down the rest of the road or as far as you can go before the road detours with the Netanyahu Government?

MR. RUBIN: You could work as one of our speechwriters when you use the road metaphor a lot.

QUESTION: You'll notice I didn't say, the window is closing or something.

MR. RUBIN: We have been working very closely with Prime Minister Netanyahu's Government. And as we had hoped and has become clear, he has shown the courage and the skill and the effectiveness to put forward an agreement and to sign that agreement. We're going to continue to work with the Israeli Government, and we look forward to continuing to work with him to implement the agreement that we negotiated so painstakingly during those many, many hours, days and nights at the Wye River Conference Center.

QUESTION: Jamie, there's a clause on discouraging unilateral actions. Does that include a time-out on settlements?

MR. RUBIN: With respect to that issue, let me try to handle it in two ways. First, as regards the possibility of a unilateral declaration of statehood or other unilateral actions by either party outside the negotiating process that prejudge or predetermine the outcome of those negotiations, the US opposes and will oppose any such unilateral actions.

Indeed, the US has maintained for many years that an acceptable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be found through negotiations, not through unilateral actions. As we look to the future, that will remain our policy. For the present, we are doing all we can to promote permanent status negotiations on an accelerated basis, and we are stressing that those who believe that they can declare unilateral positions or take unilateral acts when the interim period ends are courting disaster.

QUESTION: Specifically, do the further expansion or new settlements come under the heading of unilateral actions?

MR. RUBIN: I think we've stated quite clearly there are unilateral actions in the area you've described that we have expressed concern about, and concern that they will disrupt and harm the prospects for implementing this agreement, the environment under which this agreement has been negotiated, as well as the prospects for permanent status talks. That is our view on these various issues that you've been asking me about for many months. That has not changed.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. RUBIN: Let me finish, please. More broadly - and not with respect to your specific question, but with respect to unilateral actions in general as well as the actions that Barry asked me about - let me make the following point. One of the reasons why any unilateral action, any unilateral statement by either side was so dangerous was because there was a complete and utter breakdown in confidence and trust between the parties for 18 months.

We believe that at a minimum what has occurred at the Wye River negotiating session is there has been greater trust and confidence created - so much trust and confidence that the two leaders came to the White House, signed an agreement and intend to work together to try, as partners in their own words, to try to advance the interests of both of their peoples.

The point being that we can certainly hope that with this new found trust, this new found confidence, that some of the relatively small issues that could blow up into full-scale explosions that would destroy the peace process may not do so and may be able to be overcome as a result of the new trust and confidence that has been created.

That is a general point and not designed to reflect specifically on the subject you raised. It's designed to reflect on the subject Barry raised and the subject that you raised.

QUESTION: In the document that was signed by Netanyahu and Arafat, is it understood - as far as the United States is concerned, is it understood by the signatories that unilateral actions include expansion or building of new settlements?

MR. RUBIN: With respect to that issue, I think both sides are fully familiar with the positions of the United States throughout the last years. That issue you mentioned has been part of our view on the subject of unilateral actions. They are fully familiar with our view on it, and they don't have any reason to think we have changed our view on it.

QUESTION: But in signing it, do they accept the US view?

MR. RUBIN: All I can tell you is what our view is. They will have to speak to what their intentions are in that regard. I've stated quite clearly our view on unilateral declarations of statehood or other unilateral actions by either party.

QUESTION: Can I try and change the pace? Could you shed any light, if you can, on the situation of El Duque - the Hernandez family?

MR. RUBIN: Let's stay on this for a minute.

QUESTION: There was a problem after Camp David - I hate to make another historical reference. But the issue of settlements came up immediately, and President Carter did not engage in an immediate way to prevent it from happening. How do you hope to avoid that same thing recurring now, when you know that you're in the final status talks and this really matters?

MR. RUBIN: The view that I stated - and I just stated it very carefully, and I would look at the language that I used - is a view that both parties understand. It is a view that we hold both publicly and privately. We will act on that view, just as we will act on our view with respect to the third phase of the further redeployment or any other subject.

QUESTION: When you say you will act on that view, can you elaborate?

MR. RUBIN: No - that we will talk to the parties to try to encourage and explain the dangers of one course of action and talk to the parties about the benefits and advantages of a different course of action. That's where we are.

QUESTION: Would you inform a party that it is in violation, then, of that Article V publicly or how do you --

MR. RUBIN: Well, I think I would urge you to read Article V very carefully. What it says is something that I suspect others will interpret in different ways. But it is our view that we want to create the most positive possible environment for the implementation of this agreement and the negotiation of the permanent status talks.

QUESTION: But you're speaking; that's not what it says.

MR. RUBIN: Right. I mean, I think what it says is pretty clear.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

QUESTION: As I understand what you're saying now on the third further redeployment, those talks in a subcommittee or a committee will begin also in ten days and it will be parallel and simultaneous with the final status talks; is that right?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. Let me state very clearly, what the agreement states is there would be a committee to - let me get the words just right, because obviously it's important to both sides that the words are just right on something like this. It says with regard to the terms of the interim agreement and of Secretary Christopher's letter to the two sides relating to the further redeployment process, there will be a committee to address this question. The United States will be briefed regularly.

According to the time line, the third further redeployment committee will start during the initial phase after entry into force. But remember, the agreement doesn't go into force immediately; there's a delay about the agreement going into force. I believe it's two weeks. I will check my document on that.

Let me please finish. But on the third further redeployment, during the discussions leading to this agreement, the US made clear to both parties that it will not adopt any position or express any view about the size or the content of the third phase of Israel's further redeployments, which is an Israeli responsibility to implement rather than negotiate.

Under the terms of the memorandum, and Israeli-Palestinian committee is being established. Nonetheless, we urge the parties not to be distracted from the urgent task of negotiating permanent status arrangements, which are at the heart of the matter and which will determine the future of the area. Our own efforts have been and will continue to be dedicated to that vital task.

QUESTION: You will be briefed -- the US will not be, hopefully, offering their own notion of - you're reading Oslo, really, back to us. But it didn't stop you all from telling Israel precisely how much land you wanted them to give --

MR. RUBIN: I thought you might ask me that question, so I prepared an answer.

QUESTION: No, I know quite a bit about this, fortunately or unfortunately. Israel won that argument: you're not in the committee; you're being briefed by the committee. You read Oslo to us just now. I want to know how soon --

MR. RUBIN: Can I answer the question? I didn't just read Oslo.

QUESTION: -- how soon Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk will jump in and tell Israel how much land to give up. Will they never participate in the talks? It's a serious question.

MR. RUBIN: It is a serious question, so I'm going to try to answer it; and I hope you'll listen to my answer.

We made recommendations and suggestions about the second further redeployment at the suggestion of both parties. Both parties, including the Israelis, asked the United States to come up with a way to bridge the gap between the Israeli and Palestinian positions on the question of the further redeployment and several other questions. That was at the request of both parties, including the Israelis.

What I am telling you is what our intentions are, very clearly, with respect to the third further redeployment. So I think that answer, I hope, answers your question.

QUESTION: It does.

QUESTION: And on the trilateral security issues that were debated yesterday by Madeleine Albright --

MR. RUBIN: Can you make sure to get the "it does" in the transcript, please? Thank you.

QUESTION: What Senator Shelby had to say, what Madeleine Albright had to say - when will details be available? And can you now at this point answer the issues of the security of, say, CIA personnel that might be involved and be in the middle of monitoring this peace treaty?

MR. RUBIN: Let me address that very briefly. Toward the end of the conference, I was authorized to tell you about the presence of George Tenet at Wye and the fact that --

QUESTION: He was there?

MR. RUBIN: (Laughter) -- the presence of George Tenet at the Wye River Middle East Peace Conference, and the special role the Central Intelligence Committee was playing building on the very roles they played in the past - whether it was with respect to the Sharm al-Sheik meeting to fight terrorism, the withdrawal supervised during the 1973 period and before. The Central Intelligence Committee, through its professionals, has assisted in clarifying facts and providing information.

I think there's been a tendency to overstate the role, with respect to political judgments. That is not what the Central Intelligence Agency or its professionals have been doing here. They are facilitating the professionals from the Israeli and the Palestinian side to combat terrorism, which is a very important foreign policy objective of the United States.

With respect to the monitoring of this agreement, they will also be providing facts. But it is for the political leadership of the United States -- led by the Secretary in the case of this accord with, obviously, the President's leadership over that -- to make judgments about compliance. That is a very different thing than I think has tended to come out.

But with respect to their safety and their work and how they will conduct it, I would urge you to contact their very able public affairs office, who will provide you with, hopefully, the most effective and authoritative answers to those questions.

QUESTION: Do you think that Senator Shelby and other skeptics or critics - we all know and he knows, I'm sure, that the CIA has had a role in intelligence sharing and other things. Has the role of the CIA been changed? Does this give the CIA a larger role - political or otherwise?

MR. RUBIN: I understand the question, but to protect the - I think they have to decide how to define the change in their role if any. What I can say is that we, as the Secretary said yesterday, that I would expect the issue to be discussed by Congress and answers provided by CIA Director George Tenet and his able professionals.

From our perspective, what's important about this is to get the facilitation of the fight against terrorism. That's what this is about. People shouldn't confuse this into something that it's not. It's how best to get the Palestinians and the Israelis together to fight terrorism so that the extremists are put in their place and have the least chance possible to disrupt this important process.

QUESTION: One more. Just looking at the tasks lying ahead, it's a huge job. First question, do you seriously expect it to be finished by May 5, 1999?

MR. RUBIN: We've said - and the Secretary, I believe, said this on Friday night in her press briefing, we know how hard this is. It was certainly a lengthy and painstaking process to get this agreement signed; and we have no illusions about the difficulty in insuring its implementation. We are going to be monitoring it very carefully and trying to be helpful where we can. The clock is clearly ticking here.

What we want to see is a good-faith effort by both parties to try to get as much work as possible. But as far as what happens if they are not able to work, I'd rather not speculate about that date many months from now; other than to say we are looking for a good-faith effort, we know how hard it is going to be.

QUESTION: Do we have anything on the Hernandez family?

QUESTION: Jamie, one of the important aspects of this agreement is obviously the hand-over of territory. Is there a map?

MR. RUBIN: Sorry?

QUESTION: Is there a map?

MR. RUBIN: I believe pursuant to the agreement, it specifies that the areas to be turned over will be shared with the Palestinians.

QUESTION: Right, and do you have a map?

MR. RUBIN: I'll have to check. I don't know that we are going to get into a situation where I am going to respond to every question you have about every document.

QUESTION: Is it available?

MR. RUBIN: There is nothing available for you.

QUESTION: Is there a reason for not making it available?

MR. RUBIN: We make the decision as what's in the best interest of the peace process.

QUESTION: Isn't it to monitor, in fact, what each side is doing in this? And a map is such a central issue --

MR. RUBIN: Right, we think we will have the information we will need to do our job.

QUESTION: So that you have decided not put out a map?

MR. RUBIN: I didn't say that.

QUESTION: Can you put it in a positive sense, then? What have you decided to do with regard to the map that must go along with this agreement?

MR. RUBIN: We've decided to do what is necessary to make sure that we are in a position to monitor the agreement.

QUESTION: According to a wire report, PKK terror organization leader -- (inaudible) -- settled in Russia and the Turkish Government has already officially asked for extradition. In fighting against terrorism, the US usually plays a leader role. Did you urge the Russian side to help them with this extradition business?

MR. RUBIN: You've presented the question in such a way I guess you're hoping for a certain answer about our leadership role. I think there is no question to anybody in the world about the leadership role the United States has played in the fight against terrorism, and there is no question about that.

With respect to your question, however, let me say Ocalan is the leader of the PKK, a group the Secretary publicly identified as a foreign terrorist organization back in 1997. It's not our practice to discuss publicly what we talk about privately with foreign governments, nor to confirm or deny the location of particular terrorist leaders. We have to be very careful if we're going to continue to work with the countries that we want to work with to try to fight terrorism and to be very careful what we say publicly.

QUESTION: The Secretary and Sandy Berger met with families of the victims of Pan Am flight 103, and some of the members of the families made some statements on the way out -- including the suggestion that something may happen on December 21, which is the 10th anniversary, unless the trial begins before then. Can you shed any light on what happened up there?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. The Secretary and Sandy Berger did have a meeting with Pan Am 103 families. I will try to get you a copy of the remarks that she made there. We were trying to bring the families up to date on the status of this important initiative that we've made -- the priority that we have placed on trying to bring to justice those responsible for the murder of Americans and British citizens, the current status of that proposal and the success we think we've had in turning the tables on Qadhafi and calling his bluff.

And now the state of play, as I understand it, is that the UN is answering some of the technical questions that Qadhafi and his lawyers have about this initiative. We've made clear that this is not a negotiation, and we are going to give him some time to respond to what he said he wanted, which was a trial in a third country. We have created a very unprecedented and worked very hard to create a way to have Scottish justice in a third country. The trial would take place in The Netherlands. It would be identical, except for the question of judges instead of a jury, to one held in Scotland. Legislation has been passed in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands to permit this extraordinary trial. Family members would be permitted to attend. The Secretary told the family members how important it would be for them to be present at the trial.

The reason for the initiative is obviously to try to see whether, after ten long years, bring to justice those responsible for this heinous crime. But even if Qadhafi does not turn them over, and after getting his clarifications and questions answered he chooses not to comply, we will have called Libya's bluff and we think it will be easier to get support in the international community for stiffer measures. But I don't want to prejudge that and tell you what exactly will happen on what date. The goal here is not the stiffer measure; the goal here is a trial -- it is compliance.

QUESTION: Can you shed any light on what may or may not happen on December 21?

MR. RUBIN: I think what they are referring to is the prospect that this matter will be looked at by the Security Council in a number of different ways, and that particular date applies to -- we have not set a deadline, but the offer will not remain on the table indefinitely. I believe there is a review process in the resolution. First there is a review process for the sanctions which occurs on October 30; and then I think, as the months unfold, there will come a time that it will become clear that the Libyans don't intend to comply and that this was always a ploy and then we will have to decide what to do.

Let me say, as well, that the families, it was the sense of Mr. Berger and Secretary Albright, were quite supportive of what we've done here. We've turned the tables on Qadhafi, increased the chances of a trial and increased the chances of stiffer action by the international community if there isn't a trial.

So I'm not saying that every family member feels that way, but I think they were heartened by the support they received. Obviously, with each passing day, Colonel Qadhafi has to make a decision - does he want to take yes for an answer or does he want to try to continue to throw sand in the eyes of the international community and avoid this trial?

QUESTION: Does it appear, up to this point, that it is a ploy by Libya and they're not serious?

MR. RUBIN: We'll only know - they've asked questions, they want clarification the UN is providing them. We'll know after that whether this was a bluff or not.

QUESTION: It's too early to say that they're not serious, then?

MR. RUBIN: Well, it's too early to know what their ultimate answer will be.

QUESTION: Do you have any comment on the signing ceremony of the peace accord with - Peru and Ecuador?

MR. RUBIN: With respect to that issue, we put out a statement on Friday on that subject that I would be happy to provide for you.

QUESTION: Last week at the White House, after the White House meeting, the oil company executives announced that they will suggest another route for the - other than the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Do you have anything on the subject?

MR. RUBIN: That meeting marked a positive step forward in America's efforts to develop an east-west transit corridor for Caspian energy resources, and focused in particular on the Baku--Ceyhan and Caspian Pipeline Consortium Pipelines.

Senior officials from the US Government and US oil companies that are active in the Caspian region discussed a broad range of commercial, political and economic factors that directly affect decisions on pipelines. All participants agreed that Baku-Ceyhan offers the best option for a new main export pipeline for oil.

Intense negotiations involving the relevant companies and countries of the region are currently underway and focused on bringing this pipeline to fruition as soon as possible. The participants agreed on the importance of completing this pipeline, in which Russian companies and Russian Government play a central role.

To that effect, the United States understands Turkish concerns that came out today about the effective increased tanker traffic in the Turkish straits. We have consistently urged Turkey to work within the International Maritime Organization to develop regulations that will increase the safety of navigation and maintain freedom of navigation through the -- (inaudible) - We continue to believe this is the best forum for managing these issues.

In addition, Turkey has joined the convention on civil liability and issued a tender for a vessel tracking system. The US supports the construction of this main export pipeline that will carry Caspian oil to international markets without relying on the Turkish Straits. Ambassador Morningstar is in Istanbul today and tomorrow to participate in various training programs and information seminars for companies interested in doing business in the Caspian region under the Caspian Sea Initiative.

How did you like that transition I did there?

Ambassador Morningstar will be in Ankara October 28 and 29, for meetings with senior Turkish officials and presidents from the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus and Turkey for celebrations for the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Turkish Republic.

QUESTION: Has the United States received any requests for documentation or any other sort of assistance from Judge Garson in Spain who's working on the Pinochet matter?

MR. RUBIN: There has been contact and cooperation between the Spanish judges investigating General Pinochet and the US Department of Justice for over one year. In February and July 1997, the Spanish judges initiated broad, formal requests for US assistance under the 1990 US-Spain Legal Assistance Treaty in connection with their investigation of General Pinochet.

The State Department has provided hundreds of documents through the Justice Department to the Spanish court, including pertinent unclassified and declassified documents, and we continue to review our files. The Justice Department is the designated central authority of the United States under the treaty and is, therefore, the US Government agency responsible for handling these requests. Therefore, any specific questions about the details of that ought to be directed at the Justice Department.

QUESTION: Do you have anything to say about the status of the visa of this baseball player, Hernandez's, family?

MR. RUBIN: Yes?

QUESTION: Why are you cooperating, then?

MR. RUBIN: It's pursuant to a mutual legal assistance treaty with the Spanish Government. I got that right - the 1990 US-Spain Legal Assistance Treaty. We call that an MLAT.

QUESTION: Do you have any other view on the whole Pinochet case today?

MR. RUBIN: It's a matter to be decided between the courts and the countries involved.

With respect to the Orlando Hernandez family, the attorney general authorized last Thursday the parole in the United States from Cuba of the mother and ex-wife of Orlando Hernandez. The parole, issued for six months, was granted to supplement the issuance of derivative visas by the US interest section in Havana with the concurrence of the Department of State to Hernandez's two daughters and to ensure that the family remained intact.

Hernandez was admitted to the United States, as you may remember, under a visa petition approved in March of '98. The visa allows his children to apply for derivative status. Further details need to be directed at the Department of Justice.

QUESTION: Was enough funding provided in the budget compromise to give North Korea its quota of oil for the year?

MR. RUBIN: I had some information I provided to some of you who were out at the Wye River Middle East Conference facility. I will get that for you. I believe there was $35 million provided, and there was waiver authority which was also provided.

QUESTION: Speaking of that conference, are you prepared now to say who paid for what as far as facilities and for you all arranging this?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't have numbers, but I can say that we paid for both parties equally. In other words, we paid for each of the parties. I don't know that each of the parties spent exactly the same amount of money, but we paid for both their presence there. We think it's a small price to pay for trying to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East.

QUESTION: Do you know how much it cost?

MR. RUBIN: I'll try to get that. It's going to be very hard to track down; it will take some time.

QUESTION: Jamie, back to the budget. What was the final dollar amount for the security of embassies abroad?

MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get that for the record. I believe we got what we wanted.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:40 P.M.)

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