U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #118, 98-10-28
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
581
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Wednesday, October 28, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
ANNOUNCEMENTS
1,9-10 Ambassador Holbrooke and Kosovo Team Members Briefing
NORTH KOREA
1-2 Meeting on Suspect Underground Construction/Ambassador
Kartman to Lead Delegation
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
2-3 Israeli and Palestinian Intentions to Implement Wye
Agreements
3-4 Timetable and Venue for Permanent Status Talks
4 Time Lines for Entry Into Force of Agreement
CHILE
5 British High Court Decision on General Pinochet
SLOVAKIA
5-6 Formation of New Government
GREECE
6 US Ambassador Burns Travel to US/Purpose/Agenda
CYPRUS
6 Cyprus' Announcement of Plans to Build Naval Base
TRADE
6-7 WTO Banana Dispute with EU
AFRICA
7-8 Assistant Secretary Rice's Travel to the Region
RUSSIA
8-9 Status of Economic/Political Situation in Russia
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #118
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1998, 12:35 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing here on
Wednesday. Let me go briefly through the schedule. Ambassador Holbrooke and
several members of the Kosovo team here at the Department will be available
to you in roughly 20 minutes or so, during which time I hope we can go
through some of your other questions; and if absolutely necessary, we might
take a very short break to switch. But let's see how much we can get
through before I turn the podium over to Ambassador Holbrooke.
As far as announcements today are concerned, let me start by saying that
Ambassador Charles Kartman, our Special Envoy for the Korean Peace Talks,
will lead a US delegation to Pyongyang November 16 to 18 to continue
serious discussions on suspect underground construction in North Korea. The
talks, which began in New York during high-level meetings in August, are
aimed at completely satisfying US concerns regarding the suspect construction
that we've talked to you about.
We've made clear to the North Koreans that any attempt by North Korea to
pursue a nuclear weapons development program would be unacceptable. We have
specific concerns about suspect underground construction, and we will
demand assurances that North Korea continues to abide by its commitments in
the agreed framework. Verbal assurances will not suffice. We will press for
concrete actions, including our access to clarify the nature of underground
construction.
QUESTION: Question about that - is this the first time a negotiation has
taken place in Pyongyang?
MR. RUBIN: I will have to check that. I believe there have been talks
there before about aspects of our relationship. I know that people have
been there before, but it strikes me as one of the first times that a real
dialogue on a specific issue took place there; except to say that this is
an implementation question about an agreement that's already been signed.
So it's not like four-party talks or something like that. I'll check to try
to - depending on how one defines the term "negotiation,"
to answer your question as to what their past practice has been and whether
this is a first.
QUESTION: But is there symbolism in there that the North Koreans would
enjoy?
MR. RUBIN: We don't regard it as symbolic; we regard it as serious
business to get to the bottom of the issue of our concern.
QUESTION: Symbolism about growing ties with --
MR. RUBIN: We don't regard it as such.
QUESTION: Jamie, so they're going there to negotiate the terms of access;
they're not guaranteed access when they go. Kartman is not going to go and
look at the site himself?
MR. RUBIN: It would certainly be wonderful if upon their arrival that
access pursuant to our conditions were provided and they could immediately
move from the negotiating table to get the access that we want. But having
been around this block before with the North Koreans, what we are doing is
making very clear to them that verbal assurances will not be sufficient and
that access by us is going to be necessary. I wouldn't expect that
to overnight be accepted.
QUESTION: Can you say something about the nature of the team that
Kartman's taking with him?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get you some more details. I mean, he's the
leader of the team; I'm sure there will be experts in all aspects of this
question.
QUESTION: But the team would be qualified to go --
MR. RUBIN: Again you're jumping too far, as is often your want, too far
ahead of the game. We are beginning a discussion with them in which we will
demand access. The history of the US-North Korea discussions involves
usually a lengthy discussion process before there is agreement to our
requirements. So we're not expecting them to walk in one day and be able to
have the access the next.
QUESTION: It's hard to do the Middle East in 15 minutes but --
MR. RUBIN: We'll try.
QUESTION: Okay, you see, of course, the statements being made in
Jerusalem. But there are anonymous people saying things about Netanyahu,
for instance. There is a quote in The Washington Times this morning, for
instance, that this is not a case of smoking mirrors, suggesting whatever
concerns he's raised are theatrical and not sincere. Can you address
whether you think he has a basis?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, as I told many of you before, if you look hard enough you
can get someone in the State Department to say almost anything. What I say
to you is what is authorized by the Secretary of State and those involved
in the negotiations. What I have told you is that we regard Prime Minister
Netanyahu as having made some very tough decisions, having made some
courageous decisions, and now having to deal with the political environment
in which Israel exists. We believe that it is his intention to move forward,
to carry out these tough decisions that he has made. And we also believe
that the Palestinians are going to carry forward in the next few days and
provide the necessary security plan.
Those views come from our discussions with Prime Minister Netanyahu and
Chairman Arafat and a number of discussions at lower levels. Now, people in
the State Department or any other building are entitled to their own
opinions, but they don't reflect the views of the Administration.
QUESTION: One other thing, I'm a little confused. How can he be saying -
well, the plan isn't due, is it, until Monday? And here he's saying they
haven't finished the plan.
MR. RUBIN: The text, as some of you know who studied it carefully, makes
very clear that upon the entry into force of the agreement his plan is
supposed to have been provided. That is specified in Section II - actually,
it is specified in the time line where it says very clearly that upon entry
into force of the memorandum the work plan will have been provided --
the Palestinian security work plan shared with the US -- Section II
A 1 B, upon entry into force with the memorandum.
As you all know, that is not until Monday, if I get my days right. However,
we, in the course of these discussions, did have discussions about this
question and an understanding was reached that it would be provided before
that. And we have every reason to believe it will be provided by the end of
the week.
QUESTION: Does this delay the start of final status talks? And could you
give the location of the talks?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have a location for you; but I don't see why this
should have any impact on the start of the permanent status talks. We're
not behind schedule. Let me be very clear -- today is Wednesday; yesterday
was Tuesday. The plan does not have to be provided until Friday. Nothing
has been delayed. So we should all be quite clear on that.
As we have seen in the negotiations, sometimes things are done at the last
minute and sometimes they are even done the night before, and sometimes it
is a result of work all night the night before. So let's be very clear that
nothing has been delayed. The agreement was signed on Friday; it's going to
enter into force on Monday; and it's going to enter into force because of
the commitment and the determination and the tough choices and the
courageous decisions of the leaders, and is going to be one in which we
are going to work very hard to try to ensure that bumps in the road,
such as this, are resolved. We're working on this and we believe, based on
our assurances, that the necessary work plan will be provided in the coming
days and that the agreement will receive the necessary approval in Israel
in the coming days.
QUESTION: David Bar-Illan was quoted as saying that they have information
that they will not be getting the report on Friday or Monday. How do you
read into that comment?
MR. RUBIN: Well, without responding to any personal issue there, let me
just say that our information - based on contacts with the Palestinians -
is that we believe and have assurances that it will be.
QUESTION: And if it is provided, then the agreement should unfold as it
has been signed?
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: The US is probably the inventor of the step-by-step, phase,
parallel, lock-in, making everything contingent on everything else. What is
the US understanding - does Israel have an obligation to proceed with a
pull-back if the plan isn't submitted by Monday?
MR. RUBIN: The time line specifies how this will go forward. Upon entry
into force of the agreement, there are several things that have to happen:
a committee starts on the third phase; Palestinian work plan is shared with
the US; full bilateral security cooperation is begun, pursuant to Section
II B 1; trilateral security cooperation committee; interim committees
resume; ad hoc economic committees resume; accelerated permanent status
negotiations start.
That is prior to Phase I of the parallel effort to transfer territory. It
is not until week two upon entry into force that the FRD and security
components go in parallel. So these steps that I described to you are
things that need to happen upon entry into force. The transfer of land to
either full or partial control is something that would not happen until
later.
QUESTION: Two weeks after entry into force?
MR. RUBIN: Entry into force - week two - there are various things that
have to happen. Weeks two to six there are various things that have to
happen, and weeks six to twelve there are various things that have to
happen. Within those phases, there are things on the security side and on
the territory side.
QUESTION: Week two after the signing, though, not week two after entry
into force? It becomes --
MR. RUBIN: Week two, I would think, would be after entry into force; but
let me try to get you the answer to that.
QUESTION: But that's a lot of stuff. What if one of the pieces in that --
MR. RUBIN: Well, in this area, it is very easy to find problems. We're in
the solution-finding business, and what we will do is try to find solutions
when problems arise.
QUESTION: Entry into force means ratification or the signing?
MR. RUBIN: The signing - it enters into force, if I'm correct here-I'll
read you from the agreement. I believe it is ten days after signing, which
would be November 2, if I've counted my days correctly - anyway, it's ten
days. Yes, ten days, Monday. Have we clarified the Middle East peace
process? We can keep going.
QUESTION: Pinochet - reaction to the British court decision today; and is
there anything additional you care to say about the request for information
from the United States and whether the United States actually supports what
the Spanish magistrate's been trying to do?
MR. RUBIN: I think I've specified in both yesterday and the day before
the assistance we provided. I'd be happy to get you that for the record.
With respect to our view on the decision, this is a legal matter between
Spain, the UK and Chile. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on
this judicial decision.
QUESTION: Could I follow up?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not sure there's much room to follow up there, but --
QUESTION: Because of the Letelier case, the effects of the Pinochet years
actually spilled over on to Washington streets. Given America's past role
in Chile and our continuing strong relationship with Chile, it's surprising
to some people that the United States has taken no position in that;
particularly since this Department has so eloquently championed the cause
of human rights prosecutions around the world.
MR. RUBIN: I understand that people have been surprised.
QUESTION: I have a follow-up -- maybe a different angle of the same
question. An American citizen was killed in Washington in a terrorist
attack that responsibility was linked to Mr. Pinochet. The United States is
not considering to request his extradition?
MR. RUBIN: That would be a subject to address to the Justice Department.
QUESTION: There was one other detail in that report on Pinochet in that
the British high court decided what they did because of Pinochet's having
been a past head of state. Where does the US stand, generally, on that
subject?
MR. RUBIN: That's a good question, and upon examination of the decision
and all that the decision entails with respect to the question of sovereign
immunity, we would be able to have a comment on the legal principle of
sovereign immunity; but we need to first see the argumentation.
QUESTION: Another subject - one month after the elections in Slovakia
there is today an agreement among four political parties to form a new
coalition government. What are the expectations of the United States
concerning a possible fresh beginning in the relationship between Slovakia
and the West and Western institutions?
MR. RUBIN: Clearly, there were concerns in the past that Secretary
Albright spoke to in her trips to the region. Let me say this - the new
Slovak Parliament will convene tomorrow. The four main opposition parties
expect to form a government in the next few days. The leaders of all four
parties have stated their interest in implementing economic and democratic
reforms as well as pursuing integration into Western institutions,
including the EU and NATO, and have pledged to adopt policies to that
end.
We support those aspirations and look forward to cooperating with the new
government once it is established.
QUESTION: Another subject - do you know the particular reason for which
your Ambassador to Greece, Nicholas Burns, is in Washington today? Any
special meeting on Greek-Turkish affairs?
MR. RUBIN: Ambassador Burns, our very able former spokesman of the
Department and current Ambassador, is in the United States to address the
Secretary's Overseas Security Advisory Council, speak to several universities
and Greek-American organizations on our improving relationship with Greece,
and meet with US officials. He will be in New York, Washington and Boston
and then returns to Athens on November 4.
QUESTION: One more - it was reported that the Cypriot Government has
begun building a naval base for defense purposes. I would like to know if
the US Government is going to help Cyprus to this effect - any comment?
MR. RUBIN: We are aware that Cypriot President Clerides has announced
plans to construct a naval base. We have no information beyond this.
QUESTION: Is there any event where Mr. Burns would meet the press when he
comes to Washington?
MR. RUBIN: Mr. Burns has not been shy to meet all of you and I don't
expect he has suddenly developed a serious case of shyness.
QUESTION: Don't you have any reaction about the building of the base as
increasing the military tension in the area?
MR. RUBIN: As I said, I just have some preliminary information, and I'll
have to look into it and get back to you.
QUESTION: A different subject - the European Union has approved a new
regime for the banana trade, especially from the Caribbean. Is the United
States satisfied that this regime complies with WTO ruling or retaliatory
measures are still --
MR. RUBIN: This is under Orange 3, bananas.
QUESTION: Bananas, yes.
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: We have consistently tried to negotiate a settlement of the
banana dispute with the European Union, but have been rebuffed. Unfortunately,
time is running out for the European Union to comply with the WTO decision
on its banana regime, and our options to protect our WTO rights are
becoming limited.
We would still prefer to have a negotiated WTO consistent solution to this
problem, and remain willing to sit down with the EU to do this. But I
wouldn't be a position to speculate on any of the obvious retaliation
questions that you might raise, other than to make clear that it is an
option open to us.
QUESTION: About Susan Rice's trip to Angola -- can you tell me who she
will be meeting with? I don't believe she is meeting with the UNITA rebels,
and why is she not meeting with them?
MR. RUBIN: With respect to Susan's trip, I have some information about
her objectives. I don't have information as to who she is meeting with in
Angola, but we will try to get some after the briefing.
QUESTION: Can you talk about her objectives?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. The purpose of her trip is to engage in consultations
with regional leaders about the current situation in the Congo and to
express our deep concern about the widening conflict there. She will state
our support for a cease-fire by all parties -- that is, that the cease fire
must be based on several factors, including recognition of the Congo's
territorial integrity; the withdrawal of all foreign forces; and an end to
ethnic-based killing and respect for human rights. That is, broadly
speaking, the objectives. Obviously, there are many countries who are
neighbors of the Congo who it is worth consulting with, given their
practices and policies; and Angola is certainly one of them.
QUESTION: Is she not going to be talking about the Angola peace
accord?
MR. RUBIN: I would be surprised if that didn't come up; but the purpose
of her trip was to deal with the Congo. The Secretary had a very important
meeting on this subject about a month ago, three weeks ago, in which a lot
of concern was expressed about the future and what the dangers are and the
dangers of instability. Based on that meeting, the Secretary asked
Assistant Secretary Rice to go to the region to focus on that problem. But
just as the Secretary did when she was in Angola and others do when
we are there, there are obvious concerns about the failure to comply
with the agreement that I would expect to arise.
QUESTION: Can you say something more about how deep the concerns are
about instability there; and is this based on new analysis?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, the Congo is a very important part of Africa. We have
national interests there in preventing the instability from spreading. We
have national resource needs there. We have an interest in protecting the
integrity of any sovereign state. So we have real interests, and there is
concern that as a result of the instability and the fighting and the civil
strife and the presence of outside forces that this could get worse and
worse and worse.
QUESTION: Do you think the country could actually break up?
MR. RUBIN: I don't want to say anything that will inflame the situation.
Obviously, we have deep concerns about the future of the Congo in terms of
the dangers that would ensue if this conflict isn't resolved.
QUESTION: I should know this but I neglected to read your press release.
Is she going to the Congo?
MR. RUBIN: Let me read you the statement I should have read last week so
it got through my very thin brain. She will be traveling to Africa to
consult with regional leaders. In Angola, she will meet with President dos
Santos and other government officials to discuss the faltering peace
process, developments in the Congo. In her other consultations in the
region, she will convey the United States' views -- she will be visiting
South Africa, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda. So, yes.
QUESTION: Will she be meeting with the Congolese rebels?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know about that -- unlikely. Other subjects? Someone
think of a question, because I have to do a holding pattern for 60
seconds.
QUESTION: Can I - I don't know if someone asked yet about Russia -
Yeltsin -- the clear perception that he has been, I guess the word is
sidelined that's been used a lot. I know you can't talk about the internal
situations, but what are your concerns about who holds the reigns of
power?
MR. RUBIN: I spoke yesterday to our view that Prime Minister Primakov is
in a position to work on the economic changes and economic programs that we
think are necessary to move Russia forward on the economic front. We wish
President Yeltsin a speedy recovery. He continues to be the person that we
deal with on matters of foreign policy. The President has been in touch
with him in recent months; I don't have the last occasion for that. But
clearly we talk to President Yeltsin about important subjects.
Secretary Albright also talks to Prime Minister Primakov as well as Foreign
Minister Ivanov. The business that we need to conduct continues to be
conducted.
QUESTION: There was a report last night by one of our TV networks that
Primakov was doing the work that Yeltsin cannot do; in fact, basically
coming in as a Vice President would in this country if our President were
incapable. Is that accurate or do you know?
MR. RUBIN: All I can say to you is that in the economic area, we believe
Prime Minister Primakov is in a position to act on the important issues
that we think need to be done; I indicated that yesterday.
As far as what work he does and what work President Yeltsin does and how
they share the relevant roles and responsibilities of President and Prime
Minister, I don't have any further comment.
With the arrival of the Kosovo team, let me make a couple of brief
announcements and then turn the podium over to Ambassador Holbrooke.
As you know, the Department has been organizing itself and working very,
very hard on the subject of Kosovo in recent months. Ambassador Holbrooke
did a heroic job in trying to get President Milosevic to do what the
international community demanded. That was followed up with a lot of work
by people in this room, including the work of our NATO generals and
including the work of NATO Secretary General Solana, to bring us to a point
where we were able to say yesterday that we had achieved substantial
compliance. We have now organized ourselves for the implementation of the
agreement and the promotion of a political settlement.
Before turning the podium over to Ambassador Holbrooke, let me just
introduce two people - at least two people - with him. First we have
Ambassador William Walker, who has the job of holding President Milosevic's
feet to the fire in terms of compliance. It is his people who will be doing
the verification. As we know, that is no easy task. He will run the Kosovo
Verification Mission as soon as the OSCE gets it up and running. He is
sitting to Ambassador Holbrooke's left.
His success running the peace-keeping operation in eastern Slavonia and
dealing, at that time, in mano a mano discussions with Milosevic and
Tudjman make him the right choice to supervise the roughly 2,000 international
personnel that will be allowed to verify compliance on security and
humanitarian aspects.
In addition, we have Ambassador Pardew, sitting to his left, who has been
appointed by the Secretary as US Special Representative for Kosovo
Implementation. Actually, Assistant Secretary Marc Grossman made that
appointment specifically. He will lead a team in the Bureau of European
Affairs and will serve as the single point of contact in the Department for
implementation issues related to Kosovo. He is currently US Special
Representative for Military Stabilization in the Balkans, and will continue
to carry out those functions while assuming his new responsibilities for
Kosovo.
In addition, to his left, is Larry Rossin, the Office Director for Southern
and Central Europe; and then my next-door neighbor, Jim O'Brien, is sitting
over there, who is senior advisor to Secretary Albright, who has been
assigned by the Secretary, with the strong encouragement of Ambassador
Holbrooke, to go over and spend time with President Milosevic, along with
Ambassador Hill, in trying to pull the necessary teeth to get progress on
Kosovo in both the political and other sides.
With that introduction, let me turn the podium over to Ambassador Holbrooke,
who will bring others to the fore as appropriate.
(The briefing concluded at 1:05 P.M.)
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