U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #113, 98-10-09
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
765
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Friday,October 9, 1998
Briefer: James B. Foley
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
1-3 Plans/Arrangements/Press Coverage for Summit Scheduled to
Begin 10/15
3-4 Whereabouts of Dennis Ross and Assistant Secretary Indyk
ISRAEL
3 Ariel Sharon Sworn In As New Israeli Foreign Minister
INDIA/PAKISTAN
4-5 US Ambassador Celeste's Remarks on Kashmir/US Policy
IRAN/AFGHANISTAN
5 Reports of Skirmishes on the Border
SERBIA (Kosovo)
6-7,8 Ambassador Holbrooke's Meetings with President Milosevic
7,8 Prospects for Use of Force/Military Action
7-8 Update on Situation in Kosovo
8 US Condemns Threats Made Against Media and Human Rights
Organizations
1-10 Activation Order/Mechanisms
SYRIA/TURKEY
11 Status of Tensions/Mediation Efforts
DEPARTMENT
11-13 US Embassies Security/Supplemental Appropriation
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #113
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1998, 2:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. FOLEY: We will now undertake our daily State Department briefing. I
note Barry Schweid, Gil Butler - are you the two survivors of the
Secretary's latest marathon trip?
QUESTION: We don't have a home in London; we came home.
MR. FOLEY: Barry, instead of continuing in that vein, why don't I ask you
to ask the first question.
QUESTION: Well, you can be extremely helpful and keep me from phoning
back and forth between State and other places and tell us what you can,
logistically, about covering the Wye Plantation talks.
MR. FOLEY: I can't tell you a lot today because that's an issue that
we're still working, and it's one also that we have to work with the two
parties - with the Israelis and the Palestinians. What I can do is signal
to you the direction we're moving in, in terms of press coverage, and I --
QUESTION: You can?
MR. FOLEY: -- yes - I hate to disappoint you as members of the press, but
of course our interest is in maximizing chances for success and so --
QUESTION: The more you keep the public in the dark, the better your
chances of sneaking something by them?
MR. FOLEY: The press versus the public, perhaps but we are going to
strive, Barry, for a minimalist approach to briefing the media. We haven't
yet determined whether, and to what extent, there will be kind of a
blackout, or rather a very limited kind of briefing that might give
journalists the flavor of the schedule and the atmospherics. I would not
expect much, if anything, beyond that limited approach, and it may even be
more severely limited. We're working the issue now, and I expect we'll be
able to tell you what the press arrangements are, hopefully, by Tuesday,
when we return from the holiday.
I can tell you, though, that there are no plans for press access whatsoever
to the conference site itself. There will be limited and very small pool
arrangements, when that is appropriate; for example, I believe - and I'd
refer you to the White House on this - but when the President attends the
opening of the plenary session on Thursday, I would expect that there will
be a small pool, according to White House rules, that will be allowed in.
We may be distributing -- and that's a matter to be decided, as well --
still photographs on a daily basis. I know that's of particular interest to
you, Barry. But in any case, the details that you're looking for to
enable you to make the necessary arrangements, I don't have yet, and we'll
have them hopefully by Tuesday.
QUESTION: You know there are some news organizations that don't like to
run government pictures -- that they'd prefer taking their own pictures
instead of getting government-approved pictures?
MR. FOLEY: I understand.
QUESTION: So you might throw that in when you talk to the White House
folks - who, of course, say talk to State if you want to know the
logistics.
MR. FOLEY: I believe there is --
QUESTION: But I'd be careful about trying to sell news organizations
official pictures.
MR. FOLEY: There's precedent - on the photograph question, I believe
there's precedent going back to Camp David in terms of how it was handled
then.
QUESTION: I was at Camp David; I don't remember that. I do remember Jodi
Powell briefing regularly at Thurmont, Maryland, at the American Legion
hall. There was enough to live by and it went on for 13 days, but I --
MR. FOLEY: I wanted to signal the direction we're heading in, and we are
discussing this with the most concerned parties - the Israelis and the
Palestinians. We'll have a joint approach, I can assure you, on the
subject.
QUESTION: Will you have any sort of press office out there - American
wise?
MR. FOLEY: We're looking - I'm sorry?
QUESTION: An American office - would you have an American office out
there or something?
MR. FOLEY: Not at the conference site. We're looking at another possible
site a few miles from the conference place itself.
QUESTION: The outlet center? Brooks Brothers outlet center.
MR. FOLEY: I have nothing to confirm right now - nothing to announce. I
wouldn't rule anything out at this point, Barry.
QUESTION: Okay. How many days do you think this not-precooked event might
go on?
MR. FOLEY: I think that the Secretary has already indicated -
QUESTION: But she said multi and the President said it might be a day or
more, so there's a little confusion here.
MR. FOLEY: I don't believe that's been determined.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - attending, obviously, the opening and after
that?
MR. FOLEY: The Secretary will be present throughout the conference.
QUESTION: Will the new Foreign Minister Sharon be there?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware that he's been officially sworn in yet as
Foreign Minister. Certainly we've seen the news, and expect that he will be
formally appointed as Foreign Minister, I believe, by that time. I would
certainly expect that he'll be there if that's the case.
QUESTION: Has the State Department any opinion about the selection?
MR. FOLEY: We look forward to working with the new Israeli Foreign
Minister, Ariel Sharon, as we have with his predecessors. We plan to work
closely with him to advance the cause of peace in the region. We expect to
have a productive working relationship with him, as we have with his
predecessors.
QUESTION: Do you happen to know, on the various trips to the region, I
mean, for instance, Albright sought out Ehud Barak, who is the opposition
leader. I don't mean trips necessarily by the Secretary of State, but
Dennis has been out there a lot. Has there been much contact with Sharon,
who was in the Cabinet but he wasn't Foreign Minister?
MR. FOLEY: To be honest, Barry, I'd have to ask Dennis Ross the answer to
that question. We spoke briefly today on other matters. Perhaps Jamie Rubin
will be in a position to answer that next week from this podium on Tuesday;
I just don't know.
QUESTION: Also, a little confusion on who stayed behind to do what. It
seemed, in fact, that Dennis Ross stayed behind, planning to stay until
Friday evening. Indyk's bag was sighted going one place; others think Indyk
went to Egypt; still others think he was left with Dennis to keep working
the problem from there. Do you know where --
MR. FOLEY: I spoke to him briefly today; he was in Jerusalem.
QUESTION: Great. He is in Jerusalem? He didn't go to Egypt, then?
MR. FOLEY: I don't know whether he did.
QUESTION: Oh, that's right, he could do both; he could go and come back.
But he's in Jerusalem, working the problem?
MR. FOLEY: He was when we spoke a few hours ago, as is Dennis Ross.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. FOLEY: I don't have that for you. I didn't ask him. We were talking
about arrangements for next week in terms of the summit - the sort of
things I was discussing a few minutes ago.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. FOLEY: What's that?
QUESTION: I say, if you had to tell him what you had to tell us, you
didn't burn up the long distance bill.
MR. FOLEY: Ambassador Ross is obviously dealing with the issues that will
be dealt with in the summit. Whether Ambassador Indyk is working with him
on the same issues or not, I just don't have --
QUESTION: Speaking of ambassadors, Ambassador Celeste has apparently
irritated --
MR. FOLEY: Are we finished with the Middle East?
QUESTION: I guess. Ambassador Celeste evidently has aggravated some
Indian officials through the remarks he made or didn't make about Kashmir.
If you could address that; and most particularly, isn't Kashmir an
international problem, considering the risk involved in a face-off between
those two countries now, being nuclear-powered - or admittedly nuclear-
powered?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not sure precisely what the criticism was in the local
press. I was hoping you would give that to me so I could --
QUESTION: Well he was supposed to have said Kashmir is an international
problem, and the Indians don't think it is. They think it's a local
problem.
MR. FOLEY: He was responding to a question. Let me first state what our
policy is - our view of Kashmir; and this is not new; this is long-
standing. The United States has long held the position that all of the pre-
independent state of Jammu and Kashmir is disputed territory. The United
States believes that an ultimate resolution must be achieved through
negotiations between India and Pakistan, taking into account the interests
and desires of the people of Kashmir.
Now, what Ambassador Celeste said - and I'll just quote you, because I
think it's fully consistent with US policy. He indicated that we press both
governments to undertake direct talks to address very severe differences
between the two countries about Kashmir. He repeated what I said is our
long-standing position, that those differences can only be resolved through
bilateral discussions, he indicated, at the highest level between the two
countries. He was then asked whether the United States believed it was
an internal issue and not an international issue. He said that the
government of India has indicated it has issues with respect to Kashmir
that it must take up with Pakistan.
In that context, one can't view it as a purely internal matter; and again,
our position is that it's disputed territory that has to be addressed and
resolved peacefully between the two countries.
QUESTION: Sounds like he was saying it's bilateral and that has been
understood to mean international. Maybe that's the problem.
MR. FOLEY: Yes, I think it's a semantic issue that's really not
significant from our perspective.
QUESTION: South Asia - how concerned are you about the situation between
Afghanistan and Iran - the border skirmishes?
MR. FOLEY: Obviously, there was press reporting yesterday indicating that
there were skirmishes on the border between Iran and Afghanistan. You can
be certain that I checked with people in this building today to determine
what we knew had happened. I was told that what Assistant Secretary
Inderfurth said yesterday in testimony on the Hill remains the case - that
we don't have - the United States - independent confirmation of the press
reports, some of which have been conflicting, in terms of a clash
that I believe the Iranians alleged had taken place after the Taliban
fired on Iranian border posts. The Taliban, I believe, have claimed that
they did not initiate any such clash.
So we don't, as of today, have independent confirmation. But I'd like to
take the opportunity, once again, to urge, on behalf of the United States,
both Iran and the Taliban to use the current visit of UN Special Envoy
Brahimi to the region to achieve a peaceful settlement of this issue
between them by diplomatic means. We are actively working with other
countries in the region and through the UN to defuse this crisis and to
create the conditions necessary for long-term peace in Afghanistan. As you
know, we've been operating through the Six-plus-Two framework at the United
Nations, and we fully support Special Envoy Brahimi's current mission in
this regard.
QUESTION: Just to follow that, are there any indications that the
Iranians are moving in a way to indicate some kind of major cross-border
incursion or is that stable or do we know?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we've reported previously that the Iranians had deployed
significant military forces along their border. That's going back some
weeks. I'm not aware of a significant change, either upwards or downwards,
in those numbers and in those capabilities. And we don't have current
indications of any imminent movement of those forces. And we continue to
urge Iran to employ the diplomatic route to address the very real concerns
that they have with the Taliban.
QUESTION: Okay, and could I lead you into Kosovo to ask if you've heard
from Mr. Holbrooke? Has there been any movement, any positive signs that
Milosevic is going to conform to the demands? What more can you say about
the Chinese and the Russian warnings to NATO not to do this?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware of any Chinese utterances in this regard. I did
speak to Ambassador Holbrooke about an hour-and-a-half ago. As you may
expect, I don't have a lot to report; he's not reporting a lot himself
because he's in the middle of these discussions with Mr. Milosevic. He met
for 31/2 hours earlier today with President Milosevic. Ambassador Holbrooke
told me that those were very intense discussions, and tough going. He did
not, to me, characterize either positively or negatively those discussions,
except to say that they will resume. I don't think they've resumed yet;
they're going to resume quite late this evening Belgrade time.
But the purpose of his meeting is, as has been described all along, to
bring home to Mr. Milosevic the seriousness of the situation: The fact that
NATO is poised and ready to take military action in the absence of full
compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1199 - compliance which
must be full, durable and verifiable. And that's the exact nature of what
he's discussing with Mr. Milosevic at this moment.
QUESTION: Is he negotiating with Milosevic or is he just mindfully, but
very narrowly, listing the six or seven - that's sometimes changing number -
of demands - the US demands for compliance?
MR. FOLEY: I would not characterize them as US demands; they're contained
in UN Security Council Resolution 1199. Foreign Secretary Cook, yesterday
in London - you were there, Barry - enumerated on behalf of the Contact
Group what those demands are. Ambassador Holbrooke is discussing those very
demands contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1199, as endorsed by
the Contact Group. I wouldn't describe his meeting as a negotiation.
QUESTION: Okay.
QUESTION: How long is he staying in Belgrade?
MR. FOLEY: That's undetermined. He did not know the answer to that
question when I asked him.
QUESTION: He could be there for days still.
MR. FOLEY: I wouldn't characterize it in any way.
QUESTION: Did Ambassador Holbrooke tell you if he had received any sort
of assurances on some of those six - say one of the six or three of the
six?
MR. FOLEY: No he did not, no he did not. And he explained to me -- since
I was playing my role, as Deputy Spokesman about to go out and brief the
press -- he explained to me his philosophy that insofar as he is involved
in confidential negotiations, he would care very much to keep those
negotiations or discussions - excuse me, Barry, thank you for looking in my
direction - confidential.
QUESTION: But you said he said it's tough going, though. I mean, tough
going --
MR. FOLEY: As I said, he refused to characterize them in either positive
or negative terms. He said, "It is tough-going."
QUESTION: Are you going to plan to have anyone available on Saturday or
Sunday in case there's some development in Kosovo?
MR. FOLEY: Well, if there is a development - and I'm not saying that I
anticipate a development - if it's something that we're in a position to
talk about publicly, or to discuss in any way, we will make ourselves
available. But I wouldn't want to predict the outcome of his meetings in
Belgrade.
QUESTION: Can you comment on what the prospects are at this point?
MR. FOLEY: No, I cannot.
QUESTION: More diplomatic?
MR. FOLEY: I cannot. What I can tell you is to repeat what the Contact
Group unanimously agreed yesterday, which is that Mr. Milosevic is not in
compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1199. That has not changed
today. If you're interested, I'll give you a little update on the situation
on the ground, as we see it in Kosovo.
The stand-down of Serbian forces is holding; there have been no reports of
new fighting in Kosovo. We were pleased to see that the KLA has also
announced formally its own cease-fire, beginning today. We welcome this
move and we are watching closely, to see that their deeds match their
words. However, while there has been no shooting in the past 24 hours,
neither has there been any measurable change in the Serbian deployment of
army troops in the field. A large police presence also remains on major
roads and highways.
As Secretary Albright said yesterday, the situation on the ground in Kosovo
has not changed fundamentally. Yugoslav army and police remain deployed,
and some are even digging in for the winter which, as she noted yesterday,
I believe, at Heathrow, is not a sign of good intentions.
The withdrawals we've seen publicized represent, as the Secretary said,
only a snapshot of the situation. Tens of thousands of Kosovars remain in
the open, afraid to go home. At the end of the day, I think that is the
litmus test as to whether the security situation is changing - whether the
refugees feel safe enough to go home.
So Secretary Albright indicated in Brussels yesterday that, given the track
record of Mr. Milosevic, that we can expect half-measures and cosmetic
responses unless he is convinced that he is going to be faced with a very
harsh and imminent alternative, which is what Ambassador Holbrooke is
bringing home to him today in Belgrade.
QUESTION: Could you just clarify what your assessment is of what the KLA
is doing? They've announced a cease-fire today and they haven't moved in
terms of territory or anything? There were reports that they had moved on
some villages.
MR. FOLEY: I have not seen those reports.
QUESTION: There are reports that the Belgrade government has begun
issuing threats to media and civic leaders and monitor groups, that they
will crack down if NATO does intervene militarily. What information do you
have on this; and what would the State Department's reaction be to
it?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we've seen those threats. I'm going to be posting a
statement later this afternoon, and I can tell you in advance that,
certainly, the United States is condemning strongly the threats made
against Serbia's independent media and human rights organizations. These
have included threats of physical violence and the action that Belgrade has
taken to fire dissenting professors at Belgrade University.
I would add that we stress also that we expect Serbia to fully cooperate at
once with the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal. Belgrade's actions against
Serbian civil society demonstrate Mr. Milosevic's agenda.
QUESTION: If I could, Jim: To paraphrase Secretary William Cohen this
morning, he says that this conflict in Kosovo - paraphrasing - certainly
has to be resolved within the week because time is running out, as far as
the people who are up in the hills. Is there really that urgency now - one
week deadline? Is that the way the government sees it?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we've certainly not talked about deadlines, and I'm not
going to start to do that now. We've talked about the onset of winter,
which has begun in certain parts of Kosovo. As that accelerates, the danger
of the humanitarian crisis becoming a humanitarian catastrophe looms
larger. So we are racing against the clock of nature in one sense.
But Mr. Milosevic is facing the clock of NATO action, which is also ticking
and winding down. So there are different clocks at work, all of which point
in the direction of dire consequences if we don't achieve full compliance
with the UN Security Council's resolution in very short order.
QUESTION: Do you know where Mr. Holbrooke will go when he's done with his
talks? Cook spoke of another meeting -- meaning NATO, not the Contact Group,
I think - within a few days. Would Holbrooke - since his mission has been
endorsed by all the Contact Group now - would he go back to NATO, to Cook,
to Washington? It's a little early, maybe.
MR. FOLEY: I asked him that question, and as I explained, Barry, he truly
did not know how long he would be staying in Belgrade. He had nothing to
say about where he might go when he eventually leaves Belgrade. I don't
know the answer to that, and I don't think he does either.
He's wholly focused on the matter at hand, which is trying to persuade Mr.
Milosevic to comply in a thorough-going, durable, verifiable way. It's hard
work, and he's not there. So he remains in Belgrade. I cannot tell you how
long he'll be there and where he might go after that.
QUESTION: Do you have any sense of --
MR. FOLEY: I think our sense of action, rather, that's parallel and
provides the context for his work, occurs at NATO headquarters.
QUESTION: Right.
MR. FOLEY: The next step will be the convening of the North Atlantic
Council. We expect to authorize SACEUR General Clark to commence military
operations.
QUESTION: Well, Saturday seemed the projected date, that was time, that
was being said in corridors. I wonder if it's too early in Holbrooke's
fourth meeting with Milosevic for him or you folks to begin to wonder if
he's being held hostage -- if Milosevic is keeping him there to keep the
guns from opening up. Do you think that's possible? The Serbian leader
might be prolonging these talks or enticing the US into thinking maybe
there's some give there, as a way to play for time?
MR. FOLEY: No. Well, let me try to answer that in the following way - and
this is your humble spokesman talking; I didn't get this from Mr.
Holbrooke. He is in Belgrade now. I think you can draw the logical
conclusion that he believes that there's something to discuss and that
there's reason to stay there. He'll stay there as long as he believes that
either the negotiations can succeed or he has concluded --
QUESTION: Negotiations?
MR. FOLEY: I'm sorry, Barry, that's just a spokesman's slip of the
tongue. But to return to your -
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. FOLEY: Let me back up a second, I can explain why I used --
QUESTION: Can't you finish the sentence?
MR. FOLEY: I'll come back to it, Carole.
QUESTION: It has been reported as negotiations.
MR. FOLEY: Yes. There is an issue that is subsumed within the demands of
the Security Council - that's a political settlement, and the need for
negotiations. That's one of the items he's talking about, is the need to
achieve rapid progress toward a political agreement that respects and
guarantees the legitimate rights of the Albanian people of Kosovo. So in
that sense, that's a negotiating track as one element of the demands of the
international community.
But to return to - and he's not negotiating those demands. He's conveying
them and laying out to Mr. Milosevic that, if he wants to avoid military
action, he needs to comply.
But to finish the quote that Carole wanted me to complete: The very fact
that Mr. Holbrooke is in Belgrade is indicative of the fact that he
believes that it's worthwhile to continue these discussions. Presumably he
will remain there as long as he believes that his discussions can reap
success, and as long as he has not concluded that it's pointless to
continue those discussions.
But I don't want, in any way, to convey some sense of indefiniteness to his
effort. I think maybe that's what you're driving at. Because, after all,
there are separate, parallel tracks going on. One is what he's doing in
Belgrade. The other is the machinery of NATO decision making - the
machinery of NATO military action which will continue on its own track.
QUESTION: He went into this a little bit on this trip, and I don't think
it was ever resolved truly, and that is - I'm sorry, Barry. Is it your
understanding that the decision to have an Activation Order that will be
reached by the NAC - if it's reached by the NAC - is the last thing that
needs to be done before the actual cruise missiles or bombs, or whatever,
start falling?
MR. FOLEY: Certainly that's the last political step that needs to be
taken for there to be a commencement of military operations. The North
Atlantic Council, when it issues its Activation Order, has authorized
SACEUR to commence military operations when it becomes possible, militarily,
for him to act.
QUESTION: Then the question was --
MR. FOLEY: I wasn't on the airplane, Barry.
QUESTION: No, you were lucky, for several reasons, but then the question
became whether there would necessarily have to be some sort of a consensus -
I want to say meeting - some sort of a touching base, touching of bases
with the NATO countries, before General Clark could pull the trigger. And
we heard it every which way.
MR. FOLEY: I don't want to speak very explicitly, in a public forum,
about the mechanisms of commencing military action. General Clark will have
to have placed all of his assets where they need to be. He will have a
number of things he needs to do in order to commence military operations,
and he will do that. And if I knew the answer -- which I don't - I wouldn't
say so publicly, in terms of how long that takes or what exactly it
entails.
QUESTION: We just wondered if that's what it would be.
MR. FOLEY: Following the activation order, he is authorized to commence
military operations.
QUESTION: That's what some of us understood. Thank you.
QUESTION: Greece - I'm sorry - Turkey and Syria? Is someone still --
MR. FOLEY: Is this still Kosovo?
QUESTION: No, not really.
MR. FOLEY: We're following the leader of the band. Yes, Barry?
QUESTION: There was a lot of background noise of concern about the -
maybe we can put it on the record, if you have something - is there extreme
concern here still, that Syria and Turkey are in a very rough and dangerous
confrontation and --
MR. FOLEY: Well, the rhetoric has been worrisome, certainly. But we've
urged both countries, though, to talk to each other; to solve the issue
diplomatically. We don't, at this moment, see that there is a danger of the
rhetoric spilling over into something else. We certainly do not want to see
that happening. And we are in communication with both governments, strongly
urging them to address their concerns through diplomatic channels.
We have indicated publicly -- as we have for many, many years -- our view
that the PKK is a terrorist organization, and that Syria must cease its
support of the PKK. We've also said that we believe this is an issue that
can be and should be settled through diplomatic channels. We support
President Mubarak's efforts in this regard, which, I believe, are
continuing. The Foreign Minister of Iran, I think, is in Ankara today, also
to push for a negotiated settlement. That's exactly what we are telling
both sides.
QUESTION: Does the PKK leader live in Damascus?
MR. FOLEY: My understanding is that he has lived in Damascus. I don't
have information indicating his abode has changed - let me put it that
way.
QUESTION: Different subject. In light of the evacuation of embassy
personnel in Belgrade, and the one-day closing of the Saudi Arabia missions,
I'd like to ask a question on embassy security.
MR. FOLEY: I need to correct you, though, first of all. We have not
evacuated our embassy in Belgrade. What we've gone to - and the term of art
for the State Department is "authorized departure" -- meaning that the
ambassador may canvass the Embassy and determine what we call non-emergency
staff and dependents who may wish to leave and the ambassador wishes to
leave; and that has been preceding.
Ordered departure is another level of preparedness and of security
precaution and we haven't reached that decision yet, although we will take
further precautionary steps as necessary as the situation unfolds.
QUESTION: So a question about embassy security - what is the thinking on
constructing physical barriers around US embassies that would keep truck or
car bombers from getting close to such compounds?
MR. FOLEY: Of course, a lot was said on this subject at the time of the
bombings of our embassies in Dar Es Salaam, and in Kenya in August. Our
security officials talked, quite openly and forthrightly, about the fact
that, following the Inman report in the mid-1980s, which recommended the
ideal or the optimum solution of, I believe, a 100-foot setback from
streets, that we just didn't have the funds and the resources to even begin
to achieve that kind of an objective around the world, in our many
embassies and installations.
In the wake of the bombing though, we have been consulting with Congress
about a supplemental appropriation. Those consultations went very well.
There was strong bipartisan support. I don't have the exact state of where
that legislation is and how much is involved, but it would be significant
resources to do a number of things having to do with upgrading our
security.
It's also been said from this podium that we've sent teams of security
officials to all of our posts around the world, to assess their particular
needs, because this cannot be just a generic approach. We will develop the
standards needed, but we may require different kinds of solutions and
adjustments around the world. But it's a very high priority issue for us
now. I just don't have the particulars for you at this time.
QUESTION: What do you know about physical barriers, if I could just
follow up? Is the State Department philosophically opposed to making
overseas embassies look or feel like fortresses by having physical
barriers? I'm talking about in addition to the 100-yard (sic) set-back that
you were just discussing.
MR. FOLEY: Well, I believe many of our posts have physical barriers. The
State Department has physical barriers. I don't believe that that is an
impediment.
Secretary Albright, following the bombings in mid-August, did, I think,
speak very eloquently about the fact that we did not want our embassies to
be fortresses; that the embassies are the home of the United States
overseas, in foreign countries. We want our home to be welcoming; we want
to be able to do business with people in foreign countries, and to
symbolize the openness of America. So that remains a key factor in our
presence around the world.
At the same time, though, we have an overriding obligation to provide
security for all of our personnel around the world. I think you'll see us
doing what it takes. If it requires some aesthetic blemishes in certain
cases in order to provide enhanced security in our posts, that's what we're
going to have to do.
But the idea of physical barriers and blocks and things of that nature in
front of and around embassy installations is not new.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MR. FOLEY: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 3:05 P.M.)
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