U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #114, 98-10-13

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U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Tuesday, October 13, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

DEPARTMENT
1		Karen Kirchgasser has replaced Michael Siegel as Deputy
		  Press Secretary.
FRY/KOSOVO
2		Compliance with UNSC resolution 1199 involves judgment
		  process; it is not a science
2,3		We will know substantial, credible compliance when we see
		  it.
3		Threat of force continues to hang over the head of
		  President Milosevic.
2,4		NATO's ability to enforce compliance will remain throughout
		  the crisis.
4,5,9		War crimes compliance is part of UNSCR 1199.
5		Some US Embassy Belgrade personnel will return today.
5		US expects monitors to return to Kosovo in a day or so.
5		Part of the agreement is for the Serbs to cooperate with
		  NGOs.
6-7		Milosevic is expected to issue a unilateral public
		  statement committing to negotiations.
7,8		A Kosovar Albanian police force will be part of the
		  statement.
9		Verifiers will arrive over next few days to monitor
		  agreement compliance.
10,11,20	NATO authorities will meet on Friday evening to decide on
		  extent of FRY compliance.
10-12,19	NATO.conduct of air strikes put on hold last night for 96
		  more hours.
12		Ambassador Holbrooke is en route to New York by air
13		Aim is to get a political arrangement for people of Kosovo.
14		Kosovar Albanian lack of cohesion is a challenge to US
		  policy.
14-15		Consideration to be given that verifiers not be held
		  hostage; national makeup undecided.
15-16		KLA expected to abide by cease-fire/
16		US providing about $60 million in services and goods to
		  relieve humanitarian problem.
16,17		"Outer wall of sanctions" not involved in Milosevic's
		  agreement.
17-18		NATO reconnaissance aircraft to have unrestricted
		  capability to verify compliance.
18-19		There will be some Americans in the verification force.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
20-21		Secretary Albright spoke with PM Netanyahu this morning.;
		  agreement is not assured.
21,22		One area where parties need to broaden agreement is that of
		  security.
22		An understanding was reached on the Gaza Industrial Estate.
23,24		Sec. Albright plans to be at the Wye River Conference
		  Center Thursday to Sunday.
25		President Clinton is expected to be heavily involved.
TURKEY-SYRIA
25		US is taking matter seriously. President Mubarak of Egypt
		  made progress.
TURKEY
25-26		US remains committed to Caspian oil pipeline through
		  Turkey.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #114

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1998, 12:55 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Let me start with a personnel announcement. I'd like to introduce to you the newest member of our public affairs team, Karen Kirchgasser, who will be replacing Mike Siegel. She will be working with me on press scheduling matters and in managing the Secretary's media schedule. So she is the one you have to be really nice to and she's promised me that she'll be really nice to you. She comes from Capitol Hill, which is a good place to learn how to be really nice to each other.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - I thought he replaced Mike Siegel.

MR. RUBIN: No. She is Mike Siegel's replacement; that's Price Floyd, who works on a number of matters for us.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - ever-expanding staff.

MR. RUBIN: No, I think it's actually quite smaller than with past history. But we can go over the numbers on that some other time.

QUESTION: While we're doing numbers -

(Laughter.)

-- the four days sounds like a deadline because --

MR. RUBIN: Can I just get through a couple of things and then we'll go to your questions.

QUESTION: Oh, sure.

MR. RUBIN: That was -

QUESTION: I was going to ask about the new person.

MR. RUBIN: If you have questions about her, I'd be happy to start with that. But in any event, we have a statement on landmines and Deputy Secretary Talbott's address later in the week on US-Turkish relations. But let me go immediately to your questions. You were on this number four; why don't you rephrase that?

QUESTION: On land mines, is there a shift in policy -- against only bad land mines still and not anti-personnel?

MR. RUBIN: It's a part of the effort to actually destroy land mines and some work that we're going to be doing under the de-mining program.

QUESTION: Four days sounds like a deadline. Is there now a deadline for Milosevic?

MR. RUBIN: Let me put it this way - as the President said earlier, the facts are going to speak for themselves. If President Milosevic makes clear that he will engage seriously and substantially comply with the requirements of the international community, then NATO will be in a position to further suspend the decision to launch air strikes. If, on the other hand, President Milosevic doesn't take substantial steps towards compliance, then the order will remain in General Clark's hands and he will be in a position to launch air strikes.

QUESTION: I understand that, but on the plane, there were a lot of numbers and the numbers suggested that he had a long, long way to go to meet UN requirements. So you remove 10 percent of the police maybe; only a fraction of his troops have been withdrawn. I'm having a problem with four days and moving out tens of thousands of people who have a great facility for killing civilians. How are you going to measure - I mean, if he moves back another 1,000 policemen, is he out from under again for a few months?

MR. RUBIN: Barry, this is not a science; this requires judgment. And we're going to bring to bear the best judgment that we have. The judgment is going to be based on our assessment of what Milosevic has done and the beginnings of a verification system so that we can know with greater confidence - that is, an on-site verification system where people can monitor this.

As Mr. Berger said earlier this morning, what we're looking for is substantial, serious progress by Friday night, Saturday morning, which is the time when the 96 hours run out. If we have substantial and serious compliance, then the NATO authorities would be in a position to further suspend the authority to use force.

With respect to numbers, let me just say that the numbers game is fairly tricky because you have to take into account what was there, what will go into garrison and what wasn't there prior to the crisis beginning. Our standard is essentially a February-March time period, before the police forces and the Yugoslav National Army forces went in and engaged in this brutal crackdown on the Kosovar Albanians.

So we will be judging President Milosevic by the specific requirements of the UN Security Council resolution, including pulling back those forces responsible for the crackdown, and putting those that were there in garrison. I'm not going to get into a position where I say every last troop has to be in the right place by Friday night; I'm saying that there has to be substantial and credible compliance. We will know it when we see it.

QUESTION: How about the dug-in troops? In a sense, I'm just playing back to the Administration the tough line the Administration took at one point. I'm just trying to figure out because I'm not with Holbrooke - you had six or seven demands - it kept changing. I know you had a big breakthrough on verification. Did you get anything on war criminals? You wanted all the special police out; you wanted all the troops out; we asked specifically if going to garrison was good enough. You said no and you were extremely - I don't mean you specifically --

MR. RUBIN: There are so many questions I don't even know how to begin to address them.

QUESTION: No, you know where I'm going on this.

MR. RUBIN: Try to ask a specific question and then I'll try to answer.

QUESTION: All right. How about the troops dug in - those winterizing troops who are specifically on highways to torment and terrorize civilians and make it impossible for them to get back? I know you've got verification now; that's a breakthrough. But you now don't have to have all the troops in - he just has to make a good faith effort?

MR. RUBIN: Please ask a specific question, and I'll be happy to answer it.

QUESTION: The specific question is, what happened to your hard-line proposition? How many of them have been modified in order to reach some sort of a compromise agreement?

MR. RUBIN: Nothing has been modified; the same line applies, Barry. I don't know why you're making up previous statements.

QUESTION: Well, you said go to the garrison. I didn't make it up. You wanted all the troops out of the country.

MR. RUBIN: Nobody said that.

QUESTION: I'll try to rephrase it in a different way.

MR. RUBIN: Then maybe I can answer it.

QUESTION: Substantial compliance sounds like a softening from the position a few days ago. Can you address that?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. We're talking about the next four days - actually, now three-and-a-half days. We're talking about making the threat of force continue to hang over the head of President Milosevic so that we get as much compliance as we can in the next four days. There are a whole series of requirements that have stayed the same, because every time we've been asked what the requirements are, we've referred to Resolution 1199 of the UN Security Council.

There's only one such resolution; so the requirements are quite clear (as to) what President Milosevic has to do.

With respect to whether force will be used, that will be judged based on the compliance that we see in the coming days. And then - and this is even more important - assuming that we have substantial and serious compliance in the coming days - we are going to try to ensure that the credibility of the threat of force that now exists, with NATO having made this decision and the authority resting in General Wes Clark's hands, will remain throughout this crisis. So that NATO's ability to enforce compliance and compel compliance will remain with the inherent threat of force that will continue throughout.

I am not saying - and I think nobody is saying, and nobody who has any realistic assessment of what can go on on the ground is saying - that every single thing is going to be done in the next 24 hours. That is simply a fantasy land. What we're looking for is a demonstrated, serious effort on the part of the Serb authorities to engage in wholesale compliance with the requirements of the international community. That means letting monitors in, verifiers in; allowing the verification mission to begin to set up in Pristina; moving forward to set up an interim arrangement by early November. There are a whole series of activities that we need to push forward in the coming days; all the time with President Milosevic knowing that the threat of force hangs over his head.

QUESTION: The war crimes part of this has sort of been thrown in the last few days. How does that play out?

MR. RUBIN: That is part of 1199, and we expect full compliance; that's part of 1199.

QUESTION: So there's never been any talk of bombing Milosevic if he doesn't comply with that.

MR. RUBIN: That analogy doesn't hold, because NATO didn't envisage bombing for every violation of the Dayton accords.

QUESTION: So what you want Milosevic to do, then, is go along with this extradition treaty or this extradition vehicle that you all have been pushing for the last three years --

MR. RUBIN: We want him to cooperate with the Security Council organization set up for this purpose, which is the War Crimes Tribunal. That will require him to allow people to come in and investigate. Whether or not he will ever accept the so-called legal jurisdiction of the Tribunal is something we expect to continue to discuss. But we want the investigators to get in there and get the cooperation they need to do their job.

QUESTION: This would be for crimes in Kosovo in the past - not going back to the Bosnian War?

MR. RUBIN: Correct. Resolution 1199 is referencing Kosovo, correct.

QUESTION: Jamie, are you not encouraging, though, the return of NGOs and humanitarian aid people and everybody else back into Kosovo; is that not correct?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we haven't made any - let me speak for ourselves, and then we'll talk about the other organs. For ourselves, I think several - maybe four or five - embassy personnel returned or will shortly return to Belgrade today.

We are reviewing carefully and examining the security situation with respect to the other embassy personnel who were ordered to depart. We would expect for some time to leave the dependents who were authorized to depart a week before in a position to stay away until the situation settles down.

We do think that there is a move towards compliance; and that is why President Clinton made the statement he made last night, and that is why he made it this morning. We do believe that by allowing this verification mission in and making clear that it can come in, and by us putting together a very complicated verification team of on-site verifiers, that we are going to be in a position to verify compliance across the board. Then we will know all the answers to the perfectly legitimate questions related to Serbian compliance with 1199.

In the meantime, we do expect the monitors to be going back in a day or so, and then in some days after that, the beginnings of the verification mission to be organized and begin its work - with, obviously, more time required to get up to speed and be able to go to 2,000 or so verifiers that the mission envisages.

QUESTION: My question concerns the relief workers.

MR. RUBIN: Well, one of the requirements of Resolution 1199 is that the Serbian authorities stop denying cooperation with the relief workers. That means stop maintaining an embargo on commercial supplies of various wheat. It means allowing those who are there to have the necessary visa arrangements to not be blocked at roadblocks, and all of that.

As I understand that situation, there has been recently a fairly good freedom of movement on the roads in the last few days. With respect to the organizations themselves that are NGOs, what we can do is tell them what we're doing, and they can get information from the monitors as to how the roads are and how the cooperation will be; and they will make their own judgments. But if the situation is not improved, such that the relief workers can get in and people can return to their homes, one of the major reasons this crisis began will not have been resolved.

But that's going to be something that unfolds over a number of days.

QUESTION: Isn't there a contradiction between encouraging people to go in, let's say, at their own judgment, and trying to resume their relief work, and the threat that NATO holds over the Serbs? Because clearly, from previous experience you know that any people there who are foreigners are liable to be taken as hostage should force be used or be needed.

MR. RUBIN: Well, there are two goals here. One is to have the threat of force and the reality of force very "front and center" for Milosevic to make the decision to comply. The other is to get food and medicine and shelter to people who are hungry. What we are trying to do is to meet those two objectives in as well-coordinated a fashion as we can. But there is always the problem that you mention, and that's inherent the situation, for which there is no one solution.

QUESTION: You said forces - this is just a clarifying - four or five going back to give it some relevance, four or five of how many that have been --

MR. RUBIN: I think there was a total of 100-plus embassy employees who were in Belgrade at the time we began the authorized departure. Some of the dependents -- in the dozens or so range -- have left. I would say we were down to 15 to 20 or so embassy personnel in the last few days. So those are the rough numbers we're dealing with here.

QUESTION: Are you, in a sense, agreeing that by allowing these people to be back in and by not discouraging them for the next four days, that in a sense you undercut the threat of the use of force?

MR. RUBIN: No.

QUESTION: Well I don't see how you maintain the threat if you have potential hostages on the ground.

MR. RUBIN: There is always that situation inherent in Serbia - it's inherent today, it was inherent yesterday. So it's a problem to be managed; it's not a "black and white" situation as you're making it out to be.

QUESTION: Is there an agreement or is there a written agreement or something that's come out of Holbrooke's talks?

MR. RUBIN: They're working on that. I don't know where the status of the paperwork is, but Milosevic will commit on paper to comply in full with Resolution 1199. That is the essential point. We are working on paperwork to enable the OSCE to - Secretary Albright spoke this morning to Foreign Minister Geremek, who will be going to Belgrade shortly to finalize the arrangements for the verification teams to go in. That will also involve a certain amount of paperwork.

QUESTION: How about Milosevic's commitment - his unilateral statement about going back to negotiations and --

MR. RUBIN: That would be his unilateral statement, so we wouldn't necessarily be issuing such paper. But it's my understanding that what we're talking about here is a situation in which President Milosevic would be making clear that he is going to move smartly to a timetable in a short number of days and weeks, perhaps, or early next month, for reaching an interim arrangement with the Kosovar Albanians. He has agreed, and we believe will make that clear, that the Kosovar Albanians will have self- government and the creation of Kosovar institutions of government as well as the establishment of Kosovar local police.

So those three points - a firm timetable for interim arrangement; number two, institutions of self-government for the Kosovar Albanians; and three, police -- these are the very things that he refused to do all along that have caused the justifiable concern on the part of the Kosovar Albanians that they are not getting the legitimate rights that they deserve. So these are the things he has now agreed to do, which, if implemented, will change the political situation dramatically.

QUESTION: The police situation?

MR. RUBIN: Can we do this one at a time --

QUESTION: No, you just said something about the police.

MR. RUBIN: I can't answer if all three of you are talking.

QUESTION: What is the firm timetable in this case?

MR. RUBIN: I don't want to be more specific than to say early next month.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. RUBIN: Follow up on the follow-up of the follow-up?

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. RUBIN: One at a time; I can't hear you if you all talk at the same time.

QUESTION: You say he is restoring self-government. Is he basically, then, lifting all of the regime that has been imposed since 1989, and restoring autonomy unilaterally or is he negotiating a restoration of what was a constitutional autonomy?

MR. RUBIN: These are statements that he would make confirming the three points that I described to you, that would be part and parcel of the interim arrangement we're hoping to achieve in a short number of weeks.

QUESTION: I understand that you said that you'working on paperwork on the agreement.

MR. RUBIN: It may be done already; I'm not in a position to share that with you.

QUESTION: All right. Whether it's done or when it's done, my question is, will Milosevic sign the piece of paper himself?

MR. RUBIN: I'll have to check with the negotiators, but I believe the answer to that question is yes.

QUESTION: Can you explain the police thing again? I thought the negotiation - well, Holbrooke wouldn't call it negotiation - the conversation with Milosevic --

MR. RUBIN: No, he was prepared to call it that.

QUESTION: No, he doesn't like the word "negotiation" with a dictator; he thinks that conversation --

MR. RUBIN: I think I'd say that's a semantic distinction.

QUESTION: Okay, well, whatever it was that went on with him -- I thought one of the issues was a percentage arrangement.

MR. RUBIN: For police?

QUESTION: Police - local and Serbian; no?

MR. RUBIN: Well, certainly if one is going to get to an interim arrangement that satisfies the interest of the 90 percent or so Kosovar Albanians and the 10 percent or so Serbs in Kosovo, there will have to be some arrangements that give confidence to both groups.

What I'm saying to you is that President Milosevic will make clear publicly that there can be established a Kosovar local police force. For those of you who have been to the region and know what the Kosovar Albanians have been looking for, I would think you would agree that's a substantial step forward.

QUESTION: I mean, I'm not challenging, but we're not talking about an all- Kosovar police force.

MR. RUBIN: The exact nature, as I said when I answered, which is 90 percent Kosovar Albanian, 10 percent Serb in Kosovo, I wouldn't think that the Serbs would be satisfied with an all-Kosovar Albanian arrangement for their security. But the fact is he's going to allow the creation of a Kosovar Albanian police force, which is substantial movement towards self- government and greater autonomy and the kind of rights and confidence that the people there have been looking for for so many years.

QUESTION: And you have a timetable for negotiations.

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: Do you have a timetable for withdrawal? If it's been worked out yet - this is a complicated situation - who or what body or person or country is the judge of compliance when these three-and-a-half days are over?

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me take you through the technical side and then the political side. On the technical side, there are various bodies now that have their views as to what is going on on the ground. They include people's national monitoring capabilities; they include some of those who are remaining on the ground; they include statements by the Serb side, which we tend to take with more than a grain of salt.

So what we're expecting to see happen is tomorrow and the next day and the day after that, increasing numbers of verifiers will begin to arrive in Kosovo and begin to check to see whether the right number of troops are in the barracks; the right number of troops are heading out of Kosovo; whether there is freedom of movement on the roads; whether refugees are feeling more comfortable about returning home; whether the police are continuing to maraud and demonstrate hostile intent to the people there, or whether they are tending to be silent so that people can come back to their homes.

The technical side of your question is going to get better with each passing day, as the verifiers get into answer the questions embodied in Resolution 1199.

On the political side, it is my understanding that in the course of the next few days, culminating in Friday night, and based on these technical pieces of information I've described to you, NATO authorities will meet and discuss whether they think there's been substantial enough compliance in order to extend further the order to General Wes Clark to be able to launch the air strikes.

So this will be a rolling process, fed by the best possible factual information we can get, to make sure that we achieve two things: number one, that as much of the compliance can be achieved in as short amount of time as possible; and two, that the threat of force continues to hang over President Milosevic's head until we have full compliance. That is what NATO authorities, in conjunction with the verifiers, in conjunction with the United States and other countries, is going to continue to work on in the coming days.

But this is a work in progress; this is a situation that has never occurred before, where you have NATO threatening to use force in a situation like this. In the other cases, as you remember -- the only other case - there were - UNPROFOR was on the ground. So what we're trying to do is to meet the test that Roy mentioned, which is to make sure that people on the ground don't become hostages; but at the same time, have the information that we need so that we can make a judgment and make sure that we're in a position to feed the hungry and provide shelter to those who need it.

All of that has to be coordinated and put in sync so that we can achieve our objectives. That's what people are working on assiduously right now in the Department and in the field.

QUESTION: All last week we heard repeated statements that he can't be trusted. What is it that - asking for a bit of judgment on the Administration's part - is it the new areas - verification - what is it that caused Holbrooke, et al, the Secretary, to conclude that you can trust him for four more days maybe?

MR. RUBIN: That's not what we're saying, Barry. I tried very hard to be as clear as I can, but --

QUESTION: You wanted to give him a little time --

MR. RUBIN: No. We are willing to make the judgment Friday night, Saturday morning, whether there's been sufficient movement across the board in the key areas, so that we believe there is a strategic change in his decision- making: from playing "hide-the-troops" and "put-the-troops-in-a-different- location-but-have-them-still-available," to a strategic change: to stop the repression, to allow people to go their homes and to allow the monitors and verifiers to do their work.

These are things that we will know when we see them; and the only way to see them is to let the next few days unfold. If they don't happen, then the facts will speak for themselves and NATO authorities will be in a position to act.

QUESTION: A technical question - can NATO now strike without any other checks or conversations or consultations? Is Wesley Clark now the only person who can decide whether to launch strikes?

MR. RUBIN: After 96 hours, the authority will be provided to him. That's the decision they made last night.

QUESTION: So at this point, he does not have the authority to launch air strikes?

MR. RUBIN: The NATO decision was, essentially, to put on hold the conduct of air strikes for 96 hours; after which, Wes Clark will be in a position to act. So any time between now and those 96 hours, NATO will meet and decide whether they think that the situation has changed substantially and seriously, and that Milosevic has now made a strategic decision to change course - to change from repressing the Kosovar Albanians to providing the conditions in which the people can return to their homes without fear of being slaughtered by police and army units.

That's a strategic change that we will be able to know, whether he's moved in that direction by Friday night. If he has not, the authority will transfer to Wes Clark to act pursuant to any operational considerations he has.

That's as clear as I can be. If NATO decides that there has been substantial and serious compliance in the coming three-and-a-half days, then it will act to either extend the time frame or to create some other mechanism, so that the threat of force that is credible today continues to be credible throughout the implementation of this agreement.

QUESTION: What I'm trying to get at - there's a lot of ambiguity of what an Activation Order actually meant. We never really had a straight answer from anybody anywhere.

MR. RUBIN: Well, as I recall, you were the one who was surprised and developed some theory about why we were talking about it at all. So all I can tell you, Sid, is that this decision --

QUESTION: No, I mean, it's a technical question --

MR. RUBIN: -- is the authority - it's a political --

QUESTION: Jamie, it's a technical question --

MR. RUBIN: Let me try to answer your question.

QUESTION: Let me ask the question first, please. It's a technical question. Does an Activation Order put the gun, so to speak, in Wes Clark's hand; or is there another step in between an Activation Order and --

MR. RUBIN: I have answered it five times. Anything more?

QUESTION: Jamie, you haven't answered it.

MR. RUBIN: I've answered it five times.

QUESTION: Under NATO rules, does an Activation Order mean that the commander in the field can order strikes, or does there have to be another political consultation?

MR. RUBIN: I'd be happy to repeat for you, Sid.

QUESTION: I'm not interested in the suspension for 96 hours.

MR. RUBIN: You haven't been listening; I'll try it again. The decision by the North Atlantic Council, as I just said, is one which transfers to Wes Clark, after 96 hours, the authority to conduct military strikes.

QUESTION: That's what an Activation Order does?

MR. RUBIN: That's what this Activation Order does. There is no such thing as a generic Activation Order. Each decision is made based on its own merits and the judgment of the political authorities.

So this decision was made to provide to Wes Clark, after 96 hours, the authority to conduct air strikes. If, prior to 96 hours, the political authorities of NATO make a decision that there has been substantial and serious compliance by President Milosevic - that he's made a strategic decision to turn it around - then they can change that authorization and adjust it in whatever way they see fit.

What I'm trying to say to you is that we intend, as best we can, to ensure that any change that's made if there is substantial and serious compliance maintains the same threat, the same credibility of that threat to use force in the coming days and weeks when this agreement will hopefully be fully and completely implemented.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - Holbrooke's whereabouts at the moment?

MR. RUBIN: On a plane, heading back to New York.

QUESTION: Back to the issue of the unilateral statement by Milosevic, did he give a written assurance that there will be a unilateral statement or is that just on verbal assurance?

MR. RUBIN: I really don't know. I think we have high confidence he intends to do that. Whether it was done in writing or orally. We tend to have not so much trouble being sure that he's going to say what he says he's going to say, and much more concern about whether he's going to do what he says he's going to do. So we don't have a lot of concern that if he says he's going to say something in the next day or two days or whenever, that he'll say it. The question is will he do it; and that's what the verification system is designed to ensure.

QUESTION: But that's my next question, Jamie. I'm still not clear -- how Milosevic can issue a unilateral statement essentially offering to --

MR. RUBIN: Concessions.

QUESTION: -- to change the regime that he has imposed by law in laws of the parliament and decrees. It's a very thick collection; it's like Apartheid. This is not just something that he's decreed off the top of his head. How he can do this in a statement - I mean, can you just explain for me what is the logic?

MR. RUBIN: I think you're over-lawyering this problem, Roy. What we're talking about is a statement by him that expresses their commitment to negotiate an interim arrangement which includes these things by this date, to include self-governing institutions and Kosovar Albanian police. It's not something that is going to be implemented as a result of a statement; it's a position that the Serbs have previously not taken, that they are saying they will take in the negotiations, that we hope will lead to an interim arrangement in a short number of weeks.

So you're looking for laws to be changed on the day he's making the statement, and I would have two responses to that. Number one, he's been able to pass whatever laws he wants to crack down on the Kosovar Albanians. I have confidence that if he chose to pass laws that would ease up on the Kosovar Albanians that he could pass them provided he wanted to. Number two, the unilateral statement is not designed to implement that immediately. The idea here is you have a verification mission in place to provide confidence and security to the people of Kosovo that they can get the food they need; they will not be subject to police intimidation; that they can come back to their homes; that the military is in garrison; that the police who were not there are out of area -- pending a political settlement, which would include the two points that I described to you.

QUESTION: The other question is, are you requiring the Kosovar Albanians to negotiate an interim agreement? And negotiate implies that they have to give and take as well -

MR. RUBIN: Everyone has to give and take, yes. Let's just make that a permanent part of our dialogue here.

QUESTION: So what are you asking them to give, please?

MR. RUBIN: Well, an example of that was to postpone the question of the ultimate final status of Kosovo until after this interim period - that's an example.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - two or three years?

MR. RUBIN: Roughly, yes.

QUESTION: The point is that the autonomy was lifted unilaterally and probably unconstitutionally by Milosevic and you're asking the Kosovar Albanians to make concessions in order to get back what already constitutionally guaranteed to them. Aren't you putting some pressure on --

MR. RUBIN: Again, I think you're missing the point completely.

QUESTION: I may well be.

MR. RUBIN: What we're hoping to do is to get a political arrangement; and the political arrangement has to have a higher degree of autonomy, a higher degree of self-government, including Kosovar Albanian police forces for the people of Kosovo - something that was stripped from them, as you've said and we have said ourselves, many years ago. In order to get that and get it implemented successfully, there has to be a political discussion.

We think the threat of force in recent days has changed the dynamic on the part of the Serb side to allow for substantial concessions in this area, including Kosovar Albanian police and stated commitment to self-governing institutions for the Kosovar Albanians - something that has been sadly missing for 10-plus years.

If you're asking me, can we resolve every problem that President Milosevic has caused in Kosovo with a few meetings by Ambassador Holbrooke, no we cannot. What we can do is provide them the legitimate rights and the political institutions that they deserve. You ask for an example of something that they have to give up. Well, it's well-known that the Kosovar Albanians wish an independent state. Our idea of this negotiation is one in which that question is deferred for a couple of years. In the meantime, the self-governing institutions that I've described to you - including police forces - can be implemented; and then we can see whether the greater rights and the greater comfort level of the people living there will change the dynamic, so that they can come up with a successful resolution of the ultimate status of Kosovo.

QUESTION: This is just a specific on the institutions. One of the most symbolically important institutions in Pristina is the university. Was that mentioned at all - about if that's going to be integrated?

MR. RUBIN: I don't think where we are now is to go through the details of the political arrangements that we're hoping to get by early November. But I expect that would be part of it; this education issue is one of the self- governing institutions that the Kosovar Albanians have rightly been concerned about.

QUESTION: Was anything done about - I don't know why you would, but if you did, I wouldn't want to miss it - about who would speak for the Albanians in negotiations? Is it still the spectrum that you guys have been --

MR. RUBIN: Yes, I don't think it's changed particularly.

QUESTION: He didn't get anything out of that - he didn't get any group eliminated or --

MR. RUBIN: I mean, I think he said very clearly that their lack of cohesion is one of the challenges we face, and that continues to be a challenge. More on this subject? Do you have a question on this subject?

QUESTION: The 2,000 observers --

MR. RUBIN: Correct - verifiers.

QUESTION: Verifiers - can you narrow down in any way how many of them will be Americans; where will they come from; and is the US worried they could become hostages of Milosevic?

MR. RUBIN: We have learned a lot of lessons from Bosnia; and one of the lessons of Bosnia is to try to make sure that the Serb side does not cravenly use human shields the way they did in Bosnia. That will be something that will be foremost in the minds of the authorities as we try to arrange this new, unique, 2,000-person force of verifiers, and something that will have to be built into their daily routines and activities.

I think those of you who recall Bosnia will recall that there were people on the ground in Bosnia when air strikes occurred; so it's not a black or a white situation. It was a situation where at certain times the hostage problem was real, but over time ways were found to ensure that when the threat of air strikes was imminent, that the efforts were made to ensure that as best as possible, people couldn't be held hostage. So yes, I am sure that will be foremost in their minds as they develop their standard operating procedures; and it's certainly foremost in our minds as we go through this situation.

Secondly, with respect to the number of Americans, I don't think that's been firmly decided. There are 40-plus countries that potentially could provide people for this mission, including the Russians. I believe Ambassador Holbrooke said he expected and understood there would be some Russian contribution to this. Once a chief of this verifying mission and verification force is created, then I think you will begin to see how the breakdown of various countries (occurs).

So I wouldn't say that because there's 40 countries there's going to be 50 from each country; but certainly 40 x 50 is 2,000 - to give you a flavor of what a median number might be. But I don't think those decisions have been made.

QUESTION: The verifiers would not be armed, as you all had said, and they won't be military people - is that still the --

MR. RUBIN: I think those are the kind of things that are being worked out. I wouldn't rule out some self-protection of some kind.

QUESTION: Do you think some military escorts or something?

MR. RUBIN: I don't want to be more specific because these are the discussions that are ongoing right now. But I'm trying to signal that unarmed may be too much. But that's something that's under discussion, and I don't want to pre-judge that.

QUESTION: Okay. And the disarmament of the KLA, is that something that they --

MR. RUBIN: Excuse me - just to add to the first point, though, I think it's clear there will be a process by which the people there will have a tie-in to NATO forces for the purposes of extraction in extremis. So there will be some combination of as many of the lessons learned as we can from the previous operations.

QUESTION: This will be the rapid reaction force that was thrown around a little bit?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know if we used that word; I think it was some other word, but it could have been that word. That rings a bell from another time, too. So let me leave the military officials to use those words properly.

QUESTION: And then disarmament of the KLA - is that something that they gave in to the --

MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard that. Cease-fire - we expect them not to provoke military operations by conducting military operations of their own.

QUESTION: But no requirement for disarmament?

MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard anything about that.

QUESTION: Jamie, the question is --

MR. RUBIN: I'm the one who is afraid, so --

QUESTION: The question is about money. Were any discussions that Holbrooke had related to money or has Holbrooke or the US committed or ready to commit money to help Kosovars move back to homes which are, in fact, not like they left them?

MR. RUBIN: I believe the number we've provided is somewhere in the order of $60 million worth of assistance to refugees in various forms. I believe that's by far and away the largest number of any other country. We will continue to work through Julia Taft, our Assistant Secretary for Refugees, to try to provide the resources and the capabilities and others who are trying to get services and goods for those people.

I don't know that Ambassador Holbrooke offered a particular amount of money. That would surprise me, given the nature of the discussions. What we were looking for from the Serbs was the kind of -- facilitating the work of the refugee and other international relief organizations that right now fear to do their job. As I indicated, there are blockades on certain kind of goods. We're looking for them to let humanitarian goods in, so that the people can get what they need.

As I understand the humanitarian situation, it's not so much that we don't have sufficient supply to provide them, but it's access to them that has made it hard for them to get what they need.

QUESTION: There's a report out of Israel that quotes Netanyahu as saying that --

MR. RUBIN: Could we just stay on this subject, and I'll give you first when we change subjects? Roy, you're not going to ask me about the Middle East peace process?

QUESTION: No, I was going to stick with Kosovo for a moment. I was just wondering what the quid pro quo is for Milosevic giving these various assurances. I mean, what --

MR. RUBIN: Avoiding air strikes; I think it's pretty serious and simple.

QUESTION: But where is the outer wall of sanctions?

MR. RUBIN: Nothing on the outer wall of sanctions.

QUESTION: Is there no - can you say, then, that there is absolutely no commitment by Holbrooke on lifting the outer wall?

MR. RUBIN: I wasn't there, Roy, and so I don't want to tell you every word that was spoken. But I listened last night or this morning to a taped version of his press conference in Belgrade, in which he made clear that this had nothing to do with the outer wall of sanctions. I quote that back to you as the best answer I can offer for your question.

QUESTION: So what, though, is the - under what conditions will the outer wall of sanctions be lifted?

MR. RUBIN: The same as always. I can get that for the record for you.

QUESTION: But Kosovo was one of the major elements?

MR. RUBIN: Right, and an example would be progress towards an interim arrangement that gave the Kosovar Albanians their legitimate rights that they deserve.

QUESTION: So, then, could this agreement --

MR. RUBIN: There are other elements of that outer wall, as you know, and so I'd like to get you that formal statement of our position on that in a taken question.

QUESTION: The other sort of open question is, is there a no-fly zone - either a de facto or by agreement?

MR. RUBIN: No-fly zone, I think, would not be the right term of art; but there is certainly a capability for an elaborate air verification system that I hope my Pentagon colleagues are briefing your colleagues about, which would be run by NATO, which would provide broad confidence that NATO aircraft - reconnaissance aircraft - could fly unimpeded and unrestricted without being subject to air defense attacks in a broad swath of territory necessary to confirm and verify the arrangements required under this agreement. So there will be a broad swath of territory over Kosovo in which NATO reconnaissance aircraft will be able to fly and verify what's going on -- exactly the nature of which, I suspect, is also still being worked on and I would like to leave to my Pentagon colleagues to describe in further detail.

QUESTION: This is general, but there's also the basic political question of who has control over the airspace because if NATO is going to - can NATO fly unrestricted?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, that's the term of art - unrestricted.

QUESTION: So then NATO has control of the airspace?

MR. RUBIN: Over all of Serbia -- that's not what I said. It would have --

QUESTION: Over Kosovo.

MR. RUBIN: It will have the unrestricted capability it needs to verify from the air that the Serbs are complying with this arrangement. It's really up to the Pentagon to describe in greater detail exactly what arrangements are being made to make sure that these planes are not subject to air attack, or the radars are handled properly on the ground; that there's enough of a window before and after they try to launch a flight so that there are no mistakes. These are things that we've done in the past in other parts of the world, and the experts are working on it to make sure that we have something we've never had before, which is this combination of an on-the-ground and in-the-air verification system in a situation like this.

QUESTION: Do they have to seek or get flight clearance, as most planes would ordinarily have to do?

MR. RUBIN: Again, the arrangements as I understand them provide the unrestricted - military officials negotiated this to their satisfaction -- that they would have the unrestricted access they needed in the air to be able to contribute to overall judgments about compliance.

QUESTION: I know you said earlier someone had worked out, but did you say there would at least be some Americans in this force?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, I do expect there to be Americans in this force. I was trying to just do some simple math for you to give you a possible -- 40 countries, 2,000 verifiers. But I don't think it's fair to do the math and hold us to that; but we would expect some Americans to participate in a significant way.

QUESTION: I know you don't want to go further, but there's a Russian official quoted saying they would provide 200-250. Do you think the US might match that in some way?

MR. RUBIN: The idea now is to get, in the coming days, this arrangement put in place. In order to do that, we have to create a mission director; create a staff; create a headquarters in Pristina; create liaison office; ground verification groups: broken down into humanitarian relief, border operations, regular police verification group, force and weapons verification group - a whole bunch of missions. The goal is, in the first phase, to establish a headquarters, increase the size of so-called KDOM -- the Kosovo monitors that are now in place; then develop specific sponsored- country elements, and bring those to bear with the monitors that are in place; and then ultimately integrate the KDOM into this larger system.

I cannot give you an American number. If the Russians are going to contribute that, and it works out with the arrangements that the head of the OSCE works out, that would be fine with us. But it's really up to him to put this force together, and decide how to make it fit.

I think we will be offering contributions, the exact nature of which I'm not in a position to say; other than to say that we've made a substantial contribution to the monitoring force that's now in pace that will become the verification force.

QUESTION: I was just going to ask who's going to be in charge of this. Last two questions - will there be Americans there, and who will tell the Americans what to do; do you know?

MR. RUBIN: I think there will be arrangements to satisfy members of Congress that nobody who shouldn't will tell Americans what to do.

QUESTION: You all have been pretty clear about what Milosevic is not supposed to do in Kosovo any more. What sort of authority does he still maintain over affairs in Kosovo?

MR. RUBIN: I would have to get someone who's on the ground there who can describe it. With Roy here, I'm hesitating to give any of these legal judgments that'll be second-guessed in about a second.

Clearly, Kosovo is part of Serbia right now, and Kosovar Albanians have been repressed under the current situation, with tens of thousands of military forces and police elements repressing them and killing them. What we're trying to do is turn that around, and then given them greater and greater self-government. So I don't know how one could be in worse shape from a central authority perspective than to be killed and maimed and driven into the hillside by the Serbs.

QUESTION: Can we switch to an easier subject - the Middle East?

MR. RUBIN: You know we've gone for 48 - how many minutes?

QUESTION: 46 minutes on this.

MR. RUBIN: 46 minutes on Kosovo; it's a good thing I studied up.

QUESTION: A different question - if there is no compliance by Friday, you said the air strikes will start.

MR. RUBIN: The Activation Order authorizes Wes Clark to act after 96 hours.

QUESTION: Whatever. If the situation arises that there is air strikes, the only lesson that was learned from Bosnia in the past is that air strikes by itself did not really achieve change. It was arms shipments from Iran to the Bosnians that held Bosnia --

MR. RUBIN: I knew we'd get to the Middle East if I waited long enough. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: I wonder whether there has been any talk about whether the Iranians are arming the Albanians, whether there is any Iranian assistance to them and whether this is a factor in the equation, in the event that there is air strikes.

MR. RUBIN: I think although analogies help us understand the general terms of a situation, I think it would be wrong to make a military analogy to the forces on the ground in Bosnia vis-a-vis the Serb forces on the ground in Bosnia, and the current situation where the Albanian guerrillas - their insurgency has been set back considerably -- with the current threat of air strikes. I don't think your assessment is fully accurate with respect to Bosnia. I don't want to re-litigate that in front of all of us; I'll be happy to do that with you afterwards.

But the bottom line is, if Milosevic does not comply substantially and seriously with the requirements by Friday night, NATO military authorities will be authorized to conduct extensive air strikes to compel his compliance. It is that reality that he faces that we believe has caused him to change his tune across the board with respect to Kosovo.

QUESTION: Your new assistant has until Friday night to reconsider?

(Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: Okay.

QUESTION: There's a report out of Israel quoting Netanyahu as saying he is not ready or not in a position to strike a deal with the Palestinians. Do you know anything about that?

MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright, in addition to speaking to a number of - let me just give you that list. I'm really not avoiding your question, but I want to impart some information here. She spoke today to Foreign Minister Ivanov, French Foreign Minister Vedrine, Polish Foreign Minister Geremek on Kosovo, and she also spoke to Prime Minister Netanyahu about the Middle East peace process late this morning.

Clearly, there are a large number of hurdles that have to be overcome if we're going to get an agreement. We do believe we've put ourselves in a better position to get that agreement as a result of the work that we've done in the last week. But such an agreement is by no means a sure thing. It will require some tough choices by both sides if we're going to get such an agreement. The preparations continue, and will probably continue up to the moment when the leaders arrive for their first meeting on Thursday morning.

We will continue to work the problem; we'll continue to try to come up with the most creative ways we can to help them overcome the remaining gaps, and widen the areas of agreement.

Maybe I - let me make a proposal for those of you who may be having to cover this over the next few days. I'm going to switch from "narrowing the gaps" to "broadening the areas of agreement."

QUESTION: Don't drop hurdles.

(Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: But I will not eliminate hurdles.

QUESTION: Hurdles are big.

MR. RUBIN: We're going to try to broaden the areas of agreement and the understandings underlying that.

As far as whether we can achieve an agreement, which is what the report refers to, nobody knows the answer to that question. The only people who can contribute to answering it in the affirmative are the two leaders who need to make the tough decisions.

QUESTION: Have you lost "the big mo" -- momentum?

QUESTION: Did he articulate that to the Secretary this morning? And what's the -- (inaudible) - right now?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I wouldn't be in a position to describe his side of the phone conversation. I can tell you that Secretary Albright continues to work; that we continue to believe that we're in a far better position to overcome these hurdles, and to broaden the areas of agreement, as a result of the work that's been done in recent days and weeks. But whether we will be able to do so remains an open question.

QUESTION: Earlier, I thought there was a report that said that the Israeli Cabinet was willing to support Netanyahu in a land - for --

MR. RUBIN: I've heard different accounts. Usually they have a Cabinet meeting and you have five different versions of what happened. So I'm not going to try to predict what they're going to decide in their Cabinet meeting, or how it will be reported.

Let me just say that Secretary Albright has been dealing directly with Prime Minister Netanyahu to try to continue to lay the groundwork over the phone for the meeting that we expect to begin on Thursday morning. She is expected to speak this afternoon to the new Foreign Minister, Ariel Sharon. That hasn't happened yet; it may have happened by now.

(Laughter.)

But it hasn't happened yet.

QUESTION: Jamie, let me try on this. None of us are in the room, but the argument or the cutting edge seems to be security again. The people in the Cabinet who are dubious about this agreement are raising security questions. Can you broaden or be a little more specific in what - you say things have to be done still. Is the security issue something that still needs more work in Wye? Or is the sine qua non - you remember - or has the Secretary squeezed out of the Palestinians --

MR. RUBIN: I think we should switch places in the future; it would be a lot easier.

QUESTION: No, I'm using the words; I like talking Latin. No, has she squeezed out of the Palestinians - or extracted from the Palestinians about what can be given now in security, or is there more negotiating to do?

MR. RUBIN: One of the areas where we want to broaden the understandings and broaden the agreement is on security. We made substantial and significant progress on it during the Secretary's trip and in subsequent days. But we need to broaden the understandings and expand the areas of agreement in that area, as well as many other areas.

QUESTION: And? You remember - because it's been about a week now, hasn't it - there were things that were pretty much in place and in fact --

MR. RUBIN: It's only been six days since we were there.

QUESTION: No, no, no - but Friday night Dennis was going to pack his shaving kit and come back.

MR. RUBIN: He's back.

QUESTION: He's back - but you had a couple of things that frankly, you could have had solvable months ago - the Gaza industrial zone, the seaport. Are any of those things clicking into shape?

MR. RUBIN: There was an agreement and understanding reached on the Gaza industrial estate.

QUESTION: There was?

MR. RUBIN: During the Secretary's visit.

QUESTION: Well, all right, it's near, but it is - virtually --

MR. RUBIN: An understanding was reached. That is my understanding.

QUESTION: Is there anything - the left-behind folks - did the left-behind folks accomplish anything you want to tell us about?

MR. RUBIN: They continue to do their work. I don't have any new completed packages to report to you.

QUESTION: About the Turkish-Syrian border --

MR. RUBIN: On this subject?

QUESTION: Is the Secretary planning to be out at the Wye Plantation the entire time, or does she have other plans during those days?

MR. RUBIN: She has blocked out the entire period from Thursday through Sunday to be a the Wye River. Those of you who are going to be there - I've been advised (that ) the people who are going to be hosting this event would very much like you to use its proper name, which is the Wye River. You can do what you want; I'm asking you on their behalf --

QUESTION: They're disavowing slavery a little late.

MR. RUBIN: I'm asking you on their behalf --

QUESTION: They're a little late to - (inaudible) --

MR. RUBIN: -- to use Wye River; and as always, you will do whatever you think is best.

QUESTION: We know; we went through that.

QUESTION: Sunday, what if the talks - the talks are supposedly open- ended. Does she have other plans for the first few days of --

MR. RUBIN: The President?

QUESTION: No, does she have plans for the next few days after that?

MR. RUBIN: She is blocked out Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday, with no other plans scheduled, to be at the Wye River - what's the last word? Wye River Conference Site.

QUESTION: See. It's catching.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: What about after Sunday, is my question?

MR. RUBIN: We have no reason to think that it will go beyond Sunday at this time.

QUESTION: I thought it was open-ended and secondly, that they were planning up through the 19th?

MR. RUBIN: What date is Sunday? 16, 17, 18, 19 - so maybe we'll be home by then. My understanding is she has blocked out Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday; but I'll bet you she'd be available for a few more hours if it could advance the Middle East peace process.

QUESTION: Is she literally going --

MR. RUBIN: The Wye River Conference Center.

QUESTION: Yeah, I know. They've got a PR firm. Are they going up Thursday?

QUESTION: On Monday does she have plans for next week?

MR. RUBIN: She'll be there Thursday; I don't know when she's leaving.

QUESTION: Does she have plans for the following week - I mean, travel or other visitors so she won't be able to stay at the Wye River Conference Center?

MR. RUBIN: Roy Gutman, yes. At least one of them fell for it.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: He wants to be on the tour.

MR. RUBIN: (Laughter.) Maybe he'll eat better than you will, Barry.

As I said, this is a matter of extreme concern to the Secretary - that in the absence of an agreement very soon, that the Middle East peace process can fall apart and we can face grave danger in the region in the coming weeks and months. Therefore, she has committed a very large amount of time to this subject in recent weeks. She's committed, as I said, the next Thursday through Sunday to be there. My understanding is that it's supposed to end on Sunday; but again, if it carried over, I would be surprised if she wouldn't be in a position to adjust her schedule accordingly.

QUESTION: Do you have any schedule of press events or press arrangements at the Wye River Conference Center?

MR. RUBIN: Why don't we do this after the briefing? We can discuss this.

QUESTION: My question was sort of like that; do you want to wait until after? The question came up, will the press at least be at the beginning taken through to be shown the facilities - where they'll sit, where they'll meet?

MR. RUBIN: After the briefing, why don't we have a session talking about press arrangements. Any more on the substance?

QUESTION: What kind of involvement President Clinton will have in these talks?

MR. RUBIN: Well, he has a spokesman, and I wouldn't want to pre-empt his spokesman on the President's involvement. But from the Secretary, I understand that he will be heavily involved.

QUESTION: Is there going to be a session Thursday morning at the White House with them?

MR. RUBIN: I'd like to leave that for the White House to announce, yes. But - yes.

QUESTION: About the Turkish-Syrian border commission - last week, the State Department announced that they contacted both governments in this podium. My question is, what level was this contact? And second, when you contacted the Syrian Government, did you urge them to deliver the terrorist leader -- (inaudible) -- to Turkey?

MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get the level of the contact. But we're taking this matter seriously. As I understand it, the current situation is that, as a result of work that President Mubarak and others have done, there were serious and positive talks with both governments, and that President Demirel noted that there was a concrete message worthy of consideration from Syria.

We applaud President Mubarak's efforts in this matter. Our message was that this is a matter that we want to see resolved peacefully; that was the guts of our message. Beyond that, we've made clear to Syria what we expect from them in terms of fighting terrorism.

QUESTION: Do you have any information on this subject? For example, we heard some wire report -- (inaudible) - moved to another capital, for example, that Athens, Greece and Nicosia and the Armenian capital?

MR. RUBIN: I hadn't heard those; I've heard others. But we'll have to see what's real.

QUESTION: Also relating to Turkey -- The New York Times declared the Caspian pipeline deal dead over the weekend; is that the case?

MR. RUBIN: Why don't we get back to that question?

(Laughter.)

God forbid I should disagree with The New York Times without being fully prepared to deal with the consequences.

QUESTION: On the Iraq liberation --

MR. RUBIN: Yes, and they might come to the briefing.

QUESTION: The Iraq Liberation Act that passed Congress just recently, over the last few days, I think - it's about $90-something million. Any idea how this is going to be spent; what it goes for; who gets it?

MR. RUBIN: We have an elaborate arrangement that we have briefed Congress on, on how to spend these funds. It is a broad-based arrangement designed to promote and present an alternative - a democratic alternative - and to get maximum cooperation between the various groups. With respect to specific provisions for funding amounts, we'll have to try to get you some information and we can do that.

QUESTION: Is this elaborate arrangement not available to the press?

MR. RUBIN: I'm going to try to get as much of the elaborate arrangement available to the press as possible, but it's just not right here with me right now.

As far as the multiple pipelines are concerned, we remain committed - the United States - to making the Baku, Ceyhan, and the East-West Corridor a reality. President Demirel was 100 percent correct when he stated on Monday that the United States Government backs a route through Turkey. We will continue our efforts to serve as an honest broker in these negotiations, and we welcome the constructive statements from the Turkish Energy Minister yesterday on what Turkey can do to support the Turkish leg. So perhaps premature would be the right word.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. RUBIN: You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 2:00 P.M.)

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