U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #112, 98-10-05
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
428
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Monday, October 5, 1998
Briefer: JAMES B. FOLEY
ANNOUNCEMENT
1 LATVIA: US welcomes results of vote on amendment regarding
stateless Russians.
FRY/ KOSOVO
1 UNSYG Annan's report on UNSCR 1199 calls for justice,
investigation of atrocities.
2 No new major armed confrontations have occurred; skirmishes
occurred over weekend.
2,3 Important steps called for in UNSCR 1199 have not happened.
3 Talks cannot succeed in an atmosphere of intimidation and
repression.
1-2,3 Atrocities and killings of civilians overwhelmingly by
Serbs, though both sides guilty.
3,4 Nothing to announce on possible NATO decision to use force.
4-5 Amb. Holbrooke currently meeting Pres. Milosevic in
Belgrade.
5 NATO is still looking for complete, rapid compliance with
UNSCR 1199.
5-6 Test of Serb sincerity will be actions of internally
displaced persons in returning home.
6 Sec. Albright spoke yesterday with Russian FM Ivanov.
6 Sec. Albright considering going to Brussels; no final
decision made yet.
6 All US-Russia recent contacts stressed cooperation with
NATO on Milosevic's compliance.
7 Charge that NATO military action comes late in day not
borne out by facts.
7,8 Neither USG nor NATO has made any decision on whether to
use ground forces.
SUDAN
8 US very confident that Sudanese plant attacked was
producing CBW precursors.
TURKEY-SYRIA
9 US urges political, diplomatic solution with Syria; US
considers PKK a terrorist group.
9,10 US considers Syrian situation serious, has told Syria it
should cease support for PKK.
9,10 US supports Egyptian Pres. Mubarak's efforts to resolve
situation diplomatically.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
11 Sec. Albright personally engaged on those issues during her
trip.
NORTH KOREA
11 No information on designating former Defense Sec. Perry as
a new negotiator.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #112
MONDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1998 1:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. FOLEY: Welcome to the State Department. I have one announcement
before turning to your questions.
The United States Government welcomes the vote of the Latvian people on
October 3rd to implement amendments to their citizenship and naturalization
law. This decision, democratically reached through a national referendum,
indicates the Latvian people's strong commitment to the international human
rights standards Latvia accepted by joining the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe.
Latvia's action is fully in the spirit of our joint commitment, outlined in
the US-Baltic Partnership Charter signed earlier this year, to implement
OSCE-compliant legislation protecting human rights fully and equitably.
These new amendments fulfill all of Latvia's international obligations in
the area of citizenship and naturalization without any harm to the
development of Latvian language and culture.
This law is an important and necessary step in Latvia's road to integrating
fully into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. There's more to the
statement, but we'll post it after the briefing.
QUESTION: On Kosovo, there are reports of withdrawal of Serb forces.
Can you confirm that? And if true, does this mean that the possibility of
NATO intervention has diminished?
MR. FOLEY: I'd first like to make reference to the report issued by
Secretary General Annan this morning in New York on implementation of UN
Security Council Resolution 1199. I think that we will be in a position to
issue a formal statement, perhaps within the hour or so, on this; but let me
give you a preliminary assessment in which, George, I will address the
question that you raised.
Again, Secretary General Annan issued a report on Kosovo today, pursuant to UN
Security Council Resolution 1199. We understand the Security Council will
probably meet tomorrow afternoon in informal session to discuss the report. We
expect the Council will react strongly and deplore all acts of violence against
civilians and underline the importance of the full implementation of Security
Council Resolution 1199.
The Secretary General condemned the wanton killing and destruction and
violence directed at civilians. He concluded that it is clear, beyond any
reasonable doubt, that the great majority of such acts have been committed
by security forces in Kosovo, acting under the authority of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.
The Secretary General calls for all those involved in the killing and
mistreatment of civilians to be brought to justice, and for an
investigation under effective international control or with international
participation of all reported cases of atrocities and violations of human
rights. The report warns that thousands could die in the winter if there
is no immediate and fundamental change in the situation - and particularly
in the Serbian authorities' approach to the crisis in Kosovo.
The Secretary General appeals to the international community to undertake urgent
steps to prevent a humanitarian disaster. In terms of the status on the ground
in Kosovo today, our diplomatic observers in the field in Kosovo report that no
new major armed confrontations have occurred. There were, however, reports of
skirmishes between Serbs and KLA units in the area between Malisevo and Orahovac
over the weekend.
Observers also report that most Yugoslav Army units have returned to their
garrisons. One tank brigade is reported to have been observed leaving
Kosovo for Serbia. There are, however, major army units remaining in the
field -- that is a very important point -- especially in South and
Southeast Kosovo. While the number of road checkpoints manned by Serbs has
diminished and while large numbers of Serbian police units have left the
field, there are still police concentrations along major lines of
communications and in many villages. That's a second important point.
In terms of your overall question about Serbian compliance with the terms
of UN Security Council Resolution 1199, and the impact of such compliance
or non- compliance on the possibility of NATO action, I'd like to say, on a
preliminary basis, the following: Let me simply refer to UN Security
Council Resolution 1199. The resolution demands that all parties, groups,
and individuals immediately cease hostilities and maintain a cease-fire in
Kosovo. The Secretary General's report this morning notes that government
forces' offensives continued in various parts of Kosovo and intensified
following adoption of UN Security (Council) Resolution 1199 on September
23rd.
That resolution demands that the authorities of the FRY and the Kosovo
Albanian leadership take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian
situation and avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe. We do not see
that on the part of the Serb authorities. It calls upon the authorities in
the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter immediately into a
meaningful dialogue without pre-conditions. We don't see that happening.
It demands that the Republic of Yugoslavia implement a series of concrete
measures: Number one, cease all action by the security forces affecting
the civilian population; and order the withdrawal of security units used
for civilian repression. As I noted, we don't see that happening in
anything like a definitive manner.
A second specific demand on the Serb authorities is to enable effective and
continuous international monitoring in Kosovo which, again, is impeded to
this date; it is not thorough-going and unrestricted. It demands facilitation
of the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. We
don't see this. And it demands that the Serb authorities make rapid
progress to a clear timetable, in the dialogue that I referred to earlier
with the Kosovo Albanian community for a peaceful settlement; and we don't
see that either.
So our preliminary view of the Secretary General's report is that it makes
crystal-clear that there has not been compliance, on the part of the Serb
authorities, with the demands contained in UN Security Council Resolution
1199.
QUESTION: On the specific subject of a dialogue between the Kosovars and
the Serbs, the Serbs are saying -- and some reporters say the same thing --
that much of the blame lies with the Kosovars who have not, first of all,
been able to put together a group and then when they did, haven't agreed to
meet with the Serbs.
MR. FOLEY: Well, we've been saying from the outset that, while we've been
calling for direct negotiations -- and in the meantime we've been
facilitating through indirect contacts the elaboration of elements of an
interim settlement -- that those efforts, be they our facilitative talks, or
ultimately the direct talks that will have to take place, cannot prosper
and cannot succeed in an atmosphere of intimidation and continued
repression. That's been our point from the beginning - that it is simply
disingenuous to say on the one hand that you're willing to sit down and
negotiate directly, and on the other hand to be creating conditions under
which military offensives and atrocities against civilian populations in
Kosovo are continuing. It's disingenuous.
QUESTION: Also, I think the Secretary General says some blame lies
on both sides, in terms of atrocities and random killings. Would you agree
with that - that there has been, on both sides, some guilt?
MR. FOLEY: I believe that the Secretary General makes the point - I don't
have the specific reference before me - but that the overwhelming evidence
indicates that the atrocities and the killings of civilians have occurred
overwhelmingly on the Serb side.
We believe that such actions have taken place on both sides, however, and
that we condemn atrocities and killings of civilians, no matter who
perpetrates them, wherever they occur. We believe they have to be
investigated thoroughly and those guilty brought to justice.
QUESTION: Can you clarify, based on your assessment and what the Kofi
Annan report says, you would want to see the NAC decide to go ahead, then,
with the military intervention?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I'm not going to prejudge that right now standing here
from the podium. We're not far from such a decision; but that decision
will have to be taken by the political authorities of the 16 NATO nations,
based on the evidence that is in front of them at the time they meet to
decide that. That day is not far off, unless we see what would have to be
a strategic and definitive and irreversible change on the part of the Serb
authorities' attitude and behavior.
QUESTION: Can I change the subject for a second?
MR. FOLEY: We may have more questions on Kosovo.
QUESTION: Okay, I was wondering if --
MR. FOLEY: Is this on Kosovo?
QUESTION: No.
MR. FOLEY: Okay, I'll come back to you, I think, when we're finished with
this.
QUESTION: Okay.
MR. FOLEY: Jim, the Secretary General in the report says, "I do not have
the means necessary to provide an independent assessment of compliance, as
required by the Security Council." In the absence of that ability on his
part, what is the United States going to be relying on in making its
judgment on whether to go ahead with military action?
MR. FOLEY: Well, Secretary General Annan is careful to note that he
doesn't have the independent means at his own disposal, his own
organization, to make that judgment. The report itself, though, is a
compilation of all kinds of facts and observations that point to the
obvious conclusion; which is that the Serbs are not in compliance with the
requirements of Security Council Resolution 1199.
In terms of the United States' ability to arrive at that judgment --
together with our allies, of course - we have diplomatic observers present
on the ground who are reporting to capitals. We have national means of
determining the level of Serb compliance. So I'm very comfortable that the
United States and its NATO allies will be able to make their decision on
the basis of sound and reliable information.
QUESTION: Can you give us some idea of the timetable for making that
decision; and at what point you're going to stop gathering evidence and
look at what you have and make a decision based on that?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I have nothing to announce in that regard today. That
is, obviously, an extraordinarily important assessment and decision. It's
not one for me to make at this podium; it's not one for me to signal from
this podium. It's going to be made by the political authorities of the
NATO nations.
What I have said, I think, a few minutes ago, is that that day is coming if
we don't see what I called a strategic, definitive and irreversible
decision on the part of the Serb authorities to change course and comply
with the Security Council resolution.
Right now, as a practical matter, Ambassador Holbrooke is in Belgrade
meeting, perhaps now or shortly, with President Milosevic. So I would
hesitate to draw any conclusions about where we might be heading prior to
that meeting's conclusion, and prior to the North Atlantic Council having an
opportunity, throughout the course of this week, to assess possible changes
on the ground and changes in Serb behavior, in the absence of which, I
think, the decision of NATO is clear.
QUESTION: Is Holbrooke's message basically that Milosevic has to do
more?
MR. FOLEY: Certainly, inasmuch as we don't believe that the Serbs have
complied to this point; absolutely, the message is: Comply, and comply
immediately.
QUESTION: Is he just a messenger or is he going to act as a mediator?
Is there any other aspect to his mission?
MR. FOLEY: I would simply refer you to the Security Council resolution,
which I read from at length. I think those are the guidelines that
Ambassador Holbrooke is drawing from in his meeting with Milosevic.
QUESTION: Why did the US Government send Ambassador Holbrooke to meet
with Milosevic? I mean, you've read from the UN Security Council
resolution - it's quite explicit. What more remains to be done?
MR. FOLEY: We think that it is prudent and responsible to bring home to him
directly, personally, unmistakably, the seriousness of purpose of the United
States and of the NATO alliance to act if he doesn't reverse course. And if
these (are) initial signs of possible changes on the ground by the Serb
authorities, that they would need to be amplified, and they would need to
become, as I said -- at the risk of repeating myself for a third time -- need to
become irreversible for there to be a change in the possibility of NATO military
action.
QUESTION: How could he give that commitment, though -- irreversibility?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we are not looking for words. We want to hear what
President Milosevic has to say, but we're going to be looking to see what
happens on the ground.
QUESTION: To pull back out of the province?
MR. FOLEY: Yes; the Security Council resolution is very clear. I read at
some length from it, but I'll just repeat the one sentence that really is
more important than any other: "To cease all action by the security forces
affecting the civilian population, and order the withdrawal of security
units used for civilian repression."
I think another point that is significant in the Secretary General's report
today -- which, again, I don't have before me; I can't read from it
directly -- but I understand that he makes the point in that report that
the test of not only the sincerity but the efficacy of any potential Serb
changes of behavior in policy will be found in the attitude of the
internally displaced persons, who number anywhere from 250,000 to 300,000.
Do they feel secure to go back? Clearly, as of today, they do not. There
has been little or no change in that regard, and as we've stated before,
winter is now upon us -- at least in the mountains in Kosovo, and it's
coming elsewhere in Kosovo. So it is simply dramatically urgent that
Milosevic commit himself to complying with and implementing the demands of
the Security Council immediately.
QUESTION: The Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia had comments this
morning which said that if there were air strikes, that it could bring on
another Cold War. Do you find these words helpful; and do you think it is,
in truth, the attitude of the Russian government?
MR. FOLEY: Well, the Russians have to speak for themselves. Secretary
Albright received a telephone call yesterday from Foreign Minister Ivanov,
who called her to brief her on his trip yesterday to Belgrade. Both
Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov agreed on the necessity of
ensuring that Milosevic complies fully with all the international
community's demands. Half-steps are not enough.
So I think that, while it's obvious that the Russians have a different view
from ours about the use of force -- of NATO military force -- that we are
in agreement on the fact that Milosevic has to comply fully with the terms
of the Security Council resolution which the Russians themselves supported.
I believe that the President spoke with President Yeltsin today, and
Mr. Lockhart is or will be making some information about that phone call
available.
QUESTION: Is the Secretary going to Brussels?
MR. FOLEY: The Secretary is considering going to Brussels. I don't believe
a final decision has been made. I think it's, perhaps, likely that she will
be going to Brussels en route home from the Middle East later this
week.
QUESTION: Would that be up for Wednesday's meeting then?
MR. FOLEY: My understanding is that, if this does happen, it would be more
likely to occur on Thursday.
QUESTION: Was any more revealed in the telephone call with Ivanov and
Albright, with regard to what was discussed with Milosevic? Are the
Russians in fact trying - urging -- compliance by the Serbs or do we
know?
MR. FOLEY: That's our understanding, certainly. I don't have a wider
read-out of the conversation; except in answer also to Betsy's earlier
question, I can tell you that all our conversations with Russian officials
in recent days have emphasized the importance of NATO-Russia cooperation in
getting Milosevic's full compliance.
Milosevic cannot be allowed to conclude that there is any "daylight" between
NATO and Russian on the need for full compliance. We certainly believe
that the cooperation between NATO and Russia continues to be in the
national interest of both the United States and Russia.
QUESTION: Did you see Senator Lott's criticisms yesterday that there
appears to be a lack of having thought this thing entirely through on the
part of the Administration, and do you have any response?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we respect Senator Lott's position and his right to
speak his mind on this matter. It's a very serious matter. I think it is
somewhat contradictory to say that Members of Congress have supported
decisive action in Kosovo all along, and now that we're on the verge of it,
to question that action. We think it's very important to be signaling to
Milosevic the United States' resolve in this matter. And I would say
that we would fully expect that Senator Lott and others will support such
action if it becomes necessary.
But the charge, though, that the possibility of NATO military action comes
late in the day is also, I think, not borne out by the facts. I think that
the Administration has consistently - not just in Kosovo, but around the
world - made it a practice to combine diplomacy with the threat of military
force to make diplomacy credible, and with the use of military force when
that becomes necessary. I think in Congress there is, often times, a
greater - because Congress, after all, is not responsible for the conduct
of diplomatic relations - that there's a tendency sometimes to argue for
moving to military force earlier than the Administration would deem
prudent.
We believe that it's very important, and that we'll be judged by the
American people in the context of military action - very important that we
have demonstrated that we've explored all options, that we've worked the
diplomacy to the maximum degree possible and that, in the course of working
the diplomacy, that we've developed the support among our allies and around the
world for the use of force if it becomes necessary.
That's the job of the Administration, and I think the American people
recognize that this is an Administration which has not hesitated to use
force when necessary, but which has done the difficult work of negotiation
and diplomacy as the necessary predicate to the use of military force.
QUESTION: One follow-up - are you able to lay out, even briefly, a
follow-up plan for how to enforce a cease-fire if, in fact, one is agreed
upon?
MR. FOLEY: If the question is "if" there is a political settlement, that will
determine what may or may not happen next. What I can tell you - because
there has been some erroneous reporting on this -- that the Administration
certainly has no plans to use ground forces to enforce compliance with the
Security Council resolution. If there is a political settlement - in other
words, an agreed solution to the conflict in Kosovo - then NATO and the
international community will need to consider ways in which such an
agreement can be implemented.
But neither this Administration nor NATO has made any decisions on this
matter; and obviously, there would have to be a lot of consultations with
allies, with Congress, certainly, as we move forward.
QUESTION: NATO would not, then, be advocating the use of any kind of
ground troops a priori some full settlement? In other words, there's
nothing for NATO to do on the ground in Kosovo while there's still conflict
in progress; is that correct?
MR. FOLEY: That's the implication of what I just said, yes.
QUESTION: Has the United States offered or suggested that it might make
available a mechanized brigade?
MR. FOLEY: Not to my knowledge. As I said, certainly, there have been no
decisions made at the political level. I think military planners normally
do the work of military planning, and look at different contingencies. But
there has been no concrete political guidance approved that I'm aware of.
There has been no political decision either by NATO or by the United States
in that regard. It's simply prudent to plan down the road for what might
happen, in the event that we do have a political settlement, which I think
everyone, around the world and in the United States, would support.
The question is, how would it be implemented? I think military planners
may be looking at different scenarios, but without commitment on the part
of the United States or any NATO allies at this point. I think it would be
irresponsible to try to prejudge that. We don't even have a political
agreement at this point.
QUESTION: Do you have any comments on why Secretary Cohen has canceled
his trip to join Ambassador Holbrooke in Brussels?
MR. FOLEY: I'd have to refer you to the Pentagon.
QUESTION: Can I get you to comment on a report out today that suggests
that the Administration did not consult members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the FBI Director before launching missiles at suspected terrorist
sites in wake of the bombings; and also that there's no strong evidence
linking bin Laden to the bombings?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I can certainly comment on your latter point. We
continue to stand by what we've said from the beginning - from the very day
that we launched those strikes on the chemical plant in Sudan. We are very
confident in the information which led us to take that decision, based on
our belief that this was a plant that was involved in the production of pre-
cursor chemicals for chemical weapons. We continue to stand by our
statements and believe very strongly in our evidence.
In terms of the chain of command involved in launching the attack, I'd have
to refer you to the Pentagon. I am almost certain that General Shelton was
closely involved in the military operation; but that's a matter for the
Pentagon to comment on.
QUESTION: Reportedly, there is a general feeling among the Turkish
policy-makers, that because of the Middle East peace process, America is
being soft on Syria relating to terrorism, especially on harboring PKK.
Turks say that after all these years, the US is still suggesting Turkey
settle it with political means. Do you have anything on that?
MR. FOLEY: Well, the latter part of what you said is true - that we are
urging a political and diplomatic solution - absolutely true.
However, your premise is, frankly -- I don't say it's yours, but those
commentators who are suggesting that - is completely without foundation.
We would take issue with any suggestion that the peace process is linked to
support for terrorist organizations such as the PKK. The Administration's
position on the PKK in countries which offer it safe haven or support is
well-known. We have designated the PKK as a foreign terrorist organization
under the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Death Penalty Act, and we have long urged
that Syria cease its support of the PKK. Our policy on that is not in any
way affected by developments in the peace process.
In terms of the current situation -- if you're going to ask a question
about the situation involving Turkey and Syria and the PKK - we understand
that while there has been some harsh rhetoric exchanged on both sides,
nevertheless, both Turkey and Syria have expressed their support on the
need to settle their dispute through diplomatic means; and we certainly
agree with that view. President Mubarak has sought to defuse the
situation. He visited Damascus over the weekend; he has been in Ankara, I
believe, today or tomorrow. We certainly support his efforts to resolve
the situation through diplomatic means.
QUESTION: Did the Secretary call the Turkish Foreign Minister or the
Turkish Prime Minister on this subject?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware of that. I can try to check for you. Of course,
she's flying right now en route to the Middle East.
QUESTION: Before that, for example, all weekend -- because the tension
is up.
MR. FOLEY: I can try and get that answer for you.
QUESTION: So do you believe what's happening in Turkey at this point is
rhetoric -- it's not as serious as it seems to be?
MR. FOLEY: I would not discount the seriousness of the situation.
Precisely because it's serious, we're calling on both Turkey and Syria to
address the problem through peaceful political and diplomatic means.
QUESTION: And any plans to twist the arm of Syria in this process?
MR. FOLEY: Well I've restated our long-standing position in this regard:
That we have designated the PKK as a terrorist organization. Syria is on
this list of state sponsors of terrorism precisely because they've given
safe haven or allowed a safe haven for terrorist organizations such as the
PKK. We've made it very clear -- our view to the Syrian authorities --
that it should cease its support of the PKK.
QUESTION: Is the PKK functioning in Syria?
MR. FOLEY: My understanding is that some members of the PKK leadership
reside in Syria. That is my understanding.
QUESTION: And why you are designating PKK as a terrorist organization, not
the Turkish state who destroyed 2,000 villages of the Kurdish people two
years ago up to the ground?
MR. FOLEY: Well, as you know, Turkish forces have entered northern Iraq in
the past for limited periods, usually in an effort to destroy bases and
arms caches of the terrorist PKK. We've always supported or consistently
supported the right of Turkey to defend itself against terrorism, as long
as those incursions are limited in scope and duration and fully respect the
rights of the civilian inhabitants in the region.
QUESTION: Why are you making the connection between Syria and northern
Iraq?
MR. FOLEY: I thought that was your question. Maybe I misunderstood.
QUESTION: No. I said you are designating PKK as a terrorist organization,
and I am asking why not the Turkish state who have destroyed to the ground
2,000 Kurdish villages in Southeast Turkey, killing (inaudible) thousands
of Kurds?
MR. FOLEY: I thought you were talking about northern Iraq. Well, I would
refer you to our human rights report on this.
QUESTION: And how do you plan to mediate for this dispute between Syria
and Turkey?
MR. FOLEY: How do we --
QUESTION: How do you plan to mediate, the State Department?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we're certainly talking to both governments. I'm not
aware that we have a special mediation effort. We also support President
Mubarak's efforts.
QUESTION: One more follow-up question to the embassy bombings: Do you
know why the Administration didn't alert the FBI so that people in the
region could protect themselves?
MR. FOLEY: It's the first I've heard of that report. I'd have to take
the question. I'm not sure we would have an answer for it.
QUESTION: The New Yorker -- the piece that's in The New Yorker magazine
today --
MR. FOLEY: I haven't read The New Yorker today.
QUESTION: This paper in Argentina today states that they had asked
access to a special report of the United States Senate that said that the
US Ambassador, Peter Galbraith, had given the "green light" representing the
United States Government in order to use friendly states to sell arms to
Bosnians and Croats during the civil war. Can you comment on that?
MR. FOLEY: I heard a few hours ago that there were stories in the
Argentine press to that effect this morning. Certainly, there was a United
Nations arms embargo in place for Croatia and Bosnia at the time. The
policy of the United States Government was certainly to support this embargo.
But I'd have to take that question to see if I could get a considered
answer for you.
QUESTION: On the Middle East peace talks, what does the Secretary see --
MR. FOLEY: Let me warn you, though, in advance, if you haven't been here
before - when the Secretary is traveling in the given region, I'm unlikely
to comment on it.
QUESTION: Can I try anyway?
MR. FOLEY: You can try, sure. I'll send your question to Mr. Rubin.
QUESTION: Okay. In advance of her trip, obviously, since she hasn't
begun yet, what does the Secretary view as the main obstacle she has to
overcome in this trip in order to craft a deal on the interim agreement
between Israel and the Palestinians?
MR. FOLEY: Again, I'm not going to get into the details of a trip she has
embarked on. Moreover, Mr. Rubin has never engaged on those kinds of
details. He's described in general terms the range of issues that need to
be addressed, that need to be resolved and agreed upon, if we're going to
succeed in closing the interim issues and move on to accelerated permanent
status negotiations. There are a whole range of issues having to do with
security, having to do with further redeployments and time-outs, and some
of the interim issues involving the seaport and the (Gaza) industrial
estate and safe passage. There are any number of issues on which we've
seen progress, in which there are some final gaps that she's hoping to
close, and to see closed at the times the parties meet here in the United
States in a couple of weeks.
QUESTION: In Sunday's Post, there was a report that former Defense
Secretary Perry may be named as our new senior negotiator with the North
Koreans. I was wondering whether you had any comment on that.
MR. FOLEY: I do not. We're certainly looking at ways, discussing
internally, to intensify our engagement on this all-important issue.
But I have no information on any such nomination.
QUESTION: Last week it was reported in the Dutch press and Friday also,
in The New York Times, that an El Al aircraft that crashed in Amsterdam in
1992 was carrying pre-cursor material to Sarin nerve gas from the United
States to Israel. I wonder, has the United States Government been aware of
the export of this product to Israel? Has it been monitoring this? And is
the United States Government satisfied with the Israeli assurance that the
product is only used for the testing of certain filters?
MR. FOLEY: I may have something for you after the briefing. We had some
information on that last week that I didn't bring today, since it was last
week's news; but we'll get that for you after the briefing.
QUESTION: Greek Under Secretary -- (inaudible) - met today with Mr.
Thomas Pickering here at the State Department. Do you have anything on
that?
MR. FOLEY: Met with Mr. Thomas --
QUESTION: Pickering.
MR. FOLEY: Oh, thank you, I didn't quite understand the question. No, I
have no read-out.
QUESTION: And also, did you have the chance to look at Mr. Grossman's
record to prominent Greek-Americans that along with Imia, 132 Greek islands
of the Aegean should be entrusted to the International Court of Justice?
MR. FOLEY: I'd refer you to the answer I gave you on that question last
week.
Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 2:10 P.M.)
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