U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #82, 98-07-07
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
980
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Tuesday, July 7, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS
1 Belarus: Further Violations of Vienna Convention
BELARUS
1-4 U.S. Reaction to Further Violations of Vienna Convention
2-3 Motive for Actions/Est. of U.S. Embassy/U.S. Employees
1-3 Possible U.S. Response to Violations
PEACE PROCESS
4-5 UN General Assembly Decision to Upgrade Status of PLO
5,6 Lack of Support for U.S. Position/Russian Support of UN
Action
6 U.S. policy Re. Palestinian Statehood
5,6-8 Status of Peace Process/Effect of UN decision on Peace
Process/ U.S. contact with parties
NO. IRELAND
8 U.S. View on Parades
BURMA
8-9 Troop Deployments/Restriction of Freedom of Movement
INDIA/PAKISTAN
9-10 Discrepancies in Chaudry's Story/Status of Asylum Request
10 Update on Talbott-Kahn meetings/Talbott Itinerary
10-11 Regional Nonproliferation
BAHAMAS
11 Helicopter Crash
SERBIA (KOSOVO)
11 Creation of Observer Mission
12 Hill & Holbrooke Contacts/Objectives of Talks
12,14 Planning for the Use of Force
12-13 Identification/Purpose/Selection of Independent Observers
13,14-15 KLA
INDONESIA
15 Violence Against Protesters in Irian Jaya
CHINA
15-16 Meeting under Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #82
TUESDAY, JULY 7, 1998, 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. Today is
Tuesday, that would make tomorrow Wednesday.
Let me start - we have one statement today. The Government of Belarus has
again demonstrated its contempt for international law and international
relations. Today our Charge d'Affaires in Minsk and the Charges from all
other embassies having residence in the Drozdy neighborhood were given an
ultimatum by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to notify the Government of
Belarus by 11:00 tomorrow of our intention to remove all the furnishings
from our residences. That is, they're asking the American and other
embassy officials to notify their intention to remove furnishings.
The ultimatum goes on to state, if that response is not provided by 11:00
a.m., the Government of Belarus intends to enter the residences, remove the
furnishings and take control of the buildings. This provocation by the
government is another in a series of violations of the Vienna Convention.
We call on Belarus to stop this self-destructive course of action and honor
its obligations under the Vienna Convention. We repeat our view, as stated
yesterday, a residence of a chief of mission is inviolable. It is
unequivocally protected by the Vienna Convention. We expect the Government
of Belarus to rescind its demand, and we require the government to replace
the fences that have been removed from our property, remove representatives
from our property and permit us to post our own guards and return to a
position where they are no longer in violation of the Vienna Convention.
QUESTION: What happens if they don't back off?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we have options. We are not yet prepared to describe
what our intentions are. But clearly, at a minimum, what Belarus is doing
here is further isolating itself from the world. This is not just the
United States we're talking about; we're talking about a whole series of
countries. We're talking about an apparent decision on the part of the
government there, that is not new - which is to isolate itself from the
rest of the world; to take decisions that are, in a series, a pattern
of disrespect for the rule of law and disrespect for the obvious need of
the citizens of Belarus to integrate themselves greater into Europe and the
world.
With each passing day and each time the Belarus authorities escalate the
situation and act in further violation of the Vienna Convention, they are
making that harder. With respect to any specific response that we may have,
let me just say that we are going to respect the basic principles of the
Vienna Convention; but we will certainly exercise our rights under the
convention and international law, which include the right to respond as
appropriate to violations of that convention.
QUESTION: Jamie, could you just remind me again about what the excuse is
the Government of Belarus is using for these extreme measures?
MR. RUBIN: Well, they've made a series of excuses, none of them, in our
view, having any justification. Presumably, they want to use this property
for some other purpose. But regardless of their reason, we have valid
leases and we have the Vienna Convention behind us. What they are doing is
violating not only the lease that we have, but also a basic principle of
international behavior.
Essentially, this is the ultimate act of rudeness. We are guests there in
the sense that we are - they wanted to have relations with other countries.
The Vienna Convention codifies what is essentially the oldest tradition in
history between nations and peoples; and that is, when you have a guest,
that you don't snub that guest and act in a rude way. This has been
codified in very practical terms to create an inviolability of an
ambassador's residence. But this is not only a violation of the Vienna
Convention, but is fundamentally rude.
QUESTION: Jamie, have they said that the mission can reopen once they've
done their repairs?
MR. RUBIN: I think their position is we could reopen somewhere else.
QUESTION: Oh, they not only ask you to leave during an interim period
while they say --
MR. RUBIN: It's pretty clear to us they're trying to retake the
property.
QUESTION: To take it away?
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: And that would involve, I guess, the seizure of American
taxpayers' assets; is that not right?
MR. RUBIN: Well, it depends on whether the furnishings - I mean, we're
getting down to a level of specificity I wouldn't be able to answer. It
would depend on whether the furnishings in the residence - it's a residence,
it's not the embassy - belong to the ambassador or whether they belong to
the government. I am sure there are materials, in the sense of phones or
furniture or other provisions that are provided to an ambassador, that
would fall under the rubric of national goods. But I'm sure there
are also some personal effects.
QUESTION: Certainly the money used to pay the lease is --
MR. RUBIN: Absolutely, yes.
QUESTION: You said earlier that any response you might have, the options
you're considering would come under the Vienna Convention. How does the
Vienna Convention - if it does - how does it address this issue? I mean,
for example, if you're not going to violate the Vienna Convention, does
that mean you cannot take steps against the Belarus diplomats here?
MR. RUBIN: Without falling into the usual refuge of a spokesman, which is
that it's up to the lawyers to interpret the Vienna Convention, let me say
it is my understanding that when there is a violation of this kind, it is
customary, under international law, for the country that is the other party
- in this case, us - to take an appropriate and proportionate response to a
violation. So we would be legally within our rights internationally - under
customary international law - to take an appropriate and proportionate
response.
As you know, we have already, for this very reason - because of their
attempt to take over their embassy - told their ambassador not to bother
coming back to the United States. We have recalled our ambassador from
Belarus. And whether we decide to take other appropriate and proportional
responses is something that remains to be determined. Obviously, we hope
they don't go forward and invade the premises of an ambassador - the
residence of an ambassador and remove the furnishings and continue down
this path of lawlessness.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - no intention of meeting the 11:00 a.m. deadline
to file a statement --
MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard anybody suggest that.
QUESTION: Jamie, how long have we had an embassy in Belarus, and how
large is it?
MR. RUBIN: I believe we have about 10 or 11 people there of different
types. Presumably at some point after the break-up of the Soviet Union, it
was established. I wouldn't know the date of its establishment, but it was
soon after the break-up in '91. I suspect it took some time to create a
separate residence and embassy there, but it's roughly a dozen people.
QUESTION: Why do you think they're doing this?
MR. RUBIN: Again, they seem to have some view that they would like to use
the land for some other purpose. As I indicated in response to an earlier
question, they may have some loopy notion that this is part of the desire
to expand this desirable property for their leadership. But there is no
justifiable reason, and, therefore, I don't particularly care to articulate
their reason in any effective way, because there is no justification.
There's a lease that we have, there's the Vienna Convention. This is
an act of lawlessness that people can't remember having taken place
in peace time in a normal diplomatic relationship ever.
QUESTION: Jamie, what message does the United States take from President
Lukashenko's handling of this situation? What message in his posture
towards the United States and towards the West and towards the aid and so
forth?
MR. RUBIN: Well, this is the latest in a pattern of lawlessness and
disrespect for the rule of law pursued by this government, led by
Lukashenko. We've seen him try to kick out people who are doing basic
observation of human rights and other democratic practices. We've seen him
terminate a parliament and pack it with his own people. We've seen him
commit a series of acts in contravention of the rule of law. The message we
take from this is that their leadership doesn't care about the rule of law,
doesn't care about the opportunity to bring their people into a Europe in
which they can prosper and advance their interests, and is acting like
an authoritarian dictator who is unable to understand the basic difference
between right and wrong.
QUESTION: Acting as an authoritarian dictator or he is an authoritarian
dictator?
MR. RUBIN: Well, certainly, it's a government that's led by one man and
he rules by decree, so however you want to define that. But I think I added
on to authoritarian dictator, who does not know the difference between
right and wrong.
QUESTION: The decision by the General Assembly to upgrade the status of
the PLO?
MR. RUBIN: Let me start by saying that we regret this decision. We think
this was a mistake. We think that this decision undermines the chances of
bringing peace to the Middle East. It undermines those very people who it
was presumably designed to help. And it may be a symbolic victory for some,
but it makes it harder to prevent the two sides from not taking unilateral
actions that can harm the peace process.
This was an unilateral action that we believe was unnecessary and untimely,
not to mention the precedent we think it unfortunately set for those in the
observer category at the United Nations.
QUESTION: Why do you say unilateral, when it was taken as a vote by all
the nations in the General Assembly?
MR. RUBIN: Well, our basic view of this is, there are two parties in the
peace process - the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority. And when one of
those takes an action affecting a final status issue, that's a unilateral
act. This was an idea pushed by the Palestinian Authority
and was, therefore, a unilateral act.
QUESTION: And this comes despite assurances to the Secretary, directly
from Arafat, that he would not do this.
MR. RUBIN: Are you asserting something or asking me a question?
QUESTION: I'm asking a question.
MR. RUBIN: Okay. That is not what Arafat told the Secretary. He offered
to delay it in the hopes of seeing whether it would dissipate; but he did
not offer to not do it. He never said he would not do it; he did not say
that. He agreed to delay it for many days at her request, and did so for
over a week.
QUESTION: We were told that she expressed her views about the action, and
he --
MR. RUBIN: Correct. He certainly took the view, despite our public view
that this is a unilateral action and our private request of him that he not
pursue it, that's a fact. But that we received an assurance that he
wouldn't do it is not a fact.
QUESTION: Were you disappointed that only three countries joined the
United States in opposition?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, we're disappointed that other countries didn't understand
the fact that the way to make peace in the Middle East is to promote
dialogue between the two parties and not to pursue symbolic steps that may
feel good but do no good. We think this is a step that doesn't advance the
serious work of negotiations, that doesn't make it easier for the parties
to rebuild the trust and confidence they need to come to yes in this
important time period.
We are pushing very hard, we believe there's a sense of urgency in getting
closure on how to put the peace process back on track. Therefore, it's no
time to be seeking symbolic victories; and that's why we think this was a
mistake.
QUESTION: Jamie, some have argued that Israel has, in effect, brought
this upon itself by shilly-shallying over the peace process and, in
particular, over the American ideas.
MR. RUBIN: And you're asking if we share that view?
QUESTION: Do you share that view?
QUESTION: Are you shillying with them?
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - clearly, the peace process is not in good
shape. It has been in bad shape for over a year now. We are working every
day as hard as we can to try to put it back on track. We are not interested,
at this stage, in apportioning blame for that problem. We're interested in
solving the problem, and not interested in name-calling that is often part
of this process.
So at this point, the blame for this act goes with those who took it. They
made a decision to reject the logic of no unilateral acts and go forward.
We regret that, and we think it was a mistake.
QUESTION: You said it was a symbolic step. But I mean, they have been
granted now additional rights and privileges. So in that sense, is it not a
step toward statehood?
MR. RUBIN: Well, it's symbolic in the sense that it doesn't change their
basic international - it doesn't make them a state, for example.
QUESTION: No, but it's closer to that, is it not?
MR. RUBIN: Well, it's sort of like - I was going to make an analogy that
I think would have gotten me in trouble. But you're either a state or
you're not a state; you're not closer to a state.
Can you imagine what my analogy was?
QUESTION: The current US policy toward Palestinian statehood - if it
should be unilaterally declared?
MR. RUBIN: We do not believe in unilateral actions in the area of issues
that are reserved for final status. That means Jerusalem, it means water,
it means refugees, it means the boundaries of the territory borders. It
also, therefore, means this very question. So we do not believe that it is
a good idea to take steps to try to prejudge those issues. For those very
reasons, we do not believe it would be wise for us to state our view
of this issue. This is something that is to be determined in the
final status, permanent status talks that we are working hard to create.
Rather than prejudging those by an American view, we believe that should be
left to the parties to talk about, if we can ever get to permanent status
talks.
QUESTION: And just to follow up, is that at all a change in American
position?
MR. RUBIN: No. I know there are some people who are using their
microscopes to try to change a word here or change a word there. But
certainly since I've taken my practice course in what to say on this
question, it's always been the same; and that was some time ago.
QUESTION: Wouldn't you have expected the co-sponsor of the peace process,
the Russians, would have supported you in this?
MR. RUBIN: They're entitled to make their own decisions. We think that
their decision was the wrong one.
QUESTION: The Secretary yesterday, when she was asked about the peace
process, she indicated we were getting closer to, I guess, an agreement.
Can you elaborate on that? How are you getting closer?
MR. RUBIN: The Secretary, I think, spoke over three or four times -
probably three or four times over the weekend with Prime Minister
Netanyahu. There have been some reports out of Israel that they are looking
to try to move on this in a matter of days.
It's our view that there is a sense of urgency here. We think that the
sooner we can get an agreement and the sooner we can get Israel to agree to
the US ideas, the better it will be for the people of Israel, the people of
the Palestinian Authority, the people of the Middle East and the people of
the world. So we are working very hard. I can't even begin to enumerate
the number of phone calls, the number of discussions, the amount of
time that we have devoted to try to bridge the remaining gaps. We are
continuing to do that.
What the Secretary was indicating was, we are making progress; we have
narrowed gaps; we are getting closer. If we were not getting closer in
these efforts, we would stop them and make it clear that there was no point
in continuing. So as long as we think we're making progress and we're
getting closer to the goal, we are going to continue to make them. So we
have been making progress across the board, but we, as I've said before, in
this area, an inch is as good as a mile in terms of not being able to
close completely.
So we have not been able to close. We have made progress across the board
steadily for many weeks now. But unless we're able to close soon, we are
not going to be able to achieve the objective, and we will say so.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - concur with these Israeli reports that it's a
matter of days?
MR. RUBIN: Well, as I understood the reporting, it is that they would
like - they're suggesting that the Israeli Government decide whether it
wants to finish yes or no in a number of days; not that we're going to get
to yes in a number of days.
QUESTION: Are these media reports?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, media reports.
QUESTION: Jamie, where was the progress made?
MR. RUBIN: Well, as I said, across the board. There are a number of
issues that we've been talking about, primarily in the area of how to get
reciprocal actions by the Palestinians in the areas of fighting terrorism,
getting an infrastructure to fight terrorism and making sure that
infrastructure is front-loaded in a parallel process by which the Israelis
would redeploy territory pursuant to Oslo, as the Palestinians implemented
the necessary infrastructure to fight terrorism pursuant to Oslo. So those
two areas are the primary areas where there has been significant progress.
But again, in this business, significant progress could end up not leading
to a result because it's often in the final stretch when the parties are
unwilling to make the necessary decisions.
QUESTION: So what did the Palestinians agree to do?
MR. RUBIN: We're not going to get into any specifics, other than to give
you the categories; and I've tried to do that as specifically as I
can.
QUESTION: On Northern Ireland, I was wondering if you had any contacts
with any of the parties concerning the situation with the Orangemen
procession?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know what specific contact has been made, but I can
say we understand the deep emotions evoked by the commemorative marches in
Northern Ireland, and the difficult choices that the appointed parades
commissions must make. Public safety and the rights of both communities
must be taken into consideration. We urge responsible leaders in both
communities to abide by the parade commission's decisions, and to work to
diffuse the current impasse. That is our view; and to the extent that we
have communicated with anyone, I'm sure that is what we said in general
terms.
QUESTION: Do you have George Mitchell on this?
MR. RUBIN: I assume that George Mitchell's views are sought; but whether
he's actively involved in the day-to-day process, I just don't know.
QUESTION: There are reports from Burma that there are unusual troop
deployments in Rangoon. July 7th is the anniversary of one of the student
demonstrations, and this entire month is a month that the SLORC is touchy
about because there have been many demonstrations this month. Do you have
any confirmed reports about --
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any information about the deployment of troops. I
am aware that at about 1700 hours July 7th in Rangoon, a senior NLD
official informed the US Embassy that the Party General Secretary, Aung San
Sui Kyi, and chairman were stopped - sometimes they abbreviate these things,
to my torture - were stopped by police while traveling north of Rangoon on
the way to visit a member of parliament-elect of the NLD. At the time of
this report, it appeared that police have ordered the party leaders to
return to Rangoon. However, Aung San Sui Kyi and the party chairman
have insisted on their right to continue on their way for the purpose
of visiting this member of parliament.
Based on this information, we condemn the apparent abridgment of Aung San
Sui Kyi's right to freedom of movement and her right to visit whomever she
chooses. All Burmese should enjoy these fundamental rights. The restrictions
imposed are illegal under Burmese law, in our view, and in any case are
clearly infringements of the basic rights of freedom of movement.
We've sought clarification from the government there, and expressed our
grave concern to government authorities. We reaffirm the strong US position
that the freedom of movement should be accorded to members of the
opposition, including Aung San Sui Kyi and the party chairman, who are
right now apparently being denied the access of this fundamental right.
That is the latest report we have out of Burma. I don't have any information
on troop movements.
QUESTION: When you say you sought clarification from the government, are
you expecting some kind of response from them?
MR. RUBIN: Well, normally that's what we expect, yes, is some response to
our seeking clarification. But I don't have that response yet.
QUESTION: How would that happen through the embassy?
MR. RUBIN: We have a charge there.
QUESTION: Right, so that's how it would --
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: So who has the issue been raised with? Is it - (inaudible) --
MR. RUBIN: We've raised it with the government. I don't understand your
question.
QUESTION: I mean in what form? Was there a phone call made to somebody;
was there a letter sent? I mean, how --
MR. RUBIN: I'm sure he either phoned -- called them or visited them or
talked to them. I doubt it was done in a letter; this is a real-time
issue.
QUESTION: Did you see the story about the Pakistani deserter this morning
- additional doubt was cast about his story? Are you prepared to call him a
fraud?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I certainly hope he'll get the same attention that he
got before, as people are raising increasing doubts about him. But that's
not for me to judge, other than to express my opinion.
We have stated before that we note significant discrepancies in his story
as reported in the press. After his arrival here, US officials interviewed
him and reviewed his story. Apparently others have come to the same or
similar conclusions as we have.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - asylum request?
MR. RUBIN: Well, that's really up to INS officials to make a judgment on
what basis to allow him in. I'm just saying that based on our interviews
and our knowledge, we noted significant discrepancies in his story and we
noted that we had no information to support it; and apparently, others have
reached similar conclusions.
QUESTION: Would you say that if he wasn't in danger before, if he went
back, he certainly has achieved his goal of --
MR. RUBIN: Well, it's up to the INS to make a judgment of what the
relevant immigration regulations would provide in different circumstances.
I suspect he would be in danger, in his view, in either way. So it's not a
question of how he defines that danger; it's a question of what the
regulations are.
QUESTION: I'm interested in the discussion that was taking place between
Secretary Talbott and Mr. Kahn from Pakistan yesterday.
MR. RUBIN: Well, they did have extensive meetings. They discussed the
situation in South Asia, following India and Pakistan's nuclear tests. They
had positive and constructive meetings and set the stage for further talks
with the Pakistanis. They discussed non-proliferation, obviously, and
exchanged views on how best to ease tensions in the region. We intend to
continue our senior-level dialogues with Pakistan and India to meet our non-
proliferation objectives.
As you know, the Deputy Secretary will meet Mr. Jaswant Singh in Frankfurt
on July 9, and we intend to continue to take advantage of appropriate
opportunities in this area.
With regard to reports about what Indian officials are suggesting their
intentions are, we strongly believe - this is with respect to minimum
deterrent and other matters that I think you asked me about - we strongly
believe that the deployment of nuclear weapons in South Asia would be a
dangerous development - one that would seriously undermine the security of
both India and Pakistan.
Many multilateral bodies and individual countries have called upon India
and Pakistan to take clear and meaningful steps in non-proliferation,
including refraining from nuclear tests; refraining from deployment of
nuclear weapons; refraining from deployment of ballistic missiles; and
signing the Comprehensive Test Ban immediately and without conditions; and
finally, refraining from further production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons. So obviously, all that is inconsistent with some desire to
maintain some minimum nuclear deterrent posture, which we think would
be a grave mistake.
We also want to see both parties seriously engage in negotiations on a
fissile material cut-off. We want to work with both India and Pakistan to
bring them into compliance with these international norms. That is one of
the goals of Deputy Secretary Talbott's discussions and the continuing goal
of the Administration.
QUESTION: Did he indicate or show some willingness to sign the CTBT?
MR. RUBIN: I think we'd prefer to let the other countries describe their
own positions for themselves. What I can tell you is that we don't believe
we're on the verge of a major breakthrough in this area. We think that it's
up to India and Pakistan to make some important decisions, and we're
hopeful that some of the dialogue in India now is a signal that they maybe
have realized the wisdom of going forward with the Comprehensive Test Ban.
But we are not on the verge of achieving that at this point; we're in the
process of discussing it.
QUESTION: Jamie, one newspaper says today that Strobe told them that in
addition to meeting Mr. Singh in Frankfurt this week, he's also going to
actually go to India later in the month; is that correct?
MR. RUBIN: I think that there is always discussion about possible travel.
But for now, the only meetings that are determined are the ones in
Frankfurt and here. With respect to the President's trip, that is on hold
pending further discussion. So I'm not ruling out a visit of some officials
to the region, but the President's trip is on hold, and we have made no
decision on further travel at this time.
QUESTION: Do you have any information about a helicopter crash in the
Bahamas last night? I understand it was, perhaps, a counter-narcotics
effort related incident. But was there any State Department involvement?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, there was a helicopter crash. I'm not aware of any State
Department involvement directly; other than to say that it was a crash of
the Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Island helicopter, and it is a
counter-narcotics program. But the details of this crash really need to be
addressed by the Pentagon or the regional unit spokesman in the region.
QUESTION: Tomorrow is going to be the eighth meeting of the Contact
Group. Richard Holbrooke is back now from Kosovo. What happened in his
meetings there; where do things stand? And what do you expect to come out
of tomorrow's meeting of the Contact Group?
MR. RUBIN: Well, first of all, the Contact Group set out as one of the
most important conditions is to get international access to the region
where this conflict is going on. We have now created the Kosovo Observer
Mission, which was launched yesterday. It's a mission to observe and report
on the general freedom of movement throughout Kosovo. And it is important
not least to improve access by humanitarian relief organizations, but also
to report on overall security conditions. It will build, we hope,
confidence through an overt international precedence with non-obtrusive
observer teams that will observe and report on NGOs, on security conditions
and activities in Kosovo, on the situation of internally displaced
persons.
Each of the groups will operate under the operational authority of the
chief of mission; in our case, Richard Miles. We're trying to establish a
center in Pristina to coordinate activities on the ground for all the
different embassies participating. Each embassy will control its own
people. The observers will not escort relief convoys, but will observe and
report on how they're doing. It is a peaceful mission, and we expect and
demand full access and freedom of movement as this mission is performed.
That was one of the four requirements of the Contact Group -- to make
sure that we have independent access, independent information.
With respect to the other elements of the demands of the Contact Group,
that the humanitarian organizations get the access that they need; with
respect that the forces are withdrawn from Kosovo that were placed there
that were involved in the crackdown; and with respect to the negotiations,
we have been discussing on many tracks - and this is not a question of
Ambassador Holbrooke having a meeting and then there being a break. Frankly,
Ambassador Holbrooke was piggybacking on the work that Ambassador Hill has
been doing on a daily basis. He has been in daily contact with the Serb
side and the Kosovar side in trying to build a negotiated solution.
The negotiated solution has to start from two basic premises: number one,
both sides have to realize that the use of force is not going to achieve
their objectives for them and is only going to make the situation worse;
number two, that there has to be some compromise between the desire of some
in the Kosovar Albanian side for independence, which is not going to happen,
and the refusal by President Milosevic to give the people there the
freedoms and human rights that they deserve. That is what caused the
problem - him stripping Kosovar Albanians of their rights and radicalizing
the population with the use of force.
So this is the nature of the problem. This is a full court diplomatic
press; it's going to go on for some time. One would not expect this to be
immediately resolved. This is something that developed over time and grew
into this rather - this conflict in which there is radicalization on the
part of the Kosovar Albanians. What the Contact Group is going to try to do
is come to some agreement on what the objectives ought to be for this
negotiated outcome, and talk a little bit about modalities for achieving
those objectives. I think they will get a report from Ambassador Hill on
what he's been doing with the Kosovar Albanians and what he's been
doing with the Serbs, especially President Milosevic; and prepare
itself for what might come in the future.
Obviously, one of the elements of this is the contingency planning that
continues at NATO on an accelerated basis to be able to meet a variety of
options tasked by NATO military and political authorities. But in the
meantime, we're focused on this negotiated outcome, and it's going to be
long, hard slogging.
QUESTION: What would it take for the United States to push NATO to
intervene militarily?
MR. RUBIN: Well, you're asking the question, I presume, to be what would
it take for us to decide to use military force, let alone decide to push
NATO or get an agreement from NATO. We're not going to set out criteria
here. We believe that this is a case where planning for the use of force is
justified. Whether we decide to implement that planning is a matter for the
Commander-in-Chief to decide, and I don't intend to prejudge that.
QUESTION: Could you give us a little more detail on these teams? Will
they consist of people from several countries? How large might they be?
Would they just be diplomats?
MR. RUBIN: They will be - the teams will be diplomatic. They're called an
observer mission, and they're operated under the authority of the chief of
mission; therefore, they are diplomatic observers. I think my understanding
is the US will eventually have 12 observers making up six two-person teams.
The other embassies will have to talk about what they're prepared to
provide.
The observers will be in white vehicles, identified by a national flag and
signs that indicate "diplomatic observers." In addition, each observer will
have an armband with diplomatic observer spelled out in white lettering.
It's a peaceful mission. They don't have a mandate to resolve problems. The
mandate is to observe and report so that next time, if there is a problem,
we have accurate independent information and that can be the basis for the
international community making decisions. Often in these Contact Group
meetings or in NATO settings, in the absence of independently confirmed
information, those who want to end up on one side or the other of an issue
believe what they want to hear and say what they want to believe. In this
case, if you have independent observers, you are going to have an
independent judgment of what happened if the thing were to deteriorate
even further.
Furthermore, the very presence of those independent observers will
hopefully deter, in a sense, the kind of knowing that they will be able to
report freely and observe and report on what happened, hopefully will deter
people from doing what they might otherwise do if they were not going to be
observed and reported on.
QUESTION: If they come upon a fire fight that's going on, a battle --
MR. RUBIN: They're not to intervene; they're to observe and report about
it.
QUESTION: Are they, in fact, diplomats - foreign service officer type
diplomats, or are they military people assigned to the embassy who become
diplomatic? What kind of individuals are we talking about?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we'll have to get you some detail on where these people
are all going to come from, wherever they might come from; but they are
diplomatic observers.
QUESTION: Do you have any ideas on what the Contact Group could propose
to promote some unity in the Kosovar Albanian leadership?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, there are efforts going on. Ambassador Hill has
been working with a number of people in the State Department about
different ways in which to try to bridge this important gap in the
principle - on the one hand, of independence, on the other hand, of
stripped autonomy. So we have to find something in between that is
acceptable to both sides at least, perhaps to talk about at first. So
that's the challenge of the diplomats, but I wouldn't want to pre-announce
any particular conclusion on how you would do that. But the parameter again
is, short of independence and far more autonomy and human rights and
freedoms than now exist for the Kosovar Albanians.
QUESTION: Let me make sure the number - you said that six out of 12 is
going to be from the US side?
MR. RUBIN: Twelve Americans - six teams of two.
QUESTION: You just said that the US Government believes that the military
intervention into Kosovo is justified. Can you give us some rationale? What
are the reasons; how is it justified?
MR. RUBIN: It's funny you said that, because that isn't what I said. I
said that planning for possible military intervention is justified.
QUESTION: How do you justify it?
MR. RUBIN: We believe that there is a threat to international peace and
security that has been created by the refugees pouring out of the borders.
There are tens of thousands of refugees in neighboring lands. This is not
the first time the international community has regarded the destabilization
created by refugees as justification if appropriate for the planning for
the use of force. So this is not new.
We've made very clear that we think the stability of Europe is a national
security interest of the United States. We've made very clear that this
situation, depending on how it evolves, affects the national security of
the United States because it affects the stability of Europe. The Contact
Group itself, in its statement, which you might want to take a look at,
made very clear that the situation in Kosovo is posing a threat to the
security and stability of Europe; that's the rationale.
QUESTION: New subject - Indonesia - do you have anything --
MR. RUBIN: Do you have more on this?
QUESTION: Yes, one more. Earlier Ambassador Chris Hill had referred to
the KLA as a terrorist organization. Does the United States feel that that
was a mistake? And how do you view the KLA today?
MR. RUBIN: Usually that is attributed to a different ambassador; but that
other ambassador claims he didn't say it either.
QUESTION: That was Gelbard.
MR. RUBIN: Right, that's okay. Neither ambassador wants to be credited
with that statement. But let me take more seriously the answer as
follows.
There is no question that there have been acts committed by people
affiliated in some way or another with the Kosovar Liberation Army that we
have condemned because they have been the use of military or the use of
force against innocents, and therefore are condemnable and, in a specific
sense, could be considered terrorist acts because they are the use of
violence against innocents in the furtherance of a political cause.
That is not the same as declaring an organization or a group of individuals
who have some affiliation a terrorist organization. That is not our view of
the KLA; it never has been. The terrorist organization designation has a
certain meaning in the Department of State, especially from this podium. It
carries with it a whole series of legal requirements to prohibit the
raising of money for that purpose, and it carries with it a requirement on
our part to go through extensive legal work to prove that.
It is our view that those affiliated with the KLA are engaged in an
insurgency, and they are trying to win back freedoms that were lost during
the crackdown by the Serbian authorities and were lost by the stripping of
the autonomy of the people of Kosovo. But in so doing, they are declaring
an objective that we think is wholly unrealistic and is simply not going to
happen; that is the independence of Kosovo.
There have been individuals affiliated with that organization who have
committed acts that we condemn. But let's bear in mind the bottom line here
- the bottom line is that the primary burden for the problem in Kosovo
rests on the shoulders of Slobodan Milosevic who, number one, stripped
these people of their autonomy, took away their basic rights; and number
two, used heavy military equipment in a violent crackdown that involved the
killing of innocents. So we have very strong views about who's responsible
for the situation. But that doesn't mean we can endorse the use of force
against innocents, whoever does it.
QUESTION: On Indonesia, I'm wondering if you have any concerns about the
shooting in Irian Jaya.
MR. RUBIN: First let me say that the United States recognizes Irian Jaya
as an integral part of Indonesia. We are disturbed, however, by reports of
Indonesian troops' use of force against demonstrators, and that security
forces fired on demonstrators with rubber bullets and detained as many as
180 people. There are unconfirmed reports that some of those shot have
died. A student remains in critical condition with a bullet wound in his
head, according to these same reports.
We urge the Government and military of Indonesia to exercise maximum
restraint, permit peaceful demonstrations to proceed and to foster a
climate of dialogue, not confrontation. We urge all demonstrators to
refrain from violent acts. Violence will benefit no one.
We also call on the Indonesian Government to release as soon as possible
all those detained or arrested for the peaceful expressions of their
political beliefs in Irian Jaya or anywhere else.
QUESTION: The US and China apparently are going to hold joint search and
rescue operations, and that China is going to be allowed to observe other
US military options. Can you say for the record what the significance of
this is, please?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. The fact sheet laying out what was agreed in China that
some of you got a look at made clear that the United States and China will
hold in July the first annual meeting, under the auspices of the Military
Maritime Consultative Agreement, a meeting to promote safety in naval and
air operations. In addition, the United States and Chinese militaries
agreed to send personnel in the near future to observe a joint training
exercise of the other side on the basis of reciprocity, the size, location
and timing of the exercise to be discussed and decided by the two
sides. That's what they agreed to in Beijing.
My understanding is the Pentagon may have a little more information about
what may happen as a result of that understanding. But the basic value of
this is a long and tried-and-true tradition, which is that the more
militaries understand about what each other is doing, the less likelihood
there is for misunderstanding and miscalculation and accidents to occur
that will endanger either the relationship of the countries or would
involve risk to a particular situation.
Secondly, when it comes to humanitarian efforts, we believe that the more
people can work together to prepare for the possibility they may need to
engage in some search and rescue operation could lead to the saving of
lives in the event that they had to work together to do just that.
So both on humanitarian grounds and in terms of preventing unwanted risks
and preventing miscalculation, these kinds of greater military-to-military
contacts are of benefit both to the security of the United States and to
the Chinese as well. So we want to see that kind of greater military-to-
military cooperation occur, and this is in that context.
But the specifics of what is going on, I would have to leave to my
counterpart at the Pentagon to describe in detail.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)
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