U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #83, 98-07-08
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1252
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Wednesday, July 8, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
DEPARTMENT/STATEMENTS
1 Secretary Albright's testimony tomorrow on MFN/No briefing
tomorrow
1 Visit of Macedonian Prime Minister Crvenkovski
BELARUS
1 Government of Belarus today canceled ultimatum to remove
items from Ambassadorial residences
1-2 Possible U.S. Response/Consultations on options with EU and
Russia
2 U.S. assistance to Belarus
NIGERIA
2-4 Death of Chief Abiola/International assistance with autopsy
4-5,20 U.S. policy on transition to democracy/Gen. Abubakar's
decision to dissolve military cabinet
5 Under Secretary Pickering's whereabouts/Length of
Pickering's visit
SERBIA (KOSOVO)
6,10-11 Contact Group meeting in Bonn/Communique
6-7 Causes of conflict in Kosovo
7-11 Greek defense minister's views on ethnic and religious
factors, possible NATO intervention, U.S. policy of
autonomy for Kosovo and the reported presence of
mercenaries/Dangers of regional escalation
9-12 Actions of the KLA and peace negotiation participants
17-20,21 1992 Christmas warning/Possible use of military
force/Diplomatic efforts
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
12-14 U.S. mediation efforts in recent weeks
14-15 Status of progress on remaining issues and Oslo Accords
CYPRUS
15 Sale of S-300s to Cyprus/Secretary Cohen's comments on a no
fly zone over Cyprus
15 Amb. Miller's whereabouts
15-16 Status of Lausanne Treaty
CANADA
16 British Columbia Premier's comments on pacific
salmon/Meeting with Counselor Sherman
IRELAND
16-17 Departure of Amb. Kennedy Smith
17 Role of Sen. Mitchell
BELIZE
17 Killing of U.S. citizen Raymond Kirk
CHINA
17 Export licensing waivers and missile technology transfers
UNITED KINGDOM
20 Announcement of cuts in UK nuclear arsenals
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #83
WEDNESDAY, JULY 8, 1998, 12:55 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: We are working together with the European Union and other
affected countries, and we're considering a range of options with them on
what to do if this doesn't improve.
QUESTION: This is without precedent, but I wondered, is there any way to
litigate this? I mean, is there any international, overarching --
MR. RUBIN: I don't think people are considering that option; I think it's
more a question of what we will do in concert to our bilateral relationships
with Belarus.
In that regard, yesterday I was asked about the assistance levels that we
have. It's my understanding we provide about $7 million to Belarus, but all
of this goes to the non-state sector - independent media, NGOs and other
organizations supporting the development of a civil society. Because of
increasing violations of democracy and human rights, we suspended all new
Nunn-Lugar - that is, cooperative threat reduction - assistance for this
year. Some low-level cooperation has continued under the Partnership for
Peace program, although that is now being reviewed in light of the
Belarusian Government's handling of the Drozdy matter.
QUESTION: Have any of you all asked the Russians for help, considering
Minsk's affinity for things Russian?
MR. RUBIN: We talked to the Russians about this problem, and they have
expressed similar incomprehension about these actions. But obviously, they
haven't been able to convince the government there to get with the
program.
QUESTION: The Austrian Foreign Minister said the EU was considering visa
restrictions on Belarus. Is that something you're looking at?
MR. RUBIN: We are in consultation with our European allies; I'm not in a
position to detail what options we all have. But we are working with them
and would want to act with them to demonstrate very clearly to the
government there that these actions are the kind of steps that make it
harder for Belarus to join in the progress and success they would join in
if they were able to enter Europe and enter the mainstream of countries.
But with respect to specific options, I have nothing for you.
QUESTION: But the step in the right direction is enough to hold off on
considerations?
MR. RUBIN: No. It's just a stop to making an already terrible situation
even worse where they would have actually entered the inviolable property
of the U.S. Ambassador and other embassies and removed the contents, which
would have been an even further violation. So they are still in violation
of the Vienna Convention and if they don't turn it around, we are
considering what other options we have in addition to those we have already
taken, and that is recalling our Ambassador and telling their Ambassador
that he is not welcome to return nor - it would be a bad idea for him to
return. Other subjects?
QUESTION: On Nigeria, where does the assurances on the autopsy on Abiola
stand - where does that stand on the assurances?
MR. RUBIN: Let me run through -- some of this you know, but I'll tell you
what I do know. As I told some of you yesterday, during the meeting with
Under Secretary Pickering, in which Nigerian officials were present, at a
presidential villa in Abuja on the afternoon of July 7 - yesterday - Abiola
fell ill. The delegation was in the process of discussing the transition to
civilian democratic rule and earlier Under Secretary Pickering had made
very clear to Abiola that he was seeking his unconditional release.
After he fell ill, Under Secretary Pickering went with Chief Abiola to a
hospital in Abuja -- the State House Clinic - and witnessed physicians
working there to try to save Chief Abiola. After an hour and a half of
effort, the physicians weren't able to save Chief Abiola and he died
apparently of cardiac arrest. As the President indicated yesterday, we are
deeply saddened by the unfortunate and untimely death of Chief Abiola, and
extend our condolences to his family and all of the people of Nigeria.
Up to this point, we have seen no evidence that Chief Abiola died of
anything other than natural causes. The government has announced, at the
request of the family, that a post-mortem will be conducted by international
experts to determine the cause of Chief Abiola's death. We understand that
the chief coroner of the province of Ontario will be participating in the
post-mortem, and we are planning on sending two military pathologists and
the British will send an expert, as well.
QUESTION: Does it sound like the family is suspicious?
MR. RUBIN: Clearly the family is suspicious; they've stated their
suspicions to the media rather clearly.
QUESTION: And to the U.S., too?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know that - I'm sure there's some contact between - I
mean, but we have no doubt that they're suspicious. The question is, what
do we know? And as I indicated, we have seen no evidence that he died of
anything other than natural causes. But given the obvious suspicion by the
family, we think it is a good idea for a post-mortem to be conducted in a
way that is as independently and credibly conducted as possible. That's
why we think it is important that the chief coroner of the province
of Ontario will be participating; and as I said, we're sending two of our
own.
QUESTION: You will attend, then -- the two military pathologists will be
on-site?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Exactly what role they will play, I don't know, but we're
sending two military pathologists.
QUESTION: Do you know when it might take place, then?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have the time for that - soon.
QUESTION: When you talk about natural causes, you don't think that four
years of brutal solitary confinement contributed to his heart condition?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm not a doctor, and clearly it didn't help. The
question that's been raised, Sid, as you well know, is the question of
whether there was some precipitous act yesterday that caused his death, and
that is what I'm referring to.
QUESTION: Well, apparently, he had asked repeatedly to see a doctor in
these last few weeks, not feeling himself; and he was denied that, despite
the new open administration in Nigeria. Do you have any comment on
that?
MR. RUBIN: If you're asking whether we think that he received all the
medical treatment that he should, let me take the question to a higher
level. We thought he should be released from prison, so any restriction on
him short of release from prison, we were against.
QUESTION: I mean, you don't think that this administration in Nigeria now
ought to be held accountable in some way for this?
MR. RUBIN: I don't understand the point of the question.
QUESTION: Well, you seem to be letting them off the hook completely.
MR. RUBIN: On the contrary, I think we made very clear that we think he
should never have been in prison. Therefore, any consequence of him being
in prison is the responsibility of the government that wrongfully put him
in prison. We have been calling for his release.
QUESTION: Do you think, in view of all the things that have happened in
Nigeria, that there's any case to be made for slowing down the original
deadlines for democratization and taking things more slowly?
MR. RUBIN: We have the basic view that we want to encourage a timely and
credible transition to civilian democratic rule, and we want the rapid
release of all political prisoners; that is our view. As you may know, we
understand from official government sources that General Abubakar has
dissolved the Federal Executive Council there. This is not an unexpected
move; it enables the head of state to appoint his own Cabinet, and we're
not going to make judgments until we see the composition of this new
Cabinet. We expect that to be known more in the next few hours.
But regardless of this action, we want to see a credible and timely
transition to civilian rule. We want a free press; we want parties to be in
a position to operate -- freedom of association - so that when the
transition occurs, there's an election that can be free and fair. That is
our view, and we want it to happen sooner rather than later.
With respect to a specific time table, I think I will suffice it to say
that we want it sooner rather than later, and we want the elements to
include the ones that I've mentioned.
QUESTION: A month ago you were saying it should be by October 1,
consistent with the time table laid out by Abacha. Are you --
MR. RUBIN: I'm not walking away from that time table. I mean, that is the
existing transition plan. At this point, I'm aware of no reason that we
would like it extended.
QUESTION: The new Cabinet - could there be members of the opposition
included?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, it hasn't happened yet, and we'll wait and see.
He's supposed to make some announcement in a few hours. I don't know the
answer of what his intentions are.
QUESTION: Can you tell us about Under Secretary Pickering - any further
meetings, whereabouts, what his schedule is at this point?
MR. RUBIN: I believe he's on his way to London, having stopped once for
refueling, and is heading back to the United States.
QUESTION: You mentioned that they were seeking his unconditional release--
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: It's a bit academic at this point, but does that mean that the
conditions that were negotiated with Annan could have changed?
MR. RUBIN: Were what?
QUESTION: The conditions that were negotiated with Kofi Annan - that he
not claim the presidency --
MR. RUBIN: I don't know that those were conditions that were negotiated
with Kofi Annan. I think, as I understood it, Secretary General Annan was
talking about what he understood the situation to be - namely that he was
expected to be released and that Chief Abiola had told him that he was a
realist and didn't expect to immediately become president.
We, as I indicated, told Chief Abiola that we supported his unconditional
release. I would be surprised if Secretary General Annan had a different
view - that is, that he should be conditionally released. That doesn't mean
we were in a position to influence every action that the Nigerian
Government was contemplating. But I think, as you said, this is all,
frankly, irrelevant. It's our view that all the remaining prisoners should
be rapidly released and that they should get on with the transition.
QUESTION: Did Mr. Pickering complete his round of consultations, or was
it decided to just go ahead and bring him back?
MR. RUBIN: No, I think he actually extended his visit by a day because of
the death of Chief Abiola.
QUESTION: Was he able to meet with all people in the Nigerian Government?
MR. RUBIN: I think he met everyone he had planned to meet with,
yes.
QUESTION: Can you tell us anything about the Contact Group that met in
Bonn today?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. There was a meeting of the Contact Group in Bonn.
Ambassador Gelbard briefed the Secretary about it. The essential discussion
was about establishing some general principles that could guide the two
parties in negotiating an outcome that would avoid the threat of conflict
and the possibility of a wider war. That was the basic idea. The United
States had put some principles forward in a letter from Ambassador Gelbard
to his counterparts in the last few days.
Ambassador Hill is working closely on those principles. He briefed the
Contact Group on what he has been up to. There was general agreement that
there ought to be some principles. I am going to be reluctant to state what
the recommended principles will be publicly at this time; other than to say
that they're obviously short of independence, which was the goal of some,
and far better than the stripped autonomy and lack of rights the Kosovar
Albanians have. So between that and consistent with the previous Contact
Group statement of enhanced autonomy within the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, that is what we're working on - principles that will guide them
to come up with some form of enhanced autonomy that meets their needs and
legitimate rights while falling short of what we consider would be an
unrealistic goal that we do not support, which is independence.
QUESTION: In the New York Times they had a story that this is all about
the mines - all about the ore. Does the U.S. believe that this is really a
fight over Kosovo's mineral resources?
MR. RUBIN: I suspect that's more a need for a journalist to have a lead
to go to a mine. We don't think this is about mines. This is about the
stripped autonomy of the people of Kosovo that was stripped away from them
many, many years ago. Are there some residual interests - economic
interests that play a role in this? Of course they do. But to suggest that
this is about mines and not the political rights of the people of Kosovo is
ridiculous.
QUESTION: $5 million of revenue a year, Jamie, that's a lot money in that
part of the world.
MR. RUBIN: To suggest that this conflict is -- that the people of Kosovo
are prepared to fight and die across the whole area of Kosovo because
they're afraid of losing a mine, I think, is ridiculous.
QUESTION: Don't you think this says something about President Milosevic's
motivations, though?
MR. RUBIN: President Milosevic has taken stands that we regard as
unacceptable in terms of stripping the autonomy of the people there. Along
with autonomy goes some ability to have control over local resources -
that's what autonomy means. But to suggest that the conflict and the
fighting and dying that's going on there is over a mine is, seems to me,
looking for another different version of the same story to write again,
which is what I was signaling.
I'm not dismissing it as a factor, but to suggest that this is what this
conflict is about is wildly exaggerated.
QUESTION: But you seem to suggest that under an autonomy - autonomy by
its nature gives the autonomous ruling authority power over the natural
resources of its region.
MR. RUBIN: Sid, I am not a lawyer, and it seems to me that we are back to
the lawyering problem. What I am suggesting is that there is, obviously,
when one talks about autonomy and control over a region, there are many
factors that go into autonomy. These are some of the very principles that
are being discussed in the Contact Group and by Ambassador Hill; that is,
how the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs living there will be able to govern
themselves with greater autonomy, including governing the territory,
the land, the resources and the people there. Exactly how that would
end up, I do not know. But all I am suggesting is that not that resources
are not a factor -- of course they're a factor -- but it would a wild
exaggeration to try to suggest that this conflict which began many, many
years ago and began with the stripping of the rights of the Kosovar
Albanians is about coal or ore rather than about fundamental political
rights I think is skewed and exaggerated.
QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Rubin. The Greek Defense Minister, whose name I
wouldn't dare try to pronounce, was here this morning talking to Mr. Cohen
of the Defense Department. He said that it would be a very bad idea - this
is the Greek Government view - if NATO was to become involved in Kosovo. He
said that a greater Albanian ethnic state is not likely, in fact it's a
fantasy; and he said that there was no problem between Turkey and Greece
over the ethnic dispute in Kosovo. So I would ask you, what is the
view of the United States Government regarding the ethnic and religious
aspects of Greek Orthodox against Muslim ethnicity in that area?
MR. RUBIN: Wow, that was quite a question.
QUESTION: Try that one.
MR. RUBIN: Let me try to take it apart and answer it as best as I can.
First of all, with respect to the Greek Defense Minister's views on NATO,
it's my understanding in a press conference with Secretary Cohen just a few
moments ago - or perhaps in the last couple of hours - the Defense Minister
made clear that he is supportive of the need for NATO to conduct military
planning in the event that decisions are made that require the use of
force. He made clear that he supports that effort that's ongoing in
NATO.
Secondly, like the United States, as I understand it, the Greek Defense
Minister made clear that the goal of NATO countries and the Contact Group
and, frankly, the whole world is to solve this peacefully; and that we want
to see a diplomatic resolution to this issue because that's the only way
the interest of both sides can be protected.
With respect to a grand religious component to this, I really don't have
much to add other than to say that we believe the Kosovar Albanians have
rights; that they should be given greater autonomy over their lives.
Exactly how that would happen, again, is the kind of detail that we'd like
to talk to them about first before talking about it publicly.
With respect to a wider war issue, we still believe that if this conflict
is not stopped, that there is a risk that the conflict could spread. We've
described here from the podium what it might spread into, and I don't
really want to repeat that; other than to say that it could spread to
countries outside of Kosovo, and that poses risks of a wider war. That is
our view and that's one of the reasons why we think it's so important to
resolve this peacefully.
QUESTION: Do you believe that the risk of a wider war would also include
conflict or confrontation or heightened tensions between Turkey and
Greece?
MR. RUBIN: I think the standard analysis of this situation says that
could happen. But we are hoping that we don't get to that point. We don't
have any reason to think - and let me emphasize this - that Turkey and
Greece are now in that position. On the contrary, they are working in NATO
with us to try to resolve this diplomatically.
But in the event you had a wider Balkan war, I think Ambassador Holbrooke
and others have talked about the new situation that would create and the
dangers it would create, and there's any number of possibilities that would
be dangerous in that event.
QUESTION: He's explicit - or he was yesterday, as he appeared two
different places - why he opposes - his government opposes independence;
put in short terms because there could be union with Albania. And in fact,
he sees it as an attempt to change Albania's politics as well as to have
union. He also says that the mercenaries are being brought in. He calls
this liberation army a terrorist group. There was an American official who
once tried to retract his words but didn't succeed, who said they were
involved in terrorist actions. He's explicit -- he has Tajikistan supplying
fighters, emigres in Germany paying for it, Albanians, mercenaries fighting
in Kosovo. What is the U.S. rationale for opposing independence? I know
Greece's; I don't know the U.S.'s.
MR. RUBIN: We do not believe that that is the right way to handle this
kind of problem where rights of Kosovar Albanians have been stripped. And
it's all fine and good to talk about the problem that has been created when
those rights have been stripped and what the potential risks are and the
possibility that other rogue elements are going to join that; but to not
focus on what the problem is, is to be misguided. The problem is that
President Milosevic has stripped these people of their rights and
their legitimate rights and taken away the kind of autonomy that allowed
them to live peacefully for some time. So what we want to do is get back to
a point where they have enough autonomy and an enhanced autonomy where they
can live and enjoy the legitimate rights that we believe they ought to
have.
With respect to why no independence, there's any number of reasons, but the
first is that we don't think we have to explain why we're against
independence - that right now there is a territory called Serbia-Montenegro
and we don't, as a matter of principle, support breaking up countries
unless there are really good reasons. In this case, what we see is -
including as others have seen - the dangers of independence and the
downsides of independence, and so we're not supportive of it. And we think
people are wildly exaggerating and living in a dream if they think that
this is going to happen any time soon because the international community
doesn't support it.
QUESTION: Well, simply he says minorities should not be permitted -
tolerated is his word - to use force to change borders. I thought this was
the U.S. view as well, but I've never heard it applied to Kosovo.
MR. RUBIN: What I would say is that the thing that the Contact Group has
made clear is not so much why the Kosovar Albanians shouldn't use force,
but why President Milosevic, in his crackdown in the use of heavy military
equipment in the stripping of these rights - he is the cause of the
problem. If other governments want to focus on the results of President
Milosevic's actions, that's interesting to us and we share some of the same
views; but what is important is that we start from an understanding
of what caused the problem.
QUESTION: I wouldn't want to misrepresent any views - he favors autonomy,
he favors human rights, he just is very leery --
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: -- he's more explicitly leery of independence, more critical of
the KLA - who the U.S. thinks ought to be at the table - and --
MR. RUBIN: I see that written and let me try to correct that --
QUESTION: -- and calls them terrorists and he says they're bringing in
mercenaries, which is a little more --
MR. RUBIN: Could I answer your question, please?
QUESTION: Sure.
MR. RUBIN: Thanks. There are three issues - what do we think of the KLA;
what do we think of what they've done; and who should be at the table. I'm
going to try to explain our view, and I hope that it sinks in and is
reflected in what you write if you're going to write about our view. If you
want to write about somebody else's view, please write about somebody
else's view.
Our view is very straightforward. Number one, we condemn acts that people
associated with the KLA have taken. In the event they are classic terrorist
acts, we condemn them as terrorist acts. That does not mean, however, we
regard the KLA -- this loosely-knit group -- as a terrorist organization;
we do not. We regard it as an insurgency that is using force to respond to
the stripped autonomy - to the lack of an autonomy that President
Milosevic took away from them. That is our view on this organization,
and I hope that that can be reflected in how it's reported.
Number two, we've said that we think the table should include a wide cross-
section of Kosovar Albanian opinion; and whether it's direct or indirect
ought to be up to Dr. Rugova, not us. So therefore we do not say that the
KLA ought to be at the table. We say that indirectly or directly their
views ought to be covered, and it's up to Dr. Rugova to decide who will
join him in this situation.
Number three, we've made quite clear the concerns we have about the KLA and
we've made quite clear that, as the Contact Group statements do, that it is
part of the problem. But in talking about what part of the problem is, it's
extremely important to focus on what the primary problem is. And the people
who want to focus on part of the problem often have a different view
than we do on what the primary problem is. I don't know what the view
of the Greek Defense Minister is on these issues, but I am trying to
explain to you our view.
QUESTION: I'm just trying to say he's not as much in conflict with the
U.S. view as you might have gathered.
MR. RUBIN: I'd have to see what he said --
QUESTION: -- from his discussion - he supports human rights; he supports
autonomy, et cetera.
MR. RUBIN: Well he shares the U.S. view that --
QUESTION: -- he's made additional statements - like mercenaries; you
won't touch that --
MR. RUBIN: No, I've talked about this many times; I'll repeat it here
today.
QUESTION: All right - because you've got Bosnia all over again,
maybe.
MR. RUBIN: -- which is that in this case, we understand that the more the
fighting goes on, the greater the likelihood that these rogue elements who
look to find fights to join will try to join this fight. And we know that
they have sought to participate and sought to give assistance to the
Kosovar Albanians in terms of actual mercenaries. But we still, to my
knowledge, don't have evidence that the Kosovar Albanians have welcomed
these mercenaries into their ranks.
QUESTION: Didn't the Contact Group address that today in their communique,
talking about training camps and so forth?
MR. RUBIN: I think they said they have a responsibility to avoid violence
and all armed activities, and that includes the --
QUESTION: (Inaudible) -- mentioned training camps specifically in that
communique.
MR. RUBIN: I don't see that; we can talk about that afterwards.
QUESTION: Going back to NATO issues, with this conflict getting
intensified more and more and with the NATO getting ready to militarily
intervene, what do you think is the criteria and deadline for NATO to
intervene?
MR. RUBIN: I think in the briefing yesterday I made clear that I wasn't
going to specify criteria for intervention; that's a decision for the
President to make. With respect to a deadline, I don't think that I have
any new information about a deadline, other than to tell you that we've
accelerated our military planning, that it's increasingly focused and
options are being narrowed down and fleshed out. But I have no deadline
information and no criteria information.
QUESTION: Just to clarify what you said - you're saying that the KLA
might not necessarily have a seat at the table now, and that Rugova could
speak for them?
MR. RUBIN: No, I hope that you -- there was a misunderstanding of things
that had been said previously to suggest that we were pushing for the KLA
to have a seat at the table. Where that came from, I don't know; we can go
back and check the transcripts, but I don't know who said such a thing.
What I do know is our position - so it's not a new position, it's not now
our position, it's the same position, okay, not a new position.
QUESTION: Okay, that Rugova could speak for the KLA, for instance.
MR. RUBIN: That we want to see the table include the widest possible
cross-section of Kosovar Albanian views. As a practical matter, the views
of the KLA need to be reflected either directly or indirectly. Those are
careful terms of art and we all know what they mean. So it means they can
have their views reflected without a seat at the table - meaning indirectly.
So there's no new position, and that has always been our position, to my
understanding.
QUESTION: You said directly or indirectly.
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: So they could or they couldn't.
MR. RUBIN: Right, but the idea that we are urging that the KLA have a
seat at the table, which I've seen written by people who are sitting in
this room, is wrong.
QUESTION: With Rugova in charge.
MR. RUBIN: No, that we are pushing for the KLA to have a seat at the
table is incorrect.
QUESTION: Their views should be represented at the negotiations, but
Rugova should be in charge, is what's been said.
MR. RUBIN: There's no new formulation; we've always said Rugova should be
in charge.
QUESTION: We've got to check the briefing transcript. Not yours, but
we've got to check a briefing transcript.
MR. RUBIN: I think that everyone has always made clear that Dr. Rugova is
the leader that we see as the primary interlocutor on this issue. When we
talked about the KLA, we talked about two things: one, the obvious need to
talk to them if you're going to have a cease-fire, since they're the ones
with the guns; number two, that their views should be reflected in a wide
cross-section of Kosovar Albanian views that ought to be at the table.
They can do that either directly or indirectly. That has been our
position for some weeks.
QUESTION: All right, I mean, nothing is totally obvious on this
subject.
QUESTION: Isn't it correct that Dr. Rugova is being rejected by most of
those who are carrying the guns?
MR. RUBIN: I think that's an assertion that we don't believe is
accurate.
QUESTION: It's not?
MR. RUBIN: We certainly believe it's accurate to say that the population
has been radicalized by the use of force by President Milosevic. To say
that he's being rejected I think is an exaggeration.
QUESTION: Can we switch to something else for a minute? No briefing
tomorrow - just in the event that a Middle East agreement should suddenly
drop on our heads, there's been even less here said than I think ever
before - and that's saying something - on the specific U.S. mediation
efforts. Could you - maybe this is not the perfect occasion, maybe you can
do it in a little statement later - you do tell us the Secretary is off and
on the phone with Arafat and with Netanyahu, but your mediators per se - I
mean, we have - at least I have virtually no idea how frequently meetings
are going on; who's doing this where. We've given up on trying to get
substance, because basically we know the program you're pushing on the two
sides.
MR. RUBIN: Are you feeling out of the loop, Barry?
QUESTION: No, no, we got the percentages down and the refinements
understood and all that. But should this effort ever succeed - and it seems
a little more likely now that it might - what can be said about, let's say,
the last two or three weeks, or at least since Netanyahu was here, so far
as U.S. meetings with Israelis and Palestinians? What can you tell
us?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think there's - I mean, I can give you a reflection of
the last few days, certainly, if that kind of a snapshot will help you. I
don't believe there have been any face-to-face meetings between the United
States and the Israeli delegation - any Israeli delegation - or the United
States and the Palestinian Authority in the last few days. But I know
that over the weekend, Secretary Albright spoke to Prime Minister
Netanyahu I believe four times. I believe she spoke to him on the
phone yesterday twice. She spoke to him on the phone again this morning.
She spoke to Chairman Arafat just about an hour ago. So clearly we're in an
intensified effort here. What I'm suggesting to you is that at this stage,
the primary contacts are telephone contacts.
But if we are in regular contact with them in terms of meetings, and when
those meetings happen we try to report on them. We don't always report on
them in advance, but we do acknowledge that they happen. If they happen, I
will try to get you information about them.
The fact of the matter is, we are in an intensive end-game negotiation on
the U.S. idea that is designed to put the Middle East peace process back on
track. But we have no knowledge that this will yield success. This has been
an extraordinarily intensive and difficult enterprise. But we are
continuing to work at it; we're continuing to make sufficient progress to
justify further work. Whether we achieve success is very much an open
question at this time.
QUESTION: So, if someone reached for the cliche in reference to notable
American mediators as travel-weary, would that be sort of out of date -
that they haven't been traveling lately and have no reason to be weary?
MR. RUBIN: I think if you had been conducting the travel schedule of
Secretary Albright in recent weeks --
QUESTION: I don't mean the Secretary.
MR. RUBIN: -- I can assure you, you'd be weary.
QUESTION: Oh, I don't mean the Secretary.
MR. RUBIN: So what's your point?
QUESTION: People like Ross who have been in motion quite a bit in the
last several months. I don't have a notion whether they're still in motion,
whether they're traveling --
MR. RUBIN: The notion of motion, yes.
QUESTION: Yes, I mean, there's no sense here of whether Ross or Indyk or
someone else is shuttling or even meeting people in London or wherever to
conduct these negotiations. You're leaving the impression that the
Secretary is very deeply involved, and that seems to be a pace that's
quickening.
MR. RUBIN: Right, I mean, each of these phone conversations is anywhere
from half an hour to an hour.
QUESTION: You've gone past the detail people, and you're dealing with the
top folks are taking charge now. But I'm just asking - maybe I ought to be
more explicit - has Dennis Ross done any face-to-face mediation in the last
two or three weeks with Israelis or Palestinians?
MR. RUBIN: I'd have to ask him. I would be surprised if there weren't
some meeting of some kind. But again, you've tried to get a flavor of where
we are --
QUESTION: And I can't go to the Secretary, so --
MR. RUBIN: -- and that is the guts of the negotiation is conducted by
telephone calls between her and Prime Minister Netanyahu right now.
QUESTION: I mean, should you nail this down, what then would happen so
far as remember the notion that you would go immediately to final status
talks, or as quickly as possible; is that still the plan?
MR. RUBIN: We think it's extremely important that a decision be made, and
that it be made as soon as possible. That is why we are working so hard on
this, and that is why Secretary Albright is working so hard on it.
The goal of this is to get a parallel process whereby the Palestinian
Authority builds, in conjunction with us and the Israelis, an infrastructure
to fight terrorism across the board; and that commensurate with the
building of that infrastructure to fight terrorism, the Israeli Government
carries out the further redeployments that we've talked to them about, and
that this happen in a parallel way over many weeks.
That is two of the four pieces on the agenda that was set up in New York
last fall. The other two pieces are the time-out and the final status/permanent
status negotiations. With respect to the time-out, we have pursued that and
we believe that it is linked to this whole process, because in the absence
of a time-out on unilateral activities, it is impossible to create the
environment that's best suited for successful conclusion of both the
interim agreement issues and the permanent status issues.
It is my understanding that the goal of this is to get enough completed in
Oslo -- that is, of Oslo - in the area of the further redeployment and the
terrorist infrastructure so that they can move immediately and launch
immediately the permanent status issues precisely because there aren't that
many months left before the five-year deadline of Oslo is reached. That is
some nine to ten months away.
QUESTION: As part of your approach to the infrastructure, we've heard for
at least a year now, does that involve the U.S. telling Arafat that notable
terrorists shouldn't be welcome back in Gaza and in other places under his
control?
MR. RUBIN: We do not support anyone who supports terrorism and we make
that very clear. We want to see terrorists in prison, and we want to see
strong steps taken to fight terrorism. We think there's been an improvement
in the overall pattern of fighting terrorism by the Palestinian Authority,
and we think there's been a marked improvement. But we think this is
something that has to be done 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 52 weeks a
year in order to be sustained; and it's only a sustained fight against
terrorism that can succeed.
QUESTION: At the press conference that Bill was referring to just now,
Secretary Cohen said that one possibility that the United States might
consider for the Cyprus issue was creating a no-fly zone over the island in
order to head off a possible crisis over the missiles --
MR. RUBIN: I'd like to see what it is that Secretary Cohen said. I know
that we take the view that these missiles should not be delivered, should
not be obtained, the sale should be canceled, period, full stop.
QUESTION: But it's a Greek idea. The Greeks are - have they talked to you
about it?
MR. RUBIN: They've talked to us about this in the past, and the bottom
line is that we want the deal to be canceled. With respect to any specific
ideas on how to proceed, some of them that I first heard about were simply
unrealistic in terms of shooting down planes in a no-fly zone or things
like that.
So what I'd like to do on this issue is get you an answer for the record,
after examining specifically what the proposal was discussed publicly, and
get you an answer as to what our view of it is.
QUESTION: The Greek Defense Minister --
MR. RUBIN: The one that I'm going to get an answer for the record
for?
QUESTION: Wasn't Ambassador Miller in Moscow yesterday discussing
it?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know. We'll check that.
QUESTION: The Greek violate Lausanne treaty and start a build-up on the
Aegean island also. What is the U.S. view on this implementation of the
Lausanne treaty on the Aegean island? Do you think this treaty is still
alive or still in force?
MR. RUBIN: We'll get you an answer for the record on that.
QUESTION: The Greek Defense Minister would not - although he used a lot
of words - rule out retaliating against Turkey, should Turkey move. This is
a boiling point. Have you asked for restraint from both the Greeks and the
Turks?
MR. RUBIN: We believe that both sides should demonstrate restraint, and
we don't think that the Greek side should be deploying S-300 missiles - the
Greek side in Cyprus. We don't think that the Turkish threats are wise
either, to use military force. So we want restraint on all the sides.
QUESTION: You know the Premier of British Columbia from Canada is in
Washington today. He said this morning that he expected there would be more
confrontations this summer through the fishing season because they're
dissatisfied with the deal of a few weeks ago. I wonder what you think of
him even saying that - that he expected them. And separately, are there
conversations and discussions between state and federal governments and
provincial governments about avoiding them or reacting --
MR. RUBIN: Well, we certainly think the objective of all these discussions
is to avoid the kind of flare-ups that have occurred in past years, and we
don't want that to happen. We think everyone should act in a way to try to
prevent that across the board.
BC Premier Clark was here meeting with Counselor Sherman this morning. They
discussed several trans-boundary issues, including Pacific salmon,
including some mine questions and including the question of lumber. I
didn't get a final read-out of the meeting, except to say that we expected
the meeting to be an opportunity for the U.S. and British Columbia to
review their respective positions, not really to negotiate them, and for
Counselor Sherman to urge Premier Clark to play a constructive role in
helping to bring about a resolution on this important matter. We both seek
a mutually satisfactory agreement that protects the Pacific salmon
recourse.
QUESTION: For a head of government, though, to say that he expects
confrontations on this issue, in light of the fact of what happened a year
ago, is that incitement --
MR. RUBIN: I'd have to see what he said, but I clearly did say we'd like
him to play a constructive role.
QUESTION: Is it your understanding, Jamie, that Ambassador Jean Kennedy
Smith is going to leave Dublin this week? And is there any concern that
there will not be an American ambassador in place in the Republic of
Ireland during what is a very sensitive and difficult time in Northern
Ireland?
MR. RUBIN: I do not have her planned departure date; I will try to get
that for you. I think you asked me about this last week, and I think I had
something the next day and I don't have it with me right now. But again,
regardless of when she's precisely going to depart, the aftermath of the
agreement and all that goes with it is going to occur over many weeks and
months. We're urging restraint on the part of everyone. We believe
that we can express our views and get our views across without absolutely
requiring an ambassador during every one of these weeks and months that is
going to occur.
We obviously think that Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith has done a great job.
I think those who were involved in the initial phases of putting together
the conditions that allowed the peace agreements to unfold include
Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith, as well as Tony Lake at the White House and,
obviously, the President and others. So she's played a very historic role
in helping to get us where we are, but she is obviously at the end of her
term. But what specific day, I don't know and I'll have to get that for
you.
QUESTION: On the same subject, can you tell us what role Senator Mitchell
is playing in the current - however you want to characterize - problem?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get in touch with Senator Mitchell and ask him to
pass that on.
QUESTION: On Sunday, a Maryland school science teacher, Raymond Kirk, was
shot and killed in the Central American country of Belize. What is latest
on the search for his killers?
MR. RUBIN: Our embassy in Belize regrets to confirm that U.S. citizen
Raymond Kirk of Maryland was shot and killed July 5 in Belize. The embassy
is providing all appropriate assistance to Mr. Kirk's family, including his
wife and 12 year old son who were with him when this tragic attack
occurred. Our embassy arranged for a British military helicopter to go to
Mr. Kirk's assistance immediately after receiving the call of the shooting.
We are sorry to report the helicopter arrived after his death. Mr. Kirk's
body is being repatriated to the U.S. today.
As in all cases in which a U.S. citizen is the victim of a violent crime,
our embassy will monitor the investigation of this incident by local
authorities. We, of course, do not have authority or resources to conduct
by consular officers their own investigations. We are going to stay in
contact with the family and keep them informed of all developments.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - question please. In light of the China missile
technology transfer, is the State Department working with the Commerce
Department to fine-tune consideration process for waivers in export
licensing?
MR. RUBIN: The waivers licenses Commerce, State - this is a very complex
issue. I think I would have to go through a very long discussion to
properly answer that question, so let me get someone who can do that for
you after the briefing.
QUESTION: Jamie, without exception, anyone that I've spoken to outside of
this building or the NSC, when asked about Kosovo and what should be done
to resolve the crisis there, says that the only thing that will stop the
violence is military intervention.
MR. RUBIN: I don't think you've been talking to everybody, then. Maybe
you've been selecting groups that want to use force.
QUESTION: I don't know about that --
MR. RUBIN: I can assure you that all of the United States' expert
community is not an advocate of military force. I've talked to them; I'll
give you a list. It's not that uniform.
QUESTION: Okay, well I can give you a list also. But at any rate, why has
the U.S. backed away from the 1992 Christmas warning? And what is it that
makes you believe that diplomacy is going to work this time around with
Milosevic?
MR. RUBIN: First of all, again, I do not think there is a uniform view in
the expert community about what the right course of action is. Number two,
the premise of your question is incorrect. If the question is, what is our
position on the Christmas warning, what I can say to you is our position is
unchanged. If the premise of you question is that it has changed, the
premise of your question is incorrect. We have long stated publicly that we
are not ruling out the use of force, and there has been no change in our
policy in this area.
QUESTION: The Christmas warning said that if Milosevic used force in
Kosovo the U.S. would intervene militarily. He is using force --
MR. RUBIN: That is incorrect, that is incorrect. I think you need to
understand very carefully about these kind of very sensitive military
questions. There is no public version of the Christmas warning, so for you
to assert what it says -- it was the result of a meeting on Christmas Day
between an ambassador, and exactly what was said has not been made
public.
QUESTION: Well there was an article in the New York Times which had the
statement printed.
MR. RUBIN: That what?
QUESTION: Just what I said.
MR. RUBIN: That if a Serb policeman shot a Kosovar Albanian, we'd bomb
Belgrade? I don't understand. These are very tricky questions and the fact
that the Serbs have used force - Serb policemen have used force does not
trigger anything.
QUESTION: Well it's more than just Serb policemen.
MR. RUBIN: So that's what I'm saying. This is a very sensitive question.
The only public thing we've ever said about this - the only thing we've
ever said from this podium or from the White House or from the Pentagon is
exactly what I just said, which is that we haven't ruled out any options.
As far as others who are trigger-happy and want to see us engage immediately
in the use of force, it is our view that prior to the use of force
we need to think this through very carefully, we need to plan very
carefully and we need to do all we can to try to resolve it diplomatically.
There are some on the outside who don't have the responsibilities, who can
very quickly say that we should just bomb or something of that nature. But
it is our view that this is a very complex situation. And for those who
think that this is identical to Bosnia, they're wrong. President Milosevic
is still President Milosevic, but the Kosovar Albanians are not the
Bosnians. We did not recognize Kosovo as an independent state and it was
therefore not attacked and its independence ought to be stripped. It was a
part of Serbia that we believe President Milosevic has made some profound
errors. But the people who want to use force can never seem to answer
the question of what it should be used against and how the use of force
will end up with the result where the Kosovar Albanians get their autonomy
back and there isn't a wider war.
So we believe it is appropriate to conduct military planning, to consider
our options, to do the work necessary prior to making such a decision. And
anyone who suggests we've either backed off from the Christmas warning or
backed off from our threat to use force is engaged in rhetoric.
QUESTION: What some have said is that by not acting sooner, a situation
which was complicated to begin with is that much more complicated. Four
months ago, the KLA was about 100 people and now there are reports that it
is between 2,500 and 3,500 people. So the longer that the U.S. delays, the
longer that the U.S. waits and continues to try to work things out, the
worse the situation is becoming.
MR. RUBIN: Again, the Monday morning quarterbacks are always very good at
their job. What we try to do here is assess the situation as we see it on
Sunday when we're playing the game; and on Sunday when we were playing the
game and the Serbian authorities cracked down on the Kosovar Albanians, we
took very dramatic steps. Secretary Albright made a trip to Europe, she
galvanized the Europeans to re-impose sanctions on President Milosevic.
That was done very quickly -- as quick as any sanctions have been put
together to my knowledge. There were some European countries who didn't
see the need and the urgency to even act at that time and we galvanized
them, got sanctions imposed and made clear to him that if he didn't change
his policies, other options would be considered.
We are now at a phase where other options have been considered. In recent
weeks, for those who have been on the ground and examined it, the situation
is different than it was several months ago. Not only is there more KLA
activity, the Serb side has not engaged in the massive crackdowns that were
going on some weeks ago.
So it's a very complex situation. It lends itself not to simple, easy
solutions. What we are trying to do is work on a negotiation that will
solve it rather than try to think that we can solve it through the use of
force primarily, which we don't believe is accurate.
QUESTION: What you just enumerated right there is what critics say is the
U.S. zig-zag policy. You put economic sanctions in effect; Milosevic stops
for a little while and then starts again; and then we're back to the
negotiating table, trying all over again.
MR. RUBIN: Right, well, critics have to call - they basically have two
options: they can either oppose the policy on principle or they can oppose
it, arguing that the right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing or
the strategy and the tactics are not in sync. These are just formulations
that are often used to justify getting one's quote in the paper.
If you look at a policy over several months, you will see a consistent,
concrete and effective policy. What you will see is first, identifying the
problem and leading the world into imposing sanctions and getting sanctions
imposed; then beginning a dialogue. All of the countries of the world, and
even the outside experts who surely could resolve this very easily, would
agree that you have to have a dialogue going; so we got a dialogue going.
President Milosevic is now engaged in a process where we think that he's
beginning to understand that the use of force by him has only made the
situation worse.
So we are preparing the option to use force; we are doing what we as a
responsible government ought to do to plan for it. We are not rushing; we
are trying to pursue the diplomatic course, because we believe that is the
course that can solve the problem and the American people expect us to
pursue all diplomatic options before rushing into an ill-considered
military operation.
QUESTION: If I may jump back to the situation in Nigeria for a second,
the U.S. understanding exactly of what happened - was a dissolution - did
you say the constitutional council, was it the government top to bottom, or
the Cabinet? And most importantly --
MR. RUBIN: The Federal Executive Council, I believe I said.
QUESTION: Okay, and what exactly does that mean to the U.S.?
MR. RUBIN: Well, as I think I said - if I didn't, let me say it now -
that until he names a new Cabinet, which will happen in the next few hours,
it's hard to assess the significance of this. We want to not make judgments
until we see the composition of this new Cabinet. Then we'll be able to
know what this means.
QUESTION: Is it a positive sign that they are going over to democracy or
is it perhaps greater instability?
MR. RUBIN: As I said, it depends on who is chosen and we'll know that in
a couple of hours and we'll be able to react at that time.
QUESTION: Jamie, I understand he's going to go on the air at about 3:00
p.m. our time. Would it be possible to get something from you later in the
afternoon, please?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, let me try to arrange that.
QUESTION: Could you confirm or comment on the British announcement today
to cut their number of nuclear warheads?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen it; but less nuclear weapons, generally
speaking, is a good thing, as long as one's deterrent is protected.
QUESTION: Let me go back to Kosovo and your discussion with Andrea. It
seems that you're saying that Mr. Milosevic has shown restraint and he has
been listening to the diplomatic efforts that have been brought--
MR. RUBIN: I haven't said that. What I've said is that we judge the
situation by what's going on the ground. Recently, in recent weeks, the use
of force has not been the kind of widespread, massive crackdown that we
responded to earlier in February and earlier about six weeks ago.
Is there a continuing conflict? Yes. Is there military equipment being used
by him that shouldn't be? Yes. Should all his forces go back outside of
Kosovo if they weren't there? Yes. The question is, what is the pattern
now; and the pattern now is the conflict is continuing and we're trying to
convince President Milosevic that by cracking down all he is doing is
radicalizing the Kosovar Albanians and making it less likely that he can
negotiate a solution.
QUESTION: But he's on a course that we would find more palatable in that
he is not doing the massive crackdowns.
MR. RUBIN: Look, I'm not going to consider anything that he's doing in
the area of what's going on in Kosovo as palatable. What we're talking
about is degrees of bad. Clearly, the fact that there is not a massive
crackdown is better than that there is a massive crackdown. But he is still
taking steps that is the reason why the Kosovar Albanians are becoming
radicalized.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 2:00 P.M.)
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