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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #83, 98-07-08

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


1252

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Wednesday, July 8, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

DEPARTMENT/STATEMENTS
1		Secretary Albright's testimony tomorrow on MFN/No briefing
		  tomorrow
1		Visit of Macedonian Prime Minister Crvenkovski

BELARUS 1 Government of Belarus today canceled ultimatum to remove items from Ambassadorial residences 1-2 Possible U.S. Response/Consultations on options with EU and Russia 2 U.S. assistance to Belarus

NIGERIA 2-4 Death of Chief Abiola/International assistance with autopsy 4-5,20 U.S. policy on transition to democracy/Gen. Abubakar's decision to dissolve military cabinet 5 Under Secretary Pickering's whereabouts/Length of Pickering's visit

SERBIA (KOSOVO) 6,10-11 Contact Group meeting in Bonn/Communique 6-7 Causes of conflict in Kosovo 7-11 Greek defense minister's views on ethnic and religious factors, possible NATO intervention, U.S. policy of autonomy for Kosovo and the reported presence of mercenaries/Dangers of regional escalation 9-12 Actions of the KLA and peace negotiation participants 17-20,21 1992 Christmas warning/Possible use of military force/Diplomatic efforts

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 12-14 U.S. mediation efforts in recent weeks 14-15 Status of progress on remaining issues and Oslo Accords

CYPRUS 15 Sale of S-300s to Cyprus/Secretary Cohen's comments on a no fly zone over Cyprus 15 Amb. Miller's whereabouts 15-16 Status of Lausanne Treaty

CANADA 16 British Columbia Premier's comments on pacific salmon/Meeting with Counselor Sherman

IRELAND 16-17 Departure of Amb. Kennedy Smith 17 Role of Sen. Mitchell

BELIZE 17 Killing of U.S. citizen Raymond Kirk

CHINA 17 Export licensing waivers and missile technology transfers

UNITED KINGDOM 20 Announcement of cuts in UK nuclear arsenals


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #83

WEDNESDAY, JULY 8, 1998, 12:55 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: We are working together with the European Union and other affected countries, and we're considering a range of options with them on what to do if this doesn't improve.

QUESTION: This is without precedent, but I wondered, is there any way to litigate this? I mean, is there any international, overarching --

MR. RUBIN: I don't think people are considering that option; I think it's more a question of what we will do in concert to our bilateral relationships with Belarus.

In that regard, yesterday I was asked about the assistance levels that we have. It's my understanding we provide about $7 million to Belarus, but all of this goes to the non-state sector - independent media, NGOs and other organizations supporting the development of a civil society. Because of increasing violations of democracy and human rights, we suspended all new Nunn-Lugar - that is, cooperative threat reduction - assistance for this year. Some low-level cooperation has continued under the Partnership for Peace program, although that is now being reviewed in light of the Belarusian Government's handling of the Drozdy matter.

QUESTION: Have any of you all asked the Russians for help, considering Minsk's affinity for things Russian?

MR. RUBIN: We talked to the Russians about this problem, and they have expressed similar incomprehension about these actions. But obviously, they haven't been able to convince the government there to get with the program.

QUESTION: The Austrian Foreign Minister said the EU was considering visa restrictions on Belarus. Is that something you're looking at?

MR. RUBIN: We are in consultation with our European allies; I'm not in a position to detail what options we all have. But we are working with them and would want to act with them to demonstrate very clearly to the government there that these actions are the kind of steps that make it harder for Belarus to join in the progress and success they would join in if they were able to enter Europe and enter the mainstream of countries. But with respect to specific options, I have nothing for you.

QUESTION: But the step in the right direction is enough to hold off on considerations?

MR. RUBIN: No. It's just a stop to making an already terrible situation even worse where they would have actually entered the inviolable property of the U.S. Ambassador and other embassies and removed the contents, which would have been an even further violation. So they are still in violation of the Vienna Convention and if they don't turn it around, we are considering what other options we have in addition to those we have already taken, and that is recalling our Ambassador and telling their Ambassador that he is not welcome to return nor - it would be a bad idea for him to return. Other subjects?

QUESTION: On Nigeria, where does the assurances on the autopsy on Abiola stand - where does that stand on the assurances?

MR. RUBIN: Let me run through -- some of this you know, but I'll tell you what I do know. As I told some of you yesterday, during the meeting with Under Secretary Pickering, in which Nigerian officials were present, at a presidential villa in Abuja on the afternoon of July 7 - yesterday - Abiola fell ill. The delegation was in the process of discussing the transition to civilian democratic rule and earlier Under Secretary Pickering had made very clear to Abiola that he was seeking his unconditional release.

After he fell ill, Under Secretary Pickering went with Chief Abiola to a hospital in Abuja -- the State House Clinic - and witnessed physicians working there to try to save Chief Abiola. After an hour and a half of effort, the physicians weren't able to save Chief Abiola and he died apparently of cardiac arrest. As the President indicated yesterday, we are deeply saddened by the unfortunate and untimely death of Chief Abiola, and extend our condolences to his family and all of the people of Nigeria.

Up to this point, we have seen no evidence that Chief Abiola died of anything other than natural causes. The government has announced, at the request of the family, that a post-mortem will be conducted by international experts to determine the cause of Chief Abiola's death. We understand that the chief coroner of the province of Ontario will be participating in the post-mortem, and we are planning on sending two military pathologists and the British will send an expert, as well.

QUESTION: Does it sound like the family is suspicious?

MR. RUBIN: Clearly the family is suspicious; they've stated their suspicions to the media rather clearly.

QUESTION: And to the U.S., too?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know that - I'm sure there's some contact between - I mean, but we have no doubt that they're suspicious. The question is, what do we know? And as I indicated, we have seen no evidence that he died of anything other than natural causes. But given the obvious suspicion by the family, we think it is a good idea for a post-mortem to be conducted in a way that is as independently and credibly conducted as possible. That's why we think it is important that the chief coroner of the province of Ontario will be participating; and as I said, we're sending two of our own.

QUESTION: You will attend, then -- the two military pathologists will be on-site?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. Exactly what role they will play, I don't know, but we're sending two military pathologists.

QUESTION: Do you know when it might take place, then?

MR. RUBIN: I don't have the time for that - soon.

QUESTION: When you talk about natural causes, you don't think that four years of brutal solitary confinement contributed to his heart condition?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm not a doctor, and clearly it didn't help. The question that's been raised, Sid, as you well know, is the question of whether there was some precipitous act yesterday that caused his death, and that is what I'm referring to.

QUESTION: Well, apparently, he had asked repeatedly to see a doctor in these last few weeks, not feeling himself; and he was denied that, despite the new open administration in Nigeria. Do you have any comment on that?

MR. RUBIN: If you're asking whether we think that he received all the medical treatment that he should, let me take the question to a higher level. We thought he should be released from prison, so any restriction on him short of release from prison, we were against.

QUESTION: I mean, you don't think that this administration in Nigeria now ought to be held accountable in some way for this?

MR. RUBIN: I don't understand the point of the question.

QUESTION: Well, you seem to be letting them off the hook completely.

MR. RUBIN: On the contrary, I think we made very clear that we think he should never have been in prison. Therefore, any consequence of him being in prison is the responsibility of the government that wrongfully put him in prison. We have been calling for his release.

QUESTION: Do you think, in view of all the things that have happened in Nigeria, that there's any case to be made for slowing down the original deadlines for democratization and taking things more slowly?

MR. RUBIN: We have the basic view that we want to encourage a timely and credible transition to civilian democratic rule, and we want the rapid release of all political prisoners; that is our view. As you may know, we understand from official government sources that General Abubakar has dissolved the Federal Executive Council there. This is not an unexpected move; it enables the head of state to appoint his own Cabinet, and we're not going to make judgments until we see the composition of this new Cabinet. We expect that to be known more in the next few hours.

But regardless of this action, we want to see a credible and timely transition to civilian rule. We want a free press; we want parties to be in a position to operate -- freedom of association - so that when the transition occurs, there's an election that can be free and fair. That is our view, and we want it to happen sooner rather than later.

With respect to a specific time table, I think I will suffice it to say that we want it sooner rather than later, and we want the elements to include the ones that I've mentioned.

QUESTION: A month ago you were saying it should be by October 1, consistent with the time table laid out by Abacha. Are you --

MR. RUBIN: I'm not walking away from that time table. I mean, that is the existing transition plan. At this point, I'm aware of no reason that we would like it extended.

QUESTION: The new Cabinet - could there be members of the opposition included?

MR. RUBIN: Well, again, it hasn't happened yet, and we'll wait and see. He's supposed to make some announcement in a few hours. I don't know the answer of what his intentions are.

QUESTION: Can you tell us about Under Secretary Pickering - any further meetings, whereabouts, what his schedule is at this point?

MR. RUBIN: I believe he's on his way to London, having stopped once for refueling, and is heading back to the United States.

QUESTION: You mentioned that they were seeking his unconditional release--

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: It's a bit academic at this point, but does that mean that the conditions that were negotiated with Annan could have changed?

MR. RUBIN: Were what?

QUESTION: The conditions that were negotiated with Kofi Annan - that he not claim the presidency --

MR. RUBIN: I don't know that those were conditions that were negotiated with Kofi Annan. I think, as I understood it, Secretary General Annan was talking about what he understood the situation to be - namely that he was expected to be released and that Chief Abiola had told him that he was a realist and didn't expect to immediately become president.

We, as I indicated, told Chief Abiola that we supported his unconditional release. I would be surprised if Secretary General Annan had a different view - that is, that he should be conditionally released. That doesn't mean we were in a position to influence every action that the Nigerian Government was contemplating. But I think, as you said, this is all, frankly, irrelevant. It's our view that all the remaining prisoners should be rapidly released and that they should get on with the transition.

QUESTION: Did Mr. Pickering complete his round of consultations, or was it decided to just go ahead and bring him back?

MR. RUBIN: No, I think he actually extended his visit by a day because of the death of Chief Abiola.

QUESTION: Was he able to meet with all people in the Nigerian Government?

MR. RUBIN: I think he met everyone he had planned to meet with, yes.

QUESTION: Can you tell us anything about the Contact Group that met in Bonn today?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. There was a meeting of the Contact Group in Bonn. Ambassador Gelbard briefed the Secretary about it. The essential discussion was about establishing some general principles that could guide the two parties in negotiating an outcome that would avoid the threat of conflict and the possibility of a wider war. That was the basic idea. The United States had put some principles forward in a letter from Ambassador Gelbard to his counterparts in the last few days.

Ambassador Hill is working closely on those principles. He briefed the Contact Group on what he has been up to. There was general agreement that there ought to be some principles. I am going to be reluctant to state what the recommended principles will be publicly at this time; other than to say that they're obviously short of independence, which was the goal of some, and far better than the stripped autonomy and lack of rights the Kosovar Albanians have. So between that and consistent with the previous Contact Group statement of enhanced autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is what we're working on - principles that will guide them to come up with some form of enhanced autonomy that meets their needs and legitimate rights while falling short of what we consider would be an unrealistic goal that we do not support, which is independence.

QUESTION: In the New York Times they had a story that this is all about the mines - all about the ore. Does the U.S. believe that this is really a fight over Kosovo's mineral resources?

MR. RUBIN: I suspect that's more a need for a journalist to have a lead to go to a mine. We don't think this is about mines. This is about the stripped autonomy of the people of Kosovo that was stripped away from them many, many years ago. Are there some residual interests - economic interests that play a role in this? Of course they do. But to suggest that this is about mines and not the political rights of the people of Kosovo is ridiculous.

QUESTION: $5 million of revenue a year, Jamie, that's a lot money in that part of the world.

MR. RUBIN: To suggest that this conflict is -- that the people of Kosovo are prepared to fight and die across the whole area of Kosovo because they're afraid of losing a mine, I think, is ridiculous.

QUESTION: Don't you think this says something about President Milosevic's motivations, though?

MR. RUBIN: President Milosevic has taken stands that we regard as unacceptable in terms of stripping the autonomy of the people there. Along with autonomy goes some ability to have control over local resources - that's what autonomy means. But to suggest that the conflict and the fighting and dying that's going on there is over a mine is, seems to me, looking for another different version of the same story to write again, which is what I was signaling.

I'm not dismissing it as a factor, but to suggest that this is what this conflict is about is wildly exaggerated.

QUESTION: But you seem to suggest that under an autonomy - autonomy by its nature gives the autonomous ruling authority power over the natural resources of its region.

MR. RUBIN: Sid, I am not a lawyer, and it seems to me that we are back to the lawyering problem. What I am suggesting is that there is, obviously, when one talks about autonomy and control over a region, there are many factors that go into autonomy. These are some of the very principles that are being discussed in the Contact Group and by Ambassador Hill; that is, how the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs living there will be able to govern themselves with greater autonomy, including governing the territory, the land, the resources and the people there. Exactly how that would end up, I do not know. But all I am suggesting is that not that resources are not a factor -- of course they're a factor -- but it would a wild exaggeration to try to suggest that this conflict which began many, many years ago and began with the stripping of the rights of the Kosovar Albanians is about coal or ore rather than about fundamental political rights I think is skewed and exaggerated.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Rubin. The Greek Defense Minister, whose name I wouldn't dare try to pronounce, was here this morning talking to Mr. Cohen of the Defense Department. He said that it would be a very bad idea - this is the Greek Government view - if NATO was to become involved in Kosovo. He said that a greater Albanian ethnic state is not likely, in fact it's a fantasy; and he said that there was no problem between Turkey and Greece over the ethnic dispute in Kosovo. So I would ask you, what is the view of the United States Government regarding the ethnic and religious aspects of Greek Orthodox against Muslim ethnicity in that area?

MR. RUBIN: Wow, that was quite a question.

QUESTION: Try that one.

MR. RUBIN: Let me try to take it apart and answer it as best as I can. First of all, with respect to the Greek Defense Minister's views on NATO, it's my understanding in a press conference with Secretary Cohen just a few moments ago - or perhaps in the last couple of hours - the Defense Minister made clear that he is supportive of the need for NATO to conduct military planning in the event that decisions are made that require the use of force. He made clear that he supports that effort that's ongoing in NATO.

Secondly, like the United States, as I understand it, the Greek Defense Minister made clear that the goal of NATO countries and the Contact Group and, frankly, the whole world is to solve this peacefully; and that we want to see a diplomatic resolution to this issue because that's the only way the interest of both sides can be protected.

With respect to a grand religious component to this, I really don't have much to add other than to say that we believe the Kosovar Albanians have rights; that they should be given greater autonomy over their lives. Exactly how that would happen, again, is the kind of detail that we'd like to talk to them about first before talking about it publicly.

With respect to a wider war issue, we still believe that if this conflict is not stopped, that there is a risk that the conflict could spread. We've described here from the podium what it might spread into, and I don't really want to repeat that; other than to say that it could spread to countries outside of Kosovo, and that poses risks of a wider war. That is our view and that's one of the reasons why we think it's so important to resolve this peacefully.

QUESTION: Do you believe that the risk of a wider war would also include conflict or confrontation or heightened tensions between Turkey and Greece?

MR. RUBIN: I think the standard analysis of this situation says that could happen. But we are hoping that we don't get to that point. We don't have any reason to think - and let me emphasize this - that Turkey and Greece are now in that position. On the contrary, they are working in NATO with us to try to resolve this diplomatically.

But in the event you had a wider Balkan war, I think Ambassador Holbrooke and others have talked about the new situation that would create and the dangers it would create, and there's any number of possibilities that would be dangerous in that event.

QUESTION: He's explicit - or he was yesterday, as he appeared two different places - why he opposes - his government opposes independence; put in short terms because there could be union with Albania. And in fact, he sees it as an attempt to change Albania's politics as well as to have union. He also says that the mercenaries are being brought in. He calls this liberation army a terrorist group. There was an American official who once tried to retract his words but didn't succeed, who said they were involved in terrorist actions. He's explicit -- he has Tajikistan supplying fighters, emigres in Germany paying for it, Albanians, mercenaries fighting in Kosovo. What is the U.S. rationale for opposing independence? I know Greece's; I don't know the U.S.'s.

MR. RUBIN: We do not believe that that is the right way to handle this kind of problem where rights of Kosovar Albanians have been stripped. And it's all fine and good to talk about the problem that has been created when those rights have been stripped and what the potential risks are and the possibility that other rogue elements are going to join that; but to not focus on what the problem is, is to be misguided. The problem is that President Milosevic has stripped these people of their rights and their legitimate rights and taken away the kind of autonomy that allowed them to live peacefully for some time. So what we want to do is get back to a point where they have enough autonomy and an enhanced autonomy where they can live and enjoy the legitimate rights that we believe they ought to have.

With respect to why no independence, there's any number of reasons, but the first is that we don't think we have to explain why we're against independence - that right now there is a territory called Serbia-Montenegro and we don't, as a matter of principle, support breaking up countries unless there are really good reasons. In this case, what we see is - including as others have seen - the dangers of independence and the downsides of independence, and so we're not supportive of it. And we think people are wildly exaggerating and living in a dream if they think that this is going to happen any time soon because the international community doesn't support it.

QUESTION: Well, simply he says minorities should not be permitted - tolerated is his word - to use force to change borders. I thought this was the U.S. view as well, but I've never heard it applied to Kosovo.

MR. RUBIN: What I would say is that the thing that the Contact Group has made clear is not so much why the Kosovar Albanians shouldn't use force, but why President Milosevic, in his crackdown in the use of heavy military equipment in the stripping of these rights - he is the cause of the problem. If other governments want to focus on the results of President Milosevic's actions, that's interesting to us and we share some of the same views; but what is important is that we start from an understanding of what caused the problem.

QUESTION: I wouldn't want to misrepresent any views - he favors autonomy, he favors human rights, he just is very leery --

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: -- he's more explicitly leery of independence, more critical of the KLA - who the U.S. thinks ought to be at the table - and --

MR. RUBIN: I see that written and let me try to correct that --

QUESTION: -- and calls them terrorists and he says they're bringing in mercenaries, which is a little more --

MR. RUBIN: Could I answer your question, please?

QUESTION: Sure.

MR. RUBIN: Thanks. There are three issues - what do we think of the KLA; what do we think of what they've done; and who should be at the table. I'm going to try to explain our view, and I hope that it sinks in and is reflected in what you write if you're going to write about our view. If you want to write about somebody else's view, please write about somebody else's view.

Our view is very straightforward. Number one, we condemn acts that people associated with the KLA have taken. In the event they are classic terrorist acts, we condemn them as terrorist acts. That does not mean, however, we regard the KLA -- this loosely-knit group -- as a terrorist organization; we do not. We regard it as an insurgency that is using force to respond to the stripped autonomy - to the lack of an autonomy that President Milosevic took away from them. That is our view on this organization, and I hope that that can be reflected in how it's reported.

Number two, we've said that we think the table should include a wide cross- section of Kosovar Albanian opinion; and whether it's direct or indirect ought to be up to Dr. Rugova, not us. So therefore we do not say that the KLA ought to be at the table. We say that indirectly or directly their views ought to be covered, and it's up to Dr. Rugova to decide who will join him in this situation.

Number three, we've made quite clear the concerns we have about the KLA and we've made quite clear that, as the Contact Group statements do, that it is part of the problem. But in talking about what part of the problem is, it's extremely important to focus on what the primary problem is. And the people who want to focus on part of the problem often have a different view than we do on what the primary problem is. I don't know what the view of the Greek Defense Minister is on these issues, but I am trying to explain to you our view.

QUESTION: I'm just trying to say he's not as much in conflict with the U.S. view as you might have gathered.

MR. RUBIN: I'd have to see what he said --

QUESTION: -- from his discussion - he supports human rights; he supports autonomy, et cetera.

MR. RUBIN: Well he shares the U.S. view that --

QUESTION: -- he's made additional statements - like mercenaries; you won't touch that --

MR. RUBIN: No, I've talked about this many times; I'll repeat it here today.

QUESTION: All right - because you've got Bosnia all over again, maybe.

MR. RUBIN: -- which is that in this case, we understand that the more the fighting goes on, the greater the likelihood that these rogue elements who look to find fights to join will try to join this fight. And we know that they have sought to participate and sought to give assistance to the Kosovar Albanians in terms of actual mercenaries. But we still, to my knowledge, don't have evidence that the Kosovar Albanians have welcomed these mercenaries into their ranks.

QUESTION: Didn't the Contact Group address that today in their communique, talking about training camps and so forth?

MR. RUBIN: I think they said they have a responsibility to avoid violence and all armed activities, and that includes the --

QUESTION: (Inaudible) -- mentioned training camps specifically in that communique.

MR. RUBIN: I don't see that; we can talk about that afterwards.

QUESTION: Going back to NATO issues, with this conflict getting intensified more and more and with the NATO getting ready to militarily intervene, what do you think is the criteria and deadline for NATO to intervene?

MR. RUBIN: I think in the briefing yesterday I made clear that I wasn't going to specify criteria for intervention; that's a decision for the President to make. With respect to a deadline, I don't think that I have any new information about a deadline, other than to tell you that we've accelerated our military planning, that it's increasingly focused and options are being narrowed down and fleshed out. But I have no deadline information and no criteria information.

QUESTION: Just to clarify what you said - you're saying that the KLA might not necessarily have a seat at the table now, and that Rugova could speak for them?

MR. RUBIN: No, I hope that you -- there was a misunderstanding of things that had been said previously to suggest that we were pushing for the KLA to have a seat at the table. Where that came from, I don't know; we can go back and check the transcripts, but I don't know who said such a thing.

What I do know is our position - so it's not a new position, it's not now our position, it's the same position, okay, not a new position.

QUESTION: Okay, that Rugova could speak for the KLA, for instance.

MR. RUBIN: That we want to see the table include the widest possible cross-section of Kosovar Albanian views. As a practical matter, the views of the KLA need to be reflected either directly or indirectly. Those are careful terms of art and we all know what they mean. So it means they can have their views reflected without a seat at the table - meaning indirectly. So there's no new position, and that has always been our position, to my understanding.

QUESTION: You said directly or indirectly.

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: So they could or they couldn't.

MR. RUBIN: Right, but the idea that we are urging that the KLA have a seat at the table, which I've seen written by people who are sitting in this room, is wrong.

QUESTION: With Rugova in charge.

MR. RUBIN: No, that we are pushing for the KLA to have a seat at the table is incorrect.

QUESTION: Their views should be represented at the negotiations, but Rugova should be in charge, is what's been said.

MR. RUBIN: There's no new formulation; we've always said Rugova should be in charge.

QUESTION: We've got to check the briefing transcript. Not yours, but we've got to check a briefing transcript.

MR. RUBIN: I think that everyone has always made clear that Dr. Rugova is the leader that we see as the primary interlocutor on this issue. When we talked about the KLA, we talked about two things: one, the obvious need to talk to them if you're going to have a cease-fire, since they're the ones with the guns; number two, that their views should be reflected in a wide cross-section of Kosovar Albanian views that ought to be at the table. They can do that either directly or indirectly. That has been our position for some weeks.

QUESTION: All right, I mean, nothing is totally obvious on this subject.

QUESTION: Isn't it correct that Dr. Rugova is being rejected by most of those who are carrying the guns?

MR. RUBIN: I think that's an assertion that we don't believe is accurate.

QUESTION: It's not?

MR. RUBIN: We certainly believe it's accurate to say that the population has been radicalized by the use of force by President Milosevic. To say that he's being rejected I think is an exaggeration.

QUESTION: Can we switch to something else for a minute? No briefing tomorrow - just in the event that a Middle East agreement should suddenly drop on our heads, there's been even less here said than I think ever before - and that's saying something - on the specific U.S. mediation efforts. Could you - maybe this is not the perfect occasion, maybe you can do it in a little statement later - you do tell us the Secretary is off and on the phone with Arafat and with Netanyahu, but your mediators per se - I mean, we have - at least I have virtually no idea how frequently meetings are going on; who's doing this where. We've given up on trying to get substance, because basically we know the program you're pushing on the two sides.

MR. RUBIN: Are you feeling out of the loop, Barry?

QUESTION: No, no, we got the percentages down and the refinements understood and all that. But should this effort ever succeed - and it seems a little more likely now that it might - what can be said about, let's say, the last two or three weeks, or at least since Netanyahu was here, so far as U.S. meetings with Israelis and Palestinians? What can you tell us?

MR. RUBIN: I don't think there's - I mean, I can give you a reflection of the last few days, certainly, if that kind of a snapshot will help you. I don't believe there have been any face-to-face meetings between the United States and the Israeli delegation - any Israeli delegation - or the United States and the Palestinian Authority in the last few days. But I know that over the weekend, Secretary Albright spoke to Prime Minister Netanyahu I believe four times. I believe she spoke to him on the phone yesterday twice. She spoke to him on the phone again this morning. She spoke to Chairman Arafat just about an hour ago. So clearly we're in an intensified effort here. What I'm suggesting to you is that at this stage, the primary contacts are telephone contacts.

But if we are in regular contact with them in terms of meetings, and when those meetings happen we try to report on them. We don't always report on them in advance, but we do acknowledge that they happen. If they happen, I will try to get you information about them.

The fact of the matter is, we are in an intensive end-game negotiation on the U.S. idea that is designed to put the Middle East peace process back on track. But we have no knowledge that this will yield success. This has been an extraordinarily intensive and difficult enterprise. But we are continuing to work at it; we're continuing to make sufficient progress to justify further work. Whether we achieve success is very much an open question at this time.

QUESTION: So, if someone reached for the cliche in reference to notable American mediators as travel-weary, would that be sort of out of date - that they haven't been traveling lately and have no reason to be weary?

MR. RUBIN: I think if you had been conducting the travel schedule of Secretary Albright in recent weeks --

QUESTION: I don't mean the Secretary.

MR. RUBIN: -- I can assure you, you'd be weary.

QUESTION: Oh, I don't mean the Secretary.

MR. RUBIN: So what's your point?

QUESTION: People like Ross who have been in motion quite a bit in the last several months. I don't have a notion whether they're still in motion, whether they're traveling --

MR. RUBIN: The notion of motion, yes.

QUESTION: Yes, I mean, there's no sense here of whether Ross or Indyk or someone else is shuttling or even meeting people in London or wherever to conduct these negotiations. You're leaving the impression that the Secretary is very deeply involved, and that seems to be a pace that's quickening.

MR. RUBIN: Right, I mean, each of these phone conversations is anywhere from half an hour to an hour.

QUESTION: You've gone past the detail people, and you're dealing with the top folks are taking charge now. But I'm just asking - maybe I ought to be more explicit - has Dennis Ross done any face-to-face mediation in the last two or three weeks with Israelis or Palestinians?

MR. RUBIN: I'd have to ask him. I would be surprised if there weren't some meeting of some kind. But again, you've tried to get a flavor of where we are --

QUESTION: And I can't go to the Secretary, so --

MR. RUBIN: -- and that is the guts of the negotiation is conducted by telephone calls between her and Prime Minister Netanyahu right now.

QUESTION: I mean, should you nail this down, what then would happen so far as remember the notion that you would go immediately to final status talks, or as quickly as possible; is that still the plan?

MR. RUBIN: We think it's extremely important that a decision be made, and that it be made as soon as possible. That is why we are working so hard on this, and that is why Secretary Albright is working so hard on it.

The goal of this is to get a parallel process whereby the Palestinian Authority builds, in conjunction with us and the Israelis, an infrastructure to fight terrorism across the board; and that commensurate with the building of that infrastructure to fight terrorism, the Israeli Government carries out the further redeployments that we've talked to them about, and that this happen in a parallel way over many weeks.

That is two of the four pieces on the agenda that was set up in New York last fall. The other two pieces are the time-out and the final status/permanent status negotiations. With respect to the time-out, we have pursued that and we believe that it is linked to this whole process, because in the absence of a time-out on unilateral activities, it is impossible to create the environment that's best suited for successful conclusion of both the interim agreement issues and the permanent status issues.

It is my understanding that the goal of this is to get enough completed in Oslo -- that is, of Oslo - in the area of the further redeployment and the terrorist infrastructure so that they can move immediately and launch immediately the permanent status issues precisely because there aren't that many months left before the five-year deadline of Oslo is reached. That is some nine to ten months away.

QUESTION: As part of your approach to the infrastructure, we've heard for at least a year now, does that involve the U.S. telling Arafat that notable terrorists shouldn't be welcome back in Gaza and in other places under his control?

MR. RUBIN: We do not support anyone who supports terrorism and we make that very clear. We want to see terrorists in prison, and we want to see strong steps taken to fight terrorism. We think there's been an improvement in the overall pattern of fighting terrorism by the Palestinian Authority, and we think there's been a marked improvement. But we think this is something that has to be done 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 52 weeks a year in order to be sustained; and it's only a sustained fight against terrorism that can succeed.

QUESTION: At the press conference that Bill was referring to just now, Secretary Cohen said that one possibility that the United States might consider for the Cyprus issue was creating a no-fly zone over the island in order to head off a possible crisis over the missiles --

MR. RUBIN: I'd like to see what it is that Secretary Cohen said. I know that we take the view that these missiles should not be delivered, should not be obtained, the sale should be canceled, period, full stop.

QUESTION: But it's a Greek idea. The Greeks are - have they talked to you about it?

MR. RUBIN: They've talked to us about this in the past, and the bottom line is that we want the deal to be canceled. With respect to any specific ideas on how to proceed, some of them that I first heard about were simply unrealistic in terms of shooting down planes in a no-fly zone or things like that.

So what I'd like to do on this issue is get you an answer for the record, after examining specifically what the proposal was discussed publicly, and get you an answer as to what our view of it is.

QUESTION: The Greek Defense Minister --

MR. RUBIN: The one that I'm going to get an answer for the record for?

QUESTION: Wasn't Ambassador Miller in Moscow yesterday discussing it?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know. We'll check that.

QUESTION: The Greek violate Lausanne treaty and start a build-up on the Aegean island also. What is the U.S. view on this implementation of the Lausanne treaty on the Aegean island? Do you think this treaty is still alive or still in force?

MR. RUBIN: We'll get you an answer for the record on that.

QUESTION: The Greek Defense Minister would not - although he used a lot of words - rule out retaliating against Turkey, should Turkey move. This is a boiling point. Have you asked for restraint from both the Greeks and the Turks?

MR. RUBIN: We believe that both sides should demonstrate restraint, and we don't think that the Greek side should be deploying S-300 missiles - the Greek side in Cyprus. We don't think that the Turkish threats are wise either, to use military force. So we want restraint on all the sides.

QUESTION: You know the Premier of British Columbia from Canada is in Washington today. He said this morning that he expected there would be more confrontations this summer through the fishing season because they're dissatisfied with the deal of a few weeks ago. I wonder what you think of him even saying that - that he expected them. And separately, are there conversations and discussions between state and federal governments and provincial governments about avoiding them or reacting --

MR. RUBIN: Well, we certainly think the objective of all these discussions is to avoid the kind of flare-ups that have occurred in past years, and we don't want that to happen. We think everyone should act in a way to try to prevent that across the board.

BC Premier Clark was here meeting with Counselor Sherman this morning. They discussed several trans-boundary issues, including Pacific salmon, including some mine questions and including the question of lumber. I didn't get a final read-out of the meeting, except to say that we expected the meeting to be an opportunity for the U.S. and British Columbia to review their respective positions, not really to negotiate them, and for Counselor Sherman to urge Premier Clark to play a constructive role in helping to bring about a resolution on this important matter. We both seek a mutually satisfactory agreement that protects the Pacific salmon recourse.

QUESTION: For a head of government, though, to say that he expects confrontations on this issue, in light of the fact of what happened a year ago, is that incitement --

MR. RUBIN: I'd have to see what he said, but I clearly did say we'd like him to play a constructive role.

QUESTION: Is it your understanding, Jamie, that Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith is going to leave Dublin this week? And is there any concern that there will not be an American ambassador in place in the Republic of Ireland during what is a very sensitive and difficult time in Northern Ireland?

MR. RUBIN: I do not have her planned departure date; I will try to get that for you. I think you asked me about this last week, and I think I had something the next day and I don't have it with me right now. But again, regardless of when she's precisely going to depart, the aftermath of the agreement and all that goes with it is going to occur over many weeks and months. We're urging restraint on the part of everyone. We believe that we can express our views and get our views across without absolutely requiring an ambassador during every one of these weeks and months that is going to occur.

We obviously think that Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith has done a great job. I think those who were involved in the initial phases of putting together the conditions that allowed the peace agreements to unfold include Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith, as well as Tony Lake at the White House and, obviously, the President and others. So she's played a very historic role in helping to get us where we are, but she is obviously at the end of her term. But what specific day, I don't know and I'll have to get that for you.

QUESTION: On the same subject, can you tell us what role Senator Mitchell is playing in the current - however you want to characterize - problem?

MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get in touch with Senator Mitchell and ask him to pass that on.

QUESTION: On Sunday, a Maryland school science teacher, Raymond Kirk, was shot and killed in the Central American country of Belize. What is latest on the search for his killers?

MR. RUBIN: Our embassy in Belize regrets to confirm that U.S. citizen Raymond Kirk of Maryland was shot and killed July 5 in Belize. The embassy is providing all appropriate assistance to Mr. Kirk's family, including his wife and 12 year old son who were with him when this tragic attack occurred. Our embassy arranged for a British military helicopter to go to Mr. Kirk's assistance immediately after receiving the call of the shooting. We are sorry to report the helicopter arrived after his death. Mr. Kirk's body is being repatriated to the U.S. today.

As in all cases in which a U.S. citizen is the victim of a violent crime, our embassy will monitor the investigation of this incident by local authorities. We, of course, do not have authority or resources to conduct by consular officers their own investigations. We are going to stay in contact with the family and keep them informed of all developments.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - question please. In light of the China missile technology transfer, is the State Department working with the Commerce Department to fine-tune consideration process for waivers in export licensing?

MR. RUBIN: The waivers licenses Commerce, State - this is a very complex issue. I think I would have to go through a very long discussion to properly answer that question, so let me get someone who can do that for you after the briefing.

QUESTION: Jamie, without exception, anyone that I've spoken to outside of this building or the NSC, when asked about Kosovo and what should be done to resolve the crisis there, says that the only thing that will stop the violence is military intervention.

MR. RUBIN: I don't think you've been talking to everybody, then. Maybe you've been selecting groups that want to use force.

QUESTION: I don't know about that --

MR. RUBIN: I can assure you that all of the United States' expert community is not an advocate of military force. I've talked to them; I'll give you a list. It's not that uniform.

QUESTION: Okay, well I can give you a list also. But at any rate, why has the U.S. backed away from the 1992 Christmas warning? And what is it that makes you believe that diplomacy is going to work this time around with Milosevic?

MR. RUBIN: First of all, again, I do not think there is a uniform view in the expert community about what the right course of action is. Number two, the premise of your question is incorrect. If the question is, what is our position on the Christmas warning, what I can say to you is our position is unchanged. If the premise of you question is that it has changed, the premise of your question is incorrect. We have long stated publicly that we are not ruling out the use of force, and there has been no change in our policy in this area.

QUESTION: The Christmas warning said that if Milosevic used force in Kosovo the U.S. would intervene militarily. He is using force --

MR. RUBIN: That is incorrect, that is incorrect. I think you need to understand very carefully about these kind of very sensitive military questions. There is no public version of the Christmas warning, so for you to assert what it says -- it was the result of a meeting on Christmas Day between an ambassador, and exactly what was said has not been made public.

QUESTION: Well there was an article in the New York Times which had the statement printed.

MR. RUBIN: That what?

QUESTION: Just what I said.

MR. RUBIN: That if a Serb policeman shot a Kosovar Albanian, we'd bomb Belgrade? I don't understand. These are very tricky questions and the fact that the Serbs have used force - Serb policemen have used force does not trigger anything.

QUESTION: Well it's more than just Serb policemen.

MR. RUBIN: So that's what I'm saying. This is a very sensitive question. The only public thing we've ever said about this - the only thing we've ever said from this podium or from the White House or from the Pentagon is exactly what I just said, which is that we haven't ruled out any options. As far as others who are trigger-happy and want to see us engage immediately in the use of force, it is our view that prior to the use of force we need to think this through very carefully, we need to plan very carefully and we need to do all we can to try to resolve it diplomatically.

There are some on the outside who don't have the responsibilities, who can very quickly say that we should just bomb or something of that nature. But it is our view that this is a very complex situation. And for those who think that this is identical to Bosnia, they're wrong. President Milosevic is still President Milosevic, but the Kosovar Albanians are not the Bosnians. We did not recognize Kosovo as an independent state and it was therefore not attacked and its independence ought to be stripped. It was a part of Serbia that we believe President Milosevic has made some profound errors. But the people who want to use force can never seem to answer the question of what it should be used against and how the use of force will end up with the result where the Kosovar Albanians get their autonomy back and there isn't a wider war.

So we believe it is appropriate to conduct military planning, to consider our options, to do the work necessary prior to making such a decision. And anyone who suggests we've either backed off from the Christmas warning or backed off from our threat to use force is engaged in rhetoric.

QUESTION: What some have said is that by not acting sooner, a situation which was complicated to begin with is that much more complicated. Four months ago, the KLA was about 100 people and now there are reports that it is between 2,500 and 3,500 people. So the longer that the U.S. delays, the longer that the U.S. waits and continues to try to work things out, the worse the situation is becoming.

MR. RUBIN: Again, the Monday morning quarterbacks are always very good at their job. What we try to do here is assess the situation as we see it on Sunday when we're playing the game; and on Sunday when we were playing the game and the Serbian authorities cracked down on the Kosovar Albanians, we took very dramatic steps. Secretary Albright made a trip to Europe, she galvanized the Europeans to re-impose sanctions on President Milosevic. That was done very quickly -- as quick as any sanctions have been put together to my knowledge. There were some European countries who didn't see the need and the urgency to even act at that time and we galvanized them, got sanctions imposed and made clear to him that if he didn't change his policies, other options would be considered.

We are now at a phase where other options have been considered. In recent weeks, for those who have been on the ground and examined it, the situation is different than it was several months ago. Not only is there more KLA activity, the Serb side has not engaged in the massive crackdowns that were going on some weeks ago.

So it's a very complex situation. It lends itself not to simple, easy solutions. What we are trying to do is work on a negotiation that will solve it rather than try to think that we can solve it through the use of force primarily, which we don't believe is accurate.

QUESTION: What you just enumerated right there is what critics say is the U.S. zig-zag policy. You put economic sanctions in effect; Milosevic stops for a little while and then starts again; and then we're back to the negotiating table, trying all over again.

MR. RUBIN: Right, well, critics have to call - they basically have two options: they can either oppose the policy on principle or they can oppose it, arguing that the right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing or the strategy and the tactics are not in sync. These are just formulations that are often used to justify getting one's quote in the paper.

If you look at a policy over several months, you will see a consistent, concrete and effective policy. What you will see is first, identifying the problem and leading the world into imposing sanctions and getting sanctions imposed; then beginning a dialogue. All of the countries of the world, and even the outside experts who surely could resolve this very easily, would agree that you have to have a dialogue going; so we got a dialogue going. President Milosevic is now engaged in a process where we think that he's beginning to understand that the use of force by him has only made the situation worse.

So we are preparing the option to use force; we are doing what we as a responsible government ought to do to plan for it. We are not rushing; we are trying to pursue the diplomatic course, because we believe that is the course that can solve the problem and the American people expect us to pursue all diplomatic options before rushing into an ill-considered military operation.

QUESTION: If I may jump back to the situation in Nigeria for a second, the U.S. understanding exactly of what happened - was a dissolution - did you say the constitutional council, was it the government top to bottom, or the Cabinet? And most importantly --

MR. RUBIN: The Federal Executive Council, I believe I said.

QUESTION: Okay, and what exactly does that mean to the U.S.?

MR. RUBIN: Well, as I think I said - if I didn't, let me say it now - that until he names a new Cabinet, which will happen in the next few hours, it's hard to assess the significance of this. We want to not make judgments until we see the composition of this new Cabinet. Then we'll be able to know what this means.

QUESTION: Is it a positive sign that they are going over to democracy or is it perhaps greater instability?

MR. RUBIN: As I said, it depends on who is chosen and we'll know that in a couple of hours and we'll be able to react at that time.

QUESTION: Jamie, I understand he's going to go on the air at about 3:00 p.m. our time. Would it be possible to get something from you later in the afternoon, please?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, let me try to arrange that.

QUESTION: Could you confirm or comment on the British announcement today to cut their number of nuclear warheads?

MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen it; but less nuclear weapons, generally speaking, is a good thing, as long as one's deterrent is protected.

QUESTION: Let me go back to Kosovo and your discussion with Andrea. It seems that you're saying that Mr. Milosevic has shown restraint and he has been listening to the diplomatic efforts that have been brought--

MR. RUBIN: I haven't said that. What I've said is that we judge the situation by what's going on the ground. Recently, in recent weeks, the use of force has not been the kind of widespread, massive crackdown that we responded to earlier in February and earlier about six weeks ago.

Is there a continuing conflict? Yes. Is there military equipment being used by him that shouldn't be? Yes. Should all his forces go back outside of Kosovo if they weren't there? Yes. The question is, what is the pattern now; and the pattern now is the conflict is continuing and we're trying to convince President Milosevic that by cracking down all he is doing is radicalizing the Kosovar Albanians and making it less likely that he can negotiate a solution.

QUESTION: But he's on a course that we would find more palatable in that he is not doing the massive crackdowns.

MR. RUBIN: Look, I'm not going to consider anything that he's doing in the area of what's going on in Kosovo as palatable. What we're talking about is degrees of bad. Clearly, the fact that there is not a massive crackdown is better than that there is a massive crackdown. But he is still taking steps that is the reason why the Kosovar Albanians are becoming radicalized.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 2:00 P.M.)


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