U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #81, 98-07-06
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
696
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Monday, July 6, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS
1, 2-3 BELARUS: Further Violation of Vienna Convention
1 CROATIA: Visit of Croatian Opposition Politicians
1 BURUNDI: Peace Talks
CHINA
1-2 US Policy Regarding Taiwan/Consultations
INDIA/PAKISTAN
2 Reaction to India's Stated Willingness to Sign CTBT
2 Deputy Secretary Talbott's Travel/Meeting
KOREA
3,5 KEDO Delivery of Fuel to N. Korea per Agreement
3-4 U.S. Willingness to Support KEDO in its Efforts
4-5,6 U.S. Efforts to Aid KEDO in Fulfilling its Commitment
6 Asia Financial Crisis/Effect on N. Korean Compliance with
Agreement
6 No Linkage with Four-Party Talks
SERBIA (KOSOVO)
7 Amb. Gelbard in Sarajevo/Joining Amb. Hill in Bonn for
Contact Group Mtg
8 Safety of Diplomats in Serbia
7,8-9 US Meetings/Contacts/Conversations with Parties
9 Ambassador Holbrooke's Itinerary
GREECE
7 Visit of the Defense Minister of Greece
SWITZERAND
9 State Sanctions Against Swiss Institutions re Holocaust
Assets
NIGERIA
10 Ambassador Pickering Meeting Tomorrow with Gen. Abubakar
RUSSIA
10 President Clinton To Visit Russia in September
11 Status of Ratification of START II
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #81
MONDAY, JULY 6, 1998, 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to a new week here at the State Department.
We have three statements we'll be posting after the briefing, one on
Belarus, some recent activity that has taken place there, another on Deputy
Secretary Talbott's meeting with Croatian opposition politicians and,
lastly, a statement reflecting on the first round of the Burundi peace
talks.
QUESTION: The Administration is busy trying to placate the Taiwanese and
the ambassador and everything, but (inaudible) has now talked to the
Taiwanese president, who plaintively asked if the US wouldn't consult
Taiwan when it talks about Taiwan's relationship with mainland China. I
didn't see that Mr. Bush had anything to say to him at least, not that was
reported, but is there a policy? Is there a policy to consult Taiwan and
not just Beijing when the subject is bringing the two Chinas together,
although, as we know, there is only one China?
MR. RUBIN: I think that people may be describing a distinction without a
difference. We specifically did not put in writing a discussion between us
and the Chinese in Beijing about this issue, precisely not to give the
implication that this is a subject that we negotiate. We did state our
policy. The President stated our policy with respect to the now famous
three nos, a policy that Secretary Albright had previously stated, and a
policy that is not news to either the Chinese in Beijing or to those in
Taiwan.
There is no really new development here other than the fact that people
perhaps read one part of what was said in China and not others. We also
talked about the Taiwan Relations Act and the fact that we continue to
support arms sales pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act. There was no new
policy development, and with respect to the consultation issue, I think
what is important to understand is one of the reasons why we didn't have a
communique on Taiwan issues or the one China issue was precisely to not
give the implication that this was something we negotiate with the Chinese.
QUESTION: This is rather short notice because the meeting was just held,
but do you have anything on the narrow matter - it's not so narrow to the
Taiwanese or to the big Chinese - on the issue of Taiwan being absorbed by
China, their plea that they be consulted and that you just don't negotiate
this situation or discuss the situation entirely with Beijing?
MR. RUBIN: What I can say about that is that we will continue to pursue
what we think is a policy that advances the interests of people on both
sides of the Taiwan Straits, and that is encouraging peaceful resolution of
this issue. We have unofficial relations with Taiwan. We obviously talk to
them. We have made clear to them that what was happening in China, what was
said in China, was not new. And it isn't new and so any suggestion that
there is some new development I think is simply not to our understanding.
QUESTION: A President has never before said what Clinton said in China.
That's what's new.
MR. RUBIN: Well, correct. And what I am suggesting to you is that however
it has been stated before by the United States in discussions with both
Taiwan and China as to what our view is on these issues, and a year ago or
so - or not quite that long - when the Chinese president was here, it was
stated from this podium and it was stated by Secretary Albright when she
was in China. So what I'm suggesting is that the substance of the policy is
not new and certain concerns that to discuss it in a communique would imply
the very fear that you have been discussing was one of the reasons why it
wasn't done. And it was, however, appropriate for us to state our policy
and the President stated it when he was there.
QUESTION: There is a report that the Indian Foreign Ministry has made
some statements about being willing to engage in the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. It is seen as significant in some of the reports, but how does the
State Department view it?
MR. RUBIN: I understand there is the fact that Deputy Secretary Talbott
will be meeting with Mr. Singh in Frankfurt was also discussed in India. He
will be meeting with official - key official - former official from
Pakistan today. Mr. Yaqub Kahn is having extensive meetings today with
Deputy Secretary Talbott to discuss the situation in South Asia. They are
now in a working lunch, as I understand it. Deputy Secretary Talbott
will be meeting with Mr. Jaswant Singh in Frankfurt on July the 9th
following on his consultations in Baltic capitals. So we are going to be
discussing with them the question of how they can make the wise decision to
join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and we hope they have come to
realize the value of that, but we are not there yet by any stretch of the
imagination.
QUESTION: You mentioned a statement on Belarus. Can you enlighten us on
that?
MR. RUBIN: I can enlighten you. If you're not patient enough to wait
until after the briefing, I will be happy to tell you the details.
The government of Belarus has once again escalated its assault on the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In Minsk, Belarus officials
removed the fences protecting our ambassador's residence. This was done
without permission or prior notice. Additionally, an individual who claimed
to represent the government of Belarus was observed walking inside the
grounds of our property.
By refusing to allow us to guard our property, Belarus took on the
responsibility of protecting that property from unlawful intrusions. Now
the regime there has chosen to ignore Vienna Convention principles against
entering a diplomatic residence without permission. We remind the regime
that the residence of a Chief of Mission is clearly protected by the Vienna
Convention. We expect the government of Belarus immediately to replace the
fences that have been removed, to remove its representatives from our
property, and to permit us to post our own guards on the property and allow
us access to the property without hindrance.
QUESTION: The property, I assume -
MR. RUBIN: Of the US ambassador, yes.
QUESTION: Right. Does not contain sensitive materials, equipment,
documents, whatever?
MR. RUBIN: We are not in a position to believe that any such activity has
taken place. It's a residence.
QUESTION: On North Korea?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Could you enlighten us or bring us up to date on the status of
shipment of heavy oil to North Korea?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: And also where money will come from for further shipments.
MR. RUBIN: So far this year, KEDO has delivered approximately 150,000
metric tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. Additional shipments of
approximately 66,000 metric tons are scheduled to be delivered later this
month. For this year, Congress agreed to the Administration's request to
appropriate $30 million for KEDO funding for administrative expenses and
purchases of heavy fuel oil. A contribution from the European Union of an
additional $16 million is expected to be received by KEDO shortly to
help KEDO retire its debt for past oil purchases.
Under the Agreed Framework, KEDO is to provide 500,000 metric tons of heavy
fuel oil to North Korea each year. We are working very hard to help KEDO
raise additional funds from other countries, but so far it has not been
able to raise sufficient funds for its heavy fuel oil deliveries this year.
We believe this agreement is an extremely important one and we remain
committed to the successful implementation of the freeze on North Korea's
activities, the so-called Agreed Framework. As the President stated on June
9th, he is prepared to work with Congress to utilize certain provisions
of US law to provide funds to help KEDO fulfill its commitments. We have
been consulting with Congress and we have completed an initial tranche of
$5 million has been discussed with Congress, which will be used to make
deliveries beginning this month, and we are consulting about additional
funding at this time. These consultations are not yet complete, but we
would hope to be able to provide further information.
I think the point of all this is that we think this is an extremely
important agreement and that we are working with the Congress and with
other countries because we are sure we are going to be able to fulfill our
side of the bargain and it's up to the North Koreans to ensure they fulfill
theirs.
QUESTION: So as I interpret what you're saying, one way or another the US
will find a way to make sure that the 500,000 metric tons -
MR. RUBIN: It's not our obligation to find a way. It's a KEDO obligation.
But what I'm saying to you is that we recognize the importance of this
agreement. It's an extremely important one. We are consulting with
Congress. The President was prepared to indicate his willingness to use
unusual authorities and we are going to continue to consult with Congress
to make available what we need, but we would be looking for support from
all the countries in the world that care about non-proliferation that
don't want to see us go back to the situation in 1994, where we had the
threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea posing a danger to the world.
QUESTION: It sounds as if you will find - you will use creative ways to
find money to help KEDO meet that obligation. Is that a fair -
MR. RUBIN: We are trying to - we are going to do what we can to fulfill
our part of the bargain. As I indicated, we have come up with another $5
million as a result of consultations with Congress and we're continuing to
consult with Congress. And we want to see other countries do what they can
as well.
QUESTION: Are the North Koreans threatening to walk out of the deal as a
prominent newspaper suggested this morning?
MR. RUBIN: Well, from time to time we hear suggestions from the North
Korean side, but for now we believe that North Korea is in compliance with
its obligations under the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework requires
them to freeze their nuclear reactors and related facilities, and we
believe this has occurred and the International Atomic Energy Agency is
monitoring that. From time to time they make statements, and they made one
publicly some weeks ago, and it's our job to simply make clear that we're
going to fulfill our part of the responsibilities that we believe
are appropriate under the Agreed Framework and it's up to them to
fulfill theirs and words are not as important here as actions.
QUESTION: Pardon me if I'm wrong, but I thought the fuel oil was the US
commitment.
MR. RUBIN: Again, it's the difference between an obligation and a
commitment. There are an elaborate series of commitments that people have
made as to what they will do, but no one country is obligated to solve this
problem. It's an international job to put the money together to make KEDO
work. It's not the job of one country, but we are taking the lead here
because we recognize the seriousness of it. So I would therefore distinguish
between the word commitment and things we intend to do, things we
want to do, and obligations.
QUESTION: I don't understand. When this deal was made, did the United
States not say it would make sure North Korea had 500,000 metric tons of
fuel annually?
MR. RUBIN: Let me get you the documents which you've seen before, and we
can continue to have this abstruse legal argument after the briefing. What
I'm trying to say to you is that we are working to fulfill our part of the
arrangement. We intend to do so. As far as who is ultimately responsible
for this and the specific legal commitments pursuant to the agreement, I
would prefer to get into it either with a lawyer present or after the
briefing.
QUESTION: If you have to lawyer your agreement with the North Koreans to
understand what it says, I already think it was an abstruse legal
commitment. I would say it cuts to the heart of the whole thing. Is the
United States going to supply what it said it would or is it not? It's not
something lawyers need to deal with. You're having trouble with Congress.
Warren Christopher promised they would never have to pay more than 30
million a year. Where's it going?
MR. RUBIN: I have nothing further to add.
QUESTION: Do you know, does this government have an idea what the current
fuel oil status, reserve status is, in North Korea? Is this getting to be a
crisis?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware that there is a particular crisis here in terms
of their needs. As I said, pursuant to the Agreed Framework, KEDO, the
Korean Energy Development Organization, is to provide 500,000 metric tons
of heavy fuel oil to North Korea each year. KEDO. And we try to help KEDO
meet its obligations, and that's what we're doing in our discussions with
Congress and our discussions with other countries. KEDO has delivered
approximately 152,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea.
Additional shipments of 66,000 metric tons will happen this month, and
the overall requirement is to meet the difference between 218,000
metric tons and 500,000 metric tons, which we would have to do to meet the
500,000 commitment. So we are going to do what we can to meet this
commitment, but it is KEDO's commitment. And hopefully that will answer
questions from those of you who want to nit-pick.
QUESTION: So 66,000 metric tons are going in this month?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Definite? Definitely going to be delivered?
MR. RUBIN: Right, correct.
QUESTION: And who is supplying the 218,000?
MR. RUBIN: That is - 152 so far this year, plus 66, is 218.
QUESTION: And the remainder, who -
MR. RUBIN: That's something we are going to continue to work on.
QUESTION: So that's undetermined yet?
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: Since we're on the subject, Japan and South Korea have taken
the leading - the lead in funding the light water reactors to replace the
North Korean reactors that you were so worried about. Given the Asian
financial crisis, is the money going forward for that, as far as you
know?
MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright, I know, had extensive discussions with the
South Korean and Japanese officials on her last visit there, and they made
it clear to us they intend to carry forward with their commitments pursuant
to the agreement that KEDO entered into. And there is no evidence that I'm
aware of that the Asian financial crisis is going to change that important
commitment on their part.
QUESTION: Just to clarify the 5 million, where will it go to, the 5
million that Congress -
MR. RUBIN: Well, it's part of how we're going to fund the 66,000 metric
tons scheduled to be delivered later this month.
QUESTION: And how much in addition to that have you asked for?
MR. RUBIN: As I said, we're consulting on that and we prefer not to get
into details until we've completed those consultations
QUESTION: Have the North Koreans given any indication that if you move
forward on this that the four-party peace process will start up again?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware there is a direct linkage of any kind there.
This is a question of fulfilling the agreement on the nuclear freeze that
is now in effect. The Four Party talks are something that would be related
to reducing tensions overall in the Korean Peninsula and I'm not aware
there is a direct link.
QUESTION: According to the newspaper article which mentioned it, there
seems to be some concern in Congress that KEDO got itself into debt last
year which, apparently, Congress was not expecting. Can you address that,
and is KEDO being properly managed, in your view?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we're doing the best we can to try to make this unique
organization that has never existed before function and to provide the
required facility to build the light water reactors at the appropriate time
and to provide the fuel oil at the appropriate time. It is working. It's
not an easy proposition and we are making it work.
With respect to the concern in Congress that there are facilities other
than those at the Yongbyon reactor and other places covered by the Agreed
Framework, we believe that the DPRK is in compliance with its obligations
under the Agreed Framework and we believe that the IAEA is in a position to
monitor the freeze that is required and the North Koreans have frozen their
nuclear reactors and related facilities. If evidence was uncovered that, to
my knowledge doesn't now exist, that the North was conducting activities in
violation of the Agreed Framework, we would obviously take that matter
very seriously.
QUESTION: Did you want to move on to Kosovo with us?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: And one thing, is the Bonn meeting still on?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Ambassador Gelbard is in - the last time I spoke to him
he was in Sarajevo. He had been in Banja Luka for the morning, was heading
for Mostar to see the opening of the airport. There has obviously been some
very positive developments in Bosnia that he is trying to make sure they
continue. He will meet up with Ambassador Hill for the Contact Group
meeting on July the 8th in Bonn. Ambassador Hill will brief Contact
Group members on the status of the discussions that have been conducted
over the weekend and last week, and then I would expect Ambassador Hill to
go back to the region and continue those discussions.
QUESTION: What about countries that aren't in the Contact Group that are
in the general area; Greece, for instance, the defense minister is coming
here. And how do you bring them into it, or do you? I mean, you have the
spillover fear, so that's a measurement of how concerned (inaudible), you
know, how frequently you are talking to these folks.
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think there is the frequent discussion. As you know,
Ambassador Holbrooke was recently in Greece and I would be very surprised
if this subject didn't come up. I didn't get a readout of his meetings
specifically. As far as an institutional way or a procedural way to bring
others into it, they have all taken on their own groupings and had some of
their own discussions in this matter, and we talk to them bilaterally
through the ambassadors that we have there and then obviously through NATO
channels when discussions are held in NATO with updates from the negotiations
or discussions. Greece is a member of NATO. But there is no, at this point,
plan for a procedural special Kosovar group that I'm aware of.
QUESTION: Or any special request of Greece -- being a NATO member and
Greece coming here, the defense minister -
MR. RUBIN: Well, he's coming at the invitation of Secretary Cohen to
visit defense manufacturing facilities in Texas, Missouri and Massachusetts.
He also met with business leaders in New York. And we welcome the
opportunity to have a high level dialogue, but I think the rationale for
the visit was as stated.
QUESTION: Will there be a meeting with the Secretary of State?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think it's nailed down yet. She just returned and her
schedule is in flux. But he will be the guest of Secretary Cohen.
QUESTION: Mr. Rubin, a convoy of diplomats from the US, Russia, Poland
and the European Union are on their way today, I believe, to tour the
volatile southwest of Kosovo. And my question basically is to their
security. Are they going to be under Serb - let's say under Serb protection?
And how can their safety be guaranteed in view of the fact that the KLA did
not join in any of the negotiations with Mr. Holbrooke?
MR. RUBIN: Well, first of all, I think this wouldn't be the first time
that American diplomats overseas were not having a guarantee of safety. I
think those who have been overseas with American diplomats know that they
often take risks on behalf of their country, as the Bosnia negotiating team
did. We are engaged in a discussion on how to nail down the exact rules for
this Kosovar observer mission that just was launched over the weekend.
Certainly President Milosevic has made a commitment to allow this and is,
therefore, in that sense, responsible for making sure that they have a
certain degree of safety. But we have no illusions that this is a danger
free part of the world, and American diplomats and other diplomats who are
participating in this know those facts and know that there are no
guarantees in this business. And that is why it is such an important work
and such dangerous work.
QUESTION: Well, let me go back to my little tack-on there about Mr.
Holbrooke. Is it correct that Mr. Holbrooke did not talk to the KLA, that
they boycotted the coalition of ethnic Albanian groups?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware they were asked but, again, as I indicated last
Thursday, I'm not going to be in a position to detail every time an
American official has a contact with some element of what has been loosely
called the Kosovar Liberation Army. We are going to continue to talk to
those we think we need to talk to, especially when it comes to questions
like a cease-fire or, as you put it, security issues. I suspect that any
observer mission, including diplomats, is going to be running into
people who affiliate themselves one way or another with the Kosovar
Liberation Army.
QUESTION: But it seems to be a problem. Ambassador Miles today is quoted
as saying it's a big problem getting the Albanians into one manageable
unit. I don't know which came first: the Administration enunciating that
the KLA is entitled to be at the table but they ought to, you know, get
into one group or -
MR. RUBIN: Directly or indirectly were the words that we used.
QUESTION: Yeah. Well, it's confusing. I mean, you can't really move ahead,
can you, unless you get the right Albanians at the table?
MR. RUBIN: I think Ambassador Holbrooke has made clear that one of the
difficulties of this task is to try to bring as much cohesiveness as
possible to the Albanian side of - to the Kosovar-Albanian side of the
table, and that is not a function of the fact that we had a meeting with
the Kosovar Liberation Army. It is simply a political reality in Kosovo.
And part of that - and the primary problem - was that during the period
when President Milosevic had a chance to deal with a much more unified
Kosovar-Albanian leadership through Dr. Rugova; instead, he chose to crack
down over the last couple of months and use military force in dramatic and
condemnable ways that led to a radicalization of the society there, which
makes it harder for everyone to agree on the purposes, the goals, and the
objectives. That's just one of the realities that we now have to deal
with.
QUESTION: Will Mr. Holbrooke stay on the job shuttling or however you
want to term it?
MR. RUBIN: Well, right now as I understand it, he is on his way back to
New York. He has another big job ahead of him, which is preparing for
confirmation by the United States Senate, but I have every reason to
believe that President Clinton and Secretary Albright will continue to rely
on Ambassador Holbrooke's judgment and perhaps efforts in this area.
QUESTION: The president of Switzerland called over the weekend for the
United States government to block the boycott that various US cities and
regions are attempting to impose on the Swiss banks over the gold funds
affair. Do you have any reaction to that? Is the United States government
in any position to do that?
MR. RUBIN: The first part of your question was a much easier one than the
second part. We have not received a formal diplomatic request from the
Swiss government to block measures by US state and local governments
against Swiss institutions and have only seen press accounts like the one
you mentioned of calls made by Swiss officials on this matter.
Our position on sanctions against Switzerland remains firm. We continue to
believe that sanctions are unwarranted and counterproductive. They may lead
to less rather than more flexibility on the part of Swiss institutions.
They will prevent our nation from speaking with one voice on matters of
foreign policy. They may call into question the openness of American
financial markets, and we're calling on state and local governments
considering punitive measures to refrain from taking actions which can
further heighten tensions and delay further progress on a settlement that
can do justice to the victims of the Holocaust. In the light of recent
findings, we encourage the Swiss government to reflect on what they
can do, what ways they can develop to accelerate the movement towards
closure on these issues.
So the short answer to your question is that we continue to believe that
these are mistakes, that they're counterproductive, and that they're
dangerous. But as far as what steps we would potentially take as a
government to deal with this, it's a very complex question. It has come up
in other cases, including Burma, and we don't have any new decision to
share with you today.
QUESTION: Is there a way to do it, Jamie, to stop that sort of action?
MR. RUBIN: At the risk of, again, resorting to the refuge of lawyering,
obviously there are different legal views as to how one approaches a
problem like this where state and local governments are taking action in
the area of commerce where the federal government, if I understand and
recollect my constitutional law properly, has preeminence. But that doesn't
mean that this has happened very often and that it is an easy and natural
answer to a legitimate question.
QUESTION: Secretary Pickering is heading into talks, I believe, tomorrow
in Lagos or Abuja - one or the other. Do you have any fresh words for
us?
MR. RUBIN: I can say that Ambassador Pickering did just arrive in Nigeria,
that he is scheduled to meet tomorrow with General Abubakar and that we
obviously want to see the initial steps, the welcome steps that have been
taken by the Nigerian authorities followed up. We want to see a release of
political prisoners that would allow for a transition to civilian
government, and the sooner that Mr. Abiola, for example, is released it
would increase our optimism about the commitment of the new leadership's
respect for human rights and insuring a swift transition. But other than
those goals, I think we would like to have Under Secretary Pickering have
his meetings before commenting more fully in public.
QUESTION: How long is he going to be there?
MR. RUBIN: It's my understanding that it's one -- I don't think he'll be
there much more than a day or two. But I will get you a schedule after the
briefing.
One more.
QUESTION: How about Russia?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: There has been an announcement by Russian side President
Clinton is scheduled to visit Russia this coming September and there hasn't
been any announcement by US side.
MR. RUBIN: Yes, it's my understanding the White House has by now released
a statement confirming the President's intention to visit Russia in the
first week of September.
QUESTION: Without a START treaty?
MR. RUBIN: We have never said that ratification -
QUESTION: Oh, my. Taiwan is tough enough. Don't try it.
MR. RUBIN: Let me try to explain this to you.
QUESTION: Go ahead.
MR. RUBIN: It's funny. We predicted that reaction.
QUESTION: Then you can explain the writs of habeus corpus when you're
done.
MR. RUBIN: We have said that it would be more effective to pursue
discussions on START III if START II was ratified; therefore, the
opportunity for a more fruitful summit would exist if START II was ratified
because there would be a greater chance for START III to be advanced. In
the absence of a ratified START II, it is hard to get into a discussion in
detail about START III, as you and I discussed last week.
But there are other issues that we and the Russians have to discuss,
including the situation in Kosovo, including the threat of nuclear tests
growing in India and Pakistan, including the Russian financial crisis. We
have several issues of importance in the US-Russian relationship, bilateral
issues, issues where we share an interest in solving problems around the
world, as well as arms control.
None of this is designed to change the fact that we would like to see START
II ratified as soon as possible and that in the absence of START II being
ratified it will be difficult to move farther down the agenda of arms
control at this summit; nevertheless, there are other issues to be
discussed in this important relationship.
(The briefing ended at 1:35 p.m.)
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