U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #80, 98-07-02
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
778
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Thursday, July 2, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS
1 NIGERIA: Under Secretary Pickering's to lead high-level USG
delegation on trip
2-3 SUDAN: Humanitarian crisis affecting 1.2 million people
3 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: US welcomes the release of
opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi
NIGERIA
1 US welcomes recent statements on release of political
prisoners
2 US welcomes UNSYG Annan's announcement on political
prisoners as well
1-2 US encourages movement toward civilian rule
2 US sanctions on Nigerian remain in effect
CHINA
3-5 Munitions license dispute for Hughes Company under review
by USG
5 US position on Taiwan issues has not changed
PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
6 US strongly opposes enhanced status for the PLO at the UN
6-7 US strongly opposes unilateral actions on Jerusalem and
other sensitive issues
PAKISTAN
7-8 US has no information to support asylum-seeker's claims on
first-strike plans
CUBA
8 US continues to seek the return of several fugitives from
US justice
SWITZERLAND
9 US shares goal of justice for Holocaust victims
US believes sanctions in this case are unjustified,
unwarranted and counterproductive
KOSOVO
10 Ambassador Hill is in Pristina today
10 Ambassador Gelbard will be in London this weekend, then on
to Bosnia
10 US believes both sides need to be realistic about their
objectives to solve the problem
10 Ambassador Holbrooke will meet with President Milosevic
tomorrow in Belgrade
11-12 US has had and will continue to have contact with those who
are fighting as part of an effort to bring about a
cease-fire
12 US opposes Kosovo independence or joining with another
state
12 US continues to work with Russian in calling for Milosevic
to undertake moves called for by the Contact Group
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #80
THURSDAY, JULY 2, 1998, 12:55 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Welcome to the State Department briefing - a sporadic turnout;
perhaps people started their vacations a little early. But we here are
working.
Let me start by announcing the following. At the invitation of the
government of Nigeria and under the direction of President Clinton, Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering plans to lead a
senior-level delegation to Nigeria next week. The purpose of the visit is
to offer our support for the new leadership's recent release of political
prisoners and to discuss steps we think could facilitate the transition to
democratic civilian government in Nigeria. This visit underscores the
importance we attach to democracy and reform in this important country
in Africa.
This will be an inter-agency delegation, including Assistant Secretary
Susan Rice, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the European Command, General
James Jamerson, the NSC Director for African Affairs, a USAID assistant
administrator, as well as ambassador and other political advisors. This
will be posted after the briefing.
QUESTION: With all the aid representation, it means the visit will be
sprinkled with money, I'm sure. Is this a recognition of Nigeria's size and
importance; or is it more than that - has the Administration come to at
least some tentative conclusions about where Nigeria is going politically
now?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say the following. We are welcoming recent announcements
that have come out of Nigeria that all political prisoners will soon be
released. We've always believed that the release of political prisoners
could be a key step in the transition to civilian government. We hope these
steps will be taken soon. Taking those steps would increase our optimism
about the commitment of the new Nigerian leadership to respect for human
rights and to ensuring swift transition to civilian democratic rule in
Nigeria.
The point is that there is a moment of opportunity here. General Abubakar
has an opportunity to help bring Nigeria out of the isolation it's found
itself in as a result of the actions he takes. We want to encourage that;
we want to be encouraging where they have taken steps; and we want to urge
further steps towards a transition to civilian rule. That will be the basic
purpose of the mission.
QUESTION: Is it your understanding that Abiola is going to be the
leader?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we've seen the announcement by Secretary General Annan;
we don't have any further confirmation of it. He indicated that he expects
it to happen; we have no reason to dispute that. We welcome it and we'd
like to see that happen.
QUESTION: Does the visit take place after the release?
MR. RUBIN: Again, there is no timing set for the release, to my
knowledge. I think he said he expected it to happen. This trip will take
place - they will leave over the weekend. They will meet with General
Abubakar on July 7. So whether that is before or after this hoped for
release, we'll have to see.
QUESTION: And I assume the delegation will be pressing Nigeria on further
democratization.
MR. RUBIN: As I indicated in response to Barry's question, we welcome
what's happened so far and we want it to continue, and we want there to be
a transition to civilian democratic rule.
QUESTION: And elections this year that would be democratic?
MR. RUBIN: Following through on the plan for elections so that one can
have a civilian rule. Moving beyond Nigeria, let me say --
QUESTION: Just one more about Nigeria -- the previous attempt to send Mr.
Pickering to Nigeria, which was - well, General Abacha came to - (inaudible)
-- in a dispute over visas for prominent Nigerian -
MR. RUBIN: We have no reason to believe that that will happen.
QUESTION: But those regulations are still in force; are they not?
MR. RUBIN: We haven't changed our sanctions on Nigeria officials,
correct. To my knowledge, in preparation for this trip, the only thing that
has happened now is that this new government wants to see Under Secretary
Pickering and the last one obviously didn't.
On Sudan, we will be posting a statement, but let me say the following.
There are serious food shortages that exist in a broad area of Southern
Sudan. Currently, more than 1.2 million people urgently require food aid.
This crisis has been caused by three years of serious drought, 15 years of
civil war, the refusal of flight clearances by the government of Sudan for
UN-sponsored relief flights, and scorched-Earth military campaigns by
government-supported militias.
We are the largest funder of Operation Lifeline Sudan, a UN-sponsored
program. The US has contributed more than $700 million since it was
founded. This year our contribution already exceeds $70 million. Supplemental
contributions by the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway and other
countries have permitted Operation Lifeline Sudan to increase the size of
its air fleet substantially.
We were encouraged by recent announcements in April that they would stop
impeding relief flights, and we continue to urge the government of Sudan to
keep this pledge. Let's bear in mind, we are talking about 1.2 million
people who urgently require food aid. We are trying to do what we can and
we think more should be done by others.
On this subject?
QUESTION: No, something else.
MR. RUBIN: All right. We have several more announcements first. It's an
announcement day.
The Department of State welcomes the release from internal exile of Etienne
Tshisekedi, leader of the opposition Union for Democracy and Social
Progress party in the DROC. We urge the Democratic Republic of the Congo to
follow this positive development with other democratic measures, such as
addressing human rights concerns and opening up the political system.
Tshisekedi was detained on February 12 and we are welcoming his release.
The United States will also be sponsoring an international seminar on
trafficking in women. We'll be posting that after the briefing. We also
will be posting a statement of the monitoring group on Lebanon and a
statement of concern about recent disturbances in Algeria.
With our statements covered, let's turn to your questions.
QUESTION: The obvious one about the general's son -- you and The Times
affirming or confirming a denial blocking the general's son from participating
in the satellite? What new evidence has come to light, and is it a
technicality? Isn't it a Commerce license?
MR. RUBIN: No, the part of the license that we are reviewing is a State
Department license. At the time of the original license, the fact of his
relationship with the officials in the Peoples Liberation Army was not
known. We are continuing to develop information about this matter. We have
decided for now to suspend a munitions license for Hughes that permits a
Chinese foreign national to perform interpretation services for Hughes in
non-sensitive areas of its civilian satellite program.
The foreign national was already in the employ of Hughes under the auspices
of a Department of Commerce general license prior to the submission of a
munitions license application in '96 where there are different standards
that apply. We are continuing to review this matter. We have asked the
company for additional information. We will determine whether the work that
was being done and performed was within the scope of the license.
After we receive the additional information from the company and make our
determination, the license may be reinstated or revoked permanently. We
have not suspended the license because the person is the son of a member of
the PLA. The license has been suspended because we have decided to review
all of the facts and circumstances surrounding his work at Hughes.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - can be said of anyone, I suppose. Obviously there
are personal limitations here. But do you want to give any indication what
it is that triggered this -- what is distressing or what is the State
Department wondering about?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think we take enormous precautions any time we are
dealing with licenses of this kind. We are checking out every piece of
information we have. This action is taken as a result of a law enforcement
investigation and information that has recently been brought to our
attention that we are not at liberty to discuss publicly, and we have
coordinated our action with law enforcement officials. But all of these
areas are very sensitive areas that do not lend themselves to any specific
discussion.
QUESTION: Mr. Shen was granted a license in 1996 when Hughes applied for
another deal that is now under, I believe, investigation and you all didn't
- he wasn't probed or it was just routine. He was given a license to be an
interpreter and that seemed to be the end of it. And now this time, it's
different. What makes - not to push you beyond what you can or can not say,
but what makes it different this time? He already has a history of
you granting him a license in the past. Why deny it now?
MR. RUBIN: Again, you have these very complicated issues. They involve a
Commerce license on the one hand, and a State Department license on the
other. Based on information that is available to us and the existence of a
law enforcement investigation, we have decided to suspend the license and
seek further information from Hughes. Based on that further information, we
will then decide whether to reinstate the license or to revoke it.
As you can see from my answers to Barry's questions, I do not intend to
discuss the nature of this information.
QUESTION: So would you say - just to follow up - you mention his
involvement with the People's Liberation Army --
MR. RUBIN: No, I merely mentioned that, as I said in response to Barry's
question, the fact that he is the son of a PLA officer is not in and of
itself disqualifying. The question is, how will the activities that are
undertaken by the company fall within the scope of the license. Then, with
respect to other matters that we are looking into, we will make our
judgment. But I have no details to provide you on that.
QUESTION: I understand - just to follow up; this is not related to him -
it's sort of related. Hughes has applied for another - they've submitted
application for another license for another deal, and I understand that the
State Department is blocking that for further review because of the --
MR. RUBIN: The words you've chosen are incorrect; we're not blocking
anything. We're reviewing a number of cases, and we always review them when
proposals are made to upgrade technology. We review them - we don't block
things - until we've made a decision to allow or not allow. We're reviewing
requests for upgrades.
QUESTION: I understand that this is not the reason that the license was
suspended, but at the time it was issued, did you say you did not know he
was the son of a PLA general?
MR. RUBIN: That's my understanding.
QUESTION: Can I ask you about Taiwan? Has there been any change in US
policy with what the President said a couple of days ago, or do you see it
as being essentially a continuation of our existing policy?
MR. RUBIN: First of all, as a general practice, I did suggest that with
respect to matters China, I was going to refer most of those questions to
the party in China. But in this case, I think it's fair to say that from
this podium the fact that we have a position on not supporting Taiwan
independence, not supporting one-China, one-Taiwan, not supporting Taiwan
membership in international organizations that require a party to be a
state, is something that I've said from this podium. In fact, I remember
saying it. And it's something that, for those of you who accompanied
the Secretary to China, she said in China several months ago. So that
statement of policy is not new. Some take it more seriously because it's
now been said by the President. But as a matter of the official US
Government policy, that's something that I've said from this podium, and
that Secretary Albright has said in China.
QUESTION: If I might just ask a follow-up - would, at some point, this
need to be dealt with as a treaty matter? I mean, to play this out over a
period of some years, and perhaps the reunification process going more
smoothly.
MR. RUBIN: Wow, we're deep into the world of hypotheticals.
QUESTION: I mean, we're going to get to the year 2002, 2005 sometime and
a decision like that --
MR. RUBIN: And at that time, I'll be happy to talk about matters like
that.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Well, it maybe too - my feeling is that it may be a little late
at that point.
MR. RUBIN: I don't know how to go beyond what our current policy
is.
QUESTION: The Palestinians are not a state, either, but they're doing a
darn sight better than Taiwan - in the UN, certainly. The PLO --
MR. RUBIN: Good one, Barry; nice transition.
QUESTION: It's a transition. A two-part question - they say they have a
parliament, and they're sending delegates here. I wondered, are they going
to see members of Congress? I wondered if the State Department is going to
do anything for them; will they get access to Albright or someone high up,
other than Albright? And how goes the issue of status for the PLO at the
UN?
MR. RUBIN: The United States is strongly opposed to enhanced status for
the PLO at the United Nations, both because of its potentially negative
effects on the peace process and because of the bad precedent it would set
for the UN system itself.
We have repeatedly urged other UN members to oppose this move, and we have
urged both Israel and the Palestinians in general to avoid unilateral
actions that would prejudge the outcome of negotiations. We view this
effort as just such a unilateral action; therefore, we oppose it.
Let me say it is particularly unwelcome at this delicate time in the peace
process, when we are seeking to break the current impasse and move the
peace process forward, for this kind of step to be taken. We oppose it; we
think it's exactly the kind of unilateral action for which the Secretary
called both sides to take a time-out.
QUESTION: You can't stop it, though, can you?
MR. RUBIN: In the General Assembly, it's --
QUESTION: You need help.
MR. RUBIN: It's not a question of the United States having a veto. Let me
say that we have made these views known to the other members who are
involved, and we have made clear the harm we think it could do to the peace
process. But again, it's in the General Assembly, it's a different
story.
With respect to future travel of Palestinian officials, I haven't been
alerted to it. I haven't heard of too many Palestinian officials getting
visits with the Secretary. It happens, but they have to be quite senior.
But I'm not aware of any scheduling arrangements for that.
QUESTION: Chairman Arafat had comments, I believe, yesterday, talking
about how the Palestinians will defend Jerusalem any way we can; no peace,
security without the return of Jerusalem. Do you have any comment on those
comments?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen the specific translation of his comments. I
think what it points up is that Jerusalem is an extremely sensitive issue,
and it's an issue that we think unilateral actions should not be taken.
That is why we made very clear our opposition to the Israeli Government's
decisions two weeks ago.
QUESTION: How about --
MR. RUBIN: Can I finish the answer to the question, please?
QUESTION: Oh, sorry, I thought you were done.
MR. RUBIN: We have made clear our opposition to the specific unilateral
actions that prejudge outcomes that could be negotiated. That is quite
clear. And the kind of reaction that it has caused by the Palestinians is
precisely the kind of reaction that makes us oppose these moves, because it
makes it harder for the sides to get to yes, to get to an agreement; and it
makes it easier for the finger-pointing to start again and the name-calling
and the rhetoric, rather than the serious work of negotiating peace
arrangements.
So I have not seen a particular comment by Chairman Arafat, but your
paraphrase of it struck me as something that I would want to see the
translation before I would comment, because I think I understand the
implication of your paraphrase.
But again -
QUESTION: I will paraphrase it a little more mildly.
MR. RUBIN: Perhaps. But let's - I'd rather see it and make a comment once
I saw the specific comment.
QUESTION: I have a question about Japanese bank reforms. The Japanese
Liberation Party just released a detailed bank reform plan just today,
including the bridge bank system. How do you evaluate such an effort?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I have not been provided with specific information on
that, and we'd be happy to get it for you after the briefing.
QUESTION: Do you have anything more on that Pakistani asylum seekers,
since we don't call them defectors? Anything more to indicate whether his
story is credible?
MR. RUBIN: We have no information to support this person's claim that
Pakistan was planning a preemptive strike on Indian nuclear facilities, and
we note significant discrepancies in his story as reported in the
press.
QUESTION: Can you touch on any of the discrepancies?
MR. RUBIN: I fought very hard for that sentence. That wasn't good enough
for you?
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: What do we do for a second paragraph?
QUESTION: Jamie, what is the status of efforts by the State Department to
obtain the extradition of suspected criminals in at least two cases of
alleged cop killers from Cuba? And after you get through with your answer,
I have a follow-up.
MR. RUBIN: There are several people involved here and I am fearing that I
will mess up their names, but since they are prisoner escapees I am not
going to worry about it that much.
(Laughter.)
Ms. Chesimard escaped from prison in 1979 where she was serving a life
sentence for the murder of a New Jersey state trooper, and fled to Cuba
where she was given asylum. The United States has sought her return but the
Cuban Government has refused to do so. We do have an extradition treaty
signed in 1904 providing for the mutual extradition of fugitives from
justice. The treaty entered into force in 1905 and was supplemented by an
additional extradition treaty in 1926. They haven't been invoked,
presumably, because the Castro Government won't abide by the treaties.
The United States has sought the return of this woman, but the government
has refused. We will continue to seek the return of Chesimard and other
fugitives from justice to the United States.
QUESTION: I didn't want to mention names because it's usually an excuse
for you to say you don't talk about specific cases, but as long as you've
talked about Ms. Chesimard, do you have anything specifically on Michael
Finney (as heard) and Charles Hill who are allegedly accused of allegedly
killing a New Mexico patrolman?
MR. RUBIN: As I understand it from one of my able deputies here, the
cases are identical in their basic form in that we are seeking extradition
and the Cuban Government has not allowed extradition.
QUESTION: Okay. And the follow-up that I alluded to was -
MR. RUBIN: Clearly, we don't have a normal relationship with Cuba; and
our ability to get their cooperation in this matter is certainly affected
by the lack of such a normal relationship.
QUESTION: Okay. Well, that may have answered the question because Cuba's
response generally is that extradition is a two-way street, and that there
are a number of people accused of murder here in the US that Cuba would
like back.
MR. RUBIN: As I recall, sometimes when there are murderers in Cuba they
send them to the United States. So they need to make up their mind whether
they want to send them here or ask for their return. And let me simply say
that if we have a convicted murderer, they should be returning these people
to the United States.
QUESTION: On Switzerland, the Swiss banks -- Switzerland put out a
statement today saying that the sanctions pending against the Swiss banks
could jeopardize relations with the United States. I'm wondering if you
have a reaction.
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me first of all say we share the goal of the
committee that justice be done to victims of the Holocaust. We have been
committed to that goal and have demonstrated that commitment time and time
again. We believe it is imperative to deal with aging and fragile Holocaust
survivors as promptly as possible. That is why Under Secretary Eizenstat
has spent considerable amount of time in his role as a facilitator to work
with the parties to the class action law suit to reach a settlement and
achieve a prompt and just resolution of this matter while these people
are still in a position to receive the benefit of this settlement.
We continue to believe that sanctions are unjustified, unwarranted and
counter-productive. They will prevent our nation from speaking with one
voice on matters of foreign policy; they will call into question the
openness of our financial markets; and they may lead to greater inflexibility
on the part of the Swiss institution. A prolonged litigation is not in the
interest of either side. It will deny prompt justice to victims in their
lifetime and delay closure on this issue. We call on both sides to reflect
on the consequences of going down the road of protracted litigation
and recriminations. Before any actions are taken, we ask both sides
to consider a return to the negotiating table.
QUESTION: Something that we talked about yesterday and you helped
straighten me out. I'm going to go back to it. The matter of -
MR. RUBIN: I hope I can straighten you out again.
QUESTION: Well, okay. Please, if you can, enlighten me further on the
type of treaty that the United States and the PRC entered into with regard
to the de-targeting of ballistic missiles. And secondly, is there any kind
of an inspection regime that goes along with that or is that to be worked
out?
MR. RUBIN: Let me - if you don't mind, there has been a great deal of
information provided by the party in Beijing about these activities. It is
not a treaty, as I understand it. But there was a long briefing on it and
there are several fact sheets; and I would like us to provide that for you
immediately after the briefing lest I incorrectly state what is a very
complex issue.
QUESTION: Did you see anything about visitation of either party -
MR. RUBIN: You'll get a full chance to look at all that information when
we provide it to you.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MR. RUBIN: On Kosovo, Ambassador Hill is in Pristina today meeting with
Dr. Rugova, whose role is indispensable in this process. Ambassador
Holbrooke will be returning to Belgrade tomorrow to join Ambassador Hill in
a meeting with Slobodan Milosevic. Ambassador Gelbard will be in London
over the weekend to deliver a speech and then moving on to Bosnia. So we
continue a full court diplomatic press to try to prevent this conflict from
growing and spreading.
QUESTION: Can I ask you a question? The US seems to be in something of a
bind in the sense that you're trying to sell a solution that neither side
wants; that is, autonomous status of some kind for Kosovo within the FRY or
Serbia, whichever the case may be. Obviously -
MR. RUBIN: The FRY.
QUESTION: Well, that's to be determined, isn't it?
MR. RUBIN: That's our position.
QUESTION: Okay, all right, fine. But the Kosovars want independence and
Milosevic doesn't want to grant that autonomy. So how do you go about
selling this solution?
MR. RUBIN: You've clearly analyzed the situation well. This is a
difficult problem. The question is what do we do about it. We believe this
is a difficult problem that we need to try to bring home to both sides the
fact that they will be worse off if they don't solve the problem. The
Kosovar Albanians, if they hold out the hope of an independence that the
international community is not going to provide, they will only decrease
the chances of improving their autonomy and improving their lives.
Similarly, if President Milosevic doesn't finally get the message that
the cracking down on the Kosovar Albanians is only making it impossible
for his country to be rehabilitated and making it impossible for his own
people to operate in Kosovo, which is becoming increasingly controlled by
the - in at least, as I said yesterday, some one-third of the territory -
by the Kosovar Liberation Army. The art of diplomacy is to convince the
parties and the leaders that they're not being realistic about their
objective, and that they need to get realistic if they want to benefit
their country.
That is what Ambassadors Gelbard, Holbrooke and Hill are trying to do with
the parties - with Slobodan Milosevic and with Dr. Rugova - is convince
them that their maximal objectives and continued pursuit of them are only
going to redown to the disadvantage harm of their people.
QUESTION: Can you tell us more about Holbrooke and Milosevic - they're
meeting tomorrow? I think you mentioned that yesterday.
MR. RUBIN: Right, I mentioned it today; you now have a little tidbit. But
as far as what the substance of it is, I think that most of us know that
when Ambassador Holbrooke meets with Slobodan Milosevic, they've made an
agreement not to discuss publicly what happens. Obviously, the objective is
the same - is to get President Milosevic to realize that he's leading his
country down the path to ruin and that it's time for him to get it
through his head that the only course of wisdom is to pull back his forces,
stop the crackdown, stop the use of heavy military equipment and start the
use of the good sense of negotiations to resolve this problem.
QUESTION: Who called for the meeting -- can you --
MR. RUBIN: I don't know the answer to that. I'm sure they had talked
about the possibility of talking again. Ambassador Hill, again, is on the
ground, shuttling back and forth between the Kosovar Albanians and the
Serbs in Belgrade. Ambassador Gelbard is playing his role in Bosnia, and
also with respect to other meetings. So who called for the meeting, I have
no idea.
QUESTION: Any plans to meet with the KLA again?
MR. RUBIN: On that subject, let me say that, as I indicated yesterday, it
would be foolhardy for us not to realize that the necessities of a cease-
fire require discussions with those who are in ability, in a position to
enforce and implement such a cease-fire. So we're going to be quite
realistic in trying to make that happen. But I'm not going to get in a
position of commenting every time such a discussion is held.
Let me say this - once the monitoring mission is in Kosovo, we would expect
the monitors to be in regular contact with everyone there. But as far as
what the purpose of our contact was that Ambassador Gelbard undertook was
to make them understand that there were limits to what they could expect
from the international community and the importance of a cease-fire. So
we're not going to be in a position of commenting every time there's a
contact.
But the fact of the contact is something we've made well-known. Right, nice
haircut.
QUESTION: Has the KLA agreed to ensure the security of the monitors?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to be in a position to comment on the discussions
that were had of that kind.
QUESTION: But on that issue, I mean, there's a view in Europe that in
Kosovo there are civilians taking up arms; that they're not actually - the
KLA is not an organized fighting force.
MR. RUBIN: I think there is a view everywhere, and there's no different
analysis of the situation in Europe and the United States. I don't
understand the --
QUESTION: No, that's not the point, I'm saying that is your view that the
KLA is an organized - I mean, is as organized as you think it is that it's
able to send the word on down to hold a cease-fire?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think we've ever said it's an organized army. I think
what we've said is that if you want to have a cease-fire, you have to begin
to have contact with those who are fighting. I think that anyone who wants
to have a cease-fire knows that you need to have contact with those who are
fighting. So we've said we would be prepared to have such contact in
principle. We had such contact. I would expect us to continue to have
contact at the appropriate times and places; I'm just not going to
get into all the details of it.
But in general, I think what I was trying to point, in response to Judd's
question, is that once the monitors are in place and they're talking to all
of the people who control different parts of the territory in Kosovo, they
will be coming into regular contact with fighters who may have the KLA
patch on their uniform. The fact that this is not an organized army is not
news to us here in the United States.
QUESTION: But how do you talk to them? I mean, how do you know that the
people you're talking to can deliver?
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - Rugova as easily as the KLA.
MR. RUBIN: I don't think that's obvious. I mean, I think most people who
have looked into this situation, including people in Europe, have agreed
that if you want a cease-fire, you need the KLA to cooperate. The KLA is a
disparate organization; the extent of its unity is open to question. But
that doesn't mean you shouldn't talk to them because you're not confident
that your contact is going to yield results. It depends on what your
objective here is.
Your objective is to get a cease-fire and to get one side to stop the
fighting or both sides to stop the fighting; ours is both sides. Anyone who
doesn't want to talk to the KLA must have not that interest in mind.
QUESTION: Jamie, Ambassador Holbrooke must have changed his schedule to
go to Belgrade, because I think he was originally due to be in Germany
tomorrow; is that correct?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know what his schedule is, but I know that he's going
to be in Belgrade tomorrow. I don't know what his schedule was, but I did
speak to him this morning and know that is his intention.
QUESTION: What, Jamie, does the US say to those ethnic Albanians and
those descendants of Turks that would have a greater stake in that area for
Muslims?
MR. RUBIN: We are opposed to independence for Kosovo, and therefore,
we're even more opposed to any attempt to join such an independent entity
with another country nearby. That would be a prescription for danger and
further danger in the region.
QUESTION: Where do the Russians stand right now, in terms of do they
still oppose the military intervention in Kosovo in case the --
MR. RUBIN: Well, you'd have to talk to the Russians about their position.
As far as we're concerned, we are working closely with the Russians on
those areas where we do agree, and that is the requirements that President
Milosevic undertake pursuant to the Contact Group's decision. NATO planning
continues. As far as what their ultimate position would be on any UN
resolution, you'd have to ask them.
We certainly hope they realize that this is something that does threaten
the stability of the region, and that President Milosevic is someone who
needs to be dealt with firmly if we're going to have any progress.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)
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