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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #79, 98-07-01

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


992

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Wednesday, July 1, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

STATEMENTS
1		Deputy Secretary Talbott's trip to the Baltic States and
		  Under Secretary Eizenstat's trip to Lithuania
1		U.S. contributions to the Sierra Leonean crisis and
		  Liberian repatriation programs

PAKISTAN 1-2 Reports of Pakistani nuclear scientist seeking asylum in the U.S./Nuclear arms testing

ARMS CONTROL 2-3 Brookings Institute report on the cost of nuclear weapons 3-4 U.S. policy on Russian ratification of START II and the possibility of START III

NATO ENLARGEMENT 4-5 Timing of Polish, Czech and Hungarian entry into NATO

ISRAEL 5 Reports of construction of cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons

RUSSIA 5 Update on financial markets

FRY/KOSOVO 5-6,9 Update on U.S. diplomatic efforts/U.S. goals of cease-fire and political agreement 6 Reported presence of mercenaries in Kosovo 6-7 U.S. contact with both Dr. Rugova and KLA 7-8 Contact Group requirements for a peace agreement / Pres. Milosevic's compliance 8,10-11 U.S. policy on a UNSC resolution on Kosovo 8-9,11 Update on fighting/Risk of conflict spilling over to neighboring countries 9 Amb. Holbrooke's travel plans 9-10 Extent of Pres. Milosevic's control within territorial boundaries/International consequences to internal conflict in Kosovo 11-12 Accelerated NATO planning

IRAN 12-13 Pres. Khatemi's remarks on Secretary Albright's speech 13 Trial of the mayor of Tehran 13 U.S. policy of dual containment

IRAQ 13-15 Assistant Secretary Indyk's meeting with Iraqi National Congress leader Chalabi/U.S. program in support of Iraqi opposition

IRELAND 15 Departure date and status of a replacement for Amb. Kennedy Smith

ARGENTINA 15-16 Extradition of U.S. citizens to testify in a corruption case

CYPRUS 16 Extension of UN peace force/Reaction of Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot communities


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #79

WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1998, 12:45 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED) _

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. We have two statements we'll be posting after the briefing - one regarding Deputy Secretary Talbott's trip to the Baltic States, as well as Under Secretary Eizenstat's trip to Vilnius, Lithuania; and a statement laying out U.S. contributions to assist in the Sierra Leonean crisis and Liberian repatriation programs. They're quite detailed and extensive, and they will be put out after the briefing.

With that, let's go to our questioners, Barry Schweid.

QUESTION: This probably is a dry hole because of the usual response to a question like this; but let me try anyhow. Is there any point in asking you any questions about the Pakistani defector, or will you say it's an intelligence matter?

MR. RUBIN: Maybe it's not such a dry hole after all.

QUESTION: Has the U.S. been told that Pakistan was in the midst of preparing a nuclear strike against India?

MR. RUBIN: We have seen reports of a Pakistani who claims to have worked in his country's nuclear weapons program, and that he has asked for asylum. We have no information beyond what has been reported in the media that can confirm or deny this gentleman's story. We have no comment on his claims about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

However, we do believe in general that the nuclear tests that took place have led South Asia in a dangerous direction. We face a new and more dangerous security environment as a result of those tests. Both Pakistan and India are less secure, and we want the two countries to work together to resolve their disputes. We don't comment on specific asylum requests. I'd have to refer you to the INS.

QUESTION: That would be another question; and you're not commenting on that. In a general sense, can you say if he's provided any useful information to the United States about that dangerous nuclear race in South Asia?

MR. RUBIN: Let me repeat what I said, and maybe that can answer it. We have no information beyond what is reported in the media that can confirm or deny his story.

QUESTION: His lawyer is saying he's spoken - it's gone beyond reports in the media. I mean, there's no doubt that he has had contact and said various things. But that's it - if you can't generalize what he's told the U.S. --

MR. RUBIN: We don't have enough at this point to advance the story.

QUESTION: Is anyone at State talking to him?

MR. RUBIN: As far as who might or might not talk to him with respect to asylum, that would be a question for the INS. With respect to this gentleman's story and what we think it might mean, we don't have information to confirm or deny the story at this point.

QUESTION: But my question was, whether anyone in the government would talk to him beyond the asylum request --

MR. RUBIN: I'm sure that when people of this nature come forward with information that would matter to our national security interests, that we would want to try to ascertain the veracity and utility of that information.

QUESTION: Technically speaking, Jamie, is it possible for someone to defect from Pakistan? Is that word applicable in this case?

MR. RUBIN: Well, seeking asylum --

QUESTION: They called it a defector. I didn't know there was any such thing any more, since the fall of the Soviet Union.

MR. RUBIN: Right. Well, it's a word that helps to improve the headline creation quotient.

QUESTION: So this is someone --

QUESTION: You can defect from North Korea, for instance.

QUESTION: From North Korea, or from Syria, I suppose. But as far as his status, as far as the US Government is concerned, he's seeking asylum in the United States?

MR. RUBIN: What I'm prepared to say on that is that to the extent that we can talk about individual asylum requests, that would be something the INS would have to cover.

QUESTION: Here's something that will take both of us way, way back. Have you, like a lot of reporters, read the first three and the last two pages of the Brooking's report which --

MR. RUBIN: The nuclear-weapons-are-expensive report?

QUESTION: Stunningly expensive. But besides that, not only are they expensive, some interesting propositions are raised. The Administration and past administrations really haven't a great theory what they are doing with these weapons. And this challenges the notion - or at least leaves it open - whether having this incredible devastating force through the years - and expensive, too -- caused the Soviet Union to collapse, which the Reagan- nauts, of course, said all the time: our might caused the empire to collapse. Is this the place to address any of these conclusions? Do you have any responses?

MR. RUBIN: Let me give you some off-the-cuff responses, because we haven't had a chance to study this report. Number one, the fight to contain communism and to deter the outbreak of war in Central Europe and to deter the use of nuclear weapons against the United States necessitated a deterrent posture that we were correct to create and correct to ensure its viability and effectiveness.

Clearly, to the extent that one can judge anything, that deterrent posture worked. There was no conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that nuclear weapons could have deterred that didn't deter. So to that extent, that was successful.

Number two, nuclear weapons and the fight against communism was an extraordinarily expensive proposition. That should not come as a surprise. Some people may have been surprised by the numbers. I don't think we've had a chance to assess them and assess their accuracy; but again, I certainly think we would agree that it was an expensive proposition.

I think as a government we would also argue that it was worth the expense -- that communism was worth deterring through a combined policy of containment and modernization of nuclear forces. But those days are gone. Now we're in a different time, and the time we're in is a time of disarmament and a time of deep cuts in nuclear arms. We're in a time when we're trying to bring to bear the arms control experience across a whole panoply of activities that was never part of the arms control process during those days; including, for example, the fact that we're trying to bring fissile material into the equation, that we're trying to include the counting of warheads, not just the counting of missiles and delivery systems.

So as far as the third point, the fact of the matter is that the Soviet Union collapsed and that communism collapsed in Eastern Europe. I think we all know that is a very good thing for the peoples of those countries, and an even better thing for the rest of the world.

I'm sure the historians will be examining for the rest of time what the precipitous cause was or what the historic cause was. It's a matter for historians to decide and not for spokesmen to beat their chest about.

QUESTION: One last thing - before the Soviet Union collapsed, in those heady days when Gorbechev would announce a massive unilateral reduction of one weapon or another, compelling the Bush Administration - maybe the word compelling is editorial - to respond with cuts, there were sharp reductions. Is this Administration now simply in a position of having to wait for Yeltsin to push the START treaty through, which he can't apparently - he hasn't so far - to reduce arsenals? Is there any notion that maybe the U.S. doesn't need 10,000 nuclear weapons these days?

MR. RUBIN: Again, without crossing some tricky thresholds that have not been crossed, let me say the following. We think the best way to pursue deep reductions is through a controlled process of treaties, and a controlled process of verification; that this is the best way to assure the world and assure the United States - and for that matter, the Russians - that this is being done in a controlled, organized and stabilizing way. We are prepared to be as innovative as possible in trying to examine how to proceed, including, as I said, things like including warheads and fissile material.

With respect to the size of the cuts, the President of the United States and the President of Russia have already agreed on some general ranges on the objectives of START III. But to get down and negotiate that agreement, both the President of Russia and the President of the United States believe the necessary prerequisite is ratification of START II. We do not think the prospects for START II ratification are dead. We think that it would be better for START II to be ratified sooner rather than later; and we're certainly not encouraged by the recent events in recent weeks in which it has been delayed.

But we do believe that, as President Yeltsin continues to put the pressure on and explain to the members of the Duma that it is hurting Russia for START II not to be ratified, that logic and wisdom will prevail. It sometimes takes time for treaties to be ratified. In the meantime, we continue to have exploratory discussions, as we have had for some time, on where we go from the point that START II is ratified.

So we want to see deep cuts in nuclear arms. We want to see all the different capabilities taken into account. And we want to move forward. One of the prerequisites for moving forward in sort of a traditional negotiating context is the ratification of START II.

QUESTION: Still on security, the Polish Defense Minister is suggesting that the dates of admitting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO might be advanced and take place before next year's summit. Is there any truth in that?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I think there is a ratification process that has to go on across the board for all the 16 countries. We have done so, and some of the other countries have done so; but not all have done so. So the actual incorporation into NATO is a subject that is dependent upon the ratification by parliaments of the NATO charter amendment, which I don't believe is complete yet. Am I right about that? We'll check that. There was a proper nod over there, but I don't believe it's completed yet. That's the first step.

As far as the timing of accelerating, we've moved this quite far along and quite quickly, and much quicker than a lot of people thought was possible. I'm not aware that there's a push to accelerate it even further.

QUESTION: As far as I know, it's always been assumed that subject to ratification and so forth, that they would be formally admitted at the Washington Summit; is that still the case?

MR. RUBIN: Well, there have been several ceremonies that constituted the recognition - the signing, the ratification documents. I believe the Washington Summit would include a discussion of next steps in the area of NATO enlargement. Whether that would be the formal moment at which they're approved, I do not know. But we will get that for the record. And to those of you who report to the Poles and the Czechs and the Hungarians, my ignorance on this subject should not be perceived as any change in American policy.

QUESTION: Can I go back to nuclear weapons or dry holes, as the case may be? Reports that Israel's new submarines that it's acquiring are nuclear missile-capable, and that Israel intends to utilize them to that effect.

MR. RUBIN: We have no information to confirm reports that Israel is building cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

With respect to the overall question of Israel and nuclear weapons, let me say that we want to see, over time, a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East. But we believe that has to happen in the context of a comprehensive peace agreement. Other than saying that Israel has said it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the region, all I can say is that we want a process to marry the political requirements of a comprehensive peace with the technical requirements of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the region. We think that those need to go in a commensurate way.

QUESTION: Mr. Kiriyenko of Russia said today that the Russian economy is worsening daily. It continues to go down hill or down slope. Can you comment on his assessment?

MR. RUBIN: I don't have any comment on today's market figures and other market assessments of the Russian economy. All I can say is that we want to see the necessary reforms take place in Russia, and that, as the President has said in the past, we'd be prepared to work with the international financial institutions as necessary to provide assistance, provided the reform process continues. But I don't have any comment on today's market developments.

QUESTION: Jamie, can you bring us up to date on Kosovo, and whether or not there's any change in plans on the diplomatic front in either Ambassadors Holbrooke, Gelbard or Hill's meetings?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. Let me say first, generally, we have been engaged in an intensive effort, and that effort is going to only intensify in the coming weeks. This diplomatic full court press is ongoing; and it will be ongoing for some time.

Ambassador Hill is, I believe, in Tirana today, will be meeting with relevant officials on it, has been in touch with both sides. Ambassador Gelbard is expected to leave later this week to go to Bosnia and also, perhaps, ending up at a Contact Group meeting in Bonn in the middle of next week and perhaps having other meetings in this area.

With respect to what our goal is, our goal is clear: in the near term we need a cease-fire, we need a cessation of hostilities. Over the longer term, we need a political solution to something that we believe can only be solved politically. This ongoing diplomatic full court press is one that Ambassador Hill, Ambassador Gelbard and, as appropriate, Ambassador Holbrooke will be conducting. They're in constant contact with each other. We are trying, through this diplomatic full court press, to deter and prevent the outbreak of a more general war that will redown to the disadvantage of the people living there, as well as harm the interests of our NATO allies and the United States itself.

QUESTION: Jamie, does the U.S. have any evidence that veterans of the Bosnian war have shown up in Kosovo, either on the Muslim or the Serb side?

MR. RUBIN: The last time I checked into this, which was some days ago, we were aware of entreaties that had been made, where the rogue's gallery of mercenaries who look for a fight to which they can join would like to join fights. That doesn't come as a surprise to us. But we have made clear both to various factions within the Kosovo Albanians what a mistake this would be; and we have made clear to the world that we think this would be a mistake. At this point, we do not have any information that these requests, these entreaties have led to real effects on the ground in Kosovo.

QUESTION: In that overview which you gave us two minutes ago, it was devoid of any criticism of Milosevic and the Serbs. Are you viewing Milosevic and his allies as more or less moral equals with the KLA these days?

MR. RUBIN: On the contrary. The principal responsibility for the current situation lies with Belgrade. But we have to be realistic in terms of getting the job done. We are urging all parties to cease the use of force. This is not a conflict that we believe can be resolved with the use of force. The diplomacy is not going to be helped by the use of force.

The central figure that we have expressed our strongest support and understanding for is Dr. Rugova. We see him as central and indispensable, and look to him and his team of advisors to speak for the interests of the Kosovar Albanian people. That is the reason the President of the United States met with him; that is the reason Secretary of State Albright met with him.

With respect to the KLA, let's be realistic here. If we're going to get a cease-fire, we have to be in touch with the people who can control one side of the equation. If we don't have contact with the Kosovar Liberation Army and we get Milosevic to do what he should have done long ago - which is to stop the crackdown - the cease-fire will not be able to sustain.

Similarly, we have to be realistic that there is a large body of opinion in Kosovar Albanian society; and it is our view that all of those opinions ought to be part of the negotiating process, which should be led by - and there's been a lot of misunderstanding in this regard - Dr. Rugova. Nothing that we have done in the last week changes one wit our view that Dr. Rugova is the correct interlocutor and that he is the central and indispensable leader of the Kosovar Albanian side.

As a practical matter, we need to be in touch with those who can make it possible for a cease-fire to sustain; and that's the reason - and the only reason - we have been in contact with the Kosovar Liberation Army.

QUESTION: So is it fair to say that - (inaudible) - is Rugova with guys from KLA and probably from the - (inaudible) - side, meaning someone who is totally against Rugova's approach, you would have a whole team in Kosovo --

MR. RUBIN: Well, we are in touch with the Kosovar Albanian leadership about how they should go about organizing themselves. I don't want to prejudge what decisions they make. What I am trying to say is that in our discussions with Dr. Rugova, he has welcomed the idea that in order for cease-fires to sustain themselves, they need to include the acquiescence and support of the KLA; and that's the principal reason for our discussions with the KLA.

With respect to what his team should look like, we want it to be as full a body of opinion as possible. Whether it's a direct or an indirect role for the KLA is up for the Kosovar Albanians themselves to decide.

QUESTION: Jamie, has there been a change and is there no longer a demand for a pull-back of Serb security forces and special police units from Kosovo - because you didn't mention that.

MR. RUBIN: No, I didn't mention everything we think on this subject for brevity's sake. But let me answer the question the following way. We set out four conditions in the Contact Group statement. They included humanitarian access, commitment to negotiate with outsiders present, the allowance of monitoring missions, and the pull-back of forces that were not in Kosovo and the cantonment of those that had been there. Those are our standing requirements for the political conditions that would be necessary for a successful peace agreement.

With respect to the near-term goal, we are focused on a cease-fire for obvious reasons. But that doesn't change at all our desire to see President Milosevic return those forces that were not there to their barracks. Frankly, those are necessary prerequisites for any change in the sanctions policies that have been adopted at the various Contact Group foreign ministers meetings.

All I'm stating is what a real-world, real-time objective is now, which is a cease-fire leading to a cessation of hostilities. And a cessation of hostilities would include the kind of change in force structure and force deployment, including the return to other parts of Serbia and Montenegro the forces there. So it's not one or the other. We need a cease-fire now. We need to be in a position to have that cease-fire hold. That is the near- term objective of our diplomatic full-court press.

As far as the requirements for President Milosevic to shift the responsibility off his shoulders, we've placed primary blame on his shoulders because he is responsible for the decision of the government there to use military force, and those forces are still there. If he wants to change that, he's got to begin by pulling back those forces. If he wants to change the views of the international community about sanctions and other matters, that is still an absolute requirement.

QUESTION: From my understanding, the Contact Group statement which raised the threat of possible NATO military action listed these things as simultaneous requirements; that they all had to be done immediately.

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: Are you now saying that cease-fire first and then pull-back later, or --

MR. RUBIN: No, we want - look, I mean, I would hesitate to divine - I know that some are trying to make this point, and it's a mute point. The simple fact is that we want a cease-fire yesterday, today and tomorrow; we want a cease-fire. We want President Milosevic to allow each of those conditions to be met. He has made some progress in the area of the humanitarian access and some progress in the area of monitoring. That is a process we're now trying to create -- an international Kosovo monitoring mission.

He has not made any progress in pulling back those forces, and we want those forces pulled back. All I am saying is as a practical matter, we don't expect to see that kind of pull-back in the absence of a cease-fire. That doesn't mean we wouldn't prefer to see it without a cease-fire. But as a practical matter that is going to be, in our view, the most likely sequence. If he wants to change the blame that the international community has placed on his shoulders, he should take all four of those steps.

So long as he doesn't take all four of those steps, the primary principal blame for this conflict will rest on his shoulders.

QUESTION: At that point, Jamie, what if Milosevic is not willing to do this? Do you expect anything different after July 8?

MR. RUBIN: The Contact Group will meet. The NATO military planners continue to accelerate military planning. We haven't ruled any options out. We are supportive of a strong resolution in the United Nations, authorizing the use of force. We believe that UN authorization would be useful; depending on the circumstances; it may not be necessary. Certainly under our domestic law, we do not think that we need UN authorization to act. But we would like to see a strong UN resolution put forward at the appropriate time, and we would like to see support for it. Beyond that, I'm not prepared to speculate at this time.

QUESTION: And if I may, last one -- I'm still confused about certain things. The situation is Kosovo is worsening day by day, but U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke defined it as a dangerous but not emergency. What state of violence you would characterize as a war, or, let's say, emergency?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know how to answer that question precisely. I know that there is fighting in Kosovo. Our situation report for today includes the fact that sporadic fighting continues in various parts of Kosovo. Embassy Belgrade officials who visited the area around the coal mine yesterday noted a cessation of fighting and minimal collateral damage there. So there is fighting and the fighting continues. There is obviously a conflict. We've called it an internal armed conflict for legal reasons, previously. Those legal reasons include the fact that the international tribunal would be in a position to investigate and act appropriately on those investigations.

Beyond saying that people are dying and machine guns are firing and heavy weapons are deployed, I don't know how to be more specific.

QUESTION: Point of clarification -- you said that the diplomatic effort would be intensifying?

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: And that Hill will be holding meetings and Gelbard more meetings, which is basically what they've been doing in the last week. So how is it intensifying?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I am using the word intensifying advisedly. I spoke to all of the relevant people this morning, including Ambassador Holbrooke, Ambassador Gelbard, who had been in touch with Ambassador Hill. We are trying to intensify this process so that we can achieve the objectives we've set out.

But we recognize that this isn't a one-mission, one-failure, one-success operation. This is going to be over many weeks. It's going to take a lot of time. There's a lot of bad blood, a lot of bad will and a lot of terribly bad decisions -- most of them by President Milosevic. This will take time, and we're going to intensify this effort in the coming weeks.

QUESTION: Where is Holbrooke now?

MR. RUBIN: He's in Oslo, I believe, doing the Cyprus meeting.

QUESTION: Has he any plans to do anything directly on Kosovo?

MR. RUBIN: I have nothing to announce about future trips for him as of now.

QUESTION: Does the Administration think that President Milosevic enjoys sovereignty over his entire nation?

MR. RUBIN: I don't understand the question. I certainly know it's leading somewhere, so why don't you get to the next one.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: It's really a simple question. Does he rule all - does he enjoy sovereignty over all of his nation?

MR. RUBIN: I can say the following - we believe that Kosovar Albanian forces control some 30-plus percentage of the territory in Kosovo.

QUESTION: Right. But legally speaking, is there any reason that President Milosevic doesn't have the rights of a president over his entire nation? Those rights include the ability to deploy military force, to make foreign policy, et cetera, et cetera.

MR. RUBIN: Let me say this, without, again, answering it directly because you've stated it in a very legal formulation, and, therefore, I would want to get our legal advisor to give me his advice before I answered it. We do not believe this is a simple matter of what goes on inside Serbia- Montenegro. The international community has made clear there are international consequences for what he is doing there. The 10,000-plus refugees in Albania, in Macedonia, make that clear. So we don't believe it's a simple question of what a sovereign may do inside his territory.

Furthermore, the Security Council has imposed an arms embargo on that territory, and has done so on the logic that there are consequences internationally for what is going on there. So it is not a simple legal question. Certainly the international community believes, through that resolution, that it has a right to make decisions to protect international peace and security there.

The Contract Group has gone further. With the exception of Russia, the Contact Group has imposed economic sanctions on President Milosevic for doing things within the territory of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. So whatever the technical, legal point that you're asking, the answer to, I will give you shortly. The policy answer is that we believe we are well within our rights to be acting because of the risks to international peace and security created by his decision-making.

QUESTION: The precedent it sets for the United States and any countries that care to join it, absent Security Council authorization, to intervene in a conflict - a domestic conflict in another country - when the U.S. feels it's in its national interest to do so, it will do so?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to answer such a general hypothetical question about when we would use military force. What I can say --

QUESTION: In a domestic dispute?

MR. RUBIN: When we would use military force ever. I don't intend to answer a hypothetical generality like that because every circumstance differs.

We do expect to act within a NATO context. We are planning through NATO to proceed. With respect to a Security Council resolution, what I am pointing out to you is that, number one, there has been a Security Council resolution already making clear of the dangers; the Contact Group countries have made clear that this is a danger to international peace and security; and NATO's charter talks about the need to act - or the possibility of acting -- in the context of dangers to Europe. So we are not waking up one morning and inventing theories to apply to this situation. These are well- established principles. Some may disagree; but they are not invented for the convenience of the United States.

QUESTION: Yes, Jamie, Mr. Holbrooke was quoted as saying that, one, there was the Kijevo -- a particular Kijevo situation in Kosovo was the most dangerous place in Europe and could lead to a general war. Mr. Holbrooke also said that they were only a few steps from all-out war in Kosovo. Does the State Department agree with that particular assessment of that - let's say -

MR. RUBIN: The danger?

QUESTION: The danger or the seriousness of the --

MR. RUBIN: Let me say this -- Ambassador Holbrooke is there under the authority of President Clinton and Secretary Albright. His activities have been directed by President Clinton and Secretary Albright. As far as his characterization is concerned, it strikes me as about right. If we don't get a handle on this situation and it does spin out of control, I have said from this podium - and others have, as well - that there is risk, a serious risk, of a conflict in Kosovo spilling over into other countries and creating an even more dangerous instability and conflict in the region.

That is what the word general war presumably means. I haven't asked him for his definition of general war. But that would strike me as quite reasonable. Therefore, it's an accurate representation of what could happen if we don't succeed in stopping the conflict from growing.

As far as what the current situation is in Kosovo today, I have given you the current situation report.

QUESTION: Jamie, can I just follow then? Mr. Berger said that, NATO - and I quote - "NATO is ready to intervene." Does that mean some decision has been made as to an option of intervention?

MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen Mr. Berger's quote. But let me say that my understanding of the situation is that NATO is actively and aggressively and on an accelerated basis, preparing plans for possible decisions by decision-makers. To my knowledge, the United States Government has not made such a decision, nor has any other government.

QUESTION: No decision on the contingencies.

MR. RUBIN: But being prepared to act is a very serious matter. NATO military planners and political leaders don't ask military planners to engage in military planning, to narrow the options, flesh them out, as they've been doing in recent days, unless they are very serious. But as far as a decision having been made, this is planning prior to decision-making. You cannot make a decision until you've planned for it, prepared for it, thought through the consequences. That's what responsible governments need to do before making decisions.

QUESTION: I have a planning question. Does planning just involve literally planning, meeting, and working things out on paper? Or are there actually things being done on the ground now to prepare for --

MR. RUBIN: You would have to address that question to the Pentagon.

QUESTION: On Iran. Have you seen President Khatemi's remarks concerning the Secretary's offer for a road map leading to normal relations.

MR. RUBIN: First of all, I could note that he welcomed the tone; and certainly that's a good thing. I can also note that we don't expect this kind of serious speech by Secretary Albright and the follow-up comments by the President to yield an immediate reaction on the part of the Iranian Government, including its president. I believe these were comments made in a press conference in response to questions. I believe they also refer to the possibility of further reaction by the Iranian Government in the future.

So we have not regarded any of the statements that have been made in the days after the Secretary's speech and the President's comments as definitive reactions to her speech; in much the same way that we did not react immediately to all of the things that he said. And frankly, the most formal, comprehensive reaction to what President Khatemi said in January just came about a month ago. Nevertheless, we are prepared, as the Secretary said, to pursue parallel steps, to respond as they respond. We would obviously respond appropriately, and it would depend on what they do and what they say.

So this process is continuing. Certainly to the extent that President Khatemi recognized the effort on the Secretary's part to reflect the realities of Iran and the fact that the Iranian people have spoken in dramatically overwhelming numbers for change and for openness and for the rule of law, that's certainly a god thing.

QUESTION: But he specifically mentioned that her words will be evaluated based on concrete measures and not words.

MR. RUBIN: That's not the quote I read; you have to read these things real carefully if you want me to give you a hand.

QUESTION: We would evaluate that sincerity in concrete gestures and not in words - basically, reiterating what conservatives were saying.

MR. RUBIN: The tone of these things is extremely important. I don't want to get ahead of the tone or the substance. Both governments - us and the Iranians - are governments - presumably, on their part - let me just speak for ours - care about policies and care about, in our case, stopping the support for terrorism and stopping the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction programs. They have their own concerns, and they can speak to them.

What we have said is that as a starting point, understanding the motivations of each side and understanding the significance of statements of each side can help create a parallel process where steps are taken by one side, reactions are appropriately taken by the other and we can move down the road. We believe the Secretary's speech was designed to not only make clear that we understood what was going on in Iran, but also that in the absence of direct dialogue, parallel steps were possible. So we'll have to see.

QUESTION: Jamie, I know you don't usually comment on municipal matters, but do you have any observations about the trial of the mayor of Tehran? Are you observing it?

MR. RUBIN: I'm sure that our analysts are carefully watching that trial. I don't care to get into who's up or who's down discussion in Tehran, in terms of moderates and conservatives and clerics and all of that; other than to say that we as a nation are a nation of laws, and to the extent that other countries act pursuant to the rule of law, we think it's good for the world.

QUESTION: Apparently, Ahmed Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National Congress, had a meeting yesterday with Martin Indyk here. Do you have any information on that?

QUESTION: Can we stay on Iran?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, let's stay there and then go back.

QUESTION: With apologies because I was out during the time of the Secretary's speech, but just for the record, is the U.S. policy of dual containment still the policy?

MR. RUBIN: We had an extensive discussion on this, and I recommend - I mean, it went on for many minutes. I don't see any need to replay that.

QUESTION: I'll spare my colleagues.

MR. RUBIN: I believe it was had with the gentleman who is not sitting over there, and I will be happy to give you the transcript afterwards. If you have a further question, we can go back at it tomorrow.

QUESTION: Shall I repeat it?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, Chalabi. I spoke to Martin this morning; he didn't tell me what exactly happened in the meeting. My guess is they talked about the program that the United States is going to be preparing, pursuant to authorization we've received from Congress to better coordinate the activities of the Iraqi opposition and to create a more effective process for laying out the evidence for crimes that Saddam Hussein and his cohorts have committed - crimes against humanity, war crimes. This meeting was part of the planning that would be going on in pursuit of that program, as well as a regular contact.

QUESTION: Is this going to be a secret, covert program or something you can --

MR. RUBIN: I hardly think it would be a secret program when we've been talking about it rather extensively publicly. As far as whether every dollar is accounted for in public, that is not often the case. But certainly, the idea of the program, the idea that we want to better coordinate the activities of the Iraqi opposition, if it's a secret, is the worst kept secret in Washington. We do not - this is an overt effort.

QUESTION: Well, once you get the plans together, is it possible to maybe just lay it out step by step for the press corps?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I doubt we will ever be in a position to lay it out to your unending curiosity and interest satisfaction. But we could certainly try to brief you on the basic objectives of the program as far as possible.

QUESTION: Are there other groups in the Iraqi National Congress that you'll be meeting on this?

MR. RUBIN: There are many groups who comprise the opposition to Saddam Hussein; in fact, I would suspect that most Iraqis, if they could speak, would comprise the opposition to Saddam Hussein. But as far as who would we be dealing with and how would we best coordinate this effort, that's the kind of information that I just promised we'd get to you as the program emerges.

QUESTION: But do you look at the Iraqi National Congress as sort of the umbrella organization that you're trying to fold everybody into?

MR. RUBIN: We believe that we need the most coordinated effort possible to hold out to the Iraqi people what the future could hold. That is the objective of this program. We want the most coordinated effort so that there is an understanding on the part of the Iraqi people of what a democratic alternative to Saddam Hussein might look like.

QUESTION: You said at the outset of that answer that you assumed that's what they talked about --

MR. RUBIN: I will check that.

QUESTION: Could you post something to --

MR. RUBIN: Yes, I can confirm my assumption in a one-sentence statement posted immediately after the briefing.

QUESTION: Can you tell us where we're at with the selection of a new ambassador for the Republic of Ireland; and whether you anticipate, when Jean Kennedy Smith leaves at the end of July as she's supposed to, she's expected to actually stay on until a new ambassador is in place?

MR. RUBIN: Let me get you some information for the record on that. But as far as selection of ambassadors, that is most certainly a prerogative of the President. As far as her current plan and where this general time frame is, I will try to get back to you on that.

QUESTION: I have something on Argentina. Today the Argentinean congress, along with the foreign minister there, the justice minister and the ambassador to the U.S., they're putting together a declaration demanding greater cooperation from the U.S. on a corruption case involving IBM and the nation's largest bank over there. The conflict comes from the fact that an Argentinean judge wants to extradite four IBM executives to testify in Argentina. The Justice Department is saying that until they're formally charged, they will not hand them over.

At this point, since the foreign minister, the justice minister - who used to be the ambassador here in the U.S. - and the ambassador are all involved on this declaration, does it become a diplomatic issue? I know the two countries have been working really hard in the last few years to --

MR. RUBIN: There's not a lot I can say on this, and let me tell you what I can say, given the nature of the subject. First of all, we do have an extradition treaty with Argentina, and we intend to uphold that treaty and we intend to act within the boundaries of that treaty and other relevant law.

Number two, we expect to be receiving a formal extradition request shortly. As far as how we will handle that extradition request, that is a matter for the Justice Department to discuss. But we do intend to live up to the extradition treaty and operate within the boundaries of it.

QUESTION: Extradition is the sole purview of the Secretary of State; is that correct?

MR. RUBIN: I will get you a -- sole purview sounds like one of those phrases that -- certainly the Secretary of State is an influential player and how one defines the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Department with respect to extradition, I will get you a legal answer to; but it generally involves the Justice Department, certainly in responding to legal points that are made by another country and that's quite normal. But as far as a final act and whether the decision is made to extradite pending a recommendation from the Justice Department, I'll get one of our legal beagles to get you even smarter on the law.

QUESTION: It seems as if the Justice Department has been saying that they're going to comply with the extradition treaty - I think the specific one is from 1990. But the Argentineans have not been satisfied with the level of cooperation, which is why they're pushing forward this declaration. Is there any reaction other than we will cooperate with them?

MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen the resolution. I think there's an Argentinean congressional resolution of some kind. And after seeing that, we'll perhaps be in a better position to react to it.

QUESTION: The UN Security Council yesterday extended the UN peace force's duty in Cyprus. But, the wording of this decision got a strong reaction from both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots in the island. It looks like this kind of attitude is getting wider differences between the two communities. Do you have any reaction to yesterday's decision?

MR. RUBIN: Between the Turkish Government and the Turkish-Cypriots?

QUESTION: Turkish-Cypriots and the Greek-Cypriots.

MR. RUBIN: We passed the resolution. I know Ambassador Richardson put out a statement on that; and I will certainly be happy to give you a copy of that.

We think the best way to improve the relations between the two communities is for the process of dialogue and hard decisions and tough decisions to be made by their leaderships. In the absence of that, it's hard to improve the relationship between the communities.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)


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