U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #4, 99-01-07
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
958
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Thursday, January 7, 1999
Briefer: James B. Foley
SERBIA (Kosovo)
1 Briefing Tomorrow on the Status of the OSCE Mission in
Kosovo
IRAQ
1-12 US Support to UNSCOM Regarding Iraq's Weapons of Mass
Destruction
7 Reaction from Other Nations to Saddam Hussein's Call for
Revolution
7-8,9,11-12 Status of UNSCOM/Composition and Mission/ Chairman Butler's
Term
10 Iraqi Violations of the No-Fly Zone/Prospects for Military
Action
11 Secretary's Phone Call to UN Secretary General Annan
11 Reported Massacres of Prisoners in Baghdad
IRAN
12-13 Arrests of 'Rogue Elements' in Intelligence and Security
Ministry
CUBA
13 Response from Cuban Government Regarding New US Measures
CAMBODIA
13-14 Bringing Khmer Rouge Leaders to Justice
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
14 Ambassador Ross' Meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister
Sharon
14-15 Prospects for Travel by Ambassador Ross to the Region
ISRAEL
15 Reported Israeli Destruction of Houses on Lebanese Border
16 Status of Report on Jonathan Pollard Case
CHINA
15-16 Declassification of the Cox Report
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFF-CAMERA DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #4
THURSDAY, JANUARY 7, 1999, 1:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. FOLEY: I just have one announcement, which is that at 2:30 p.m.
tomorrow afternoon here in the briefing room, Ambassador William Walker,
who's head of the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission, will step to the
podium to deliver an on-the-record briefing about the status of the OSCE's
mission in Kosovo. That's at 2:30 p.m. tomorrow.
QUESTION: Well, there's still some left-over on the UNSCOM business and
the eavesdropping allegations and all. Since State and, I guess the UN,
both have acknowledged that there was intelligence-sharing between the UN
and the US, does this in any way undercut US policy - undercut the
rationale for demanding entry and attacking Iraq? I mean, does this
undercut in any way US policy?
MR. FOLEY: I don't think so at all, Barry. As you'll recall, yesterday
Spokesman Rubin made the point that the word "intelligence" has a sexy
connotation for some, when what really is involved is a more mundane,
prosaic reality; i.e., the question of information-gathering on Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction programs. That's what UNSCOM's mission is all
about.
As Mr. Rubin indicated yesterday, UNSCOM's mission, its aggressive effort
to uncover the concealed information on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
programs would not be necessary if Iraq simply determined to meet its
obligations that it undertook in 1991.
The effort by UNSCOM to uncover not only Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
programs, but to penetrate through the concealment mechanism that Iraq has
erected to prevent UNSCOM from doing its work, is wholly legitimate. The
United States has aided UNSCOM in its efforts to uncover Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction in accordance with our international obligations under
Security Council resolutions.
There is nothing in any way problematic or embarrassing about the fact that
the United States has met its Security Council obligations to assist
UNSCOM. We're not alone. As Chairman Butler said yesterday, upwards of 40
nations are providing support to UNSCOM in different kinds of fields -- in
the fields of personnel, logistics, equipment, personnel, information. So,
I think we're proud of the fact that we are involved in a very concerted
national effort to support UNSCOM in its Security Council-mandated work to
uncover Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
QUESTION: I guess so, but what particularly strikes me is that Iraq had
insisted all along that the American monitors were really engaged in
espionage. Here comes the State Department and the UN saying, "well, we did
share intelligence," and you say it's prosaic material. But it's sort of -
MR. FOLEY: No, I didn't say prosaic material.
QUESTION: No, I mean the information.
MR. FOLEY: It's material that Iraq does not want the international
community to find out about.
QUESTION: I misstated it.
MR. FOLEY: -- concerning weapons of mass destruction. I'm just saying
that it's exaggerated to read into something -- to over-dramatize sharing
information-seeking. That's exactly what UNSCOM is about and is trying to
do. It's what UNSCOM would not have to do if Iraq simply agreed to
cooperate.
QUESTION: You're in a propaganda war. You are trying to enlist international
support. You and the British stand alone in your determination to get at
these weapons - most people don't care as much as the US and Britain
do.
MR. FOLEY: I quibble with that.
QUESTION: If they cared, they would have supported the strikes. If they
care - I know the State Department says -
MR. FOLEY: Well, let me just interject to say that -
QUESTION: Nobody wants Iraq to build up its nuclear weapons, I understand
that.
MR. FOLEY: Nobody disagrees with the aim.
QUESTION: A lot of folks don't want to do anything about it.
MR. FOLEY: Well, let me say that Secretary Albright said that those who
criticized or did not support our military action have not come forward
with credible alternatives to achieving the elimination of Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction. But we don't see any fissures in the Security Council
concerning the need for Iraq to comply with its obligations and to disarm
its weapons of mass destruction.
QUESTION: But you don't feel you've lost any public relations ground by
acknowledging that, indeed, there was intelligence-sharing between the
Commission and the United States? It doesn't make your case any more
difficult to make?
MR. FOLEY: There is nothing new in that reality that has emerged in the
last two days. It has been of public knowledge that the United States and
many other nations are assisting UNSCOM in its work. It is aggressive work;
it is work that Iraq abhors; it is work that Iraq tries strenuously to
block and render difficult. But there's nothing new in the story,
Barry.
QUESTION: Has the Secretary spoken to any of her Arab counterparts? Have
you had any protests from Arab nations today or since we last heard from
you?
MR. FOLEY: No, I'm not aware of what further conversations with
international colleagues she's had, if any, since Mr. Rubin spoke to that
subject yesterday. But I'm certainly not aware of protests; I don't see
what there is to protest over. As I said, the United States is proud that
it's supporting UNSCOM. After all, we're simply doing what the international
community has decided needs to be done, which is to uncover, expose and
hopefully disarm Iraq of its programs of weapons of mass destruction.
QUESTION: Jim, on the intelligence business, when you cast a net to
collect information sometimes you pick up bits of information which are not
strictly relevant to the issue at hand -- weapons of mass destruction. I
think one of the questions which was left unanswered yesterday is, what do
you do with that other information? Is it of any value to the United States
as an ancillary intelligence resource; for example, in tracking the
whereabouts of Saddam Hussein?
MR. FOLEY: As we indicated yesterday, American support to UNSCOM was and
is specifically tailored to facilitate UNSCOM, the UN inspectors' mission,
and for no other purpose, and, of course, was done at the direct request of
the UN Special Commission.
In other words, we have acted only to support UNSCOM, number one. Number
two, our aim and UNSCOM's aim and presumably the aim of every member of the
international community but Iraq is to achieve this purpose, is to find out,
to uncover, to expose and hopefully disarm Iraq of its programs of weapons
of mass destruction.
As Mr. Rubin also indicated yesterday, the United States did not work with
anyone at UNSCOM to collect information specifically for the purpose of
undermining the Iraqi regime. Our aim, again, was coincidental to and
identical to UNSCOM's aim, which was to find out about weapons of mass
destruction programs which Iraq is vigorously trying to disguise.
QUESTION: Right. I'm not talking about your objectives. I'm talking about
the fact that sometimes incidental information does come into your net as
you're gathering this information. My question is: If that information, for
example, concerns the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein or some of his key
aides, is that not useful to the United States and its intelligence
agencies; and do you not think -
MR. FOLEY: The aim is the same.
QUESTION: I'm not talking about the aim.
MR. FOLEY: No, this is very important. The aim is the same. It has been
reported -- I think it's certainly in the public domain - that the Iraqi
concealment mechanism, the structures and the personnel that the Iraqis
employ to thwart UNSCOM, to disguise its weapons of mass destruction
programs, are similar to or identical with the structures and personnel
which play a security role in Iraq on behalf of Saddam Hussein and his
regime. That is not a reality of the United States' choosing; that is
simply a fact produced by Iraq -- that they may employ the same structures
and personnel to protect their regime and also to disguise their programs
of weapons of mass destruction. It only points to the reality that Saddam
Hussein quite evidently looks upon these weapons of mass destruction as
vital and central to his rule.
Mr. Rubin answered a question in that regard yesterday. It only emphasizes
the point that we've been making, lo these many years, that Saddam clearly
does not want to relinquish those weapons of mass destruction programs and
that he's been engaged in an ongoing con-game with the international
community in order to obtain a lifting of the sanctions without giving up
those weapons of mass destruction.
QUESTION: But my question is - you keep disappearing from the point that
I'm trying to raise. Does the United States make use of such incidental
information that might come into its possession as a result of incidental
intelligence-gathering?
MR. FOLEY: Again, I don't see a distinction. We make use of information
that comes from, for example, the U2 over-flights in order to achieve or
further two objectives. One is to enhance UNSCOM's ability to ferret out
these weapons, and also to enhance our understanding of the weapons of mass
destruction. I just don't accept the premise of a distinction that you're
trying to draw here.
QUESTION: In other words, part of the program to find out, uncover,
expose and disarm Iraq of its chemical/biological weapons involves finding
out where Saddam Hussein is, his key operatives, Special Republican Guard;
is that what you're saying?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I'm not going to comment on operational details of that
nature. I simply said that it's Iraq's choosing that they use the same
structures and personnel for both purposes. Our purpose is to support
UNSCOM; UNSCOM's purpose is to ferret out Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
QUESTION: Can we deal with the latest specific allegations, which do, in
fact, go beyond what we believed yesterday, in spite of your attempt to
banalize them.
MR. FOLEY: An English formulation.
QUESTION: To portray them as being banal.
MR. FOLEY: Or British.
QUESTION: Did US officials, intelligence officers, work as UNSCOM
inspectors undercover without the knowledge of UNSCOM? Secondly, was there
a direct feed of eavesdropped information to the National Security
Agency?
MR. FOLEY: On the second question, it really is impossible for me to
discuss intelligence matters as such. We never do it; I'm not going to do
it now. As far as your first question is concerned -- and I think Chairman
Butler, though, referenced that question himself yesterday.
But in terms of the first question, let me say that UNSCOM certainly has
one of the most difficult tasks in the history of the United Nations, which
is disarming a non-cooperative member nation, Iraq, of its hidden arsenal
of weapons of mass destruction. The business of weapons of mass destruction
arms control is extremely serious and cannot be carried out by amateurs.
The United States has sent UNSCOM our best weapons experts, both from the
government and private organizations. When they work for UNSCOM, they do
just that: they work for UNSCOM. We tell people we send to UNSCOM
that if you cannot take orders from your chief inspector, who may
be of any nationality, then we won't send you.
Now, as I said, UNSCOM draws its inspectors from a variety of nations, and
each nation provides experts in the areas of weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery vehicles from a number of government agencies. Again,
these experts were sent to UNSCOM to carry out UNSCOM's mission and take
direction from UNSCOM. Beyond that, I'm not going to get into how they do
their jobs. But let me stress, as we've been saying all along, that US
support was tailored to support UNSCOM's important mission.
I believe that there is a profound misunderstanding that lies behind the
kind of question you raise as to how UNSCOM engages people who work for
UNSCOM - how this process of hiring nationals from different countries goes
about. I checked into this today, and was informed that it is UNSCOM which
does the initiating here. UNSCOM approaches member nations, including the
United States, with requests for personnel according to very specific
criteria.
For example, they may be looking for an expert in chemicals or in chemical
weapons or in missiles or in the biological field, for PhDs, for researchers,
whatever. But they come to the member nations; the member nations don't go
to UNSCOM. Now, the member nations, including the United States, respond to
those appeals and propose candidates which UNSCOM either accepts or
rejects. I'm told that UNSCOM has often rejected American-proposed
candidates for particular UNSCOM jobs on the basis that UNSCOM was
looking for a different level of expertise, a different nature of
expertise or training or background or whatever.
But these are experts, arms/weapons experts whom we send there, and that's
whom we send to work for UNSCOM.
QUESTION: Can you tell us whether such people continue to receive payment
from the United States Government?
MR. FOLEY: I'd have to take that question; I don't know the answer. I
believe that - and I'd like to take it - I believe that the UNSCOM
employees continue to be compensated by - actually, I think it would be far
safer for me to take the question and get you the correct answer because
I'm just speculating at this point.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - US Government receives these requests from UNSCOM
- would have received these requests?
MR. FOLEY: I'd have to take that question, too. My assumption is that
these requests probably would be transmitted in New York to our mission to
the United Nations and then are farmed out as appropriate, again, on the
basis of finding those who have the expertise that fit the criteria that
UNSCOM defines.
QUESTION: Do you dispute the report in The Wall Street Journal that some
of the information gathered in the pursuit of UNSCOM's mission, gathered to
help UNSCOM, was also used to help plan the American air strikes?
MR. FOLEY: In terms of the military action that took place last month,
I'd have to refer any operational questions over to the Pentagon. But I
think we've been pretty categorical that - I can just repeat what I said
and what Mr. Rubin said yesterday, that the United States did not work with
anyone in UNSCOM to collect information specifically for the purpose of
undermining the Iraqi regime. Our support to UNSCOM was based solely on the
aim of helping UNSCOM uncover Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs.
QUESTION: Do you agree that it can put UNSCOM in a very difficult or
uncomfortable position when, at the time it is receiving intelligence from
the United States or even sharing intelligence with the United States, the
US has two policy goals - one being military action and the second being
overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime - that go beyond a UN consensus?
MR. FOLEY: Again, in supporting UNSCOM, we're responding, in the first
instance, to a requirement under Security Council obligations. In the
second instance, we're responding to specific requests by UNSCOM to provide
experts for them to do their job.
In terms of US national policy, our policy aim is not to conduct military
action against Iraq. The President decided that had become necessary in
December because Iraq was not cooperating with UNSCOM; but that's not a
policy aim.
QUESTION: Jim, let me go back to the weapons of mass destruction,
specifically gas, poisonous chemicals and the potential for germ warfare. I
understand that the targets that might have been relevant - surface targets
- were passed up because of the fear of spreading these toxins and the
like. So the question is, how does the allies, the UN, the US deal with
these places that haven't been touched, where the manufacture apparently is
free to go on with it? How do they approach that?
MR. FOLEY: Well, that's the type of question that was asked and answered
in December at the time of our military action, about targeting and what US
military and British military forces were aiming at and what they weren't
aiming at, and the question of collateral damage that was taken into
account, and the need to minimize civilian casualties and the like. I would
refer you to the lengthy transcripts of various briefings that were
conducted in December.
But the question remains, though, Iraq continues to have programs to build
weapons of mass destruction. We have always stated our belief that a
functioning UNSCOM is the best way of conducting the work of disarming Iraq
of those programs. But in the absence of a functioning and effective UNSCOM,
the US was going to keep a hawkeye, through national means, on developments
inside Iraq and remain prepared to act as necessary.
QUESTION: Could I just ask another little different subject? Saddam
Hussein called a couple of days ago for a revolution throughout the Arab
world. I just would like to ask you, what's the State Department's opinion
as to the reaction to this call in other Arab countries? Did it fizzle?
MR. FOLEY: I think fizzle is about a good a word as any. You could say
there has been negative reaction on the part of spokesmen in the Arab
world. But I think that our judgment - and I believe it's shared in the
Middle East - is that these calls by Saddam Hussein, his speech, the
attempts to challenge the no-fly zone, that taken together, these are the
actions of a desperate man; at the very least, a remarkably frustrated
man.
First frustrated because of the demonstrated impotence of his military
establishment during the conduct of the US-UK strikes. They were AWOL,
absent in the action. That had to have been somewhat humiliating. Secondly,
frustration because of the absence of support for Iraq's position. Third -
and this is related to the second - the sense of regional and international
loneliness that Saddam Hussein must feel in the wake of the action that he
brought upon himself. We think he's certainly isolated in the region and
probably he feels he has a lot of explaining to do to people in his
own regime and in his own country over why he's not getting support,
why his country is continuing to be subject to sanctions and to periodic
military action. He's lashing out in desperation. I think there's no better
explanation.
QUESTION: How crucial was the contribution of US personnel to UNSCOM? In
other words, would UNSCOM be as effective, in your opinion, without the
contribution of US personnel?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we've always stated that the composition of UNSCOM's
teams is a matter for UNSCOM to decide. We've also often pointed out that
the United States, through decades of Cold War experience, has developed a
lot of professional expertise in the field of weapons of mass destruction.
It so happens that we've got an enormous reservoir of expert talent and
capability that UNSCOM has chosen to draw upon.
QUESTION: You quoted the Secretary as saying that those countries that
criticized military action and did not acquiesce had failed to come up with
an alternate plan. Does that mean that the United States would be open to
discussion on disarmament options for Iraq?
MR. FOLEY: Well, that's a very general question. If the implication is as
was formulated to Mr. Rubin yesterday - namely, a question about the future
shape of UNSCOM, whether we would entertain any proposals or changes or
modification -- Mr. Rubin stated that we've always been open to any ideas
and efforts that will strengthen UNSCOM, make it even more effective, a
more effective instrument of achieving Iraqi disarmament.
Now, if you're talking about reports that you see here and there in the
press that some argue for something along the lines of an "UNSCOM-lite" -
an UNSCOM that doesn't hurt Iraqi feelings and, perhaps, on that basis
doesn't do its job, that's not something that the United States is going to
entertain.
QUESTION: No, I don't think anybody's advocating that.
MR. FOLEY: I should hope not.
QUESTION: Are you open to other approaches to disarming Iraq?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we believe that UNSCOM is the best vehicle to produce
Iraq's disarmament in the field of weapons of mass destruction. Right now,
UNSCOM isn't in Iraq and hadn't gotten sufficient cooperation from Iraq to
do its job for most of the last year. So to some extent, currently, it's a
moot question. If you ask me a very theoretical question, not related to
any kinds of proposals that may be out there concerning UNSCOM, but
just simply theoretically whether the US is willing to entertain ideas that
actually and truly will lead to disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction programs, the answer is yes. But that's sort of a truism.
QUESTION: I'd like to go back to the question of intelligence officers
working undercover for UNSCOM. Obviously, it's not enough to say that if
Butler denied it; he wouldn't be aware of such a thing if they were working
undercover. Can you - just to keep this short - can you just tell us that
you're not prepared to discuss intelligence matters of that kind and have
done with it?
MR. FOLEY: I'm sorry, what is your question?
QUESTION: My question is, did US intelligence officers work undercover as
UNSCOM inspectors? It's a simple question.
MR. FOLEY: No, the United States, like many other nations, responded to
specific requests by UNSCOM to provide experts in the field of weapons of
mass destruction, and that's what we provided.
QUESTION: Do you know if there are member nations of the UN, if other
countries contributed intelligence officers to work as UNSCOM inspectors?
MR. FOLEY: I have no idea. Let's recall, though, what Mr. Rubin stated
yesterday -- three or four times -- I reread his transcript -- about the
fact the people who go to Iraq come back outside of Iraq with more
understanding of what's going on inside Iraq - be they journalists,
diplomats or whatever. That's not a dramatic issue either.
QUESTION: There's no UNSCOM operating now, so I can imagine the days that
you or Rubin will be standing there and telling us how a reshaped UNSCOM
without Butler as chairman is actually a positive development because it
would get UNSCOM back in there. But the question is: Is the US prepared or
considering scaling down UNSCOM's operations and/or encouraging Mr. Butler
to retire from the job, maybe in June?
MR. FOLEY: On the second point, no; absolutely not. No, I've seen press
reports that indicate some question as to whether he's interested in
remaining on the job after June of this year, when his current contract, I
believe it is, expires. That's a matter for Chairman Butler to decide.
We continue to have complete confidence in his professional and independent
efforts and, indeed, the rest of UNSCOM to vigorously meet its disarmament
mandate, as called for in UN Security Council resolutions. We support him;
he's done a superb job. If he is willing to stay on in the job, then he
will continue to have our confidence and support.
That's not the question. Iraq would like to personalize this issue. In the
person of Richard Butler, it would like to demonize UNSCOM. But as Jamie
Rubin said yesterday, that's all part of an effort to shoot the messenger,
to change the subject, to put the onus back on those who are trying to
oblige Iraq to meet its international commitments.
Now, you asked, I think also, about a different UNSCOM going back in. I can
just refer you to the answer I gave to Carole.
QUESTION: You said the US wouldn't go for - well, it's hard to pursue
this because we don't know --
MR. FOLEY: You're talking hypothetically, and, of course, we don't answer
hypothetical questions.
What I can say, though, is that we're not panting to have UNSCOM go back in
there now, as you can see. We'd have to be convinced, through affirmative
action, that UNSCOM would be going back in able to do its job, enjoying the
kind of honest cooperation from Iraq that we haven't seen. So we indicated
at the time of the military strikes in December that the Iraqis would have
to, going back to the Missouri motto, "Show Me," we would have
to be convinced that UNSCOM was going to be able to do its job and that we
didn't want to be drawn back into this pattern that we've been going
through over the last several years where Saddam makes a promise, UNSCOM
goes back in, starts to do its work and then encounters obstructionism and
concealment. We don't want to go back into that.
We feel pretty comfortable about where we are. In spite of a lot of things
you read, commentary in the press, that Saddam is in a good position and
we're not, we think, look at what Saddam is saying and what he's doing. We
see an increasingly desperate man and we feel that our overall policy of
containment, which two Administration have pursued, has been very
successful and that Saddam is basically where we want him to be, which is
contained and unable to threaten his neighbors.
QUESTION: Well, all right, if we take the State Department's position
that everybody wants to see Iraq disarmed, and if we take Saddam's position
that he won't let the UNSCOM team in the way it's constituted now, then you
would seem to have to make a decision whether you're going to revise UNSCOM
more to Saddam's acceptance.
MR. FOLEY: I don't accept that premise.
QUESTION: All right. Then how are you going to get them back there?
You're not going to be able to get them back there.
MR. FOLEY: Let me tell you why. Just as I stated a few minutes ago, we
can accept the status quo right now. It's not perfect; we would like to see
an effective UNSCOM going back in there - and only an effective UNSCOM
going back in there. But we can live with the status quo. It's Mr. Saddam
Hussein who wants to have sanctions lifted. And he's not going to have
sanctions lifted if UNSCOM isn't able to go in there, do its job and
come out and certify that Iraq has been disarmed of its weapons of
mass destruction.
In other words, I think the status quo is one that Saddam Hussein does not
like and wishes to escape from.
QUESTION: But we can't accept the status quo of his possession of weapons
of mass destruction and his continued -
MR. FOLEY: I think I've covered that point -- we are prepared to act
again as necessary.
QUESTION: Continuing aerial assault by Iraq -- how long can the United
States and Britain put up with that? Could that possibly prompt a new round
of significant air strikes?
MR. FOLEY: I can only restate what we said at the close of the military
operation in December -- that if we see Saddam Hussein working to
reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction, to threaten his neighbors, to
move against the north, to do things of that nature, that we remain
prepared to act. I think the United States has shown remarkable staying
power over the last seven, eight, almost nine years now in dealing with the
threat posed by Saddam Hussein.
QUESTION: Jim, what you said about you would only want to see an
effective UNSCOM go back in there and do its job -- you're really setting
the bar so high that it's just not going to happen.
MR. FOLEY: Look, Saddam is the one we are confronting with this difficult
choice. He's always wanted to have it both ways - to have sanctions lifted
and to keep his weapons of mass destruction. As long as we are able
consistently to drive home the message that the only avenue to sanctions
relief is disarmament, then I think we're in a very strong position.
QUESTION: Jim, one clarification -- the telephone call yesterday between
Kofi Annan and the Secretary, who initiated that phone call?
MR. FOLEY: I believe the Secretary did.
QUESTION: The Secretary did.
MR. FOLEY: I don't know the answer for a fact, but -
QUESTION: There was some conflicting reports on it.
MR. FOLEY: My understanding of what Mr. Rubin said yesterday was that she
read the articles and wanted to seek clarification; so I'm only assuming
that she initiated the call. I can check it for you if you want.
QUESTION: Please do.
QUESTION: Also on Iraq but on a slightly different subject -- there is
some reports out of Iraq that in mid-December some 180 political prisoners
were massacred or executed by the Iraqi authorities in a prison in Baghdad.
Do you know anything about that?
MR. FOLEY: I've not seen that specific report. I can check it for you. As
you know, earlier in the week, Mr. Rubin did lay out in some detail
information that we have concerning increased repression in the South of
the Shia, and he laid out some great detail. I'd not heard that report, but
I'll look into it, see if we have any information on it.
QUESTION: Can I switch next door to Iran? Do you have anything on the
report that they were going -
MR. FOLEY: Just a second, Barry.
QUESTION: One last one on UNSCOM transformation -
MR. FOLEY: Last one.
QUESTION: Yes, can you be more specific on what's your bottom line, if
you accept any change in UNSCOM's composition, mission, mandate, whatever?
Would you be willing to accept, for example, a non-permanent presence of US
inspectors on Iraqi soil? I mean a system by which they could come in and
go out, or a system by which the UNSCOM mission would be carried out by non-
US inspectors.
MR. FOLEY: Well, you're getting - first, into a hypothetical realm that I
can't get into and also into a level of detail that I can't get into
because our position is pretty clear and very firm on this, as I've laid it
out to you. You mentioned composition, you mentioned mandate, you mentioned
leadership. On all of these issues, we have a firm position. On the
leadership, we support Chairman Butler. On the composition, we've always
said that this should be up to UNSCOM, based on its assessment of its
professional expert needs. On the question of mandate, I made very clear
we're not going to accept a watered down mandate or an UNSCOM-lite.
QUESTION: Can I ask one quick on Iraq?
MR. FOLEY: Andre promised that was the last one on Iraq, and he engaged
all of you in that commitment.
QUESTION: While the US says it's okay with the status quo, other members
of the Security Council don't appear to be so satisfied. I mean, the French
President, Jacques Chirac --
MR. FOLEY: Can I interrupt for one second? I didn't say that the status
quo is ideal. The ideal is an UNSCOM back in, working effectively. I'm just
saying that in the absence of that, we can live with the status quo because
we think it's a status quo that keeps Saddam contained.
QUESTION: Well, how do you respond to the French President's somewhat
criticism of the US-British air strikes in saying that now the UN Security
Council should take over the leadership role and it shouldn't be in
American-British hands?
MR. FOLEY: Well, the Security Council determined that it needed to create
a body of experts - those who understood the complex issue of weapons of
mass destruction. We believe that it requires experts to go in there and
verify what Iraq is doing - experts who can certify, at the end of the day,
hopefully, that Iraq has been disarmed. This is not a political decision in
the first instance.
The political authority is the Security Council. We will have to assess,
ultimately, an UNSCOM and IAEA report of good behavior or of disarmament.
But we believe that the experts need to do the disarmament work.
QUESTION: Iran's next door. There's some similarity, though: our policy
never changes in both places. In Iran, where you think you see moderation
and you're jumping up, clicking your heels with joy over the report that
even maybe with the Ayatollah's approval, there will be some action taken
against some officials or some intelligence folks for mistreatment -
actually, slaughter is a better word that mistreatment --
MR. FOLEY: I'll be honest with you: I have nothing prepared that's new on
that. What Mr. Rubin said - was it yesterday --
QUESTION: I must have been out of the room; I beg your pardon.
MR. FOLEY: He noted that it was a positive development or step if Iranian
authorities had arrested some people responsible; and it would be a further
positive step if this were pursued and all those guilty were brought to
justice, because we certainly support the idea that Iran develop a system
in which the rule of law is prevailing. We think that's very positive.
QUESTION: Develop a system where the rule of law is prevailing and also
pursue weapons of mass destruction that threatens virtually the entire
world. Are these two things inconsistent? Would you be happy with half a
loaf - Iran-lite?
(Laughter.)
MR. FOLEY: No. That's not --
QUESTION: Well, the people in this building seem to be awfully excited
about Khatemi and see all sorts of - it sounds like 1970-whatever.
MR. FOLEY: I happened to be at the podium a number of times last year
when we were dealing with this issue, so I can more or less paraphrase
myself when we said that we welcomed the prospect of change in Iran, of an
Iran that was becoming more democratic in which the rule of law would
prevail, an Iran that, on that basis, would be a better regional neighbor
and member of the international community.
We also stated that we wanted to see positive changes in Iran reflected in
Iranian external policies and in its military capabilities as well.
Cuba?
QUESTION: Have you gotten an answer or any response?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware of any response.
QUESTION: On Cambodia, there was an AP story this morning that said a
former Khmer Rouge general in Cambodia has threatened renewed fighting in
case any more efforts are made to bring Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea to
trial. I was wondering whether you had anything on that.
MR. FOLEY: The United States is consistently attached great importance to
bringing senior Khmer Rouge leaders such as Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan to
justice for their actions during the 1975-1979 period. We are now
consulting with the Cambodians and other interested governments in how to
accomplish this.
We strongly support Cambodia's goal of national reconciliation, and we
believe that Khmer Rouge accountability for their actions is consistent
with the goal of national reconciliation. In terms of that threat, I can't
really speak to it. Of course, it's something that we would condemn. In
terms of its potential impact, though, on what might happen, let me say
that Prime Minister Hun Sen stated on January 1st that he supported a trial
for Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan. Prince Ranariddh, the Chairman of the
National Assembly, has also publicly supported a tribunal for the
atrocities of the mid-70s.
Secretary of State for Information Khieu Kanharith has indicated that the
Cambodian government would review the issue of arresting the senior Khmer
Rouge leaders if they are indicted. We call upon the government of Cambodia
to insist upon the accountability for the crimes of the '75-'79 period.
QUESTION: In your conversations - US' conversations - are they convinced
that that is the operative position because he's taken about every position
you could take.
MR. FOLEY: Well, he made a public statement on January 1st. Our
Ambassador met with the Prime Minister earlier this week. On that basis, we
believe that there's reason to hope that the Cambodians will pursue
accountability of these Khmer Rouge leaders.
QUESTION: Did the mention of the atrocity make a difference as to whether
you think the one who committed it should be tried or forgiven in the
interest of reconciliation? I'm thinking of Pinochet versus the Khmer Rouge
people here.
MR. FOLEY: I think it's always difficult, and you know we've been back
and forth on this so many times in this briefing room to make sort of arm
chair comparisons about what needs to be done in given situations.
I have no further comment on the Chilean situation. They, after all, they
have been dealing with this issue and have managed to negotiate their way
to a democratic form of government. At the same time, we've made clear that
we do support the principle of accountability for crimes that were
committed - human rights violations - terrible human rights violations that
were committed during that period in Chile.
So, it's the comparison business is not an easy one, especially to do kind
of spontaneously if you will. There are certain episodes in the history of
the 20th Century that certainly stand in their own category. One of them is,
obviously, the Nazi barbarism of genocide perpetrated in Europe. I don't
think anyone has characterized as what the Khmer Rouge did in Cambodia as
anything but genocide, mass killing on an unimaginable scale.
QUESTION: When and where is Ambassador Ross meeting with Foreign Minister
Sharon? And do you know when Ambassador Ross is going to be traveling back
to the Middle East?
MR. FOLEY: You know, I had heard, I believe, that he was going to be
meeting with the Foreign Minister in New York on Friday. I'd have to check
that for you though.
QUESTION: As to when he goes back to the Middle East?
MR. FOLEY: I heard that he's going to be traveling to Israel. I don't
have a day yet on that.
QUESTION: Is this another team trip or is - because he has a date to make
a speech - but is there more to the trip than that? I mean, does he take
the baggage - although I don't mean personnel being baggage, but -
MR. FOLEY: The honest answer, Barry, is that I don't know. I would be
surprised if he didn't use the opportunity of his presence there to touch
base with the parties, but I -
QUESTION: I'm sorry. Well, I was going to -
MR. FOLEY: Maybe I should speak on.
QUESTION: Well, there's a 17th candidate - or, I don't know, if lost
track - the general, who reminds people of Rabin, he probably has a good
chance.
MR. FOLEY: You know my answer.
QUESTION: Well, no the question is, will he talk to these - I know the US
always talks to the opposition, particularly Labor, when it's in the
opposition. But will he take the inclination to talk to this general -
MR. FOLEY: In a democratic country and friendly country like Israel, we
talk to a range of voices, no matter who's in power.
QUESTION: I know, (inaudible) and there were 27 candidates. The serious
question is: Can you determine a little more on the extent of his mission,
if it really goes way beyond on making the speech, and will he speak to at
least - I don't know what - the prominent candidates, including the newly
declared general?
MR. FOLEY: I'd be happy to look into that for you.
Thank you.
QUESTION: Do you have anything on the Israelis knocking down about 12
houses in Lebanon on the border?
MR. FOLEY: I have not heard that report. I'd have to look into it for
you.
QUESTION: Do you have any comment at all about the select committee -
House committee - that Chris Cox chairs and their report specifically about
technological transfers to China? Does the State Department favor making
that public?
MR. FOLEY: The Cox Committee and the Executive Branch agencies are
working on declassification of the report's findings and appropriate report
material. We've received a copy of the Committee's recommendations and are
currently reviewing them. As soon as we receive a copy of the full report,
we will start the declassification process.
Thank you.
QUESTION: How long?
MR. FOLEY: I don't know how long it's going to take.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) report on Jonathan Pollard, that the US is
considering reducing his sentence from life to 25 years. Can you comment on
that?
MR. FOLEY: I've not heard that report. As you know, the President is
going to be reviewing the matter and he's asked for input from relevant
agencies. But I have no status report for you on that. In any case, I won't,
because that's going to be a White House matter.
QUESTION: Would there be input coming from the State Department -
MR. FOLEY: Yes.
QUESTION: And will the Secretary of State be giving a recommendation to
the President?
MR. FOLEY: She will be, yes.
QUESTION: So she decided on that?
MR. FOLEY: I don't know the status of that.
Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 2:05 P.M.)
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