U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #3, 99-01-06
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
964
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Wednesday, January 6, 1999
Briefer: James P. Rubin
IRAQ
1,5,6,9,11 UNSCOM's aggressive information gathering efforts have been
necessitated by Iraq's violation of pertinent UN Security
Council resolutions.
1,5,7,15 US has assisted UNSCOM in its work, at UNSCOM's specific
request, as called for by UNSC resolutions.
1-2,5,6 US support was specifically tailored to facilitate UNSCOM's
mission, and for no other purpose.
2,6 US support for UNSCOM is a matter of public record; 40-plus
nations also support UNSCOM.
2-4 Secretary Albright spoke with UN Secretary General Annan
today. He said: views attributed to him were not his; he
had no evidence of misuse of UNSCOM; he supports
Amb. Butler.
2 US will continue to reject efforts to undermine UNSCOM.
4-5 US continues to have complete confidence in Ambassador
Butler and UNSCOM.
7 At no time did US work with anyone at UNSCOM to collect
data for the purpose of undermining the Iraqi regime.
8 US has always provided maximum support to UNSCOM; at no
time did we change the practice.
9 To extent that disarmament of Iraq hurts Saddam Hussein,
the US favors that.
9-10 Saddam is lashing out in frustration and desperation.
CUBA
12 US is not aware of any response from Cuban government to
yesterday's announced new measures.
SIERRA LEONE
12 Fighting in, around Freetown continues; US in contact with
ECOWAS; Embassy operations have been suspended since
December 24.
IRAN
12 Arrests of 'rogue elements' in intelligence and security
ministry are a positive step.
CHINA
13 Use of torture is abhorrent to US.
13 US has seen report of torture of Catholic priest, and will
raise case with Chinese government.
13,14 US will resume bilateral dialogue on human rights here on
January 11-12.
14-15 US has discussed case of Hua Di with Chinese officials, and
with Stanford University.
NORTH KOREA
13 Fourth plenary session of four-party talks to take place in
Geneva, beginning January 19.
14 Discussions on suspect underground construction will resume
in Geneva January 16-17.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
15-16 US does not share Ambassador Shoval's
assessment. Palestinians have worked hard to fulfill many
Wye commitments; Israel has not fulfilled any Phase Two
obligations.
16 More needs to be done by both sides; they should be talking
to each other, not pointing fingers.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #3
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 1999, 12:50 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. Let me
start with a subject that many of you have been calling me about all
morning. That is the subject of Iraq.
First, let me remind everyone and reiterate that the reason why UNSCOM, the
UN inspectors, have needed to take such an aggressive effort to discover
information and learn the whereabouts of concealed weapons of mass
destruction, and try to figure out where Saddam Hussein is hiding the
weapons of mass destruction that he has not given evidence he has destroyed,
is because UNSCOM is dealing with a totalitarian regime of great brutality
that is not abiding by, and significantly violating, Security Council
resolutions.
Iraq has taken, for many years, an affirmative position to prevent, deny,
obstruct and deceive UNSCOM about the subject that UNSCOM, the UN
inspectors, have been given a mandate by the UN Security Council to
discover. This has required UNSCOM to take an aggressive effort to
determine the location, the whereabouts, and the procedures by which the
weapons of mass destruction Iraq refuses to disclose are hidden.
If Iraq were to disclose its weapons of mass destruction, to come forward
and comply with the requirements of the Security Council, as set forth in
resolutions going back to 1991, UNSCOM would never be in this position.
Some thought this could be done in a matter of weeks.
So the reason why UNSCOM, the UN and countries around the world have needed
to operate in this fashion is because Iraq refuses to disclose what it has
done, and has taken an aggressive posture of concealment, denial and
obstruction; which leads us to the question of US support for UNSCOM and
what it is for and what it is about.
The United States, like many other countries, has assisted the United
Nations in carrying out its work in Iraq. This is something that is called
for -- specifically called for -- by Security Council resolutions. Our
doing so is therefore meeting an international legal call - an obligation,
in a sense.
It was provided -- our assistance to Iraq -- at the specific request of the
UN Special Commission, and involved the provision of intelligence and
technology by UN members, that has been vital to the effectiveness of the
United Nations carrying out its inspection mandate. Given the highly
sensitive nature of some of this, obviously UNSCOM's own procedures limited
the knowledge of these efforts to relatively few people. Let me emphasize
this -- American support was specifically tailored to facilitate UNSCOM --
the UN inspectors' - mission, and for no other purpose, and was done at the
direct request of the UN Special Commission.
Intelligence cooperation with UNSCOM by the United States and other
countries was intended to assist the UN and member states in assessing
Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions, and the status of the programs that
were the targets of UNSCOM's work.
The fact that we provide support for UNSCOM is a matter of public record,
in accordance with calls in specific UN resolutions. As Ambassador Butler
has said, there are 40-plus nations who do this. Obviously, we are uniquely
qualified and uniquely capable in this area. We have provided both
logistical support and intelligence to UNSCOM, to help it carry out its
mandate of disarming Iraq.
These resolutions clearly call on all states to provide whatever assistance
they can to help UNSCOM. We are, therefore, acting in full accordance with
the letter, and the objective, and the spirit of these resolutions. It is
the bottom line here that if Iraq were to fully disclose its weapons of
mass destruction, then we wouldn't have this kind of a problem of Iraq
claiming that it's all because of spying that the situation has developed.
With respect to the Secretary General, let me say the following: Secretary
Albright spoke to Secretary General Kofi Annan this morning, and obviously
asked for an explanation of what she, along with others, read in the
newspapers. We are aware of a statement that he has just issued, in which
he has made clear that the views attributed to him in The Washington Post
and other newspapers are not his views, and that he does not believe there
is evidence of this kind of misuse of UNSCOM.
Significantly - and secondly - he's made clear that he is supportive of
Ambassador Butler and Ambassador Butler's work.
Now, clearly, given the sterling reputation of the news organizations
involved, somebody must have been telling them this information. In that
regard, let me say that the people who were purporting to speak for the
Secretary General, and are attributed as such, must be either incredibly
ignorant about the workings of UNSCOM, or be misguidedly sympathetic to the
position of Saddam Hussein; because the result of all this is to give
armament to those who say that it is not Saddam Hussein's fault, when I
think it's clear from the Secretary General's statement, from the comments
of all the Arab leaders that you are familiar with, and several other
comments, that the problem here is a problem that has begun because Saddam
Hussein has refused to comply.
With respect to these suggestions, let me simply add that sanctions cannot
be lifted until Iraq is disarmed. Determining whether Iraq has been
disarmed is a technical judgment only the UN Special Commission and the
International Atomic Energy Agency are qualified to make. We will continue
to reject any political, diplomatic, or bureaucratic efforts to undermine
the professionalism and integrity of the UN Special Commission, because we
believe that both the Special Commission and the International Atomic
Energy Agency must be able to operate as professional, technically-
oriented arms control entities if the Security Council resolutions
are to be carried out.
With that short opening statement, let me turn to you, Barry.
QUESTION: You had two possible - obviously it's guesswork, but two
possible motives: one being sympathy for Saddam Hussein. Is it possible
that this is an attempt to undermine UNSCOM; that there are people who
don't like UNSCOM? And secondly, I haven't seen his statement - Kofi
Annan's statement - but could you say whether there is any space, any
disagreement or any - not even disagreement, any difference in view as to
operations undertaken in behalf of this mission? You know the old bit,
where one person's intelligence may be another person's fact-gathering or
another person's interpretation of something. Assuming it's not malicious
- which I'm not ready to assume - but suppose it isn't malicious: Could it
be a matter of an honest distinction between his interpretation of what the
people should be doing and the US Government's interpretation?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say, the Secretary General's statement directly rejects
the characterizations of his state of mind attributed in these articles. So
he doesn't accept that any of these so-called confidants speak for him.
Being a spokesman, I believe very strongly that the media should try to
focus on those people who can speak authoritatively, rather than those who
you can always get to say something.
Having said that, let me say that every diplomat, every journalist, every
technician, every expert that enters an opaque dictatorial, totalitarian
regime -- whether it be Iraq, North Korea, Libya, or you name it -- comes
away with more information than they came in with, because of the limited
amount of information that's available in those regimes. I'm familiar, from
my days in New York, with numerous times when diplomats from the Secretary
General's office or the United Nations went off to Iraq, and came back and
presented themselves as having unique knowledge about the functioning
of the Iraqi regime, and who was up and who was down.
So, this is a standard fare for people who enter into dictatorial regimes
where there's no information. And people who get the rare experience to go
there often come out and speak to that and learn things. That is the normal
way of doing business. Anybody who's shocked - shocked -- that people who
go into Iraq come out hopefully better understanding the Iraqi regime, I
think are naive in the extreme.
QUESTION: And Kofi Annan would not be in that category?
MR. RUBIN: Not based on his statement.
QUESTION: Do you know if, by the way, did he say - and again, I don't
have his statement here - was there anything said about whether the
newspapers that reported this approached him and gave him an opportunity to
say whether - he didn't get into that with Albright?
MR. RUBIN: He indicated that he did not agree with the characterization
of his state of mind attributed in various newspapers, and he made that
clear to her. He made clear to her that there is no issue with Butler as
described in these newspapers, and I think his statement speaks to
that.
QUESTION: Yes, Jamie, still on that point, then another question: Did he
tell her -- the Secretary -- that he does not believe there's evidence of
this kind of misuse of UNSCOM?
MR. RUBIN: His statement says as follows -
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: I can't reveal the details of a confidential conversation
between the Secretary of State and the Secretary General, but I think I can
answer your question. In his statement he says - his spokesman on his
behalf - "We not only have no convincing evidence of these allegations, we
have no evidence of any kind." I think that's pretty definitive.
QUESTION: The article also raises sort of a side point -- that, for
whatever reason, the Clinton Administration is now prepared to consider a
change in UNSCOM, a successor to UNSCOM, some such notion. Can you address
that at all?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I think that is a misunderstanding of the views of anyone
who spoke to this issue. Let me say that, first of all, we continue to have
complete confidence in the professional and independent efforts of Richard
Butler and the rest of UNSCOM to vigorously work to meet its disarmament
mandate, as called for in the Security Council's resolutions. We have long
taken the position that UNSCOM exists because UN Security Council
Resolution 687 set forth a disarmament obligation. UNSCOM was set up as
an independent body in order to fulfill that obligation.
We have always taken the position that we will look with interest at any
proposal to improve the effectiveness, the integrity, the professionalism,
and the ability to operate of UNSCOM; and that continues to be our
position. But it's clear from Iraq's behavior of the last nine of the last
12-to-13 months, that their position is to block the work of UNSCOM, to
block the work of any entity trying to discover the location, and then
destroy the weapons of mass destruction. It is currently our judgment that
Iraq believes that it can somehow keep, on the one hand, its weapons of
mass destruction and, on the other hand, get sanctions easing. That
is simply not going to happen.
QUESTION: So you say you're willing to consider changes to UNSCOM if it
improves their ability --
MR. RUBIN: Let me just make sure we get this exactly right. It has long
been our position, for the last several years, that any proposals to
improve the effectiveness, professionalism and ability to operate of UNSCOM
we would be supportive of. There have been minor adjustments here or there,
and we have no problem with that.
But the idea that somehow there is not going to have to be a disarmament
regime that vigorously determines what Iraq has and disarms Iraq is fantasy-
land, and it may be something that some think is going to happen, but it's
not going to happen as long as the United States is a permanent member of
the Security Council.
QUESTION: Would you consider the removal of Richard Butler?
MR. RUBIN: I think I indicated to you that we continue to have complete
confidence in the professional and independent efforts of Richard Butler,
period, full stop.
QUESTION: Let me go back to the text of Bart Gellman's article and ask:
Does the United States deny -- or what is the United States' response to
this allegation, that the US asked for the collecting of eavesdropping
intelligence, and did take steps to assist, or ask that UNSCOM take steps
to assist the United States in this? Can you also respond to the allegations
that the Iraqis have made for a long time, that US and other agents
in UNSCOM have been spying?
MR. RUBIN: On the second point first, Iraq has consistently taken the
approach of trying to change the subject. Rather than allowing the focus to
be on their failure to disclose the weapons of mass destruction that they
built and are secreting away in various facilities, they are trying to
blame the messenger, shoot the messenger. The messenger is UNSCOM, the UN
Special Commission, that tells the world that Iraq has failed to do
so.
So whether it's by personal attack, by hysterical suggestions about
intelligence or other means, Iraq consistently tries to blame UNSCOM and
the messenger for the message they're sending, which is that Iraq has
refused to fully disclose its weapons of mass destruction.
With respect to the first point, I think I addressed it in my comments at
the outset; and that is that our support was specifically tailored to
facilitate the UN Special Commission's mission and for no other purpose,
and was done at the direct request of UNSCOM. That is my understanding of
the situation, and it's hard to go much beyond that.
QUESTION: I'm sorry, that's still confused. UNSCOM has been aiding the
United States in some kind of eavesdropping within Iraq or not. Has it
happened, is it a fantasy, or what?
MR. RUBIN: No, you're putting the situation in reverse. The United States
has been helping with intelligence and logistical support of UNSCOM, to try
to get to the bottom of the concealment mechanism which operates primarily
through the special Republican Guard units of the leadership, to hide its
weapons of mass destruction. Through intelligence, logistical support,
expertise and personnel, we have been helping UNSCOM to try to find out
where these weapons of mass destruction are, as called for by Security
Council resolutions. That's the fact situation.
QUESTION: So the gist of this article is erroneous - that the US has been
asking UNSCOM to provide information?
MR. RUBIN: UNSCOM has asked us to help them try to determine where the
weapons of mass destruction are. Like 40 other countries, we have assisted
UNSCOM in this work. It is my understanding that our support was specifically
tailored to facilitate UNSCOM's mission and for no other purpose, and was
done at the direct request of UNSCOM.
QUESTION: Jamie, you're not answering his question. Okay, we accept the
point that UNSCOM asked for intelligence help from the United States in
intelligence matters and such. The question is, did UNSCOM personnel at any
time provide the United States with intelligence information which did not
go through the usual UNSCOM chain of command?
MR. RUBIN: Look, you're going to have to talk to the relevant authorities.
QUESTION: I'm not talking about the United States helping UNSCOM; we're
talking about UNSCOM personnel working on behalf of --
MR. RUBIN: You're going to have to talk to the relevant authorities, who
can speak more specifically on such a specific question.
What I can tell you is that the assistance we provided, the support we
provided was - listen to the words carefully - specifically tailored to
facilitate UNSCOM's mission and was done at the direct request of UNSCOM
and for no other purpose.
In answer to previous question, I also pointed out what I hope you as a
professional journalist and others like you understand what I would call
the obvious fact; which is that anybody going into a dictatorial,
totalitarian regime is going to learn information about that regime that
they didn't know. That applies to the UN diplomats who travel to Iraq and
come back wiser, presumably, about the workings of the Iraqi regime, and
purport and speak to other diplomats and to the press as if they have been
improved in their knowledge of what goes on in Iraq. That applies to
journalists, to colleagues of yours, that go to Iraq and learn information
about Iraq. That is the normal way of diplomatic intercourse around the
world. Every diplomat who comes to the United States, obviously, if they
think they are earning their salary, is writing cables back to their
government, presumably learning things about the way things work in the
United States.
It's particularly acute in a totalitarian system like Iraq. But the
hysterical suggestions that this - what's ironic about this is in similar
news reports some six months ago, it was suggested that we somehow were not
using UNSCOM aggressively enough. And now six months later, we're being
accused of using UNSCOM too aggressively. So the bottom line is that we're
using UNSCOM pursuant to Security Council resolutions. The reason why this
has all become so controversial is because neither anyone on the 38th floor
of the United Nations, nor any diplomat from Russia, or France, or
anyone else, can convince Saddam Hussein to disclose what he has and prove
those disclosures in a way that you wouldn't need to be aggressively
seeking information about the special security apparatus that controls
weapons of mass destruction.
QUESTION: Can I take it - I mean, your declining to confirm or deny the
specific allegation that UNSCOM eavesdropping information was passed the
United States. Which authority can comment on this?
MR. RUBIN: I disagree with your characterization. I can add as follows:
It is my understanding that at no time did the US work with anyone at
UNSCOM to collect information for the purpose of undermining the Iraqi
regime.
You didn't write that down. I thought that was going to be helpful.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: To follow up, then, are you saying as a by-product of providing
intelligence and technology to UNSCOM, the US, as part of that, may have
obtained some intelligence and sensitive information?
MR. RUBIN: What I'm trying to communicate to all of you is that all of
you need to understand that just because one uses the word "intelligence"
doesn't make it interesting. I know, for you, whenever the word "intelligence"
is used, this has to be fascinating, and this has to be something
great. The reality is that we have been providing information, technology,
expertise to the UN in order for them to do their job. Iraq has caused that
problem because it won't disclose its weapons of mass destruction.
What I'm suggesting to you is that those on the 38th floor of the UN were
focused on these allegedly sexy issues of who did what with whom, and who
learned what when they were in Iraq, are undermining the mission of the
world to get the focus on Saddam Hussein's failure to comply.
Beyond saying that, it is very difficult for me to be more specific,
without going into the details of what UN inspectors or others are doing.
The bottom line is: None of this activity that UNSCOM is performing to try
to locate weapons of mass destruction, would be necessary if Iraq wasn't
failing to disclose the locations, and the apparatus, and the procedures,
and the paperwork associated with WMD.
QUESTION: I think there's actually a further allegation this morning
through another charge by Scott Ritter. That is -
MR. RUBIN: I didn't see him quoted in this particular article.
QUESTION: He was quoted in The Boston Globe today.
MR. RUBIN: Oh.
QUESTION: That is that it wasn't just that the US helped in the
intelligence gathering with UNSCOM, but the US shut off the faucet of
turning over that intelligence to UNSCOM. He said that's been happening
since early 1998. Can you respond to that?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, on that point, let me first say that if you're going to
use Mr. Ritter as a source, I hope you'll bear in mind, all of you, that he
has indicated that he doesn't believe these allegations in today's papers:
that the work of UNSCOM served some other purpose. I hope that's as
relevant to you as other suggestions that he makes.
Now, with regard to other suggestions that he's made, let me simply say
that we have always done our utmost to provide the maximum amount of
intelligence, logistical, personnel and other support to the UN Special
Commission; and we have done that across the board and continuously. At no
time, for no policy reason, did we change the practice of assisting the
work of the UN Special Commission.
It is well-known, to Mr. Ritter and others, that we do consult with the
Special Commission chairman, and we have talked to him about issues like
last August - if Iraq is about to make an announcement that they're going
to cut off cooperation with all UN inspections, we don't see the point of
conducting a particular inspection -- or giving him our political judgment
about what will best yield support for UNSCOM in the Security Council. But
that is very different than scaling back our support for UNSCOM in the
intelligence, logistical and other avenues.
What I can say to you about that is that it's ironic that on the one hand,
some are accusing us of not supporting UNSCOM strongly enough, and others
are accusing us of supporting it so strongly it's going beyond its mission.
So obviously, UNSCOM is a complicated piece of business; and for those who
don't truly understand how it works, not only at the technical level, but
how it works at the political diplomatic level in ensuring continued
support for it, sometimes they miss the forest for the trees.
QUESTION: But is he correct in that charge?
MR. RUBIN: I think I specifically refuted the charge, and that was any
suggestion that for policy reasons we changed our practice of providing
maximum intelligence, logistical and personnel support to UNSCOM is simply
not correct.
QUESTION: We now have two denials: one that United States intelligence
helped UNSCOM - went beyond the mandate; and secondly that anyone in UNSCOM
ever provided information for the purpose of undermining the Iraqi regime.
Can you go a bit further and say - tell us whether anyone in UNSCOM ever
provided --
MR. RUBIN: I'm always stunned by the appetite.
QUESTION: Can you tell us whether anyone in UNSCOM ever provided
information that went beyond the strict limits of the UNSCOM mandate to the
United States?
MR. RUBIN: Let me again state that the more that the world focuses on the
technicalities of UNSCOM, and the more that Saddam Hussein tries to keep
the focus on the subject of UNSCOM doing this, this UNSCOM inspector doing
that, the more that we lose what is the larger reality. I hope in your
coverage and in the coverage of your colleagues, the larger reality is not
lost. That is: The aggressive approach UNSCOM has to take as a result
of Iraq's failure to disclose.
If you want more information on what every UNSCOM inspector did or didn't
do, you'll have to go to UNSCOM. I think Ambassador Butler has been rather
categorical, in much the same way I have been categorical, that this is an
attempt of mischief-making, to change the subject from Iraq's failure to
comply to the question of US support for a UN operation that is called for
by a UN Security Council resolution.
QUESTION: I just wondered why, if they do their job and search for hidden
weapons, wouldn't the net result be undermining Saddam Hussein? What's
wrong with that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, to the extent that disarmament of Iraq hurts Saddam
Hussein, we're in favor of that. In fact, we're in favor of the regime
changing. I'm being asked questions about the technicalities of our support
for the UN mission, because of what I would call exaggerated focus on the
fun "intelligence" word rather than a focus on what the reality is.
QUESTION: It's just that it struck me that gathering information is part
and parcel of an attempt to expose Saddam Hussein and possibly cause him to
depart.
MR. RUBIN: Well, any one of you who's actually taken the time to read an
UNSCOM report - and I urge you to do so - will see treasure troves of
information along these lines. Therefore, you might conclude there's less
new here than meets the eye.
QUESTION: Jamie, the matter of the provocations of the Iraqi aircraft and
the Iraq missile batteries and such: Is it the State Department's
perception that these things are happening to gain Saddam some kind of a
victory when he failed to inflict any casualties or any equipment damage on
US and British forces back during the Desert Fox operation? And shouldn't
the United States be cautious not to enforce the fly-zone; or on the
other hand, should that be enforced, and should US air cargo into
Iraq where they're based and take out the aircraft?
MR. RUBIN: With respect to the second part of your question, I respectfully
suggest that you address that to the Pentagon, about their operational
approach to enforcing the no-fly zone.
With respect to the first part of your question, let me simply say it is
our view that Saddam Hussein has rarely, if ever, been as isolated
internationally and in the Arab world as he is today. We saw his intemperate
lashing out against other Arab leaders in a speech yesterday, and clearly
he realizes that he is alone in the Arab world, and alone in the world.
There is no one who is prepared to stick up for a regime that uses the kind
of tactics that he is using, including simply for seven long years
refusing to cooperate with the United Nations inspectors and get this
job done, so that his people could be freed of the sanctions regime,
and his country could move forward.
He's refused to do that. I think it's increasingly clear that the blame for
that, and the resulting use of military power by the United States, is
resting squarely on his shoulders. So he is lashing out in frustration and
desperation, with intemperate speeches, with attempts to show that he can
still fly his planes; and all that it ends up showing is that his planes
get chased away. What we're seeing is the acts of a desperate regime
and a desperate man.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - on this with respect to the State Department,
either with -- (inaudible) -- or in a quarrelsome way?
MR. RUBIN: On which subject?
QUESTION: On the report.
MR. RUBIN: On the report. I believe Secretary Albright spoke to several
foreign ministers today in an unrelated call, and explained that this is
normal procedure for the United States to provide intelligence assistance
to UNSCOM for the purpose of disarming Iraq, and that the Secretary General
made clear to her that he did not share the allegations attributed to him
in the newspaper report.
QUESTION: Was Russia one of those?
MR. RUBIN: No.
QUESTION: France?
MR. RUBIN: No, this was, as I said, an unrelated call. I believe they
were several Latin American foreign ministers.
QUESTION: Does she intend to talk to any Arab countries' foreign
ministers?
MR. RUBIN: We don't regard this as all that new. She spoke to Kofi Annan
because he was reportedly of a view that he has now said he doesn't
have.
QUESTION: Earlier you talked about how, when someone comes in contact
with one of these regimes they come away with more information. What I
think you're - correct me if I'm wrong - are you saying that through your
efforts on behalf of the United Nations, the United States came away with
information on the regime that it didn't have before?
MR. RUBIN: What I am saying is that everybody who went into Iraq, since
they've become an opaque, dictatorial, totalitarian regime - UN workers, UN
diplomats, diplomats from foreign countries, the United States, all the
people, everybody who goes into Iraq -- presumably comes out wiser about
the workings of that regime; just as you or any of your colleagues come out
wiser about that regime. That strikes me as an obvious fact that is being
blown way out of proportion by some in a misguided attempt to shift
blame from Iraq to UNSCOM.
QUESTION: Okay, so, you did get more information than you had before?
MR. RUBIN: I'd be happy to repeat my answer if you'd like me to.
QUESTION: No, but that information, then, doesn't leave - isn't somehow
purged from US files, if you will. It goes to the UN; it stays here; and
you use it for whatever else you choose to use it for.
MR. RUBIN: What I'm simply pointing out to you is that the United States,
like every government, obtains information, analysis, judgments, wherever
it can. That's the way governments do business. Anybody who finds that
fascinating, it strikes me, is quite ignorant of the way of the world.
QUESTION: But it wouldn't, then - this is wildly speculative - it
wouldn't, then, be surprising that any information you might have gleaned
from these UN operations you participated in, such as the site of
Republican Guard barracks or what time they sleep, you would have
used.
MR. RUBIN: Let me simply say if Saddam Hussein were to have disclosed the
locations, information and paperwork associated with his weapons of mass
destruction program, the United States' assistance to UNSCOM and the
assistance of 40 other countries to UNSCOM, to try to locate those
facilities and weapons of mass destruction would never have been necessary.
QUESTION: How much concern is there here that as Saddam Hussein feels
more desperate and isolated, he might do something insane, like making use
of his weapons of mass destruction?
MR. RUBIN: I think we have taken the view that Saddam Hussein's regime is
an extremely dangerous regime. We have deployed our forces and made our
planning on that assumption. We have made clear that if he were to be
foolish enough to use weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors,
that our response would be swift and devastating.
In addition, we have made clear that we are prepared to act militarily if
he were to move against the North, if he were to threaten his neighbors, or
if he were to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction. We are
concerned always about that, given the track record of his invasion of
Kuwait, and his regular attempt to distract attention from his failure to
comply with UN Security Council resolutions by moving forces to the South,
attempting to violate no-fly zones, kicking inspectors out. Whatever the
method is, we're quite aware of the danger he poses. That's why we thought
it was so important to use military force in December to degrade his
capabilities in this area, and send the sternest possible message about
our determination to protect our vital national interests.
QUESTION: Can I switch to the subject of the last couple of days: Cuba?
First of all, has there been any response, or has the Secretary talked to
Chairman Helms? Secondly, has there been any response from the Cubans?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of any new response from the Cubans. I've seen
some press reports about their wait-and-see attitude. As far as Chairman
Helms is concerned, she spoke to him, or there was contact between us and
the Committee the day before the decision was finally made. I take it from
some of your colleagues accounts that some member of Senator Helms staff
thinks we didn't go far enough. I don't think there's a problem in that
area.
QUESTION: On Sierra Leone if I may? The American Embassy is still closed
there. Are there Americans there? What's your take on the situation?
MR. RUBIN: We understand that there is fighting in and around the capital
of Freetown, but we do not know the details of the situation on the ground.
We have been in touch with the Economic Community of West African states in
Abuja, and understand that ECOWAS troops remain committed to the defense of
the capital and the elected government of Sierra Leone.
As you know, we suspended operations at our embassy in Freetown on December
24. Last week, the foreign ministers of six of these countries expressed
total support for the government there. The six West African governments
also strongly condemned support by external forces to the rebels in Sierra
Leone and the atrocities being perpetrated by the rebels against the
civilian population.
With respect to - we attended this meeting on the subject of our embassy.
We believe that - we're not sure how many Americans chose to remain in
Sierra Leone; we believe the number to be small. There were only 120
Americans registered with our embassy, and they were notified of our
decision to suspend operations, and so they are suspended. They were
encouraged to leave. The embassy assisted those who wished to leave Sierra
Leone.
QUESTION: Iran: No doubt you've seen the reports that the authorities
have identified the people responsible for the killings. Since you were
concerned that they do so, I wondered whether you had anything to say about
that; and whether you saw this rather dramatic turn of events as a good
sign for the rule of law in Iran and so on.
MR. RUBIN: We have noted statements by Iranian officials that rogue
elements in the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security have been
arrested in connection with the recent murders of certain writers and
political activists. The arrests are a positive step towards maintaining
the rule of law in Iran and providing for the security of Iranians to
express their views.
QUESTION: Do you think that this might facilitate the rise to prominence
of elements favorable to dialogue with the United States?
MR. RUBIN: We have taken the position that it is not useful for us to
speculate about the future. There have been a number of events in Iran over
the last year, some going in different directions, as I think you and
others have reported. So we're aware of the vibrant political climate of
Iran, and certainly we're prepared to state quite clearly our view that
this is a positive step. But what the future holds, only time will
tell.
QUESTION: On the subject of religious freedom in China, there's an
article yesterday that comes from Fides, the news agency of the Vatican
missionary arm, about a Roman Catholic priest named Father Li,, who, in
Hubei province, China, was tortured and subjected to sexual abuse by
prostitutes. Have you heard this story and what is your reaction toward the
Chinese Government about this?
MR. RUBIN: On the 60 political prisoners that were allegedly tortured -
I'm familiar with that story. Our view on that is that we have not yet seen
the study entitled, "Tales of Terror: Torture in Tibet," published by the
Tibetan Center for Human Rights. The study reportedly states that reports
of torture and ill treatment are prevalent in Tibetan prisons.
We have long been concerned about credible reports of torture in Tibetan
prisons. The Country Report On Human Rights Practices describes the use of
torture as one of the serious human rights abuse that occurs in Tibet. The
use of torture is abhorrent and unacceptable to the United States. It is
also a violation of international human rights instruments, including the
Convention Against Torture that China has signed.
We regularly raise our serious concerns about the use of torture in our
high-level discussions with China. Let me point out that we will resume our
official bilateral human rights dialogue with China on January 11 and 12;
and that will provide us an opportunity to discuss fully our concerns about
the human rights situation in China.
With respect to the specific priest mentioned, let me say we've seen this
disturbing report; we will raise our concerns about the case with the
Chinese Government. We believe -- it is the strongly held view of the
United States that Chinese citizens be allowed to worship as they choose
and that China should respect internationally recognized fundamental
freedoms. The practice of torture is particular abhorrent to us and we
condemn it.
Before closing, let me also add two announcements on North Korea. A four-
party working level group met in New York on Tuesday, January 5, to discuss
arrangements for the fourth plenary session of the four-party talks. As a
result, the four parties have agreed to convene the plenary in Geneva
beginning January 19. Obviously, Ambassador Kartman will lead our
delegation.
Let me remind you that the US goals in these talks continue to be the
reduction of tension on the Korean Peninsula, and replacing the armistice
by the achievement of a permanent peace arrangement. As agreed at the third
plenary, two subcommittees will convene during the fourth plenary to
discuss, respectively, the establishment of a peace regime in the Korean
Peninsula and tension reduction there.
In addition, let me say that, with respect to the next round of talks on
the suspect underground construction, consultations on arrangements for the
next round were completed on January 5 in the New York channel. These
discussions on the Kumchangni underground construction site will resume in
Geneva on January 16 and 17.
With respect to our view on that, let me say: We are seeking that North
Korea fully satisfy our concerns about this site, including by providing
access to it. Let me make clear we are not prepared to pay North Korea to
ensure compliance with this obligation under the Agreed Framework. We have
said that were we able to improve our economic and political relations with
North Korea in the context of an Agreed Framework implementation, missile
proliferation progress, and cooperation on the return of remains of missing
Americans, as well as terrorism, success in the four-party talks would
also have a significant improvement -- impact -- on our bilateral
relations.
So were we able to make success in those four areas, we are prepared to
improve our economic and political relations, including by sanctions
easing. But that is a long way off, given the current posture of North
Korea.
QUESTION: Will Dr. Perry be at those talks?
MR. RUBIN: No.
QUESTION: Who will lead?
MR. RUBIN: Ambassador Kartman.
QUESTION: That's Kartman, too?
MR. RUBIN: I believe so.
QUESTION: What about January 11 and 12 on China? You said you'll resume -
MR. RUBIN: I said Assistant Secretary Harold Koh.
QUESTION: And where will that be?
MR. RUBIN: I believe that's here.
QUESTION: Would you be able to comment on the AP wire news report about
Hua Di, a Chinese rocket scientist, who has been under house arrest? Has
the United States Government urging the Chinese Government to -
MR. RUBIN: This is a Chinese citizen who had been in the United States in
California for awhile?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. RUBIN: Let me get you some information on that. We have discussed the
case through embassy Beijing of this Hua Di with Chinese officials, and
we've been in touch with Stanford University regarding this matter. We are
concerned that Mr. Hua's detention may have a chilling affect on academic
exchanges between the United States and China. We are also concerned about
his reported health problems, and we're seeking further information about
the situation.
QUESTION: Has the United States Government talked to the Chinese
Government on that?
MR. RUBIN: As I indicated, we have discussed this case with Chinese
officials.
QUESTION: Jamie, Ambassador Rauf Ekeus has said that because, as a part
of UNSCOM -
MR. RUBIN: You've been out there gathering information with which to make
my job more difficult.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: As part of UNSCOM's daily work, they would gather tremendous
amounts of data, and on occasion what they would do because - simply for
limited resources and to sort of help speed things along - they would farm
out some of the processing of this data to countries, including the United
States. He raised a number of instances, for instance with U2 planes, the
fly-overs -- they get 1,000 frames of film sometimes. They had asked the
United States to develop this film and then screen it and pass it
back to UNSCOM. Can you comment on this?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. The United States has provided major intelligence,
logistical, technical and personnel support to UNSCOM, including of the
kind that you mention. The U2 that is loaned to UNSCOM involves procedures -
because it's an American airplane on loan - that we try to help UNSCOM. I'm
not familiar with that particular case you describe, but it strikes me as a
perfectly reasonable way by which the United States can assist UNSCOM in
doing its work, as called for by the world body's Security Council
calling on member states to provide information, assistance, technical
expertise to Iraq.
So the kind of example you're giving is something the UN Security Council --
including the Russians, the French and all those who are on it -- asks the
United States and other countries to do, and we do try to help. That kind
of an example strikes me as quite likely.
QUESTION: Did you see Ambassador Shoval's commentary in The Washington
Times today, in which he claims the Palestinians had gone back to what he
calls "business as usual," not living up to their obligations?
MR. RUBIN: We do not share Ambassador Shoval's assessment at all. The
Palestinians have, in fact, worked hard to implement many of their
commitments under the Wye agreement, including annulling clauses in the
Palestinian National Council Charter, and stepping up the fight against
terror. There are some commitments that still have to be fulfilled; but in
our view, overall, they are making progress here.
Let me point out that it is the Israelis that has not fulfilled any of
their Phase 2 obligations by failing to pull back further re-deployment, as
required by Phase 2. We think more needs to be done by both sides, and that
instead of pointing fingers at each other, as this particular article does,
both sides should be talking to each other about how to get the job done.
That includes implementation actions by Israel and by the Palestinians.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:35 P.M.)
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