U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #68, 98-06-08
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1055
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Monday, June 8, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS
1 US-ASEAN Business Council
1 Attempted Coup in Guinea Bassau
NIGERIA
1 Reports of Death of Abacha / No Confirmation / US Policy
Toward Nigeria
KOREA (NORTH AND SOUTH)
2,3 South Korea's President Kim Visit & Itinerary / Issues for
Discussion, Including North Korea / US Sanctions on North
/ Secretary's Earlier Visit
2-4 Fuel Oil Delivery to North / Agreed Framework / Freeze on
Nuclear Program / Adherence to the Framework By All
Parties / DAS Kartman Mtg in NY
4 MIA Research With North
SERBIA (KOSOVO)
4-5 Update on Situation / Contact Group Mtg on Wed / Agreement
on International Monitoring Mechanism / Contact Group
Reps Visit Kosovo
5,8,9 NATO Options on Use of Force
5-7,10-11 Sanctions in Place & Proposed / Freeze on Assets /
Investment Ban / US-EU Coordination
7-8 Negotiations / US Treatment of Milosevic
8 Military Campaign & Ethnic Cleansing
9-10 Contact Group Meetings in Paris and London This Week
10 British Draft UN Resolution on Deteriorating Situation &
Refugee Concern
11 Stolen Military Equipment Spotted
BELARUS
11-12 US Ambassador's Residence Gate Welded Shut / Violation of
Vienna Convention
VIETNAM
12 US Use of Nerve Gas During War
INDIA / PAKISTAN
12-13 Attendees at G-8 Meeting / Indian, Pakistani Reactions to
P-5 Communique, UNSC Resolution
13 Pakistani Receipt of M-11s from China
CHINA
13-14 Secretary Raised Proliferation Issues With FM in Geneva /
Current Attitude on Arms Control Issues / Technology
Transfers
ETHIOPIA / ERITREA
14-15 US Diplomatic Efforts / US Evacuations / Travel by Asst
Secy Rice / OAU Involvement & Action
MEXICO
15-16 Indictments of US Customs Service Officials / Presidents
Clinton Zedillo Mtg in NY
16 Secretary's Mtg with FM Green re Operation Casablanca
CYPRUS
16 Rpt on Missing People and Inter-Communal Violence
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
16-17 Whereabouts of Amb Ross / Update on Talks / Settlers in
East Jerusalem
TURKEY
17 Islamic Uprising
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #68
MONDAY, JUNE 8, 1998, 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing this
Monday. We do have a statement for you on the US-ASEAN Business Council
that will be posted after the briefing.
With regard to the situation in Guinea-Bissau, the United States deplores
and condemns the attempted coup by elements of Guinea-Bissau's armed forces
against the democratically-elected government. We call upon the rebels to
return to their barracks and allow the government to resume normal
operations. We urge all parties to guarantee the safety of civilians and
foreigners living in Guinea-Bissau.
QUESTION: Same general neighborhood - any comment on the apparent death
of President Abacha of Nigeria?
MR. RUBIN: We, like you, have seen the media reports about this
situation. We've received some reports from normally reliable channels
confirming that. On the other hand, we do not have any assessment or
confirmation that General Abacha is dead. We are not in a position to
confirm that at this time.
QUESTION: Jamie, the news agency of Nigeria, which I think is state-run,
has announced his death.
MR. RUBIN: Again, we, as of a moment ago when I walked in and I spoke to
the people monitoring this situation closely, they indicated to me that
they had some reliable reporting to that effect. But absent some sort of
official announcement -- and I think that Nigerian press would not quite
meet that test - we're not in a position to make that judgment; although we
are aware that many sources are reporting it, and that normally reliable
sources are reporting it.
QUESTION: Be that as it may, do you want to make the call for a
democratic transition?
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: Well, certainly we have said for some time, and I can
reiterate today, regardless of the final resolution of this report, that we
believe there should be a civilian transition in Nigeria - a transition
that allows for a genuine democratic process, including allowing opposition
parties to operate; allowing the media to cover the work of opposition
parties; and allowing the transition that General Abacha promised to take
place.
QUESTION: Another area of the world - Korea. President Kim meets
President Clinton tomorrow. President Kim has called for easing of
sanctions against North Korea. Do you have a response to that?
MR. RUBIN: First of all, let me say that we look forward to welcoming
President Kim to Washington, to the White House. He arrived in New York on
the 6th, and as I understand it, will arrive in Washington late this
afternoon.
He will meet with the President tomorrow morning and will attend a luncheon
hosted by the Vice President at the State Department later in the day and a
state dinner hosted by the President in the evening. He will address a
joint session of Congress on Wednesday, and will depart for San Francisco
on June 11.
The President and President Kim will review a broad range of issues that
bear on our security alliance, as well as issues related to the Korean
economic recovery. We work closely with the Republic of Korea on issues
relating to North Korea; and our policy towards North Korea, our joint
efforts to see peaceful resolution of issues to reduce tensions and will
surely be discussed.
With respect to sanctions specifically, as you know, the United States has
a series of sanctions in place that are quite stiff on North Korea. We have
also said that in the context of implementation of the agreed framework,
that we would be moving towards greater bilateral contact and relations
with North Korea. Those have been the standing policies of the United
States. We certainly will look with interest at what President Kim might
have in mind. Secretary Albright had a good chance to exchange views with
President Kim when she was in Seoul some weeks ago, and we would expect
President Kim and the President to have a really full and thoughtful
discussion about the future of the Korean Peninsula, and we will look
forward with interest to having that discussion with him.
QUESTION: Can you bring us up to date on the fuel oil issue with regard
to North Korea?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. I'm sorry you lost your question, but it happens around
the briefing room.
The issue is one where we are working with the Congress and with other
interested parties around the world to try to make it possible for the fuel
oil to be sent to North Korea, pursuant to the schedule laid out. There was
a delivery, I believe last month, and we will be working with Congress and
others to make sure the deliveries happen.
But let me be clear - the United States is going to live up to its part of
the bargain, and the North Koreans should do nothing to act in any way in
contravention with the 1994 agreed framework, which did so much to advance
the security of the entire world by freezing their nuclear program in its
tracks, getting unprecedented access for the international community's
agent in this regard -- the IAEA -- to monitor that program. As far as I've
been informed, that monitoring continues and that program is frozen.
But North Korea should know that we are going to fulfill our part of the
bargain. We're going to work on ways to do that; we're consulting with
Congress and other countries in order to do that. I would expect that issue
to come up in discussions with President Kim because the question of the
freeze on North Korea's nuclear program is a matter of such importance to
the United States, to South Korea and to the region that I would expect it
to come up.
QUESTION: When the Secretary was in Seoul, there was some talk about the
South Koreans needing some help to carry their share of their obligation
under the accord.
MR. RUBIN: That's not exactly the way I recall it. The way I recall it
was that we were trying to ensure that South Korea understood the
importance of it pursuing the part of the arrangement that envisaged the
construction of a light water reactor that is more proliferation-resistant.
We worked with them to make sure that, together with the Japanese and other
countries, that everyone is in a position to construct that reactor.
In addition, Secretary Albright pointed up the urgency of the problem,
noting, as I think it should be evident to all right now, that protection
against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction -- especially
nuclear weapons - is the highest priority for the Administration, and
should be the highest priority for countries around the world; and
obviously wanted to make clear to the people of South Korea the importance
of following through on our share of the program and working constructively
where problems arise to try to make sure that the North Koreans don't make
excuses to not live up to their share of the bargain.
QUESTION: One last one - is there any sign the North Koreans are not
living up to their end? I mean, there was this question of pieces of fuel
rods around.
MR. RUBIN: As a technical matter, it's my understanding that the IAEA
believes the freeze is still in place. As a policy matter, however, we are
concerned about some of the rhetoric coming out of North Korea, suggesting
that they will be looking for excuses not to follow through with this
agreement.
We do not want to see that happen, and we are going to be working to make
sure that the North Koreans understand that we are going to do what we need
to do to get the heavy fuel oil provided, and they should not be looking
for reasons to not follow through with the agreement.
It's my understanding that a meeting did take place on Saturday in New
York. On our side it was principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Chuck Kartman
who met with his counterpart from North Korea in the context of welcoming
President Kim here to the United States.
MR. RUBIN: Met with his North Korean counterpart in the context of going
to New York to meet the delegation from South Korea coming to the United
States.
QUESTION: Oh, I see, he wasn't talking about greeting President Kim with
the North Koreans.
MR. RUBIN: No, no, no. I was merely pointing out that he was in New York
for that reason, and took that opportunity to meet with his counterpart.
QUESTION: Kosovo?
MR. RUBIN: Okay - there might be - same on South Korea? Yes.
QUESTION: There has been coverage of a joint MIA research with North
Korea. Can you give us any understanding of --
MR. RUBIN: Yes, let me get you some material for the record on that,
immediately after the briefing?
QUESTION: Right, do you know that North Korea demanded to postpone their
joint research?
MR. RUBIN: We have been trying to work with the North Koreans, and
consider it a high priority to get them to provide as much access as
possible to allow for the finding of the remains from missing in action
servicemen. We consider that a high priority.
But as far as the current state of play in that discussion, which tends to
be between the Pentagon and its counterparts, let me get you some
information for the record.
QUESTION: On Kosovo, Pope John Paul II has called just yesterday for
intervention in Kosovo, saying that violent options, repressions and
flights of people in Kosovo must not leave the international community
inert. I believe that the latest offensive by the Serbs in Western Kosovo
has killed over 250, has leveled several towns - it's just been a scorched
earth policy. Where does the Administration now stand on possible
intervention to quell this disaster?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say that as far as today is concerned, we do have
indications there is a reduced level of violence, although fighting has
continued in the Decani region. We will be meeting with our European allies
in the Contact Group on Wednesday to review further steps the international
community should consider.
Following Ambassador Hill's meetings over the weekend with President
Milosevic, Belgrade did agree to an international monitoring mechanism for
the region, drawing on foreign embassies in Belgrade. Foreign missions in
Belgrade, according to this agreement -- which we'll have to see whether
it's carried out - will permit unrestricted access to all parts of Kosovo.
Our embassy is working with key other embassies, especially from the
Contact Group, to make arrangement for frequent visits to the effected
area.
As a first step, Contact Group embassies were escorted yesterday by
Belgrade authorities to several parts of Western Kosovo. Ambassador Hill
visited the Decani region today with a representative of the ethnic
Albanian leadership, Dr. Agani. They saw significant destruction of houses
and evidence of widespread armed conflict. We do not, however, have a
complete report on his findings.
With respect to the use of force, we have long said that we are not ruling
out military options, and that remains our policy. We are working actively
with our NATO allies and partners in NATO channels; and the NATO authorities
are pursuing a variety of plans in this area. Clearly, we believe this is a
deteriorating situation. This is a situation that is dangerous, that
effects the security of the world, and effects particularly the security of
Europe. That's why it's so important to work with our friends and
allies on this subject, and we will continue to do so.
QUESTION: On that very point, I think the European today imposed
sanctions on investment in Kosovo. Is the United States going to follow
suit or where do we stand?
MR. RUBIN: Let me start by turning the tape back slightly to remind all
of you that it was the United States, at Secretary Albright's behest, that
convinced the European allies to impose sanctions in the first place. We
now have in place essentially three sanctions prior to this EU action. One
is an international arms embargo pursuant to a Security Council resolution;
the other is a voluntary ban on equipment that can be used for repression;
and the third is a prohibition on government financing for investment and
trade in Serbia.
We also pushed our allies to support the idea of a freeze on assets and a
ban on private investment in Serbia, as well. We suspended those steps as a
result of the decision by President Milosevic to engage in a serious
dialogue with the Kosovar Albanian leader, Dr. Rugova. We created a
mechanism here in which the on-off switch can be easily turned in
sanctions. That's something the United States has long believed we need to
be able to do if we're going to influence Belgrade.
As a result of the recent deteriorated situation and the use of military
force in Kosovo, we are clearly moving in the direction of re-imposing
those sanctions. No final decision has been made, but obviously we are
moving in that direction. We're going to have meetings in the next couple
of days, some internal meetings today. I'm not in a position to make a
final announcement, other than to say that clearly the situation has
reversed in terms of what Milosevic has done; and therefore we are moving
in the direction of imposing these additional sanctions, and that should
happen soon.
QUESTION: On this point - have the Europeans taken a step before the
United States in this particular case?
MR. RUBIN: This isn't a score card, Roy; it may be score card for some of
you. We imposed --
QUESTION: I'm not asking about a score card, I'm just asking about the
sequence of events --
MR. RUBIN: No, but it seems that you're trying to keep score on the
situation. What I would say to you is that the United States has been
certainly in the lead in getting agreement for sanctions to be put in place,
getting agreement on a mechanism to turn them on and turn them off as
appropriate. Just because at 1:00 p.m. on Monday I am not in a position to
announce final decisions for you doesn't mean that decisions aren't in the
works.
QUESTION: Did they coordinate their decision with --
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Secretary Albright had a meeting with Foreign Secretary
Cook in Geneva in which we talked about next steps. Our ambassadors and
working level officials have been in regular touch over the last four
days.
QUESTION: What is the consideration in not imposing sanctions right
now?
MR. RUBIN: The consideration is that when the senior officials of the
United States Government are ready for an announcement to that effect, they
will announce it. I am trying to be as clear as I can that we're moving in
that direction without making an announcement.
QUESTION: Are there any other sanctions that are under consideration
besides these, or is this sort of the last set that you plan to impose?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we have a variety of ideas that have been kicking around
as to what is the best way to continue to bring home the mistake to
Milosevic that he's making. And let's bear in mind that with each day that
he allows his military or his military police or his internal security
apparatus to use military force in Kosovo is another day that the UCK
forces are gaining support amongst the people. And with every day that he
makes the mistake of using force rather than finds the wisdom to negotiate
at the negotiating table, he becomes the membership chairman in the UCK's
efforts, because he continues to push the people of Kosovo into a more
extremist posture than they otherwise would be.
At some point we hope he stops shooting himself in the foot and shooting
the people of Serbia in the foot and gets the message that the way to
protect the interests of Serbia is to work at this problem at the
negotiating table, come up with a comprehensive set of confidence and
security-building measures that can make sure that this problem is solved
at the negotiating table. His failure to do so only harms his own
interests.
With respect to your question about what other factors might be motivating
him, all we can say is that we are moving in the direction of not
suspending sanctions, but imposing sanctions. If we conclude there are
other steps that can bring that message home, we would not hesitate to
deploy those steps.
QUESTION: Do you think it was a mistake, perhaps, for Richard Holbrooke
to suspend them before they were actually even introduced a couple of weeks
ago when he met Milosevic?
MR. RUBIN: We think that the steps that Ambassador Gelbard took with
Ambassador Holbrooke were designed to allow for a negotiating process. It's
easy to look back at every situation and point fingers and find blame, and
I know some of you have to do that for a living. But in our business, what
we're trying to do is influence the situation. We do believe that sanctions
can have an influence, and that being in a position to impose them and
suspend them at will is a way to influence the behavior of President
Milosevic.
Prior to that time, there had not been a meeting between President
Milosevic and Dr. Rugova; and prior to that time, President Milosevic had
refused to take personal responsibility for this issue. He now has; but he
has made the mistake of using the discussions as an opportunity to
accelerate the violence rather than an opportunity to stop the violence and
improve his own country's security. As a result, the European Union took
the step that it took, and we're moving in that direction for early action
as well.
QUESTION: Which were the sanctions which were suspended by the United
States?
MR. RUBIN: Everyone, I believe, suspended the asset freeze and the
private investment ban.
QUESTION: Jamie, just to touch upon Roy's question about the treatment
that the US has given Milosevic during this process - you said that you
believe that negotiating is always the best option initially. However, as
you've moved the tape back, would you say there was any room in your policy
that could have been a little more room for heavy-handedness toward
Milosevic?
MR. RUBIN: Negotiating is not always our policy, and it's not always
going to be our policy. What we realize, as the Albanian leadership
realizes, a lasting solution to this problem can only occur through a
peaceful discussion that gives greater autonomy to the people of Kosovo.
That is the solution to this problem.
That can't happen out of the barrel of a gun. That has to happen through a
negotiating process. The sooner that President Milosevic realizes that, the
sooner the people of Serbia will be in a position to integrate into the
rest of the world.
With respect to looking back, all I can tell you is the United States made
clear once this started - as those of you who traveled with the Secretary
may remember or have chosen to forget - the United States led the European
countries and the rest of the world in identifying this problem; reminding
other European countries of the lessons of Bosnia; making clear that what
President Milosevic understands is pressure - and not positive pressure,
but negative pressure; and got agreement from the European allies to a
set of sanctions - some of which certain countries did not want to
see implemented.
So we took a very robust approach up until we had an indication that
President Milosevic was, for the first time, willing to take personal
responsibility of this. We have now given that a try, as we have to do if
we want to solve it peacefully. So far what we've seen is President
Milosevic using these discussions as an opportunity to pursue a military
campaign in Kosovo. As a result, the United States is now working with its
NATO allies and other partners to consider the military planning that NATO
is doing. We have not ruled military options out, and we are changing
the direction on sanctions.
So therefore, it would be hard to identify a more robust posture for the
United States to have taken during these last few months.
QUESTION: Can I just follow up on the NATO contingency plan that Albright
discussed back in Luxembourg, I believe, a couple of weeks ago now? Would
you say that NATO troop intervention is right around the corner, as we look
at the Kosovo situation that seems to have hit a melt-down point?
MR. RUBIN: I am not going to make any assessment of the timing of any
action that is now under the planning phase. What I can say is that we're
not ruling military options out and that NATO authorities are engaged in a
very determined effort focused on what NATO can and should do to deal with
the deteriorating security situation that I've said effects the security of
Europe. But I am not going to get drawn into any further discussion
of military options.
QUESTION: Could you say that maybe they're more determined now than they
were two weeks ago?
MR. RUBIN: I would say that there has been a steady determination on the
part of NATO, led by the United States, to try to bring home to President
Milosevic the danger of not solving this at the negotiating table, and to
prepare the Alliance with its friends and partners for any action that
might be necessary if that lesson is not learned.
QUESTION: Can we talk about the events last week - the military events to
which you alluded? Do they constitute ethnic cleansing on the part of the -
or the beginning of ethnic cleansing on the part of Milosevic and
Kosovo?
MR. RUBIN: When you see a determined effort to focus a military campaign
against one ethnic group to move people out of villages, to use heavy fire
power against one ethnic group, that is ethnic cleansing in my book. There
is no legal term "ethnic cleansing;" isn't equivalent to other legal terms
that have some meaning in the international legal lexicon. And if I
make a mistake on this I think there's someone in this room who might
correct me. But the bottom line is we've seen the movie called ethnic
cleansing before; we didn't like it the first time, and we still don't like
it.
QUESTION: It appears that several times now that the Clinton Administration
is not ruling the military option out --
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: -- and NATO is planning for it. Your statement is supported by
numerous US officials in various buildings. However, Sandy Berger this
morning on Air Force One said that there is no consideration for military
action.
MR. RUBIN: I've read the quote of what he said; I spoke to Mr. Berger
this morning - there is no disconnect on this point. The fact that NATO is
planning now makes it not on the front burner for what the United States is
talking about today. One of the issues that we're talking about is the
timing of the re-imposition of sanctions, and so it's not different because
NATO is now planning for that.
Furthermore, within the construct of military options, there are different
military options, some of which might not be contemplated at this time. So
I think Mr. Berger would agree, and told me what I could comfortably say,
was that we are not ruling military options out. I think he was asked a
specific question about a particular type of action that may be considered
today in the United States. I think he was signaling two things -- number
one, that the action for planning is now in Brussels, where NATO authorities
are contemplating what next steps might look like, not on the table in the
United States; secondly, that within the construct of military options,
there may be things that are not being considered. But we are not ruling
military options out.
QUESTION: I gather that what he was saying was--
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to parse this much further, but I think I know
where you're going.
QUESTION: Okay. We're talking - the focus, I imagine, was on American
troops?
MR. RUBIN: Or unilateral - or something like that.
QUESTION: Not unilateral, okay. My question is will American forces do
their share in NATO's operations if it comes to that?
MR. RUBIN: We've made no decisions - we've made no decisions on
that.
QUESTION: Not even whether you would do your share?
MR. RUBIN: What we've done is ask NATO to plan; that is the first step in
this process. That decision has been made - to ask NATO to plan. The next
steps in the decision-making chain on the use of force have not been made
to my knowledge.
QUESTION: Where and what level will the Contact Group meeting be on
Wednesday?
MR. RUBIN: As I understand it, it's a political directors' meeting, with
Ambassador Gelbard representing the United States in Paris. They will be
setting up a meeting the foreign ministers of the Contact Group, probably,
plus some other countries will have on Friday in London. It may be that as
a result of the arrangement for India-Pakistan that other countries may
participate in this discussion as a way to avoid breaking up the meeting.
But nonetheless, the six Contact Group foreign ministers, if they all
attend, will be in London on Friday, and be meeting on the subject of
Kosovo, based on discussions their political directors will have in
Paris on Wednesday.
QUESTION: What about the United Nations, Jamie? Are you seeking any sort
of resolution there that would authorize action in Kosovo?
MR. RUBIN: Well, the fact that the British have drafted a resolution in
this regard appears to have been widely publicized. Let me say that we are
going to work with the British Government and others on the situation in
Kosovo.
As part of a previous resolution, the Security Council has made clear that
depending on the conditions that the situation in Kosovo can pose a threat
to international peace and security, thereby triggering Chapter 7 action.
We are of the view that the situation has deteriorated, there is a regional
threat as a result of these steps. You can see the large numbers of
refugees crossing from Kosovo into Albania, which is the essential basis
for why this is an international matter.
We are going to be working with the British on that. But with regard to
what we'll exactly support and how the language will emerge, that will be
something that we'll be deciding in the coming days.
QUESTION: You're not co-sponsoring that?
MR. RUBIN: No.
QUESTION: Jamie, is there a circumstance under which the United States
would not impose these additional sanctions on Yugoslavia?
MR. RUBIN: Well, if in the next few hours there were a massive turn-
around on the part of the government of Belgrade.
QUESTION: And what would a massive turn-around look like?
MR. RUBIN: I think we'd all know it when we saw it.
QUESTION: Just a moment, are you asking them for some specific actions in
order to avoid this next -- having to take this next step?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to be in a position to get into any of the
diplomatic steps that we're taking right now in real time, Roy. What I can
say is, we're clearly moving in the direction of re-imposing sanctions; and
barring some unforeseen development in the coming hours, that is the
direction we're moving. But I'm not in a position to make known publicly a
final decision before the people involved have made it.
QUESTION: Opening up the Kosovo to diplomatic inspection is not a
dramatic turn-around, as far as you're concerned?
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: Speaking of people being forced from their homes, what can you
tell us about the US Ambassador in Belarus?
QUESTION: One more --
MR. RUBIN: Good link, though. That was pretty good.
QUESTION: Are you aware that some of the armored personnel carriers or
other equipment the Serbs are supposedly using in Kosovo were spotted by
Dutch experts as among the equipment that was stolen from the UN, the Dutch
contingent in - (inaudible)?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of that, but I'm not surprised you would know
about it and ask me about it.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Belarus --
MR. RUBIN: Could you pose the question again, please?
QUESTION: What can you tell us about the American ambassador and his
family being evicted, locked out of their - welded out of their residence?
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: It's a new phenomenon - welded out. Workers from the
Belarusian Government earlier today welded shut a side gate leading to the
residence of the US Ambassador, Daniel Speckhard. The front gate to the
residence is still open, though indications are that road access to the
area will be blocked in a few days. Ambassador Speckhard continues to use
the residence at this time.
These actions are apparently being taken pursuant to a government decision
to evict diplomats from their residences in the suburban Minsk neighborhood
of Drozdy. The government indicated that all residences in the area should
be vacated by Wednesday, June 10. Ostensibly, the reason for this decision
is to allow the government to replace utility lines in the area.
We and the dozen other countries facing eviction have made clear that this
action by the government of Belarus is a violation of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations. The residence of an ambassador is inviolable. The
host government is obligated under the convention to take all appropriate
steps to protect the residence and to make sure that it is supplied with
adequate services. This action is also inconsistent with our lease,
which will remain valid until 2001.
The government of Belarus has once again chosen to precipitate a crisis in
its relations with the United States and other governments. We have urged
the government to halt this self-destructive action. And if the government
of Belarus makes it impossible for our ambassador to carry out his
responsibilities, we will be forced to take retaliatory action.
QUESTION: Which is?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we certainly would have options of our own in the
welding area here in Washington.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Do you have any comment on a CNN-Time report that the US
military used nerve gas in the Vietnam War?
MR. RUBIN: I am under the impression that Secretary Cohen has said there
is no evidence for this. I am not aware of any evidence for it. Obviously,
this is something that happened a long, long time ago. It's my understanding
that the Pentagon will be looking into it. But we have no evidence for the
claim in those esteemed organizations' report.
QUESTION: Jamie, can you say who is going to attend the meeting in London
- the G-8-plus? Do you know if India and Pakistan are going to be
invited?
MR. RUBIN: I do not expect India and Pakistan to be there. My understanding
is that the meeting will consist of the G-8 plus, I gather some countries
were being added. I don't want to name them before they've been invited.
But other countries outside of the G-8 who would have special influence and
responsibility and expertise in the proliferation area are expected to be
invited to a part of that meeting.
QUESTION: Has there been any reaction from either India or Pakistan to
the findings of the communique of the meeting on Friday?
MR. RUBIN: Well, not surprisingly the Indians have taken the position
that somehow - what was the word they used - grotesque -- regarded the P-5
communique as grotesque. Well, we didn't; we regarded it as a responsible
step from the international community to try to bring to bear some reason
on the situation between India and Pakistan, to set forth some clear goals
for India and Pakistan -- essentially to stop nuclear testing; to not
deploy nuclear weapons; to not test or deploy ballistic missiles; and to
begin to deal with the underlying dispute, including Kashmir, that has led
to such tension between India and Pakistan.
The Pakistani Government has had differing reactions to both the P-5
document approved in Geneva on Friday and the subsequent Security Council
resolution approved over the weekend.
The bottom line is, both of these countries are countries that should
realize the international community is trying to help them dig themselves
out of the hole they've dug for themselves. The fact is that we are going
to be working bilaterally; other governments are going to be working
bilaterally. We're not trying to isolate them; we're trying to engage them
to move away from the direction they were going, which only will lead to a
futile nuclear arms race and danger to their people, and move toward the
kind of responsible policies that would put them back into the mainstream
of countries in the world that accept the proliferation norms, that
accept the fact that nuclear weapons are not going to make them more
secure, and begin to pay a little more attention to the needs of their
people and a little less attention to the perceived value of nuclear
weapons.
QUESTION: Staying on Pakistan - Defense Department officials told
reporters a few weeks ago that Pakistan may have nuclear warheads for their
M-11 missiles that it bought from China several years ago; and the
amendment to the Arms Export Control Act requires economic sanctions to be
imposed on the sale of missiles, which the M-11's do fit under. Why haven't
there been sanctions imposed on China? And now how can Pakistan dig its way
out of the hole?
MR. RUBIN: With respect - I've heard about such a briefing; I've never
seen a transcript of it. I would refer you to the Pentagon for the specific
details of what this official may or may not have been referring to. But it
is the position of the United States Government that we have not determined
that Pakistan has received M-11 missiles from China. We have serious
concerns about transfers. We're watching these issues very closely, but as
a government, we have not made that determination. So that official, if
accurately quoted, was mistaken. But I would refer you to the Pentagon
for a formal response to that official's briefing.
QUESTION: Did the Secretary raise this issue with the Chinese Foreign
Minister on Friday - Thursday?
MR. RUBIN: The Secretary raised with the Chinese Foreign Minister a whole
series of issues related to proliferation of missiles, of nuclear weapons
and the importance of dealing with the situation in India and Pakistan.
Let me say that Secretary Albright was very pleasantly surprised at the
cooperative spirit that the Chinese showed in dealing with a real problem
the world faces. It's very easy to focus on the past and what may or may
not have happened ten years ago, 15 years ago or 20 years ago; but what we
as a government need to focus on is what's happening today. What's
happening today is the Chinese Government has been helpful and supportive
in trying to deal with one of the biggest dangers the international
community has faced in a long time, has behaved responsible, chaired this
meeting, took very forward-leaning positions and, in the proliferation
area, has changed its behavior.
Whether it's on missiles, on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and nuclear
weapons, whether it's chemical weapons, whether it's a whole series of
detailed negotiations related to technology transfer, the Chinese
Government today behaves in a way that would have been unthinkable ten
years ago, for those who were studying the proliferation issue. Our
cooperative relationship with them enhances the security of the United
States, makes it easier for us to fight the battle against proliferation.
And as much as some would like to focus on what happened 15 years ago,
reality dictates that we focus on what cooperation we can get now, and it
has been significant.
QUESTION: But isn't it a lot less than 15 years ago? This Administration
imposed sanctions against China --
MR. RUBIN: Are you referring - there are several issues and I can run
through them with you, George. One of the issues was nuclear transfers to
Pakistan that date back to the '80s that we have deep concerns about and
made very clear and took steps to respond to in the '80s and '90s - early
'90s.
More recently, there have been concerns about technology transfers by China
to certain countries and concerns in the missile area. But if you look at
the whole panoply of chemical, nuclear weapons and missiles and missile
technology -- something that ten years ago the Chinese were prepared to
justify a transfer in -- they now indicate they will not support; and
something four years ago that they would not agree to - namely an agreement
not to provide nuclear cooperation with Iran - that they were defending as
their sovereign right four years ago they've now cut off.
So if you look at the panoply of issues - whether it's missiles, civilian
nuclear cooperation, nuclear cooperation more broadly, chemical weapons -
there has been a broad-based policy decision by the Chinese to change their
behavior and that has redound to the advantage of the security of the
United States.
That doesn't mean there aren't problems. China's a very big country with a
lot of companies and needs a lot of experience in export controls that will
prevent problems from happening. But to go from a situation where no export
controls were promulgated and, in fact, their transfers were defended to
some of the most dangerous countries in the world to a situation where
those transfers are rejected, export controls are promulgated but there are
problems in the implementation, is a massive change in behavior.
QUESTION: Do you have anything Eriteria, Ethiopia - either the war or the
diplomacy?
MR. RUBIN: Assistant Secretary Rice has been briefing the Secretary and
other officials over the weekend, and I gather Mr. Berger indicated the
President had spoken to the two leaders over the weekend. We have not heard
reports of continued fighting along the border. Ethiopia declared a
moratorium on air raids for Saturday to allow the evacuation of expatriates.
We have no information that a bilateral cease fire has been concluded. We
have evacuated approximately 200 Americans by various means -- the embassy
staff is now down to six official American volunteers. We are obviously
monitoring the situation closely. The embassy in Asmara is considering an
additional charter flight that would leave late Tuesday night local
time.
Essentially, we are trying to get the parties to realize they need to
resolve this peacefully; we've been working on that for many weeks now.
Assistant Secretary Rice has been there a couple of times and, as I
indicated, the President spoke to the leaders this weekend. But beyond
saying we are trying to help them resolve it peacefully, I don't have any
additional details.
QUESTION: Why did Secretary Rice come back when the conflict is still
going on apparently?
MR. RUBIN: Her travel schedule isn't only determined by whether there is
fighting; her travel schedule determined by a variety of factors, including
whether she thinks it's necessary to consult with senior officials.
I would also point out, as she indicated this morning, that a couple of
hours after her plane left Asmara, bombs dropped in the airport. So that's
another reason why she may have needed to move. More importantly, she went
to the Organization of African Unity and got agreement on a US and Rwandan
effort to try to encourage the parties to resolve this peacefully. Some of
the observers from the OAU said it was one of the first times that the OAU
had acted so quickly in such a situation and responded extremely well
to her presentation.
So there are several places in which we can do our best to help. One is in
the region, in capitals, working with the leaders; another is at the OAU,
trying to bring to bear influence of the African countries; and a third is
here in Washington, talking to the Secretary and, by extension, the
President to try to engage their actions. So she's making her decisions
about where to be based on where she can best be helpful.
QUESTION: Does she plan to go back?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any current schedule at this point, but I
wouldn't rule it out.
QUESTION: Have you talked to the Ethiopians and the Eritreans about the
kinds of targets that they have chosen for their --
MR. RUBIN: I don't have that level of detail.
QUESTION: On another subject, has the United States Government now
received confirmation that the government of Mexico is handing down
indictments of some US Customs officials?
MR. RUBIN: I have not heard that we have any confirmation of that. The
President is expected to meet President Zedillo this afternoon, but I've
heard nothing official on that. We see a lot of press reporting about all
sorts of things that don't get communicated in official channels.
QUESTION: On Mexico --
MR. RUBIN: You mean, where the President is going to meet with President
Zedillo in New York and they'll be giving a full briefing after that?
QUESTION: No, this has to do with Madeleine Albright being in Caracas.
Could I ask a question on that?
MR. RUBIN: Okay.
QUESTION: All right. It was reported, I believe by The New York Times,
that Madeleine Albright had a conference with Mrs. Rosario Green, and she
had to apologize, I believe, for the Casablanca undercover operation and
said to Ms. Green, "I had no knowledge; I did not know myself." Is that
correct; did Ms. Albright not know about this three-year sting operation?
MR. RUBIN: As I indicated at the time, the State Department was informed
in advance of the public announcement. Beyond saying that, and saying that
I don't intend to confirm any statements that Mexican officials may have
attributed to the Secretary in a private meeting, I can say that the State
Department was informed prior to the announcement.
QUESTION: The State Department was.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - President, a few weeks ago, submitted his report
on the missing persons on Cyprus, the five Americans, to Congress. In his
transmittal letter, he referred to the issue as a result of inter-communal
violence. Since many Greeks were killed by the Turkish invasion forces, do
you have a comment on that?
MR. RUBIN: I'm glad you asked this, because I would like to clarify any
misunderstandings. Of course, we believe that while people on both sides
were missing as a result of inter-communal violence, it is equally true, as
the report clearly states on page three, that people were missing as a
result of inter-communal violence during the 1960s and the 1974 conflict.
So there was an editing error in terms of making sure that the transmittal
letter had all the information and conclusions in it that the report itself
did have.
QUESTION: Dennis Ross - is he in Washington, or is he jetting around
somewhere else?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm not going to be in a position every day to tell you
where Ambassador Ross is. I can say that my understanding is he is in New
York today with Israeli Minister Kahalani, discussing a number of issues of
mutual interest.
We are continuing to work with the parties to overcome the differences so
that we can reach an agreement based on our ideas. Our hope is to conclude
that as soon as possible so that accelerated permanent status talks can be
re-launched.
We have been trying to close the gaps between the parties in a variety of
ways. Some of the discussions we've had have been useful. And we're going
to continue working as long as we believe there is a possibility of
reaching an agreement. When we believe that it is not possible, we will
make that clear.
With respect to some of the reporting about our ideas, let me point out
that we have not - and I emphasize the word "not" - provided our ideas in
writing to either party. But other than saying that, I can't get into
further detail.
QUESTION: Do you have reason to be optimistic to the --
MR. RUBIN: Given the nearly, let's see, nine months I've been doing this
from the podium, optimism goes up and down based on a daily basis. Some
have developed, I guess, what they call an optimism index. My standard
optimism about diplomacy and the hard efforts of Ambassador Ross and the
Herculean efforts of Secretary Albright is tempered by the reality of the
last nine months. So it's hard to be optimistic when so little has happened
for so long.
QUESTION: Jamie, on that subject - some Jewish settlers took over some
homes in East Jerusalem. Do you feel that the Israeli Government is doing
what is required to keep up the momentum?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say that issues involving Jerusalem are the most
sensitive of all the peace process issues, and we hope that this kind of
dispute can be resolved peacefully.
There was reportedly some scuffling between Palestinians and Israelis over
a housing dispute in East Jerusalem. We're looking into the incidents, but
let me say this - we call on both sides to exercise maximum restraint, both
in their actions and their rhetoric, especially when it comes to issues as
sensitive as Jerusalem.
QUESTION: Last week I asked a question on this same thing. What is the
purpose of several State Department officials discuss in the defense
university Islamic uprising in Turkey?
MR. RUBIN: We'll get you something for the record.
QUESTION: Okay.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:40 P.M.)
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