U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #67, 98-06-01
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
384
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Monday June 1, l998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
ANNOUNCEMENT
1 SecState Trip of Perm-5 in Geneva on South Asia to Discuss
Current Situation After Pakistan Testing/Stability in the
Region
5 Question of Whether Someone From India or Pakistan Will
Attend
MONTENEGRO
1 Parliamentary Elections/SecState w/President Djukanovic
PAKISTAN/INDIA
1,2,7 Purpose of the Meeting/Prevention of Further Escalation in
the Region/Ways Countries can Work to Avoid Provocative
Steps / Long Term Goals/Understanding Dangers
2 Sanctions/Next Steps/Countries that have Joined the NPT /
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
2,3 The Issue of Kashmir
3 Sanctions and Their Affects/Sanctions as a Tool Against
Non- Proliferation
3,4 START III Negotiations/Progress of Nuclear Disarmament as
Result of START III
4 Passage of START II
4,5 Impact of South Asia Crisis/World Trends Toward Non-
Proliferation
6 Pakistan's Fears of an Imminent Attack by Israel and India
6 Pakistan Delegation in Washington
6 Relationship Between Pakistani Test and the CTBT/Testing of
Nuclear Weapons
7 Tools for Deterring Non-Proliferation
7 French Government Suggestion to Allow India/Pakistan Access
to Nuclear Energy
7,8 Number of Tests Pakistan Conducted
8 Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
14 Pakistan's Statement re Further Testing/Calls by USG not to
Weaponize Ballistic Missiles or Provoke
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
4,5 South Asia Crisis and the Middle East Peace Process
8 Accusations of Double-Standards re Nuclear Programs and
Israel/CTBT
IRAN
4,5 Iran and Weapons of Mass Destruction
SERBIA
9 Holbrooke's Comment to Reuters on Kosovo and Bulgaria
9 Refugees Flowing into Albania from Kosovo
9 International War Crimes Tribunal Investigations into
Attacks
9 SecState Meetings with Rugova
9,10 Next Delegation Meetings Scheduled for June 5
10 Calling for NATO to Push Back Troops/Asset Freeze
NAZI GOLD
10,11 Nazi Gold Report/Under Secretary Eizenstat's Background
Briefing on June 2 /Misleading Reports
TURKEY/CYPRUS
11 SecState's Meeting with Foreign Ministers
12 DOS Discussion of Defense University
COLOMBIA
12 Elections/Turnout/Second Round of Elections
RUSSIA
12,13 International Aid/IMF/Russian Markets/Further Reforms/
Congress and the IMF
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #67
MONDAY, JUNE 1, 1998 1:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. I see
some faces we haven't seen in several days; welcome back.
Let me start by saying that we welcome the May 31 parliamentary elections
in Montenegro as a positive step forward in building democracy in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro. The elections appear
to have proceeded peacefully and in accordance with international
standards.
Preliminary reports based on an unofficial count of more than 90 percent of
votes cast indicate a very strong showing by democratic reform forces of
President Djukanovic. We expect a formal report later today by the OSCE;
but let me say again that Secretary Albright had a very good meeting with
President Djukanovic in the Department some weeks ago, and his approach to
trying to bring Montenegro back into the fold of European countries is
something we support.
Secondly, unless there are any questions on that, let me say that on June 4
in Geneva Secretary Albright will join Foreign Ministers of the Security
Council's five permanent members to discuss the situation in South
Asia. The immediate focus of the meeting will be to consider ways to reduce
tensions between India and Pakistan, and to try to avoid the kind of
provocative steps that have been taken in recent days and weeks. The
situation has deteriorated significantly as a result of the tests of
nuclear weapons by both countries; and the international community is going
to, we hope, start by reinforcing the goals of the global non-proliferation
regime that have served the American people and the security of the world
so well.
The meeting will also examine ways in which the international community can
bring greater stability and security to South Asia, including steps that
can be taken to encourage dialogue and reconciliation between India and
Pakistan. The permanent members will also be discussing follow-on
multilateral meetings involving other interested countries.
QUESTION: Jamie, on that, the two reasons you gave for the meeting both
sound not to be a punishing events. Will this meeting take up perhaps
trying to get some unanimity on sanctions which are compelled by US law;
but would the Secretary be trying to get the four others to follow the US
lead? Would you be exploring other measures? I could go on and on, but
wouldn't the record suggest that you can't depend on either India or
Pakistan to respond to moral appeals - that you have to use something
stronger than that?
MR. RUBIN: The short answer is no. The purpose of the meeting is to
develop a coordinated strategy. We have a near term problem and we have a
longer term problem. The near term problem is how do we prevent a further
escalation of tension; a further ratcheting up of the nuclear arms race in
India and Pakistan. We want to discuss ways each of the countries can work
together and by themselves to prompt the countries in the region to avoid
further provocative steps, including additional missile and nuclear tests,
inflammatory rhetoric, and additional military activity of more a
conventional type.
Secondly, we want to look at the long term, and the long term is to try to
avoid a regional nuclear and missile arms race and, relatedly, to deal with
the underlying political issues between India and Pakistan, including
Kashmir, that have caused conflict between these two countries before and
now, in the aftermath of their nuclear testing, raised the frightening
prospect of conflict that would be of a different character.
So we want to dramatize the situation; we want to get an agreement about
how serious it is; we want to get a coordinated strategy. Each country is
going to have its own influence that it can bring to bear.
With respect to your sanctions question, just as it is true that Pakistan
did not respond to moral appeals, India did not respond to moral appeals,
they didn't respond to the threat of sanctions. It's clear that what we
need to do now is to prevent the situation from getting worse. The way to
do that is, beginning with the five major powers and expanding the group as
appropriate in coming days and weeks, to try to bring to bear each
country's unique influence and expertise.
Relatedly, and the reason why the five are so important, is because we want
to make sure that the international non-proliferation regime that has been
set back by these events does not get set back further. In saying that,
let's all bear in mind that as bad as it is in the Subcontinent, as bad as
it is in South Asia, as serious as the decisions by India and Pakistan
were, in recent years the trend has been the other way. Brazil and
Argentina have forsworn nuclear weapons and gone the other way; South
Africa, given them up and joined the NPT; North Korea, its program frozen
under IAEA safeguards; Iraq, its program eliminated, as best as we can
tell, by the IAEA.
So the trend, even amongst countries of concern, has been in the other
direction, and we don't want to see India and Pakistan's decisions lead to
any unraveling of the determination of the world to move away from the
nuclear arms race, rather than towards one.
QUESTION: A quick follow-up - Kashmir. I think two wars have been fought
over Kashmir. The problem didn't surface just yesterday. It hasn't yielded
to all efforts until now. Is the US going into this meeting with any new
ideas how to plebiscite or whatever to resolve the issue of the portion of
Kashmir that is under Indian territorial control?
MR. RUBIN: The short answer to the question is, today is Monday, the
meeting is Thursday. What we do want to do is to make clear to the parties
- the Indians and the
Pakistanis - that the combination of the political tensions, including over
Kashmir, with the nuclear testing that has occurred is a volatile
combination and that it's time to get on with resolving this problem. In
terms of America or other countries' specific ideas for how to do so, I'd
prefer to defer on that.
QUESTION: I have just one clarification and then another question. Your
comments on sanctions suggest to me - and correct me if I'm wrong - that
even though the United States was forced by law to impose sanctions on
India and Pakistan, you really now don't see them as a very viable tool in
this context.
MR. RUBIN: On the contrary. What I think I was trying to say is the
following. The message that these sanctions sent to other countries in the
world who might be considering such a step are profound. India and Pakistan
will suffer economically and politically from their decisions, and I think
anyone who examines this will see that. At the same time, in the case of
India and Pakistan, the prospect of the sanctions overwhelmingly did not
have the desired effect because of the overwhelming political pressure, at
least in the case of Pakistan, that Prime Minister Sharif faced.
So what I am saying is that yes, sanctions are an important tool in the
fight against non-proliferation; but one has to realize when they didn't
work. And they obviously didn't work in convincing India and Pakistan not
to test. So what we are trying to do is make sure that the rest of the
world understands India and Pakistan will pay a heavy price for their
decisions -- decisions we think were wrong, decisions that did not advance
their security, that set their security back, decisions that will now set
back their economic security and their political legitimacy in the world
greatly.
At the same time, other countries have different views about sanctions, and
this meeting, in answer to Barry's question, is not an attempt - let me
emphasize the word - not an attempt to gather support from China, France,
Russia and the UK for the draconian sanctions the United States has
imposed.
QUESTION: As you proceed on a strategy to try to defuse the situation, is
the United States giving any thought to accelerating START III
negotiations, essentially skipping over - the Russians have stymied START
II approval in the Duma, now put it off until the fall. Given the urgency
of this situation, might you accelerate START III negotiations to
demonstrate a new commitment of the nuclear powers to disarmament?
MR. RUBIN: Underlying the impeccable logic of that question is the view
that somehow the decisions of the international community, or rather the
decisions of the US and Russia and China and Britain and France to not go
as quickly in nuclear disarmament as others would like, was relevant to
India and Pakistan's decision to test. We reject that argument
categorically.
As a result of policies of President Reagan, President Bush and President
Clinton, the nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia has
been stopped, turned around, and there have been dramatic reductions in the
numbers of nuclear weapons deployed, the number of delivery vehicles
deployed. Every trend has been in the opposite direction -- cut in half;
when START II is ratified, I think it goes up to 70 percent, 80 percent.
This was not a reason, this was an excuse on the part of India and
Pakistan. So therefore, the speeding up of our disarmament process is not
going to change the mind of India and Pakistan any more than sanctions
changed their mind. These two countries had a unique regional dynamic at
play, and they made this decision, which we think was profoundly wrong.
Secondly, with respect to START II, we don't think it's stymied. It's on
the agenda. President Yeltsin made clear to President Clinton that he
believes START II will be passed. We believe that as President Yeltsin and
his team make the case for START II ratification, and if the Duma puts its
national interest first, as we would expect all parliaments to do, START II
will be ratified and we can move quickly on with negotiations and hopefully
agreement on a START III package.
QUESTION: Jamie, what do you draw from the fact that the first Foreign
Minister to visit Pakistan after the test was from Iran? And in a broader
sense, what is the impact on the Middle East and the Middle East peace
process and Israel's nuclear program to the fact that there is now an
Islamic bomb?
MR. RUBIN: None.
QUESTION: I'm sorry, can you answer the first question?
MR. RUBIN: Look, people can, because they want to make comments, find
unrelated issues to talk about. We don't see why the fact that India and
Pakistan, who live in South Asia, not the Middle East, having made regional
decisions that we think were wrong necessarily means that the rest of the
world is going to be affected by that unless countries in the rest of the
world change their views. We believe, as I answered in the question
earlier, that the trend in the world is against proliferation; the trend is
against developing nuclear weapons. Whether it's Brazil, Argentina, South
Africa, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus, the freezing of the North Korean
nuclear weapons, the disarmament of Iraq's nuclear program -- these are the
powerful trends that are occurring in the world. India and Pakistan's
regional dynamic needn't have any affect on other countries' decisions.
With respect to Iran, we've made very clear our views on Iran and very
clear our concerns about Iranian attempts to develop weapons of mass
destruction programs. Our policies and practices are going to remain the
same. With respect to visits, who got there first is not so important as
what the policies of the two countries are. We will have to wait and see
what the results are. We have, at this point, no reason to believe Pakistan
is now about to transfer any of its capability to other countries. So the
timing of visits seems less important to us than the policies and
substantive practices of countries.
QUESTION: Okay, just so I understand, the Clinton Administration's view
of the broader proliferation question here is that India and Pakistan's
test have no impact on the worldwide proliferation landscape.
MR. RUBIN: I don't see how anyone who's been listening to me for the last
15 minutes could draw that conclusion. No, that is not our position.
Our position is that we are gathering as one of the stated purposes of this
meeting, the shoring up and locking in of the global non-proliferation
regime. I stated that as one of the purposes of the meeting of the
permanent members. If we had no concern about this, that wouldn't one of
the stated purposes of the meeting.
If somebody wants to make a direct linkage that we can't see, I hope that
when I rebut that linkage, that is not perceived as a lack of concern about
the potential damage to the non-proliferation regime that has occurred as a
result of India and Pakistan's decisions.
With respect to the Middle East, the Middle East dynamic is primarily
driven by Iran and Iraq in a regional security context, by the peace
process in terms of the Israelis-the Palestinians, the Israelis-the
Egyptians, the Israelis-the Syrians. Those are the driving dynamics in the
Middle East.
Again, with respect to Iran's pursuit of a weapons of mass destruction
program, our views are very clear. We've been taking very concrete steps to
try to stop that. The fact that we don't see a direct linkage doesn't mean
that we're not concerned about the problem.
QUESTION: There's reports that the Pakistanis believed that they were
about to be bombed by Israel and India together, and that was one of the
reasons they hurried up a couple of tests. But they were seriously enough
concerned about this that they were calling Washington to talk about
this. I'm not even getting into the question of whether or not this
cooperation or alleged strike was true or not. I'm just asking whether or
not the Pakistanis were so - if I can use the expression - freaked out by
the possibility that they approached the United States to ask you to
intervene. If so, what does that say for the kind of responsibility that's
putting its finger on the nuclear button at this point?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this. We were aware of statements made by Pakistani
officials about this scenario. We had no information about this
scenario. We have no information that it was ever a realistic danger. So
therefore to the extent that people cried wolf about a particular threat,
their credibility has been damaged.
QUESTION: If I could just follow up. Was this faulty intelligence, lack
of intelligence or hysteria?
MR. RUBIN: You gave me my out. I certainly couldn't comment about
intelligence.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: A couple of specific questions. On this meeting Thursday, will
anybody from India and Pakistan be invited?
MR. RUBIN: Not to my knowledge, no, it's just the five.
QUESTION: And when will anybody in this building see this delegation from
Pakistan which has now arrived?
MR. RUBIN: Assistant Secretary Inderfurth will be meeting with that
delegation this afternoon.
QUESTION: Anybody else?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of any other meetings.
QUESTION: Jamie, a line of argument surfaced over the weekend that I'd
like you to address about the relationship between the Pakistani test and
the CTBT. The line of argument goes to the effect that what the Pakistanis
have done is demonstrate that it's entirely possible to produce nuclear
weapons without testing; and therefore, the treaty is automatically of
diminished or minimal value, so why should we bind ourselves by it?
MR. RUBIN: The short answer to this question is, no one treaty is a
panacea for a problem as complex as nuclear non-proliferation. However, the
Pakistanis and the Indians obviously desperately wanted to test the weapons
that they had been working on. So the idea that not testing is a sufficient
confidence for one to have a deterrent or a deployed system is simply
incorrect. Despite the threat of sanctions, despite the very real impact of
sanctions, despite the opprobrium from every country in the world, Pakistan
and India desperately wanted to test their weapons.
So obviously it's important to test these weapons if you're going to have
anything resembling a nuclear program. And so therefore, a ban on testing
puts a powerful crimp in anybody's nuclear style. For them to try to
develop a nuclear program without testing, obviously for Pakistan and
India, was not possible because they wanted to test. The CTBT would've
prohibited such tests. So whatever additional danger exists -- and we
believe it's serious -- would not have existed if India and Pakistan had
been members of the CTBT and not tested.
If you go around the world and you look at countries you're concerned about
and you want to prevent them from developing a viable nuclear capability,
you don't want them to test. Therefore, if you want to prevent countries
from going nuclear in any serious way, you want to have them commit not to
test.
QUESTION: At the risk of boring my colleagues, I'd like to belabor this
with one follow-up, please.
MR. RUBIN: Okay - I wasn't fully persuasive?
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Pakistan and India chose to test in underground facilities in a
controlled environment. They could have chosen to test on each other, so to
speak. I don't follow the argument that you have to test in order to have a
deployable weapons program.
MR. RUBIN: I didn't say that it's a perfect solution. What I'm suggesting
is there are many different tools one has to try to deter proliferation. A
powerful tool is the Comprehensive Test Ban. Another powerful tool is a
cut-off in fissile material production; another powerful tool is monitoring
by the IAEA of civilian nuclear power facilities so that material can't be
developed which then could be put together in a weaponized system. A fourth
powerful tool is our own national means for determining what's going on and
hopefully bringing to bear the views of the international community.
There's no one panacea to the nuclear problem, but clearly they wanted to
test, clearly testing was excruciatingly important to them because they're
prepared to withstand excruciating pain economically, and the reports out
of Pakistan make that quite clear. So it is an important piece of the
puzzle, but it isn't the whole puzzle.
QUESTION: There was a suggestion in an interview, apparently with Chirac
by Hoagland this weekend that the French have proposed to the perm five
that perhaps you offer access to nuclear energy technology and facilities
to India and Pakistan as a way to get them into the CTBT and into a regime
of some sort. Is this being discussed? Do you see this as a credible --
MR. RUBIN: We haven't heard anything directly from the French Government
on that particular idea. Without pre-empting what is going to occur on
Thursday -- and we want to be able to have a discussion with other
countries as best as we can to try to develop a coordinated strategy --
there are two principles that will guide us in this area. The first
principle is to try to insure that the threat of miscalculation,
misunderstanding and inherent danger that comes with nuclear weapons is not
combined with the inherent danger of war between India and Pakistan.
In other words, we want to look at a confidence-building process so that
India and Pakistan don't make a mistake and unintentionally escalate to
some sort of conflict. That's a serious risk. I don't want to exaggerate
it, but it is serious.
On the other hand, we would not want to pursue practices that by their very
nature advance, encourage, legitimize or support the pursuit of nuclear
weapons programs by either of the two countries. So on the one hand, we
want to help them avoid this spinning out of control; on the other hand, we
do not want to legitimize any nuclear programs. There have been various
proposals bandied about. I'm usually asked about them, and I wasn't
today. Those are the two principles that will guide us.
But with respect to your specific question, we have not heard that, to my
knowledge, from the French. But again, we're looking forward to having a
discussion with them.
QUESTION: Jamie, one other technical issue. Does the United States now
have confirmation that there were, in fact, six Pakistani tests?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think we've made it a practice of confirming numbers
of tests in either the case of India or Pakistan; other than to say that
they have made certain claims and our analysts are assessing them. But
clearly, nuclear tests took place.
QUESTION: As the United States is pressuring India and Pakistan to cease
their nuclear testing and sign, among other things, and perhaps sign on
board to the CTBT, as many senators, I'm sure you're aware of, this weekend
pointed out, wouldn't it bring more weight to your argument in the
Secretary's meeting if the United States would speed up their actions in
maybe signing the Test Ban Treaty?
MR. RUBIN: I would certainly agree with any senator who believed that
early ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban would assist us in our
fight to prevent the threat of spreading nuclear weapons.
The key there is to get the senators to move on it. There's been a treaty
that we want to see movement on, and the more the senators believe the
argument you just articulated, the more I hope they put pressure on their
colleagues to at least consider the treaty and make the case for and
against and then, hopefully, in our view, the decision will be to advise
and consent.
But we certainly want to see action on the CTBT as soon as possible.
QUESTION: Do you agree it would give your argument, during this crisis,
more weight?
MR. RUBIN: Absolutely. Our hand would be strengthened if we ratified the
CTBT.
QUESTION: Jamie, over the last few days there's been sort of a steady
drumbeat of charges from the Middle East that the United States -- the
West, in fact -- has a double standard towards Israel's alleged nuclear
program. Can you address that in any way?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say that with respect to Israel, we can note the
Israeli Government's statements that they will not be the first to
introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.
Secondly, we have made clear our support for a process leading to making
the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including
nuclear weapons. But as a practical matter, that will have to be
accompanied by real progress toward a just and lasting and comprehensive
peace in the Middle East. That's what we want to see happen. We want a
peace process that leads to greater security that will allow all the
countries of the region to support a zone free of weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear weapons.
Beyond that, I can point to the fact that Israel has signed the CTBT and, I
believe, ratified the CTBT as well.
QUESTION: To take you back to the Balkans, emissary of President Clinton
for Cyprus and Bosnia, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke on May 26 in an
interview for Reuters, discussing the conflict in Kosovo and mentioning the
scenario of spreading the conflict. In particular, he quoted Bulgaria might
decide to grab a piece of Macedonia. This statement brought a very negative
set of responses in Bulgaria. Could you comment on this statement?
MR. RUBIN: Well, Richard Holbrooke is a fine analyst, and in this regard
we have long talked about the dangers of conflict in Kosovo spinning out of
control. But in that particular reflection, he was speaking for himself.
QUESTION: What can you tell us about the Nazi gold report?
QUESTION: Can we just stay on the Balkans for one second? There are
refugees streaming by the hundreds, if not perhaps over 1,000 by now, into
Albania from Kosovo. There appears to be a lot of violence, a lot of
bloodshed at the moment. Any comment?
MR. RUBIN: We are deeply concerned by the reports of increased fighting
in Kosovo over the weekend. We are trying to confirm the details, including
the number of casualties, reports of executions and the number of refugees
moving into Albania. Unfortunately, key areas have been closed to
international aid workers, diplomats and the media. This action goes
against President Milosevic's stated commitment to ensure open access.
Those responsible for committing atrocities should bear in mind that the
International War Crimes Tribunal has already opened an investigation to
determine whether indictable offenses may have occurred during previous
attacks in Kosovo. We are unable to confirm the details of many of these
reports, and we are trying to get access by international observers and
embassy personnel as soon as possible.
Clearly, the situation has deteriorated dramatically, and that is why
Secretary Albright met with Mr. Rugova on Saturday, why the President met
with him on Friday, why NATO began planning for various contingencies in
the event that it's necessary to consider preventive deployments of some
kind. So we are very concerned by the situation there. We are deeply
engaged in the crisis; it was our efforts that got a dialogue
started. Ambassador Hill remains with good proximity to both parties for
helping out as needed.
But the bottom line is we think there has to be a political solution which
provides an enhanced status for Kosovo, preserves the territorial integrity
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and safeguards the human and civil
rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo, whatever their ethnic
origin. President Milosevic has special responsibility to ensure that steps
are taken to achieve a peaceful solution in Kosovo, and we urge concrete
measures to lower tension and stop the threat of violence.
Our understanding is that the next meeting is scheduled for June 5 between
the delegations; and during his discussions with Administration officials,
Dr. Rugova indicated his readiness to engage in continuous talks given the
urgency of the situation. So we hope that a political solution can be found
through such continuous discussions, and it's time for the negotiating
process to move directly to substantive issues that can produce real
changes on the ground.
QUESTION: One other thing. The Albanian leader - the leader of Albania is
now calling on NATO to put troops along the border to stabilize the
situation. Given the deterioration of the last few days, are you any closer
to coming out in favor of that?
MR. RUBIN: As I think you're aware, NATO made some decisions last week
when Secretary Albright was there for the North Atlantic Council Meeting to
engage in planning, and that planning is ongoing. But beyond referring you
to that planning, I have no further comment.
QUESTION: Do you feel now that you may have been snookered by Milosevic
into - who has agreed to enter into talks while the international community
agrees not to impose an assets freeze on him, and yet the talks are going
nowhere?
MR. RUBIN: Let me start by saying that no, we don't believe that
happened. Secondly, we believe that the way to solve this problem is at the
negotiating table, not at the battlefield. Prior to this effort by
Ambassador Holbrooke and Ambassador Gelbard, there was no negotiating
table. So you have to start building a negotiating peace by building the
table first. Now there is a table and that process has begun.
At the same time, we had no illusions that this was going to be an
instantly successful solution. I think if you look to the comments that we
made here from this podium and that the President made in Europe when the
announcement was made, and what Ambassadors Holbrooke and Gelbard said at
the time is we recognize that this was only a very small first step.
With respect to the asset freeze, let me make clear, as Secretary Albright
made clear in Luxembourg, that this can be reversed very quickly.
QUESTION: Nazi gold?
MR. RUBIN: Oh, you asked me about Nazi gold, then we'll go over
there. Nazi gold. There have been some preliminary reports that are
premature because they were based on early drafts of the report. Those
early drafts were outdated and incomplete, so there are significant
inaccuracies as a result of reports based on old material.
The report has undergone significant revisions and Under Secretary
Eizenstat will present in full the findings and major conclusions of the
complete final report at a briefing tomorrow.
QUESTION: Can we do some specifics, maybe? Have US Government historians
concluded that much of the looted wealth was routed through Switzerland to
pay other neutral nations for vital supplies that sustained Hitler?
MR. RUBIN: We have a process by which the reports final conclusions are
being put together, prepared and briefed to relevant governments in time
for Under Secretary Eizenstat to brief on this report for all of you
tomorrow. What I can say is that, in general, the basic elements of the
stories that you've seen about this report were, according to Under
Secretary Eizenstat, inaccurate because they were relying in whole or in
part on old, outdated conclusions.
And so I am not going to be in a position, as I understand your motivation,
to go paragraph by paragraph down particular news reports to decide which
was old and which was new, which was misleading in part or misleading in
whole, other than to say to you that we are going to try to get you the
information from the final, complete, proper, comprehensive, not misleading
report as soon as we possibly can.
QUESTION: Well, they said that you say that there were significant
revisions. Does that suggest, then, that there was great debate within this
Administration on --
MR. RUBIN: I think as we are prepared to talk about the report's final
conclusions and you were to pose legitimate questions about why a
particular wording ended up one way if an original draft was another way,
then perhaps you would be in a position to get a considered and thoughtful
answer to that question.
QUESTION: Are you satisfied with Switerland's response to this issue?
There have been some decisions in the last few days.
MR. RUBIN: Generally speaking, yes. Again, I would like to say that
they've taken some steps to try to come to grips with this issue in recent
weeks and months that we've been supportive of. But with respect to where
do we go from here as a result of this new report, I hope you could pose
those legitimate questions to Under Secretary Eizenstat when he's in a
position to brief on the report.
QUESTION: Last week, I believe Secretary Albright met with Turkish and
Greek Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg. Could you please comment on the
reports that Secretary Albright proposed Madrid-like new set of principles
or a new --
MR. RUBIN: Proposed what?
QUESTION: Proposed Madrid --
MR. RUBIN: Madrid-like?
QUESTION: Yes, Madrid-like principles and a new platform between the two
countries. Could you comment on it?
MR. RUBIN: What I can say about the meeting is the Secretary had a useful
exchange of views with each Foreign Minister. They took place, the
meetings, shortly after the conclusion of the sessions in Luxembourg. They
reviewed the results of the meeting and discussed other security
issues. She did not, to my knowledge, engage in a process leading to a
dramatically new solution to this problem. The solution lies in serious
efforts by both governments to come to grips with the issues between them.
QUESTION: Also, Turkey. What is the purpose of some State Department
officials discussing in Defense University some kind of Islamic uprising in
Turkey?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get you an answer for the record on that.
QUESTION: Going back to the initial announcement of travel this week of
the Secretary, can you say anything about travel the following week to the
conference called by the British?
MR. RUBIN: We are aware there was a follow-up meeting discussed, and we
would expect to be there. But I think the key now is to get the major
powers in Geneva to begin this process, and then it lends itself to
expansion and more coordination not just between the major nuclear powers,
but others.
QUESTION: Do you have any comment on the Colombian elections?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say that we note with admiration that the Colombian
people turned out in large numbers to vote in the first round of the
Colombian presidential elections, once again demonstrating their clear
support for their nation's democracy.
Initial reports from Colombia indicate the turnout was large, the balloting
was free and fair, but that there were some attempts by the guerrillas to
disrupt the process. As no candidate obtained over 50 percent of the vote,
there will be a second round on June 21. But we commend the people for
going out at some risk, in certain cases, to stand up for democracy. It's
another sign that the democratic trend in our hemisphere continues.
QUESTION: Jamie, on that subject, do you think both of the men who will
be participating in the run-off are completely clean of the taint of
narco-trafficking, narco-politics in Colombia?
MR. RUBIN: Well, my proposed answer to that says, we have no further
comment to make on the Colombian presidential elections, and then someone
wrote in, "period".
(Laughter.)
QUESTION:A question about Russia and the statement made yesterday by the
Treasury Department and the White House. It sounds like the US is
supporting additional international aid to support Russia through this
economic crisis. However, the till is sort of on the way to running dry at
the IMF because there may not be enough room for additional crises. So what
exactly is the US willing to spend, or what does the US think the IMF
should be willing to spend to help tide Russia over right now?
MR. RUBIN: First of all, let me say that Russian markets were mixed
today; interest rates were slightly lower; and the ruble traded within its
band. The stock market was down some 7 to 10 percent in very light
trading. The past few days have been difficult for Russia, as well as other
emerging markets.
However, Russia's new policy package and agreement with the IMF staff is
the right framework to reassure investors. It puts a sound fiscal strategy
in place to promote a stable ruble. Prime Minister Kiriyenko and his
economic team met with a dozen or so investment banks. This pro-active
approach to implementing their economic strategy and explaining it to the
investment community is a good sign that the Russian Government is
seriously committed to restoring confidence and stability to the Russian
market.
President Clinton yesterday added that the United States endorses
additional conditional financial support from the international financial
institutions as necessary to promote stability, structural reforms and
growth in Russia.
There is an active dialogue now ongoing between US officials, officials
from other G-7 countries, international financial institutions to look at
further reforms that will be necessary, what financial needs there are in
light of the current market conditions. So there's an active assessment
process ongoing. As President Clinton made clear, the action would be
through the multilateral system.
The short answer to your question is that the more support Congress gives
the IMF, as we've been seeking, the more support we can give to the kind of
growing market around the world that will redown to the advantage of the
American people, allowing our exports to be sold, our imports to be cheaper
and helping to fuel what has been a remarkable period in the economic life
of the United States. With each day that that doesn't happen by the
Congress, it's harder for us to advance the interests of the American
people economically.
As far as any specific numbers are concerned, that's premature.
QUESTION: Would some additional assistance be difficult to obtain right
now, given the deadlock in Congress?
MR. RUBIN: As far as exactly how the IMF's current financial structure
is, that's something I would refer you to the IMF and the Treasury
Department to answer.
QUESTION: Can I go back to India-Pakistan, and ask if, in the judgment of
the State Department, India or Pakistan or both are getting in position to
deploy nuclear weapons?
MR. RUBIN: Let me try to get you an answer for the record. We have made
clear that we do not want to see India or Pakistan weaponize their
ballistic missiles for use with weapons of mass destruction. Our exact
assessment of what their current status is, I would have to try to get you
for the record.
QUESTION: Are their statements to be believed, given the track record of
India and Pakistan now on testing?
MR. RUBIN: Which statements?
QUESTION: Well, their various statements on their intentions.
MR. RUBIN: As I understand it, the Pakistani officials have indicated
that, in particular, their nuclear scientist, Mr. Kahn, announced that
Pakistan had recalled missile systems deployed to forward positions on May
27. We are not in a position to confirm Mr. Kahn's statement, but we
strongly urge Pakistan and India to take positive steps to diminish
tensions and not undertake to weaponize or deploy ballistic missiles.
As far as what our assessment of what's going on is, I'm going to - if at
all - try to get that for you for the record.
QUESTION: You took all my questions. Back on the subject of
deployment. Henry Kissinger, several nights ago, suggested or recommended
that the United States immediately act with India, act with Pakistan, reach
out diplomatically and ask them to delay or just defer deployment of their
nuclear weapons, back to what Barry was saying. Is the United States
currently actively asking those two countries to stand down as far as --
MR. RUBIN: Believe it or not, even prior to Dr. Kissinger offering those
views on national television, we had thought of it. We made clear in a
series of demarches to the governments in India and Pakistan the importance
of not taking any further provocative or escalatory step. And I believe
from this podium several times last week and the week before that, I
indicated that one of our desiderata, our goals, was to see that Pakistan
did not weaponize or deploy ballistic missiles.
QUESTION: Have they responded in any way you can reveal?
MR. RUBIN: I think the best answer I can give you is the one I gave is
the one I gave to Mr. Schweid, which is that we've made clear what our
views are; we've taken note of what certain Pakistani officials have
said. To the extent we are going to give you an assessment of where we
think they stand militarily in terms of capability of their forces, I will
have to try to get for the record.
QUESTION: And the Indians-- no information on them?
MR. RUBIN: We would have the same view on India as we do on Pakistan.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 2:10 P.M.)
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