U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #59, 98-05-13

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U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Wednesday, May 13, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

SERBIA (KOSOVO)
1		Secretary's Statement Welcoming May 15 Milosevic-Rugova Mtg
		  in Belgrade
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
1,4		Secretary's Meeting Today with Israeli Prime Minister
		  Netanyahu / Minister Sharon Participation
1		Recap of Secretary's May 12 Speech at National Press Club
		  re US Involvement
1-2		Marrying Additional Steps with Accelerated Permanent Status
		  Talks
2-3		Israeli Needs & US Ideas / Efforts to Get Back On Track
3		US Role
3		Delays and Stalls / Hard Decisions To Be Made
4,15		US Expectations from Meeting / Public Remarks After Meeting
		  / Readout by US
INDIA / PAKISTAN
4		Another Round of Nuclear Tests in India
4-5,7,8-9,16	Sanctions: US Imposition / Costs & Categories / Time Table
		  / Impact on US Businesses in India / Pending Projects /
		  Affect on Military Sales
4		US Contacts: Pakistan, China / International Reaction to
		  Tests
5-6,7-8		Pres Clinton's Call to Pakistani PM / Dep Secy Talbott
		  Leads US Mission to Pakistan / No US Mission to India
6,8		Similar Sanctions Against Pakistan / Security Guarantees
		  for Pakistan
7		Nuclear Capabilities
9,11		Congressional Criticism of US Response and of Tests and US
		  Contacts / Future Tests by India
9-10		Nonproliferation Issues Discussed With India and Pakistan /
		  No Advance Warning
11		Signature to CTBT
11		Possibility of Nuclear Tests by Other Nuclear Powers
NORTH KOREA
12-13		Nuclear Reactor Remains Sealed / Maintenance Continues
		  Under IAEA Observation /US & KEDO Fulfilling Obligations
		  Under Agreed Framework / Funding Discussions Continue 
15,16		Contact with US re Delay / Three-Way Policing of DMZ
INDONESIA
13-14		Use of Force Against Demonstrators / Political Situation
		  Deteriorating / US View of Pres Soeharto / Human Rights &
		  National Interest
TURKEY
14		Attack on Human Rights Activist Birdal / Claim of
		  Responsibility
ILSA
14		No Decision
CUBA
14-15		Easing Sanctions
CYPRUS
15		Greek Dep FM Remarks re Restarting Talks
TURKEY
15		EU Membership Not Objected to by Greece

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #59

WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 1998, 1:30 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Let me start by saying that we're going to have a statement posted shortly by Secretary Albright, welcoming the announcement from Belgrade that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President Milosevic and Kosovo Albanian leader Rugova have agreed to meet in Belgrade on May 15.

Secondly, let me say that Secretary Albright has just left the building to begin her meetings - I guess they will start about 1:30 p.m., in ten minutes - with Prime Minister Netanyahu. And with that, let me go to your questions.

Barry.

If you guys can decide who's sitting where, it would be really helpful. (Laughter).

QUESTION: Oh, no, no, I'm leaving right after you tell me - (inaudible) - or are you going to wait until the meeting --

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say this - obviously, the Secretary laid out in great detail yesterday at the National Press Club the extraordinary efforts the United States has made in trying to bring peace to the Middle East, trying to bring the peace process - put it back on track. She laid out in some detail what we've done, the efforts we've made and the fact that, frankly, our ideas meet and are virtually identical with the essential elements of the desires of the Prime Minister of Israel - namely, that we move to an accelerated permanent status talks, rather than waiting for all the interim steps to be taken. Secondly, that they require Chairman Arafat to move substantially down from the amount of land that he was looking to have redeployed to Palestinian control. And, thirdly, that the redeployment takes place in parallel with an infrastructure to fight terrorism, and that is reciprocal and that is to occur in parallel with the further redeployments.

So we have taken extraordinary steps to try to meet the needs of the Israeli Government, and that is why we have put together our set of ideas. Obviously, Chairman Arafat has agreed in principle to them; and Secretary Albright's focus today will be to try to overcome the differences that remain in terms of the Israeli view, and try to see whether, with some creativity that we hope she can bring to bear and by having this additional meeting, that we can get ourselves into a position where we can do what Prime Minister Netanyahu has wanted - which is launch, as soon as possible, the permanent status talks.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - that can be important, too. And unless I'm mistaken, in her very lengthy and detailed description of US policy - and this goes to a question I keep asking, and you know why we keep asking - she did not say that the US expects Israel to carry out interim arrangements, even if and when you start final status talks right away, you hope. You just sort of refer to it without taking all the interim steps. So let me ask you what I've been asking all along. Is it still the US position - she reiterated the Christopher letter stands - is it still the US position that Israel is obliged to carry out withdrawals, indeed, territorial limitations of their choosing, but they're obliged to carry out more phased withdrawals; or is that subsumed by going to final status talks?

MR. RUBIN: Let me answer the question this way, Barry. The Secretary is engaged in a discussion right now about how to marry the interim accords - the additional steps necessary with accelerated permanent status talks. We, as she said yesterday, stand by Secretary Christopher's letter from last year, in which we made clear that the decision on what territory should be transferred is Israel's to make.

However, as you can surmise from the ideas that we've put forward, we believe that in order to put the peace process back on track, it is important to take into account the views of the other party. With respect to the third redeployment, which I gather is what you're asking me about, all I can say is we stand by the letter. Obviously this is one of the issues that's under discussion, that is part and parcel of the ideas and that would be something that they are going to talk about and have talked about; but I would not regard it as the principal obstacle to reaching an agreement.

QUESTION: You talk about and the Secretary spoke about this at length yesterday - about the extraordinary efforts that you put into recognizing Israel's needs; but at the same time, do you get a sense that they're ignoring your ideas? I mean, the meeting was sort of pushed by the wayside by the Israelis and you put a lot of energies into taking their considerations into account. Is there any sense that they're ignoring your ideas?

MR. RUBIN: You mean blowing us off, or something like that, as you suggested yesterday? We've decided we may rename you the Sam Donaldson of the State Department press corps in your effort to try to get us to say something outrageous, which we will not do here at the State Department podium. Let me say this.

QUESTION: You just did.

(Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: What? Something outrageous? Well, it was more in the mode of the questioning rather than anything else, because there's nothing about you and Sam Donaldson that resemble each other.

(Laughter.)

Let me say this -- we do not believe Israel is ignoring the US ideas. We believe that Israel is engaged in an effort to discuss with us a way to put the peace process back on track and that involves a series of very intensive discussions; it involves a lot of creativity; it obviously involves a lot of meetings, a lot of phone calls, extraordinary lengths taken by Secretary Albright and Ambassador Ross in traveling back and forth across the Atlantic and taking calls in the middle of the night and trying to do everything we can do to get the parties to yes. That doesn't mean that we, as an ally and friend of Israel, are not occasionally going to have disagreements about what's required to get to yes. But that, at the same time, doesn't mean that we believe they're ignoring our ideas.

QUESTION: She seemed very frustrated - there was a sense of frustration in her voice, for obvious reasons because things, as she said, things are taking - they're being dragged out, she seemed to suggest. And she said that this couldn't go on indefinitely, and the role of the US is somewhat tarnished if we allow this to keep spinning out and dragging out. Is there ever going to be a time - I know she said that she wasn't going to ever stop working on this -- but that the US would take a lower profile or take a break.

MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't want to prejudge what any potential re- examination of our role would be. I think what I can say is that this phase of our efforts is rapidly drawing to a close, and that it can only go on so long before one can conclude that no matter how creative or how much effort is made, that this particular approach is not going to work.

We have not reached that point. I can say that we're rapidly reaching it, and that should be evident from what Secretary Albright said in London and what she said yesterday. But today's meeting is a chance for the process to be put back on track for the kinds of discussions to take place that will give us confidence that we can get to yes and get the agreement to launch the permanent status talks and implement additional steps from the Oslo accords.

QUESTION: Jamie, there's been a lot of use of the word "delay" and "stall." Do you think the Israelis are delaying and stalling this process - delaying and stalling in consideration of your ideas, as the Secretary made pretty clear yesterday and the President, in a little more ambiguous way, said today?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't think there was much difference between what the Secretary said and what the President said, and there rarely is. Let me say this - what Secretary Albright and the President are indicating is that additional meetings, additional discussions and additional procedural devices only go so far; and that ultimately these are substantive judgments, political judgments that have to be made. At some point, we may conclude that there is a desire to meet for meeting's sake, rather than meet for substance's stake.

I'm not going to characterize anything further with respect to any particular leader at this time. The meeting is about to start in two minutes. Our goal is to have the meeting succeed. We're not interested in some feel-good confrontation; we're interested in getting the two parties to yes so that the dangers of a collapse of the Middle East peace process don't occur.

QUESTION: And also, with Minister Sharon refusing to join this meeting, how do you read that sign? Is it a hopeful sign or does it cause you to downgrade your expectations, if you had any, for this meeting?

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say this - as a matter of practice, I don't think it's useful for us to make comments about the internal machinations in the Israeli Government. For one thing, there are quite a few of them; so obviously, we would be in a position to have to do that a lot. I don't think it's appropriate for us to comment every time something happens.

With respect to our expectations from this meeting, it's hard to be overly optimistic, given the history. On the other hand, Secretary Albright said that she had a very good talk with him, in agreeing in their discussion earlier in the week in which this meeting was set up. So I can say that given that discussion, we remain hopeful.

QUESTION: Jamie, a procedural question - are you or she planning a statement after this afternoon's meeting?

MR. RUBIN: I have no information on press arrangements. Again, the purpose of these meetings is to try to get progress; and sometimes progress is not enhanced by public discussion of it. So I can't assure you there will be any particular discussion publicly after this meeting.

QUESTION: Another subject - on India, there's now been another round of Indian tests. What do you make of that? Do you have any confidence that this will be the end of it?

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say this - obviously the additional announcement by India of these tests is stunning. And given the international condemnation that came in the last 24 hours, it's really impossible to fathom what the Indian Government thinks the result of another set of tests would be.

As you know, President Clinton announced in Europe that he was going to impose a set of sanctions that will have a profound effect on the US-Indian relationship. The scope of these sanctions is very significant. President Clinton also spoke to Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan, I guess, in the middle of last night. They had a good discussion. He explained the importance of restraint.

Secretary Albright just recently spoke to the Foreign Minister of China about urging the Pakistanis to not respond with nuclear tests of their own. What I can say is that we deeply deplore this second set of tests and they're unfathomable. The sanctions that are now going to be imposed will have a profound effect on our relations with India. It's hard to give you an exact number at this time, but I can say that the international reaction has been rather dramatic. Japan, the largest bilateral donor of economic assistance, has denounced the tests. China expressed its grave concern. Japan also announced it would consider the suspension of its aid. Malaysia deplored the action. President Yeltsin condemned the tests. Ukraine invoked the memory of Chernobyl. Canada's Foreign Minister called these tests a major step backwards. Australia and New Zealand have lodged official protests.

The sanctions that are now in place are going to pose very stiff penalties on the government -- they're going to involve very stiff penalties on the government of India, including development assistance, military sales and exchanges, trade and dual-use technology, US loan guarantees. The requirement for the United States to oppose loans and assistance in the international financial institutions could potentially cost India billions of dollars in desperately needed financing for infrastructure and other projects. The prohibition on loans by US banks to the government of India and on Ex-Im and OPIC activities could cost hundreds of millions of dollars, affect projects already approved and could cause major US companies and financial institutions to rethink entirely their presence and operations in India.

So clearly, India has made a grave mistake that will redown to its disadvantage for a long, long time to come.

QUESTION: A technical question and then I have some more substantive questions.

MR. RUBIN: We'll just leave the floor with you for a while then, Carol.

QUESTION: Do these sanctions take effect immediately?

MR. RUBIN: Well, the decision has been made to impose them. We are now running through the traps of suspending all of the activities that I described to you. I think the short answer to your question is that they do take effect immediately. But I must say that what you need to bear in mind is that this is a new law that has never been used. We are entering new territory - this has never happened before where in one fell swoop a whole set of bilateral activities and multilateral support is going to be cut off.

There are a lot of questions about what's in the pipeline and what's not. We have made some preliminary examinations of what this would involve and obviously there's an exception for humanitarian items, but I can run through some of the general categories of numbers with you. But clearly, this is a major, major set of sanctions that will sting for a long, long time to come.

QUESTION: Did the President get an assurance from Pakistan that it would not test?

MR. RUBIN: Let me say this -- the President had a very constructive discussion with the Prime Minister of Pakistan; and as a result of that discussion, a mission is going to be sent to Pakistan, headed by Deputy Secretary Talbott and General Zinni, the Commander in Chief of the regional command. They are going to be leaving this afternoon; they are going to be meeting with the Pakistani Government on Friday. They are obviously going to discuss the question that has now arisen by India's nuclear test and the danger to the region of India's testing program, and will be following up, of course, on the President's urging of restraint on the Pakistani Government.

That mission is going to be leaving later this afternoon, and they will be working closely with the Pakistani Government to try to insure that this unfathomable decision by the Indian Government does not spawn a nuclear arms race on the Indian Subcontinent, and that all steps we can take are taken to encourage restraint and to try to stabilize what could be an increasingly dangerous situation.

QUESTION: So the answer to that question right now is no - that despite a direct call from the President of the United States, Pakistan has not given you assurances --

MR. RUBIN: I am not the President's spokesman, and I am not going to get into the habit of confirming specific details of conversations between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Pakistan. I described to you the general nature of the conversation. I am not going to get into any of the details of that conversation other than to say that Deputy Secretary Talbott has been asked by the President and the Secretary to launch this diplomatic mission to Pakistan; they will be leaving later today. At that point, we will then be in a position to give you more information, after they've had some additional discussions. But I would not characterize my answer in the way you did.

QUESTION: Has the United States told Pakistan that it would be subject to sanctions as well? I mean, have you specifically said that?

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say this - the law is rather clear, and I think we have demonstrated that we will implement this law. It's extremely important that India's neighbors not follow the dangerous path that India has taken. The law speaks for itself, and if Pakistan were to take similar steps, the reaction would be much the same.

QUESTION: Given India's --

MR. RUBIN: This is the last one we can give you, before your colleagues think you're dominating the floor.

QUESTION: No, it's not.

QUESTION: Well, other people have done the same on other subjects, so I don't feel that bad.

MR. RUBIN: Well, we're on number ten.

QUESTION: Given India's action, has there been any thought given to the international community sort of saying, okay, India is now, in fact, a member of the nuclear club and trying to approach from that point of view - altering the NPT to include India in it?

MR. RUBIN: At this point, I don't think we are interested in any kind of nuclear embrace with India. What we are doing is imposing stiff penalties on India for this unfathomable decision to move against the increasing understanding in the world that nonproliferation is the wave of the future and that the spread of nuclear weapons doesn't add to anybody's security.

However, let me put this in context by saying that I've seen some rather alarmist and dramatic reporting that strikes me as way out of line with the reality. It has been true for some time that with regard to both India and Pakistan, we have said that we believe that they have an ability to put together a limited number of nuclear weapons in a relatively short amount of time. So I think it would also behoove those talking about this and explaining it to the American public to not get into high drama about the sudden danger that didn't exist yesterday.

Clearly, this threat has existed for some time. It has been dramatized and increased by these tests, but let's not go into a situation where we are exaggerating the change. For many years now, we have said that India and Pakistan have an ability to put together a limited number of nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time. Obviously, India has just done that.

QUESTION: This is a very straightforward question about Commander Zinni. How do you spell his name?

MR. RUBIN: General Zinni, Z-i-n-n-i. He's the regional CINC.

QUESTION: What region is that?

MR. RUBIN: That's Cen-Com, the Central Command.

QUESTION: And what's his first name?

MR. RUBIN: Anthony Zinni.

QUESTION: And on that trip, a couple of questions. Will they be going to India?

MR. RUBIN: No.

QUESTION: They will not. Will anyone be going to India? Will there be an envoy sent to India?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of any at this time.

QUESTION: How about China? China is also regarded as an adversary of the Indians.

MR. RUBIN: I don't think the motivation is to go anywhere there's an adversary of the Indians. I think the motivation is to talk to the Pakistanis about the danger that has been posed to the Subcontinent and the South Asian region by this unfathomable decision by the Indian Government. The mission's sole and exclusive location and - I'm struggling for this word - the only place they're going is Pakistan.

QUESTION: In your effort to prevent Pakistan from following suit, are you considering granting them some sort of security guarantee against Indian attack?

MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard that. I think that obviously we will try to bring home the advantages of not testing, and the disadvantages of testing.

QUESTION: But will you be offering to share, to give a sense of early warning capability? Is there something - having a general there suggests there will be some very detailed --

MR. RUBIN: Right, and I hope that given the extreme seriousness of this situation, that you will bear with us in allowing us to have such discussions with the Pakistani Government before we discuss them publicly.

QUESTION: On the question of sanctions, do you have any more detailed information? And do you have any idea how this will impact US businesses that operate in India?

MR. RUBIN: Well, again, as I said, it will clearly have a profound impact on a number of American businesses that have been operating there. It could cause major US companies and financial institutions to rethink entirely their presence and operations in India. It will affect the US ability to give loans by US banks to the government of India, and could cost hundreds of millions of dollars and affect existing projects.

Let me just say this - with regard to credit and guarantees by any US agency or instrumentality, which is one of the sanctions, there are several million dollars in TDA grants now pending; there are several billion dollars of Ex-Im guarantees that are now pending; there are $10 billion worth of OPIC insurance and financing pending. I'm not saying that each and every one of those projects would necessarily be affected, I'm trying to give you a magnitude that's involved here.

As well, when you look at the international financial institutions, there are some $3.8 billion worth of loan approvals that are coming down the pike in international financial institutions. Again, we don't have a flat veto in every case, but if you see what's going on around the world and you see the fact that Japan and Germany and other countries that are leading players in this area have reacted in much the same way as the United States. I think the Indian Government badly miscalculated the effect of this decision and perhaps thought there would only be a more limited effect from these sweeping penalties that have now been imposed.

QUESTION: Jamie, one more -- the US and India, I believe, are jointly working on a jet fighter together. Do you know if this would be affected?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm not familiar with that particular project; but if we were, I can assure you it would be affected. It certainly terminates all military sales and financing; it terminates licenses from munitions list items, including over $500 million that have either been approved or are scheduled for approval -- there's some million dollars worth of financing and military sales in the pipeline. So these are sweeping, across-the-board sanctions that will have an impact for a long, long time to come.

QUESTION: I guess the sanctions law is the law, but some lawmakers seem to be critical of the Administration's response to this, including Speaker Gingrich --

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: -- on whether they're defending India or defending nuclear explosions or --

MR. RUBIN: Or just generally being critical.

QUESTION: Right. So would you like to respond?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I need a more specific criticism because I certainly know that every day Speaker Gingrich and others find something to criticize. So I need a specific criticism - that we did what?

QUESTION: Just critical of the sharp Administration response and critical of the sanctions.

MR. RUBIN: That he doesn't want them imposed?

QUESTION: Well, I don't have it in front of me, so rather than misquote --

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say this -- whosoever might criticize us from Congress or elsewhere, let me say this - that as soon as these tests occurred, our reaction has been strong and swift. We made clear that we deplored this action; we contacted the relevant governments immediately.

President Clinton, since the decision, Under Secretary Pickering - since the announcement, and Assistant Secretary Inderfurth have met with the Indian Ambassador, they have spoken - Under Secretary Pickering - on the phone with the Indian Foreign Secretary, each day they spoke with the ambassador; President Clinton telephoned the Pakistani Prime Minister; the ambassador from Pakistan met with our Assistant Secretary; our Embassy in Islamabad has been active; Secretary Albright has spoken to the Chinese; and now we've swiftly imposed these sanctions. So other than being able to guarantee that nothing bad can happen in the world, as some seem to think we can, I think the Administration has done what it can, given the fact that the Indian Government made such a deplorable decision.

QUESTION: In any of those communications with the Indian Government - and you sort of touched on this in answer to Carol's first question, but I may have missed something - has the Indian Government said that this is the end of their tests?

MR. RUBIN: Well, yesterday in the conversation between Under Secretary Pickering and the Indian Government, we did not get an indication that they would agree to our urging that the first set be the last set. So to that extent, I don't think we were surprised that this happened.

QUESTION: But there's been no communication after the second set, saying that that was the end? Because there are reports that the Indian Government has said that.

MR. RUBIN: Yes. I do not have any information current today to suggest that we, in our contacts with the Indian Government, have been assured that this is the end of it.

QUESTION: Back to Howard's question on the subject of specific criticisms, one criticism that is out there is that the Clinton Administration had made a tragic miscalculation in its relations with India; that it had, although not intelligence-wise, it had been given plenty of warnings that something like this could happen. Nevertheless, you continued to pursue relations, planning a trip by the President and, even in recent weeks, that the Administration was given signals that this might happen in meetings here in Washington; and never acted on it, never made the sort of effort to prevent it that we've seen in the past from other Administrations.

MR. RUBIN: I would categorically reject that kind of Monday morning quarterbacking by people who know very little about the functioning of government.

We made nonproliferation the highest priority in our discussions with the Indian and Pakistani Governments. When Secretary Albright was there, it was at the top of her agenda. When Ambassador Richardson was there, it was at the top of his agenda. We were appalled at the fact that in meetings as recently as last week, there was no indication given - contrary to those unnamed critics you mentioned, who seem to have information that is nonexistent that there were indications from the Indian Government in communications with us that they were going to take these actions.

This Department has been in contact with the Indian Government, unlike those officials who make up stories to try to find something to put themselves on television. In our view, during these discussions, there was no indication. Secretary of State Albright was appalled that in a high- level contact as recently as last week, with National Security Council officials, Deputy Secretary Talbott, with Assistant Secretary Inderfurth and Under Secretary Pickering, we had no reason to believe that this set of tests was forthcoming.

Therefore, there's really only two remaining criticisms. One is the intelligence criticism; and I don't care to get into that from this podium, other than to say that obviously we did not have an advanced warning of this. The CIA has talked about what it's going to do in that regard. With regard to engagement with India, I don't think any of the serious students of US policy toward the Indian Subcontinent believed that we would have had a better chance of convincing India and Pakistan to not take - or let's stick with India - had a better chance to convince India to not take this step by isolating them. I think the majority of the opinion of serious scholars, as opposed to quick Monday morning quarterbacks, is that by engaging the Indian Government, we were demonstrating to them the beneficial results of a relationship with the West and with the United States that could only be possible in the absence of testing.

Their criticism would only be valid if we had not made clear our views on this issue. I have a three-page chronology, which I don't care to read right here. But what I can summarize for you is that in all the major contacts between our government and the Indian Government at the Presidential level, at the Foreign Minister level, at the Under Secretary level, the Indian Government had no doubt about the seriousness with which we consider the nonproliferation issue and the result in relations if they were to go forward and make such a test.

No critic who makes such claims can seem to deal with the simple fact that India had an election; that a political party was elected that made a decision contrary to its indications that it was going to review this subject for several months. That was a democratic decision that we think is profoundly and dangerously wrong. But it was a decision that we in the United States cannot prevent if we're going to believe in the concept of democracy and other countries being able to make their own decisions. The only possible way to stop it, I guess, in the view of these Monday morning quarterbacks, were somehow to go in there and stop it. But, I mean, that's a ridiculous charge, and is typical after-the-fact-know-it-allness.

QUESTION: Did the Administration suggest to India yesterday that if it agreed to sign on to the CTBT, the sanctions might be either postponed or not levied?

MR. RUBIN: No, Under Secretary Pickering made clear that what the President said publicly about signing the CTBT and the not taking any additional tests and joining in other international regimes in the area of nonproliferation were the minimum necessary to avoid things getting worse. But he did not say that doing so would adjust our decision on sanctions.

QUESTION: Are you confident that China and France will not now take this opportunity to test?

MR. RUBIN: Well, one can't be confident of every other government's decision, and one can't know in advance everything that's going to happen in the world. We certainly hope that this does not change the determination of the major countries - China, Russia, United Kingdom, France -- it certainly doesn't change our view that the Comprehensive Test Ban is in our interest and is in their interest. The best way to put pressure on those who have not signed or who would purport to test is to get this treaty ratified, which increases the ability of the international community to place pressure on the recalcitrant countries, like India.

QUESTION: Very quick question - you said you didn't want to read that tick-tock that you have. Would you release it in print?

MR. RUBIN: No, but I'll try to find a way to get it communicated to you.

QUESTION: Another nonproliferation issue - North Korea. There was a story in the Times this morning which suggests that they may be backing away from the 1994 framework agreement.

MR. RUBIN: Well, without getting into the name of any particular newspaper, the suggestions in news accounts that the North Koreans are unsealing the Yongbyon reactor are inaccurate. We have confirmed with the International Atomic Energy Agency that its seals remain in place and that the freeze at North Korea's nuclear complex remains in place.

Under the arrangements established by the Agreed Framework, North Korea is able to conduct regular maintenance activities at the reactor under the observation of IAEA inspectors. We are confident that North Korea has not violated the across-the-board freeze on its nuclear activities in this regard, and the Agreed Framework is alive and well.

The canning of the fuel was essentially completed in mid-March; only clean up remains. This involves recovery of whatever material remains in the spent fuel storage pool. It is true the DPRK criticized US compliance with the Agreed Framework, and in late April, temporarily suspended some clean up operations. But let me emphasize the United States has fulfilled its part of the Agreed Framework and will continue to do so. We believe it is in the interests of all parties.

The specific DPRK charge that KEDO, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, and the US are not meeting our obligations with regard to delivery of the specified heavy fuel oil is not correct; we do not accept this. With the next delivery later this month, KEDO will have delivered 130, 000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil this year. It has been funded on a year- by-year basis, and we are obviously having discussions on arranging financing for the remainder of this year.

So neither the heavy fuel oil has been delayed, nor has the construction of the light water reactor been delayed. We're working on the finances for that. The South Korean Government has agreed to fund 70 percent of the construction of that reactor, and Japan a significant part of the project. We're discussing the additional details. So the long and the short of it is that the freeze on North Korea's nuclear program is alive and well. The IAEA has confirmed that, and this account is incorrect.

QUESTION: Is it 130,000 metric tons that you mentioned?

MR. RUBIN: Metric tons, yes. So far this year.

QUESTION: But is that consistent with the agreed upon schedule?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we have to get 500 metric tons by the end of the year. So we have significant additional fuel oil to provide. There is an additional delivery scheduled for later this month, and we're going to work on getting this additional deliveries made.

QUESTION: On this article you mentioned, it was rather specific and it was based on an interview with Selig Harrison, who had gotten this information from officials in Pyongyang.

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: So it's really just recounting, I believe, his conversation. But anyway, it said that, specifically, there were 200 fuel rods that had not been packaged yet; and you're denying that?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not in a position to get into exactly what rods or not rods, but if the suggestion is that the canning process of all the rods has not been completed, that's incorrect. What is going on is clean up. That doesn't mean there can't be parts of rods in the pool. But the suggestion that a huge chunk of the material -- the rods -- that was supposed to be canned have not been canned is incorrect.

QUESTION: Indonesia. Specifically, it appears that as many as six people may have been killed by rubber bullets; and you don't kill someone with rubber bullets unless you shoot them at point blank range. I wonder if the United States has any reaction to that kind of use of force by the Indonesian Government.

MR. RUBIN: Well, we deplore the use of force that involves the killing of civilians in that way. Violence did break out in West Jakarta, after a mostly peaceful memorial service for six students. Witnesses report rioting and looting and several buildings were burned. One person was reportedly killed after being run over by a truck.

We repeat our calls for the security forces to show restraint and refrain from violence when facing protesters and journalists covering the demonstrations. Violence will benefit no one, and we urge the Indonesian Government to allow peaceful demonstrations.

Clearly, the political situation in Indonesia is deteriorating. There is increasing involvement of the people of Indonesia, not just the students. We believe that the situation required a statement by Secretary Albright yesterday, making clear that the government ought to move forward with a dialogue with its own people in order that some of the different ideas for political reform, of which we're not in a position to choose, could begin to be implemented. The situation is deteriorating.

QUESTION: Jamie, does that mean you're now withdrawing your support for President Soeharto, or is he still your man in Jakarta?

MR. RUBIN: Well, he is the leader of Indonesia. What we're suggesting is that the political situation has been deteriorating, and that it's not just a simple matter of students protesting, but that there are larger numbers of other citizens participating; and in order to stabilize the political situation, there are various reform ideas out there. I'm not going to say that we have picked one or the other, but clearly the government and the other groups in Indonesia need to get together and discuss these political reforms, and there needs to be some sort of dialogue. But President Soeharto is still the leader, and we accept that.

QUESTION: I mean, the line between human rights and engagement and national interest is kind of murky. But are you not at all uncomfortable that you've given so much support to Soeharto - visible, financial and so forth - when he is ordering his security forces to do the kinds of things that are clearly outside of the realm of any --

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say this - we do not believe that the international financial support that's gone to Indonesia is designed to support the current leader. It is designed to avoid the kind of economic chaos that will make the situation far, far worse for the average citizen of Indonesia. This is not a bail-out of Soeharto; this is an effort to avoid the kind of chaos that will harm the average citizen of Indonesia by seeing more skyrocketing prices and a steep decline in the economy. So we believe we are serving the human rights of the people of Indonesia by avoiding this kind of economic chaos and what might go with it.

QUESTION: Isn't there a level of violence by security forces against civilians beyond which the United States would feel obliged to respond with more than words?

MR. RUBIN: I have no way of answering that hypothetical question.

QUESTION: I have a question about Turkey, if I may. There's a report in The Washington Post today about the attack on a prominent human rights activist in Turkey. Is there any indication that those responsible have ties to the Turkish military?

MR. RUBIN: We understand that two gunmen shot Mr. Birdal repeatedly in the chest at the HRA offices in Ankara, and that Mr. Birdal is in critical condition in an Ankara hospital. We also understand that a group calling itself "The Turkey Vengeance Brigade" has claimed responsibility. We do not have any further information on this group. The US Government strongly condemns the apparent assassination attempt against Akin Birdal, one of the foremost human rights advocates in Turkey. We note Prime Minister Yilmaz' condemnation of this attack, and urge the Turkish authorities to move swiftly to bring to justice the perpetrators of this reprehensible attack.

QUESTION: This is the latest in a number of such attacks on human rights activists. Is there any indication that there are ties to the Turkish military?

MR. RUBIN: Again, I think I said that we do not have any further information on the group that has taken responsibility for this action.

QUESTION: Is there a decision on ILSA yet?

MR. RUBIN: No.

QUESTION: Is there anything that you can say about the easing of sanctions towards Cuba before the briefing at 2:30 p.m.? Can you give us anything on camera?

MR. RUBIN: 2:30 p.m. briefing, yes.

QUESTION: The visiting Greek Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Kranidhiotis, he said that he met with the Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Assistant Secretary Marc Grossman, and he said the US officials held Turkey responsible for the latest failure in the attempt to restart talks in Cyprus. Is that the way the United States see the situation in Cyprus?

MR. RUBIN: I'm going to have to - okay. Please repeat your question; I got distracted by my able deputy.

QUESTION: The Greek Deputy Foreign Minister said that US officials held Turkey responsible for the latest failure in the attempt to restart the Cyprus talks on Cyprus. Is that the way the United States and the State Department see the Cyprus situation?

MR. RUBIN: I'll have to take that question for the record.

QUESTION: And also, their meeting, did they - did the Greek officials give any support or insurance they are supporting Turkey's membership to the European Union? They explained that they discussed on the subject.

MR. RUBIN: We were pleased the Secretary General of the PASOK Party say that Greece does not object to EU membership for Turkey. We have long believed that Turkey's future is in Europe. It is in the strategic interests of the US, the European Union and Turkey that the European Union and Turkey have a constructive relationship. We consistently support efforts to build and improve that relationship.

QUESTION: Just one more thing on the afternoon. Is there no chance that you'll be giving us a read-out on this meeting this afternoon? I ask because I know that Mr. Bar-Illan will be doing so.

MR. RUBIN: We're much less press savvy than the others.

QUESTION: I knew that, but I wondered whether perhaps you might want to get with the times.

MR. RUBIN: Oh, you knew that; so then you wouldn't expect us to answer your question in the positive.

QUESTION: Mr. Rubin, I'd like to ask brief follow-up questions on North Korea. One is, has there been any communication directly from North Korea to the United States about the kind of displeasure the newspaper account talks about on the delay, so called?

MR. RUBIN: We don't comment on those kinds of communications.

QUESTION: Okay. Well, there was also in the news account an idea about creating three-way peace-keeping force and structure for policing the DMZ in Korea. Was this something that the United States has proposed in terms of confidence-building measures?

MR. RUBIN: I have no information on that; I'll have to get that for the record.

QUESTION: Jump back to the sanctions on India. I heard we were proposing World Bank loans be stopped to India, but I don't think we have enough clout to do that by ourselves. Have any other countries --

MR. RUBIN: What I said was, I can't predict exactly what would happen with those loans; but what I can say is that some of the key countries that are involved in the international financial institutions, like Japan and like Germany, have taken very similar stances to the United States in reacting to this test. But we will have to see how things develop. I would expect at the G-8 meeting, this issue to be a subject of intensive discussions.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 2:15 P.M.)

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