U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #58, 98-05-11
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1238
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Monday, May 11, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
1 President's Meeting with Secretary Albright, National
Security Adviser Berger, and Ambassador Ross Today
1,2-3,9-10 Secretary Albright and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to
Meet In Washington
1-2,9 Secretary Albright's Travel Itinerary
2-8,11 Launching of Permanent Status Talks/Elements/US Role/Ideas
Put Forward
5,7,8-9 Terrorism/Reports of Convicted Terrorist Abu Abbas in
Region
INDIA
10-11 Nuclear Test/US Reaction
10,13 Possible US Sanctions
10,12-13 Meeting Between Indian Ambassador and Under Secretary
Pickering
11-15 India's Relationship with China and Pakistan
11-16 NPT and CTBT Treaties
COLOMBIA
16 Reported Human Rights Violations by Military Unit
IRAN/LIBYA
16-17,18 Status of Decision on Iran/Libya Sanctions Act on
Sanctionable Cases
SIERRA LEONE
17-18 Reported Arms Shipment by British Company
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
18 Status of F-16 Fighter Sale
GREECE/TURKEY/CYPRUS
18-19 Status of Peace Talks/Results of Holbrooke Trip
19 Comments by Thomas Miller
SERBIA-MONTENEGRO
19-20 Holbrooke/Gelbard Travel in Region/Meeting with President
Milosevic
KOREA
20 Status of KEDO/Agreed Framework/Financing
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #58
MONDAY, MAY 11, 1998, 12:55 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. I guess
all of you have missed us; we have been away for a long time - I know that
we've missed you. Let's start with George.
QUESTION: Where's Barry? Let him ask you.
MR. RUBIN: Where's Barry?
QUESTION: Did he leave already?
MR. RUBIN: Go ahead, ask me about the Middle East - go ahead.
QUESTION: What have you got?
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: My understanding is that the President will be issuing a
statement, and may have done so already, making clear that the President
had a meeting with Secretary Albright, National Security Adviser Berger,
and Ambassador Ross. I think, in our view, it's unfortunate that there will
not be a meeting today with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat to
launch the permanent status talks. We regret that. Secretary Albright
just got off the phone with Prime Minister Netanyahu and they agreed
to meet here in Washington on Wednesday to discuss ways in which we can
overcome the remaining differences and be able to proceed immediately to
the permanent peace talks; the so-called final status talks. After that
meeting, Secretary Albright will be in a position to report to the
President and tell him whether she believes there is a basis that exists
following those meetings to launch the permanent peace talks - the
accelerated permanent status talks that we have been looking to try to
catalyze with the meetings in London and the various contacts that
Ambassador Ross has had.
QUESTION: So she is not leaving with the President for Europe? Is she
delaying her departure?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Secretary Albright will stay in Washington and, as I said,
she spoke to Prime Minister Netanyahu a few moments ago and intends to meet
with him here in Washington. I think she will be meeting -- sorry, she will
be speaking with Chairman Arafat; either she has done so or will do so
shortly in order to bring him up to date on our current thinking.
QUESTION: Is there anything in Dennis Ross' report that leads to some
optimism that this Wednesday could be the day of actually putting the seal
on something?
MR. RUBIN: We've been at this a very long time. The United States has
been working for over nine months to try to bridge the gaps between the two
sides to try to revive the peace process that has been so moribund and we
believe very strongly in peace; this is not about confrontation, this is
about provoking success in the peace process and so Secretary Albright had
a good set of meetings in London. We obviously had hoped that as a
result of Ambassador Ross' trip to the Middle East over the weekend
that it would have been possible to move smartly to the launching
of the permanent peace talks; but that is not possible at this time.
The Secretary has decided - or the President has asked her to meet with
Prime Minister Netanyahu here on Wednesday. As a result of the briefing
that she received and that took place over at the White House, the belief
is that there are some positive elements to explore in these discussions on
Wednesday to see whether we can make the breakthrough that we need to
launch the permanent peace talks, consistent with the ideas that we've put
down for some time now.
QUESTION: So basically what you're saying is that the meeting on
Wednesday will be a continuation of the meetings that Dennis Ross held in
Israel over the weekend?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, they are meetings with the Prime Minister of Israel.
Clearly, Chairman Arafat has accepted the US ideas, and now what we need to
do is use some of the positive elements and see whether diplomats can be
creative -- which is what they're paid to be - in trying to get to yes and
get to an agreement and launch the permanent peace talks so that the people
of the Middle East can achieve what they've yearned for so long, which is
peace and prosperity in that troubled region.
QUESTION: How damaged do you think this Administration's efforts to be a
broker in these talks - how much may be damaged by setting a deadline and
then sort of stepping back and saying, well, we're going to continue to
meet with them?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we never set a deadline; those are your words. What we
did is issue an invitation for a meeting to be held today, based on
acceptance of the US ideas. That meeting obviously did not take place, and
we regret that. But our goal is not some kind of feel-good confrontation;
our goal is a process that leads to peace in the Middle East. So we are
going to go the extra mile. Certainly, Ambassador Ross has gone the
extra 10,000 miles over the weekend, in trying to help catalyze this
process.
Secretary Albright is going to stay in Washington and forego the trip she
had been planning to take with the President, in order to meet with Prime
Minister Netanyahu here in Washington and discuss with him some of these
positive elements that Ambassador Ross heard, and explore with him whether
those positive elements are sufficient to get us to yes. That is what she's
going to do on Wednesday.
But as far as the deadline is concerned, we never issued it as a deadline
or an ultimatum. What we said was that we were prepared to have the
President launch the permanent status talks here on Monday, today, and if
the two sides could agree to the US ideas, then we could do so. As of yet,
the Israeli side has not agreed, and the Palestinian side has agreed. So
what we're trying to do is work with the Israelis to get to yes. That is
the business of peace-making.
QUESTION: Jamie, can I ask you, the aim still is to launch final status
talks, right?
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: And is there still a conditional invitation so far as the
Israelis are concerned? Has there been any change in that?
MR. RUBIN: The peace talks that would be launched in a meeting with the
President, Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu would be based on
acceptance of the US ideas, yes. But that's not to say, as I indicated,
that there aren't refinements possible so that both sides can agree to the
meeting and the launching of permanent peace talks.
QUESTION: Since you brought up the word "refinement," let me bring up the
other word that was used in that context - her word - that the ideas or
what the US put on the table will not be "watered down."
MR. RUBIN: First of all, let me start by agreeing with the Secretary of
State.
QUESTION: But is that still the case, considering what you're up against?
Are you still in the posture of not being willing or interested in
"watering down" your basic ideas? Refining it, perhaps, but --
MR. RUBIN: The short answer to your question is yes. The key elements of
the American ideas have remained constant throughout this process; and we
are not going to water down those key elements. But the business of
diplomacy often requires creativity in trying to refine these types of
issues so that both sides can agree and we can launch the permanent status
talks, the permanent peace talks, and get to a final settlement of the
Middle East problem between the Israelis and the Palestinians. That is our
objective.
QUESTION: Can I try one more and dig a little deeper? We all know how
long Ross has been at this, and we know how creative he can be in refining
things. Are we to believe or assume or are you telling us that all the
variations or refinements that didn't bring Netanyahu to Washington today
now will be embellished with additional refinements? Or is it possible that
things that didn't go down over the weekend are now being reconsidered by
the Israelis? Do you follow me?
MR. RUBIN: I would assume it is a combination of both. There is a process
that negotiations entail. Sometimes the change that allows people to get to
yes is not only a change of substance, but a change of mood. What we are
looking to do is to try to use the good offices of the United States, one
of Israel's closest if not the closest friend of Israel in the world - in
fact, I probably could say the closest friend in the world - and see
whether the discussions here in Washington could build on some of
these positive elements that were discussed in Israel and meet the
security needs of the Israeli Government and be able, therefore, to
launch the permanent peace talks; that's our objective.
QUESTION: I promised only one more, but now let me try one more.
MR. RUBIN: That's OK, but we never make promises here.
QUESTION: Is the use of American troops to assure whatever - what am I
trying to say - to take care of, to allay Israel and Netanyahu's security
concerns something under discussion?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard, in any of the discussions that I've been in,
any discussion of American troops as being an additional incentive in the
context of these current discussions to change the equation.
QUESTION: Jamie, in London there was also a threat -- call it what you'd
like - that the United States would re-evaluate the way it ran the peace
process. What happens to that in this current delay?
MR. RUBIN: Well, today is Monday. Wednesday the Secretary will be meeting
with Prime Minister Netanyahu to see whether we can overcome these
differences. Based on that meeting, she will report to the President. At
that point, the President and the Secretary will consult on whether a re-
examination is appropriate, at that point. Let me say this. We have to
bring this phase of American mediation to a conclusion; it's gone on far
too long.
We've been at this for many, many, many months, we've been doing the best
we can in trying to close the gaps, we've tried to be as creative as we can
and we've been consulting quietly, closely, patiently with both Israel and
the Palestinians to factor in their needs and requirements. But this can't
go on forever and there is a need to make some decisions and what we are
doing here is trying to bring to bear our view that we have a sense of
urgency about this. At some point, if we cannot bring this to a conclusion,
then, as the Secretary said, we would have to re-examine our approach in
this matter. That does not mean walking away from the American concern
about the Middle East peace process or the security of Israel or the
security of the Middle East. It does mean re-examining what the proper role
for the United States should be.
I wouldn't see this as anything other than the United States going the
extra mile in trying to determine, whether through a little more creativity
and a good atmosphere here in Washington on Wednesday, whether we can
really move the ball down the field.
QUESTION: Can you address this observation some of the pundits have made
that the Secretary thought she had clear marching orders when she came out
in London and spoke and within -- after climbing out on a limb, the White
House was selling it off within about six hours. Can you address that in
any way?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. The pundits have to pundit and they have to earn a living
writing things they know nothing about and, in this case, they don't know
what they're talking about.
QUESTION: Am I right in assuming that the American ideas included a
suggestion of an amount of land that would be the minimum acceptable or the
appropriate amount for Israel to be turning over in this part of the
process?
MR. RUBIN: Could you rephrase that?
QUESTION: Am I right in assuming that the American ideas that you've been
talking about include an amount of land, a specific amount of land, which
the United States believes is the minimum or the appropriate amount for
Israel to be giving to the Palestinians at this time?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - the ideas that the United States has put
forward are based on trying to restore key elements of the interim peace
accords, the Oslo accords, including the scope of a second further
redeployment of Israeli forces from land they now control to cede, in
different forms, control over to the Palestinians. That is a key element of
Oslo that has not been implemented.
At the same time, we think it's extremely important that parallel with any
redeployment of Israeli forces, there are stepped-up measures and
procedures and a plan for the Palestinians to fight the dangers of
terrorism that have bedeviled the Middle East. So certainly, it is correct
that one of the key elements of our ideas is a parallel process of
increased fighting of security and terrorism on the part of the Palestinians,
and the scope of a redeployment of Israeli forces from areas it now
controls in different forms.
QUESTION: So if there is a set amount of land that's being talked about
in the ideas, as part of that package, do the positive elements that you've
mentioned that Mr. Netanyahu has raised include reducing that amount of
land?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I've tried to answer that as best I can without
violating the premise that the negotiators have - or the burden the
negotiators have placed on me, which is to avoid getting so specific that
we are not in a position to close a deal.
But in response to Barry's question, what I indicated is, when it comes to
the key elements of the American ideas, they are not going to be changed,
and they have stayed constant throughout.
QUESTION: Is one of those key elements a certain amount of land?
MR. RUBIN: The best that I can do for you is say that a key element
includes the scope of the further redeployment.
QUESTION: Is there an American map (inaudible)?
MR. RUBIN: I have not heard - I've not seen our map that involves a
specific proposal for - I mean, we have our maps that currently lay out
what land is controlled by the Israelis; what land is called Area B, which
means Israeli security and Palestinian civil and police control; Area C,
meaning controlled by the Israelis; Area A, meaning controlled by the
Palestinians. So we have maps that lay out the current configuration and
talk about what the result would be if different steps were taken.
But again, let me emphasize here, the United States cannot dictate to
Israel its security needs. That should be fundamental and obvious to all.
What we can do and what we have been doing and what we believe our proper
role is, is to try to move this process forward by provoking and catalyzing
constructive responses on the part of the two leaders.
In this case, we have moved Chairman Arafat dramatically from where he
began this process. He started this process believing that each further
redeployment ought to be in the range of 30 percent; and we have dramatically
reduced that. In addition, what we've done is dramatically increased the
procedures, plans and mechanisms for fighting terrorism on the part of the
Palestinians. What we have been doing is not telling the Israelis what it
is that they must do, but telling the parties what it is that they
ought to do if they want to get to an agreement, put the peace process back
on track and give the people of the region the opportunity for peace that
they've been yearning for.
QUESTION: But the question really pertains to whether the figure that's
been booted about of 13.1 percent actually can be - if withdrawal can be
done and Israel will retain its feeling of security, because people like
Ariel Sharon were in town last week, stating that it would be an extreme
danger to Israel to accept a figure like that because there is no way that
they will have the security. That's why I'm asking whether you have a
map that demonstrates that there's nothing of the kind, that in fact
there's no problem with Israel's security.
MR. RUBIN: Again, we are not going to make that judgment for Israel --
what a configuration of land would yield in terms of their security. What
we can do and what we have been doing and what we think we ought to do is
try as best we can to bring the parties to a position where they can both
agree that their security needs are met, bearing in mind that if the peace
process is put back on track, if there is no longer the growing resentment
and growing disillusionment and potential for violence, then everybody's
security in the Middle East will be enhanced.
So what we've been trying to do is to bridge the gaps by putting creative
ideas forward that we think meet the needs of both sides as a result of
thousands of hours of discussions with both parties describing their needs.
But it's not up to us to present a map, a definitive map to the Israelis on
a take it or leave it basis and we have not done so.
QUESTION: Is one of the key elements of the American ideas still a time
out on Jewish settlements in the West Bank?
MR. RUBIN: Certainly we believe, and part of the package that we think
will make an accelerated permanent status negotiation possible and
successful, is a time out on unilateral steps, the precise nature of which
is something that's under discussion and I don't care to get into. But
certainly we believe that if unilateral steps are taken during the
launching of these talks or soon thereafter, the climate for the negotiations
would break down very quickly and we would be very hard pressed to make any
progress.
QUESTION: Map aside, you have just spoken of dramatically moving Arafat
and his people on security measures. Have you moved them so far, do you
think, or does Ross think, or does the Secretary think that some Israeli
settlements no longer need the protection of Israeli troops? Because as far
as I understand, that's what the whole argument is about; whether Israel's
view that to go 13%, however the refinements are, some of the settlements
would be stripped of the immediate protection of Israeli troops. Would
you have these settlers protected by the Palestinians or what is your or
what is the State Department's thinking on that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I would not like to get into that level of detail for
fear of making it more difficult to reach our objective but I can say this.
When I was referring to fighting terrorism and security steps, I was
talking about the kind of measures that have taken place in recent months
to arrest terrorists, to uncover bomb factories, to dismantle infrastructure
for those who would pursue terrorism - terrorism not necessarily directed
at any particular settlement, but terrorism that often has bloodied the
streets of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. We are talking about an environment
where even during Oslo there were terrorist acts that took place on the
streets of Tel Aviv. That is inconsistent with a peaceful environment that
we're trying to create. So what we've been doing here is focusing on making
sure that Chairman Arafat takes 100% effort to fight terrorism of that kind
so that the climate for the peace talks does not collapse, but more
important so that Israeli citizens are not murdered on the streets of Tel
Aviv. That is the kind of terrorism-fighting package that we've been
working on.
As far as what the different amounts of land would do to the security of
different settlements, again, that is not for the United States to
determine. What it is for us to do is to try to improve the confidence of
both sides that the different ideas we have meet the objectives and needs
that they've laid out. On the Israeli side, what I am suggesting, is that
by dramatically reducing the amount of land that Chairman Arafat initially
wanted turned over and by dramatically increasing the pattern of cooperation
and the mechanism for cooperation in the fight against terrorism,
we have met key Israeli concerns, not that we are determining what Israel
should or shouldn't do with any particular settlement.
QUESTION: But I'm asking, sort of on the tail of Roy's map question, with
all due respect, your very honest and complete answer dealt mostly with
atmospherics in Tel Aviv. What's at issue now is how much more of the West
Bank Israel is prepared to give up, and that means pulling troops back. And
unless I'm mistaken, the argument - you don't want to talk percentages and
you don't have to - the argument of what Israel is willing to do and
what you and the Palestinians together want Israel to do is a matter
of exposing some of these settlements, stripping them of the Israeli troops
in their immediate visage. Now, if the US' position is, it's a good risk to
take, it's a safe thing to do because the Palestinians have taken all these
measures atmospherically - and you also say they're dismantling I don't
know what -- cells, et cetera --that's significant.
MR. RUBIN: Let me try to answer it as best - I certainly understand the
question. But the best answer I can offer for you is that the United States
believes in the principle of land for peace. And if land has to be given up
in order for peace to be achieved, that is a security-enhancing result,
provided it is land and peace that both sides believe meet their needs. So
land for peace is inherent in the American approach, it's inherent
in UN Security Council resolutions, and frankly, it is basic to the peace
process.
So if the question is, might some land have to be given up in order for
peace to be achieved; I think the answer is yes.
QUESTION: Sharon says on that that the settlements have been put in
specific places purely for security reasons; and that they will be directly
exposed as a result of the US demands; and that this is unacceptable,
highly dangerous.
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, as you know, the view of the United States is
that the land to be transferred is to be determined by Israel. What we are
talking about here is what would be enough land in combination with
security steps to put the peace process back on track. We are not telling
Israel what land it has to return, and that is for it to decide.
QUESTION: Two issues on the terrorist threat to Israel in this matter.
The Iranian resistance says that large amounts of money comes to Damascus,
it is disbursed by the Iranian ambassador there to terrorist groups in
Palestine. The second issue is that Abu Abbas is running loose in Gaza for
the fourth time, I believe. Why does the US tolerate the Israelis to let
him in and out of the country?
MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry, I'm unfamiliar with the second part of your
question. With regard to the first part of your question, I think our
terrorism reports adequately deal with our concerns about Syria and Iran in
the area of terrorism; and those concerns have not changed. We still have
concerns in that regard.
With regard to the second question --
QUESTION: Yes, this is from an AP story today in The Washington Times.
Abu Abbas is currently active in the Gaza Strip. I believe he's still
wanted by the United States for terrorism last decade, infamous terrorism.
Why does the US tolerate that the Israelis should allow him in and
out?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say that the United States strongly believes that
Abu Abbas should be punished for the crimes committed aboard the Achille
Lauro in 1985. Abbas was tried in absentia in Italy in 1986, found guilty
and sentenced to life in prison. There are no charges pending against Abu
Abbas in the United States. The statute of limitations has long since run
out. You'll have to ask the government of Italy about their efforts to make
him serve his sentence. And I can refer you for any further detail
about the legal situation to the Department of Justice.
QUESTION: And do you believe that he is having a specific pacifying
influence by being there in Gaza?
MR. RUBIN: It's hard to believe that a convicted terrorist would do
anything but make the climate worse in any place he was.
QUESTION: He's a close friend of Arafat --
MR. RUBIN: Wherever a convicted terrorist is, the climate is worse, as
far as I'm concerned.
QUESTION: Is the Secretary going to be going to Europe, or is she staying
here?
MR. RUBIN: I suspect the Secretary will be going to Europe, but probably
not tomorrow - definitely not tomorrow.
QUESTION: Right, but will she then try to leave Wednesday or --
MR. RUBIN: I can't give you the exact date when she will leave, but soon
thereafter, I suspect.
QUESTION: One question is whether she might want to extend her talks and
have more talks with Netanyahu, I think is here through the week.
MR. RUBIN: Well, maybe that's the reason why I'm not giving you a
departure date.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: How worried are you that Netanyahu coming here, making speeches
at a time Israel is defying the Administration's position and that the
Secretary is out of town, the President might be out of town? Does this
concern you, because Netanyahu does have a lot of support in Congress -
seems to be - for his tough position?
MR. RUBIN: The President is the President; the Secretary of State is the
Secretary of State. I can certainly speak for the Secretary in saying that
she will continue to conduct diplomacy based on what she thinks is the best
way to advance American interests. Certainly, we're interested in the views
of Congress, but at the end of the day, the one area where the Constitution
is rather clear is that the conduct of diplomacy is in the purview of
the Executive Branch. Secretary Albright will continue to act in what
she believes is the best interest of the United States, and frankly, in so
doing, expects to be advancing the interests of Israel.
With respect to the American public, I feel quite confident that the
position of the United States Government is fully in sync with the views of
the American public about it.
QUESTION: The Times or somebody this morning reported that there's been
an informal two-week extension in the - what do you want to call it -
conditional invitation to --
MR. RUBIN: You got it, perfect.
QUESTION: -- to come to Washington to a Washington summit. Is there
anything to that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, that is clearly a case of some official having no
connection with his government, because the Secretary and Ambassador Ross
and the President did not make such a decision. That official was either
talking out of their hat or was otherwise uninformed.
QUESTION: What can you tell us about the scope of the Indian nuclear test
today? And what is the thinking of the US Government on its reaction,
including possible sanctions?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say this - we are deeply disturbed by this
announcement. We are seeking clarification from the Indian Government
regarding what I think is obviously a very, very negative development. Our
policy with respect to nuclear testing is clear: we urge all countries,
including India, to refrain from nuclear testing, and to sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
We are examining the relevant data right now, as we speak. There are some
intensive meetings going on in the Department and around the bureaucracy.
We have reached no independent conclusion at this time. There are a number
of US sanction laws that potentially apply to a non-nuclear weapons state
that detonates a nuclear explosive device. In this case, India would be
considered a non-nuclear weapons state, based on its status under the
provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
We certainly are not going to speculate on what result this will have on
the region, but we strongly urge Pakistan to refrain from responding with a
nuclear test of its own. The Indian Ambassador has been in touch with Under
Secretary Pickering about this announcement, and we are proceeding with a
careful analysis of the data and consider this a very negative development
and are intensively discussing how to respond.
QUESTION: Did the US have any foreknowledge that the Indians were going
to make these tests; because the Indian Foreign Minister was apparently in
town last Friday, meeting officials?
MR. RUBIN: My understanding is that in those meetings we strongly urged
them not to respond to any of the steps that Pakistan had taken, including
the testing of a medium-range missile. But I don't believe that any of our
officials knew for sure that there was going to be such an announcement
today.
QUESTION: So this caught you unaware?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I didn't say that. I said that in those meetings, that
there were no, to my knowledge, warnings that this was going to happen. I
wouldn't be in a position to get into any of the areas using the word that
I don't use and if you use, I get to say no comment.
QUESTION: A very, very quick one on the Middle East.
MR. RUBIN: You want to go back to the Middle East?
QUESTION: Just very quick. Is the notion still --
MR. RUBIN: You know that I counted, we had 37 questions on the Middle
East.
QUESTION: This is so quick. The site is the question, because while
you're knocking down The New York Times report, I wonder what you do with
Israel radio that they're all going to meet in Birmingham, England. Is the
site, the projected site for launching these final status talks still --
the hoped-for site -- still Washington?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say that Israel radio had a report yesterday that
didn't resemble anything anybody knew about, except for the fact that it
woke me up from my nap after two weeks on the road, and I inquired as to
what the basis of that report was and the answer was nothing.
The President's statement, I think, will make clear that the talks would be
launched in Washington.
QUESTION: Back on India, what makes you so sure that the Indian test was
directed at Pakistan and not at China? And are you giving similar urgings -
would you give similar public urgings to China, which apparently has
deployed some nuclear missiles in Tibet recently?
MR. RUBIN: I'm unfamiliar with that report.
QUESTION: It was a report in one of your major clients last week. Anyway,
what would you say to China in this case?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we certainly understand that India's attitudes toward
nuclear nonproliferation are strongly influenced by its security
perceptions vis-a-vis China, and by its traditional opposition to measures
it sees as discriminating against non-nuclear weapons states.
My understanding is that the Chinese have engaged in a moratorium and have
signed the Comprehensive Test Ban, and like the United States, are engaging
in a process of getting the treaty ratified. So what we would like to see
India do now is, having made this announcement is get on with the business
of signing this treaty so that the world can become a safer place and
rather than it becoming a more dangerous place, India would join the
Comprehensive Test Ban regime.
We certainly understand that that is a factor in their thinking, but again,
we believe the right course for the security of India, for the security of
Pakistan, for the security of the Subcontinent, the right course is to join
the Comprehensive Test Ban regime.
QUESTION: Is there analysis in this building or others, or have you been
notified that what India was actually doing was similar to what China had
done which is to conduct a flurry of tests to make them comfortable with
their arsenal and then proceed to join the NPT?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we do not have information to confirm that that is its
intention by any means. What I am simply saying is that we've urged at the
highest levels in a series of meetings with India and Pakistan that both
sides show restraint. Under Secretary Pickering did that; Strobe Talbott
did that; I believe there were meetings over at the White House last week.
When Ambassador Richardson was in the region he did that as well.
We believe that continued restraint in the area of nuclear and missile
development will improvement the security of the region, rather than their
view sometimes which appears to be that flexing their nuclear missile
muscles will improve their security when it does just the opposite. So
recognize that there are a number of different factors that go into their
consideration. We know that they can assemble a limited number of nuclear
weapons in a relatively short time, and what we think is important is
that they realize that they are not improving their security and that
this is a very disturbing development and that they should now move on to
signing the Comprehensive Test Ban.
QUESTION: Did the Secretary actually call in the Indian Ambassador or did
the Indian Ambassador volunteer to come in?
MR. RUBIN: I believe he volunteered to speak to Under Secretary Pickering,
and right now, the interagency is meeting to decide on next steps, but I
can assure you we will be raising
very strongly with India our concerns about -
QUESTION: So he brought in an explanation, in other words?
MR. RUBIN: Of some kind, yes.
QUESTION: And I take it you find this explanation unsatisfactory?
MR. RUBIN: We consider this an extremely negative development.
Q`Can you say what the Indian Ambassador carried to you -
MR. RUBIN: We still - even after hearing from him, we still consider it
an extremely negative development.
QUESTION: And what actually was the explanation they gave you?
MR. RUBIN: I am not in position to get into that kind of a diplomatic
discussion.
QUESTION: In an announcement, the Indian Government said that there were
three explosions and that they were nuclear warheads as opposed to what
they used to call a peaceful nuclear device. Does that sound correct? Are
they - were they warheads?
MR. RUBIN: I think, Jim, you heard me say that we are still analyzing the
date, and when we've made a conclusion, we'll share it with you.
QUESTION: I have one other question. You mentioned the possibility of
sanctions. What sort of sanctions are on the list?
MR. RUBIN: Well, there are pursuant to various laws, sanctions, that
affect foreign assistance, that affect trade assistance, that affect bank
loans, et cetera. And we are going to be examining whether the laws apply
in this case.
QUESTION: Could I ask you if the pact with China, this missile and
nuclear relationship with Pakistan, may have had anything to do with this
in the US's judgment, and is that relationship now of a sort that you're
comfortable with it?
MR. RUBIN: I don't understand how China's relationship with Pakistan
would help India conduct a nuclear explosion as announced by them, not
determined by me.
QUESTION: Well, one would - it wouldn't take a lot of imagination to --
MR. RUBIN: Certainly, anyone who contributes to proliferation on the
Indian Subcontinent is putting themselves in a position where the security
of the world is at risk. We have taken very strong measures in the past to
impose sanctions on companies that have been involved in assisting
Pakistan.
I believe just a week ago we imposed sanctions on two companies with regard
to missile transfer or component transfer to Pakistan. So I think we
consider stopping the threat of missile and nuclear development on the
Indian Subcontinent extremely important to us, and are using all the laws
and persuasion at our disposal in order to combat that threat.
QUESTION: Well, it's a component of the situation. In February 1996, you
concluded there wasn't sufficient evidence that China had provided missiles,
medium-range missiles, to Pakistan. And this problem keeps cropping up.
India doesn't exist in a vacuum; it exists with countries around it that
it's suspicious of. I just wondered if the State Department thinks that
China's relationship with Pakistan may have been provocative. And secondly,
are you satisfied now that China is not proliferating?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we believe that China is following through on its
commitments pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and pursuant to
its bilateral agreement with us not to assist non-nuclear weapons states in
making nuclear weapons. So in that sense, we believe they are living up to
that commitment.
With regard to the overall tensions in the region and the residual impact
some technology transfers may have, it's very hard to judge what motivates
India to make this kind of announcement; and if true, to explode nuclear
weapons at a time when the rest of the world is signing up to the
Comprehensive Test Ban and moving towards nonproliferation. I don't want to
presume to make that judgment for them, other than to say we think all
countries in the world ought to do their utmost to prevent fueling the arms
race in the Indian Subcontinent so that we don't see the current situation
spiral into an even more dangerous situation.
QUESTION: Is it more bad news for the Test Ban Treaty? I mean, there is a
possibility that, like France, India is doing something it feels it has to
do to get up to date.
MR. RUBIN: Well, as I indicated to Sid --
QUESTION: Yes, I know, but on the treaty itself, I would just welcome
some observation. You already have a tough job.
MR. RUBIN: Yes, we certainly believe the Comprehensive Test Ban is
decidedly in the national interest of the United States because it will
prevent other countries from testing nuclear weapons, and it will make it
easier to isolate and pressure those countries who have not signed.
Certainly, the fact that we believe that has not changed; it's only made it
more important that the treaty get ratified so that the inherent pressure
that can be brought to bear on non-signers can be brought to bear through
the ratification by these five countries.
QUESTION: Do you have any reason to doubt that there were actually the
Indian nuclear tests?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I've been provided very careful wording and --
QUESTION: So you cannot confirm it?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not confirming that it's a nuclear test. I mean, certainly
the fact that they announced that it was a nuclear test is rather
compelling information.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - last week, the Indian Defense Minister, Mr.
Fernandez, was making statements --
MR. RUBIN: Which defense minister?
QUESTION: The Indian Defense Minister, Fernandez, was making statements
about being encircled by China or China's clients, but specifically about a
number of nuclear weapons that were being stored in the southern border,
near the Indian border of Tibet; airfields that were being enhanced in
Tibet that would directly threaten India. I think that was maybe one of the
reasons they tested; I don't know. Do you have any comment to that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, in response to Sid's question, I gave you as much as I
could on that - which is that we're aware that India's attitudes toward
nuclear nonproliferation are strongly influenced by its perceptions vis-a-
vis China and China's activities. We're quite aware of that.
QUESTION: Would the US think that China moving their bombs back into
China mainland would be wise?
MR. RUBIN: I have no ability to confirm or get into any detail on this
precise location of Chinese nuclear armaments.
One more on India, and then we'll move to the other subject that I can tell
someone wants to ask about.
QUESTION: Repeatedly India has made it clear that she would sign the CTBT
only if the nuclear weapons powers agree to firm date for the abolition of
all nuclear weapons. What makes you think that now India will reverse its
policy and agree to sign the CTBT in spite of the fact that the five
nuclear powers think it absolutely essential for their national security to
have nuclear weapons, but somehow India should be naked against the
Chinese without any either missiles or nuclear weapons; India should
be completely --
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - we think that position is fundamentally
wrong. We think that position does not enhance the security of India, but
it decreases the security for everyone on the Subcontinent and the world.
There are plenty of countries in world that are prepared to forego nuclear
testing, even recognizing that the United States and a few other countries
have an inherent nuclear capability. So therefore, if India wants to help
the world move away from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
if it wants to be a leader in the fight to stop the threat from weapons of
mass destruction, it should sign the CTB rather than using other countries'
inherent capabilities as an excuse to be the laggard in this area.
QUESTION: I had a question - today Deputy Secretary of State Talbott met
with Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs from Greece and the General
Secretary of the Majority Party. Do you have a read-out on this meeting?
MR. RUBIN: No, I don't, but we'll get you one as soon as we do.
QUESTION: Can I ask one quick question on India again? Suppose the Indian
Government says they will be willing to sign the CTBT. Is it conceivable
that the sanctions would not be imposed?
MR. RUBIN: Well, certainly --
QUESTION: And also, do you think this kind of undermines or stops
President Clinton's plans to visit South Asia at the end of the year?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I wouldn't be in a position to speculate on his plans.
That would be something you'd have to take up on the White House. Certainly,
as I said, this is a very negative development and it would certainly be a
welcome development if India were now to announce its intention to sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban.
QUESTION: On Colombia, The Washington Post reported yesterday a serious
human rights violations for military unit in Colombia - specifically the
Unit 20. Do you have any comment about that? And how will it affect the
relations between Colombia and the United States?
MR. RUBIN: Concerns have circulated widely for some time in Colombia of
alleged human rights violations, attributed to some elements of the
Colombian army intelligence apparatus. We noted these concerns in our
annual human rights report for Colombia. We condemn the murder of human
rights and political activists in Colombia, and have urged the Colombian
Government to immediately, vigorously and thoroughly investigate their
deaths, and to promptly prosecute those responsible to the fullest extent
of Colombian law.
As part of our agreed process, before disbursing US assistance to be used
by Colombian police and military for counter-narcotics purposes, we have
sought assurances from the Colombian Government that all military units
receiving aid be fully vetted to ensure that aid does not go to units which
abuse human rights. This vetting process is ongoing. In addition, we
continue to draw on all sources of information to investigate allegations
to assure that US assistance does not go to units which abuse human
rights.
Beyond saying those remarks, I'm not in a position to be more specific.
QUESTION: Sorry, James, I would like you to - what The Washington Post
said exactly is that the American Government thinks who is behind the
assassination of the three human rights leaders is the 20th Brigade of the
Colombian Army; isn't that right?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I think you heard the last comment I made, which is
that I'm not in a position to be more specific, other than to make the
point that we expect the Colombian Government to immediately, vigorously
and thoroughly investigate the deaths of human rights and political
activists; that we draw on all sources of information to investigate
allegations to assure that our assistance does not go to units which abuse
human rights.
With regard to this specific charge, I'm not in a position to be more
specific.
QUESTION: Yes, a story in the Financial Times today says the United
States is going to announce this week that it's going to waive sanctions on
Total and the rest of them, under ILSA.
MR. RUBIN: That story is absolutely untrue. European Vice President Sir
Leon Brittain confirmed to Under Secretary Eizenstat today the following -
and I quote - "that neither I nor anyone on my behalf said to the Financial
Times reporter that Secretary Albright gave the indications to me as cited
in that article." He added that, "she did not say that to me."
I thought that was rather definitive.
QUESTION: Having said that, Jamie --
MR. RUBIN: Having said that? I mean, that was definitive.
QUESTION: It was. But having said that, you've been saying that you're
close to a decision. Is that still --
MR. RUBIN: It is certainly true that we are nearing a decision on that,
and that we have been consulting with European Governments, including this
past weekend in London, about policies towards Iran and related issues. We
are working vigorously with our European friends and allies to counter
Iranian support for terrorism and Iranian efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction. We are continuing to do so, and we are moving rapidly
towards a decision in the South Pars case that best advances the objectives
of that law.
QUESTION: Jamie, what involvement, if any, or knowledge did the US
Government or State Department have in the shipment of arms by British
company Sandline to the forces of the ousted president of Sierra Leone?
MR. RUBIN: We're certainly going around the world today. This is long,
but let me cut to the chase.
There was a resolution in the Security Council to impose sanctions on the
junta that had taken power in Sierra Leone. UN Resolution 1132 urged all
states - and this is important - to provide technical and logistical
support to assist the Nigerian-led force to carry out its responsibilities
in responding to that.
UN Security Resolution 1162 commended that force on the important role they
were playing in the restoration of peace. The resolution also urged all
states to provide technical and logistical support to assist ECOMOG, the
Nigerian-led force, to continue to carry out its peacekeeping role.
Sandline is a private security firm that protected mining and construction
interests in Sierra Leone. Sandline representatives periodically contacted
State Department officials and commented on the situation in Sierra Leone,
but we are not aware - at least I am not aware - of any information
provided on possible arms shipments. Sandline provides security for private
mining and construction interests, and Sandline employees were among the
few expatriates who remained in Sierra Leone after the coup and provided
the State Department with information on the events in the countryside.
The State Department has encouraged the British Government to take the lead
in coordinating international contributions for logistical and technical
support for that peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone as requested by
Security Council resolutions. And it's my understanding we have never
contemplated or suggested that this logistical support should be provided
by Sandline.
QUESTION: The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and the United Arab Emirates will
be meeting with President Clinton and Mrs. Albright and the Secretary of
Defense and this is the first time a senior high-level official from Abu
Dhabi will visit - make an official visit to Washington. Do you have any
read-out on the purpose of the visit and the agenda, and if the US has
reached a final agreement with them to sell them the F-16 fighters?
MR. RUBIN: As we get closer to the visit we will certainly be happy to
give you some information on the expected agenda, but obviously this is an
important visit.
QUESTION: I'd like to follow up a little bit on the Iran-Libya Sanction
Act. What do you mean exactly by we are moving toward a decision? And why,
if the US is not moving towards deciding not to impose sanctions, why are
Republican senators approaching the government, urging them to --
MR. RUBIN: You certainly have to ask Republican senators - we get a lot
of letters from the Congress and they have to explain their motivations
themselves. I think I would spend my whole day if I tried to assign
motivations to every member of Congress who sends us a letter; and they'll
have to speak for themselves.
But when I said we're moving nearer to a decision, that means we're moving
nearer. We're not months away, but how much closer than that we are I think
we'd like to leave that until we make the decision. I can say that
Secretary Albright has not received a recommendation yet on this subject.
QUESTION: A meeting of Western European Union is taking place today and
yesterday in Greece. Since the Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Solana, is
there, do you expect any - (inaudible) - any breakthrough on Greek-Turkish
relations regarding the confidence-building measures in the Aegean?
MR. RUBIN: We certainly hope that, in that context, that additional
progress will be made in that important area between these two important
NATO allies. But as far as our expectations in this area, they are
chastened by the difficulties that Ambassador Holbrooke had in his most
recent trip with regard to Cyprus. And so it would be hard pressed to be
overly optimistic about any such breakthrough.
QUESTION: I have a follow-up. Since you referred to the difficulty that
Mr. Holbrooke had in Cyprus recently, the US Government and Mr. Holbrooke
personally gave the responsibility for this failure to the Turkish-Cypriot
side and Turkey. Does the State Department agree with Ambassador Holbrooke?
MR. RUBIN: I can assert that Secretary Albright and Ambassador Holbrooke
see the situation identically. However, I think your statement was a little
more complicated than that. He certainly pointed to, as a key problem, the
decision to say that the declaration had to occur in advance and that the
EU had to rescind its willingness to have Cyprus join the EU. But I don't
think he left the other parties blameless.
QUESTION: Actually, that's what I wanted to ask, but since you gave this
answer - Ambassador Miller, who is the Special Coordinator on Cyprus -
MR. RUBIN: And I agree with him, too.
QUESTION: Okay, great. So, in an interview, published yesterday, in
Greece, on -
MR. RUBIN: Well, maybe I don't. What did he say?
(Laughter)
QUESTION: He said that Ankara - and he made it clear, and he said "not
Denktash, Ankara" is to blame for the obstacles in Cyprus. He explained
that that's what Ambassador Holbrooke meant in Nicosia. My question is, do
you subscribe to that position? I take it you do, since you just said that
Miller is right; and I guess that is what your are supposed to say.
Secondly, what is the US doing to make Ankara be more cooperative in
Cyprus?
MR. RUBIN: We work with Turkey, a close ally and friend, on a wide range
of important issues. We speak frankly to each other as good friends. The
Turkish leadership is aware of the importance we attach to the Cyprus
issue. We believe it is in Turkey's national interests to support a Cyprus
settlement.
Primary responsibility for this failure lies with the parties themselves.
But I would urge you, before making sweeping statements about who the
entire 100 percent of the blame belongs to, to take a careful look at
Special Presidential Envoy Richard Holbrooke's press conference. I have a
copy of it here - it's quite long - and I'd be happy to have the press
office make copies for you. Then maybe the statements you report wouldn't
be so sweeping.
QUESTION: Can you bring us up to date on Mr. Holbrooke and Mr. Gelbard's
talks with Mr. Milosevic?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. I just spoke to Ambassador Holbrooke a few moments ago.
He has just left a four-hour meeting with President Milosevic. They had
intensive discussions. Obviously, Ambassador Holbrooke is trying to his
best to deal with what we believe is a very grave situation - and that is
the risk that, if the sides don't turn towards a peaceful solution and
continue to try to resolve this conflict on the battlefield, there are
grave risks to the security of the region and the security of the world
because of the inherent risk that it would spill over into Albania
and from there into other countries of concern and direct material
interest to the United States.
He's engaged in an intensive discussion; he met with President Milosevic on
Saturday for four and a half hours. They flew to Pristina on Sunday and
were in Albania last night. My understanding is they are on their way to
Pristina again, and probably will end up back in Belgrade. So they are in
the middle of an intensive set of discussions designed to pursue the
objectives the Contact Group ministers have laid out, based on the goal of
resolving the situation peacefully before it spins out of control.
QUESTION: Can you tell us whether they are making any progress or whether
it's just intensive? One assumes that since you've brought Holbrooke into
it -- but are they making progress in -
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'd like to leave it to them to comment on their
progress; other than to say that at this point, as you probably can tell
from the public commentary coming out of the region, this is an extremely
difficult enterprise.
QUESTION: Korea. Now, while you all were in Korea, the Secretary issued a
warning that KEDO might be falling apart; the North Koreans were not
getting their oil. Can you update us on that? Has there been a solution to
that particular problem?
MR. RUBIN: We haven't resolved all of the nuances of financing for the
light water reactor and the heavy oil. That's something we're working on
intensively.
Secretary Albright believes that it's extremely important that we bear in
mind the risk that we averted through this important agreement in 1994;
that is, a nuclear-armed North Korea being able to threaten both the Korean
Peninsula, the region and the world. In the absence of this agreement, that
is a genuine, grave risk that we faced. She and her EU partners and Korea
and Japan have all discussed the modalities of ensuring that both the
heavy fuel portion and the light water reactor portion of this agreement
are fulfilled; and we are going to be doing what we can in the coming days
to make that happen.
What I can say is we have fulfilled our part of the Agreed Framework and
will continue to do so, and that we've worked with South Korea and Japan to
create the KEDO organization. They've agreed on an estimated cost of $5.2
billion for the light water reactor. The ROK has agreed to fund 70 percent
of the construction, and Japan a significant part of the project.
Discussions over details of the funding for the rest of the life of the
project continue.
There are a whole bunch more details that I can provide you later. But the
long and the short of it is that the United States has contributed
approximately $86 million to KEDO for heavy fuel oil and administrative
expenses, as well as roughly $30 million for the canning of spent fuel
rods; and we're going to continue to work on this problem. There is a
problem of short-term debt that KEDO is experiencing that is making it
urgent for us to get some early financing.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:50 P.M.)
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