U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #31, 98-03-11
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1207
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Wednesday, March 11, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
ANNOUNCEMENTS/DEPARTMENT
1 U.S. Condemns Attack on Karen refugee camp in Thailand
3,13 Secretary Albright not likely to accompany President
Clinton on his trip to Africa
17 Background briefing this afternoon on Four Party Korea
talks
SERBIA / FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
1-3,5 Contact Group statement requirements/Ten day deadline on
FRY authorities to comply/Russian commitment to the
Contact Group agreement on UN Security Council
consideration of an arms embargo against FRY
3,4 Contact Group meeting on March 25/Secretary Albright's
participation/Possible action at March 25 meeting
3,7-8 Early burials of victims of violence in Kosovo/External
investigation into the violence/Amb. Gelbard conversation
with Pres. Milosevic/International Red Cross access to
Kosovo/International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia role
in investigation
4,5-6 FRY offer of conditional dialogue with Kosovar Albanians /
Participants in a meaningful dialogue/U.S. position on
political definition of Kosovo
4 Definition of "ethnic cleansing"
6 U.S. position on the use of force in Kosovo/International
concerns about the international situation in Kosovo
IRAN
8-9,11 Judicial decision against Iran in the case of a U.S. victim
of a terrorist attack in Israel
9-11 Iranian support of terrorism/USG relationship with
Pres. Khatemi/Requirements for a future U.S.-Iran dialogue
UNITED NATIONS
11-13 Possibility that legislation authorizing the repayment of
U.S. arrears to the UN will include language on family
planning ("Mexico City" language)
SAUDI ARABIA
13-14,18-19 Update on the health of King Fahd
IRAQ
14-15 Structure of UNSCOM relationship with new diplomatic
observer group led by Amb. Dhanapala
15-17 Initial judicial finding that 6 Iraqis are ineligible for
immigration relief in the U.S./Evacuation of Iraqi Kurds
and opposition members in 1996/USG relationship with the
Iraqi opposition
18 Iraqi complaints of U.S. blocking contracts under the
"oil-for-food" program
RUSSIA
17-18 Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meeting/Press conference at
conclusion of meeting
18 U.S. reaction upon Russian ratification of START II treaty
INDONESIA
19-20 Japanese PM Hashimoto to visit Pres. Suharto/IMF compliance
CYPRUS
20 Comments of Turkish community on Cyprus re conditions for
participation in political talks
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #31
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 1998, 1:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to this State Department briefing. I don't
see any of those who traveled with us made it today. That's unfortunate.
But let me start by saying that the United States condemns the attack by
armed elements associated with Burma's State Peace and Development Council -
that's the new name for the SLORC - on unarmed civilians in a care and
refugee camp in Thailand on Tuesday, March 10. We call on the government of
Burma to end its campaign of terror and violence against ethnic minorities,
and instead to engage in dialogue with the ethnic groups and with the
National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Sui Kyi, to bring about
national reconciliation in Burma.
Let's start with a new person - Barry Schweid.
QUESTION: Clarification please, a little logistics. The Contact Group
meeting was in London.
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: You have another meeting here on the 25th.
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: But that's more than a two-week span from the previous one. So
what is, to be literal about it, what is the time span Milosevic has to
shape up or face a move for new sanctions - until the 25th?
MR. RUBIN: He has ten days, according to the Contact Group statement, if
he doesn't take rapid and effective steps to stop the violence - the steps
that are laid out in the statement. These must be done within ten days,
otherwise, the Contact Group will move to further international measures.
The measure identified is the freeze on assets.
So this is an ongoing process. The decision was made by five countries -
Italy, France, the United Kingdom and the United States and Germany - to
impose that additional step, the freeze on assets. That decision was made
now to be triggered if he fails to follow through on the steps required.
QUESTION: But requiring the UN Security Council to --
MR. RUBIN: Well, this is to be determined. There are some - let me try to
do the best I can with this. This was a very rapidly moving situation. When
the Secretary got on the plane to go to the first leg of her trip, there
was no package of sanctions in her brief. These were sanctions that were
developed on the aircraft by her and her advisors, in the face of an
ongoing situation. So the kinds of steps - an arms embargo, a ban on
equipment that could be used for repression, a visa ban, as well as the
prohibition on government financing - are steps that can be taken
without a Security Council resolution, if countries so choose. And
the first step in building international support for this stiff response
was to get the Contact Group countries to endorse them.
That endorsement occurred on those four; it occurred on the fifth, to be
triggered in ten days. And now the Contact Group members are working
assiduously to implement those measures. In the first case - the arms
embargo - there is expected to be Security Council consideration of an arms
embargo. The point there is not so much that the European countries and the
United States transfer arms to Serbia, but rather we have some concerns
that the Russian Government may begin some military cooperation in this
area, and that other governments around the world may, in the aftermath of
the Dayton accords, begin pouring weapons into Serbia. So we would be
working to develop a Security Council resolution to prohibit that.
On the asset freeze, this is a complicated technical issue that the
treasury departments of governments are now consulting on. Some governments
believe that it needs the action of the Security Council before it could
implement that; others believe it could be implemented without that. That's
what we're working on right now.
QUESTION: One question - on the weapons, is it your understanding that
Russia is going along only so far as having it considered by the Security
Council, presumably to abide by any decision?
MR. RUBIN: You'll have to have the Russian representatives give you their
formal position. But given the tenor of the meeting, the discussion that
was had, the discussion the Secretary had with Foreign Minister Primakov, I
would be surprised if the Russian Government blocked an imposition of a
Security Council resolution; and doubly surprised, if that resolution were
passed, that they were to break that resolution.
QUESTION: Do you understand a $1.5 million deal - did you understand
whatever ban there might be applies prospectively; or would it apply also
to that recent --
MR. RUBIN: You're talking about the telephone system with the Italians.
QUESTION: Right.
MR. RUBIN: That is something --
QUESTION: No, the Russian weapons deal. There's also the telephone
deal.
MR. RUBIN: Well, I didn't make any specific comment on a specific number
of Russian weaponry. If there was a ban on arms sales --
QUESTION: That's the question.
MR. RUBIN: That would apply, once the ban was in place. I am not aware of
any transfers of arms. I am aware there are discussions about resuming a
military relationship. So long as the arms embargo were to be put into
effect prior to the transfers, it would b prospective, in the sense that
these embargoes, as my --
QUESTION: It's the delivery, not the contract.
MR. RUBIN: Correct. These embargoes would prohibit the transfer of
weaponry. If that weaponry hadn't yet been transferred, it would then apply
prospectively.
QUESTION: Fine. One fast last question. Meeting's here the 25th. I think
that's a conflict with the trip to Africa. Will the Secretary be, do you
think, at the Contact Group meeting; or do you know at this point?
MR. RUBIN: The decision as to whether that meeting will be a Foreign
Minister-level meeting or political directors, or perhaps at the special
envoy level, has not been determined. I think it's become clear during the
course of the day that the Secretary is not likely to go on the trip with
the President to Africa. So that would not be a conflict for her, if it
were a foreign ministers' meeting.
QUESTION: Jamie, two things. Why isn't the Secretary going to Africa,
since that's been - that subject has been introduced? And then I have a
second question.
MR. RUBIN: The Secretary has to make her decisions based on a number of
factors - scheduling, timing, other events, budgetary pressures, the work
that needs to be done here in Washington. She and the President and Mr.
Berger and others talked about the various pros and cons of her being on
the trip. At this point it looks like the pros of her staying in Washington
or being available for other activities outweigh the cons of her not going.
So that's where we are right now. I consider it unlikely that she will
go; but it's some days away, and that decision can always be revisited.
QUESTION: And have you seen any evidence that Milosevic has done what the
Contact Group called for him to do, which is to pull back from military
actions?
MR. RUBIN: No, on the contrary. What we've seen is an outrageous decision
by the Serbian police to conduct early burials. These are burials that were
conducted without the approval of the families. This action suggests that
President Milosevic has something to hide. We are concerned that the
burials have destroyed and damaged evidence before it could be properly
examined by independent forensic experts.
Bob Gelbard requested that the families be able to have the bodies examined
by outside authorities. This was a message the Contact Group made with
regard to outside information being made available. This is another
demonstration of the intransigence and flouting of the will of the
international community by President Milosevic. It's this kind of
uncooperative behavior that undermines the prospect for meaningful dialogue
in Kosovo, and that raises serious doubts as to whether he will take the
steps that the Contact Group has called for.
QUESTION: Jamie, on that point, Milosevic's government, I think last
night, did offer the resumption of dialogue with the Albanians on no
conditions except that they give up their desire for independence. I'm just
wondering, do you regard that as a serious offer or just a cynical one, in
light of what else they've done?
MR. RUBIN: Again, "no conditions except" is a formulation that doesn't
make a lot of sense to me.
Let me say this - we and the Contact Group members believe that both sides -
- the Serbian authorities, as well as the representatives of the Kosovar
Albanians- must get into a meaningful political dialogue without preconditions.
This is a situation that can spin out of control. This is a situation that
Secretary Albright is determined to do what she can to prevent from
spinning out of control. Belgrade's offer, as reported and described by you,
is woefully inadequate, even if it signals the possibility of dialogue.
What we want is both sides to make clear that they are prepared to talk
their way through this problem so the kinds of atrocities that we saw - the
ethnic cleansing that we saw over the last week - is not repeated, and the
people of the region get their legitimate rights met and the Serbian
Government gets its legitimate desire for its territorial integrity to be
protected.
That's not going to be resolved by making preconditions or by burying
bodies before investigators get a chance to look at it.
QUESTION: When you say ethnic cleansing, would you define that as what
you've seen in the last week as ethnic cleansing? What makes that ethnic
cleansing?
MR. RUBIN: Well, at the risk of getting into an extensive discussion with
someone who may be the world's greatest expert on the subject, let me say
this - that when civilians and people are targeted and killed based on
their ethnicity and driven out of their homes based on their ethnicity,
that is, in my book, ethnic cleansing.
QUESTION: Jamie, you've given President Milosevic an ultimatum, a
deadline to which he needs to respond or reverse course. You just said that
he's not starting off on the right foot, and the question, then, that comes
to mind is, what happens after the 25th, should the results you're looking
for you don't get? And what - is the Contact Group prepared to take swift
and firm action - firmer action - against him? Or are you going to wait
this out for two more weeks?
MR. RUBIN: If I'm not mistaken, today is March 11. March 25 is two weeks
from now. I'm not going to be in a position to project for you what steps
will be considered at a meeting two weeks from now. What I can point you to
is the statement by the Contact Group, talking about firmer measures that
would be applied, including the asset freeze that was discussed. Foreign
Minister Primakov, himself, indicated that they would take a look at
the third and fourth of the steps that the other five countries support
now - namely, the ban on government financing for privatizations and the
prohibition on visas for senior officials responsible.
So those are three issues that have already been identified. Beyond saying
that we have a number of options available to us, and that we are not
ruling any of them out, I am not in a position to project what we will
decide to do two weeks from now.
QUESTION: Jaime, let's go back to your statement that you think there
should be a meaningful dialogue between the two sides without preconditions.
How does that - I thought the US position was there can be no statehood for
Kosovo; there can be enhanced autonomy. But you seem to be saying that both
sides should come to the table without ruling that out. Can you square
that?
MR. RUBIN: If people want to come to the table and talk, they can do
that. We've seen that all over the world -- parties that had diametrically-
opposed positions that managed to find a way to sit down and talk without
giving up their positions. If they want to have a discussion, they will
have to move off their maximal demands publicly in order to begin a
meaningful dialogue.
It is not new for us to take the view that if we want to solve a problem,
that it's better to have it solved at the negotiating table rather than
solved on the killing field. It is our view that the way to do this is for
the sides to move off their maximum demands; sit down and negotiate
arrangements, including the implementation of the education agreements that
were negotiated in the past; and that that doesn't require people to give
up their positions - it requires them to sit down and talk about how we can
make progress peacefully, rather than see more killings and more death.
QUESTION: Just to clear - I want to be absolutely clear. You're not
saying that statehood should be on the table?
MR. RUBIN: I'm sure you're familiar with our position on this subject;
and let me say what our position is.
QUESTION: I'm familiar with yesterday.
MR. RUBIN: Well, it's still the same position. I can assure you it didn't
change between yesterday and today. Our view is that the Kosovar Albanians
have a right to greater self-administration; they have legitimate political
rights that ought to be respected. We do not believe in the independence of
Kosovo, but that doesn't mean that one can't sit down and begin to talk
about practical ways to improve the lives and enact the legitimate rights
of the people of the region without requiring a complete resolution
to every issue of principle that exists. This is a standard problem
around the world that, if people want to see violence ensue, they can stick
to their maximum demands. Or they can decide that they care about the
welfare of their people, and they can sit down and start improving
it.
QUESTION: Is the Administration ready to restate what the previous
Administration had said on using the threat of force to prevent violent
repression of Albanians in the region?
MR. RUBIN: The best answer I can provide to you is that this is a matter
of the most seriousness to the President and the Secretary of State. This
is an area of the world that, if it spins out of control, can affect the
vital interests of our allies in NATO. It's a grave matter; and in that
situation, we have many options available to us. And I'm not going to rule
any option out.
QUESTION: So I guess President Bush's Christmas warning is still
government policy?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not in a position to discuss in detail the nature of any
warnings that may have been issued through diplomatic channels.
QUESTION: On the Security Council deliberations, there's a report that
opposition to putting all the blame on the Serbian side, coming from a
surprising source, the Chinese. Is that in fact the case?
MR. RUBIN: Say that again.
QUESTION: That the Chinese are objecting to what they consider to be an
unbalanced placing of responsibilities on Yugoslavia. They think that
Kosovo bears part of the responsibility and should, therefore, take some of
the consequences.
MR. RUBIN: Without purporting to describe the Chinese position for the
Chinese Government, let me say this - we do not believe this is an internal
matter. We, in the Security Council, in many past cases, we have made clear
that if a situation within a country that we accept its boundaries risks
spinning out of control and affecting the international peace and security
of the neighbors, that it is a matter that is legitimately to be discussed
and perhaps decided upon by the Security Council.
This is one of those cases where the scenarios are quite familiar to all of
you. We have a situation where Albanian refugees from Kosovo could find
themselves in one of the neighboring countries. One of those neighboring
countries may feel that it needs to go to protect that country. That is why
the Albanian Government had asked for a meeting in Brussels with the NATO
alliance - to discuss how to ensure that stability in that area can be
protected.
So whatever the Chinese Government position may or may not be - and it
certainly wouldn't surprise me if they took the position that anything that
happens within a country is an internal matter - that it is our view that
it's a legitimate subject for consultation in the Security Council.
QUESTION: New subject?
MR. RUBIN: Just a minute.
QUESTION: Mr. Gelbard, I believe, certainly publicly and maybe also to
Milosevic directly, said he wanted an investigation of the earlier
atrocities, ten days ago. I just wanted - clearly, by the Serbs burying the
dead in a mass grave that's a kind of a response. But what did Milosevic
tell Gelbard? Did he agree to some kind of outside investigation?
MR. RUBIN: I don't believe Ambassador Gelbard has talked about the
details of his discussion with President Milosevic, other than to say that
it was a very difficult discussion and that he laid it on the line with
regard to the American views and the views of the Contact Group members,
and that we have - I can certainly say from this podium - we've seen no
evidence other than this woefully inadequate discussion of possible
dialogue, that President Milosevic has got the message and is going to
start talking rather than ordering the killing of Albanians.
QUESTION: But the question of the investigation - what kind of an
investigation would the United States like to have into the circumstances
of the deaths of --
MR. RUBIN: Well, we could start with the ICRC to find out what happened.
We've made clear that we believe that this is under the authority of the
International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia; that Justice Arbour has made
clear that she believes this fits under her purview. The statute setting up
the Tribunal specifically talks about actions on the territory of the
former Yugoslavia, which this clearly is. So this is within her purview.
Normally in cases like these, what you're looking for are outside groups to
be able to go in and find out what happened. The ICRC would be a very good
start.
QUESTION: But do you know what happened at the ICRC today?
MR. RUBIN: I think I've made clear that we haven't seen the kind of
response from President Milosevic and his authorities to allow the outside
groups to go in. We want them to be able to go in.
QUESTION: They closed down their office in Pristina because they were
getting death threats - a serious number of death threats. So they've
actually pulled out, and --
MR. RUBIN: That doesn't mean that the ICRC wouldn't be in a position to
investigate if it was made available. The problem isn't available
investigators or fact-finders; the problem is access. And that's our
problem, not the availability of people trying to go into it.
QUESTION: Just to clarify, you say that Milosevic is facing the prospect
of war crimes prosecution over there?
MR. RUBIN: I did not say that that would necessarily apply to President
Milosevic. I said that the United States believes, and the Contact Group
statement makes clear, that we invite the International Tribunal to see
whether it believes that crimes against humanity, violations of international
humanitarian law have occurred there; and if so, they can proceed with
their investigations. And where that leads is up to the Tribunal.
QUESTION: Excuse me, but your agony and your despair or the State
Department's with Milosevic seems to be accelerating. I wanted to give you
one more swing. In a long answer to Roy, you ended up with the phrase, "or
order the killing of Albanians." Were the killings - you were on the road
when this broke out, I believe, and the State Department was very careful,
as it always is at the beginning, until all the facts are in place, to be
outraged by killing; to be outraged by civilian victims - not necessarily
putting direct blame on the Serbs.
MR. RUBIN: I think I know where you're going.
QUESTION: Okay --
MR. RUBIN: Barry, I think I know where you're going. Let me --
QUESTION: Is Milosevic - does the State Department - you can say anything
you want, and you can take back anything you said, because you didn't say
he ordered the killing.
MR. RUBIN: I specifically --
QUESTION: But I'm inviting you to clarify whether he was responsible for
the killings that have occurred already.
MR. RUBIN: All right, there's a difference between legal responsibility
in terms of --
QUESTION: I'm talking about war crimes.
MR. RUBIN: -- in terms of the War Crimes Tribunal or in other legal terms,
and political responsibility. Clearly, these acts were taken by the Serbian
police. Clearly, the Serbian police ultimately operate under the authority
of the president of the country. So if President Milosevic does not want
these policemen to engage in these tactics, I suspect he would be able to
find a way to prevent it.
QUESTION: This morning, Jamie, a federal judge here entered a $247
million judgment against the government of Iran in a case brought by an
American woman who was a victim of one of those terrorist attacks in
Israel. This is the first act of this new law that Senator Lautenberg is
sponsoring. Does this help or hinder these very cautious and carefully-
worded sort of diplomatic messages to Iran that have been coming from the
Administration? And is the Administration prepared to force this judgment?
MR. RUBIN: The judgment was, as you know, handed down late this morning,
and we have not had a chance to review the opinion in great detail. We
can't, therefore, comment specifically on the court's findings.
However, we do believe it is a fact, in our view, that Iran has provided
financial and other support for organizations, like Palestinian Islamic
Ji'had, that have carried out violent acts of terrorism. We condemn
terrorism strongly. As you know, the question of Iran's support for
terrorism is one of the key issues that we have between our two countries.
We have not detected a pattern of activity on the part of Iran that
indicates that they have terminated that support. We are hoping that the
words that President Khatami used at the time of his public statement to
the people of the United States, which were encouraging words about their
views on terrorism, will be followed by a change in the pattern of activity
that we think constitutes support for terrorist organizations.
Our policy doesn't get affected by court judgments. Our policy is to try to
encourage and induce these changes in behavior. We believe the best way to
resolve the differences we have with the Iranian Government on terrorism,
on weapons of mass destruction, is through direct dialogue -- as well as
the Middle East peace process. We believe that these issues can be overcome
through this dialogue.
As far as what we would do to enforce the judgment of this court, because
we haven't had an opinion - an opportunity to study it completely, we're
not in a position to make a judgment as to what its legal implications are
for the Department of State. This event is not a surprise to us. Our former
US Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Phil Wilcox, met with the family and
their attorneys last summer and discussed the April '95 attack, as well as
Iranian-sponsored terrorism generally, with them.
So court opinions, in our view, are not going to change our policy; and our
policy is that these are major problems between our countries, but they are
problems that we believe can be overcome through direct dialogue.
QUESTION: Jamie, do --
MR. RUBIN: Do you have a follow-up?
QUESTION: If you read what Assistant Secretary Indyk said yesterday, and
what the President and the Secretary of State have said over the past
couple of months, it seems to me that the Administration has been careful
not to avoid doing things or having the United States do things that would
undermine any inclination on the part of President Khatami to, shall we say,
move back toward the mainstream of the international community. Does this
judgment get in the way of that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, that remains to be seen. We are still studying the
judgment, and I can't possibly answer the question of what we would or
would not have to do under a judgment until we've been able to examine
it.
But I guess the point I would make is that this kind of situation is not a
surprise, in that we have long said that the support by Iran for terrorist
groups, like the one that apparently committed this act, is a major problem
for us. But we have also said that the best way to overcome this problem is
through direct dialogue, and we have made clear that we are intrigued and
encouraged not only by the election of President Khatami, not only by his
ability to get a cabinet through the parliament, but by the statements
that he made in public. And as well, Secretary Albright has said that in
the case of the Middle East peace process, there is greater space for
Chairman Arafat to operate in the Arab world, and that is an encouraging
sign.
But what we're looking for in the case of terrorism, which is the key issue
here, is a pattern of behavior; and so far, we have not seen a pattern of
activity that indicates they have terminated support for these terrorist
groups.
QUESTION: Just on that brief point, as you said a couple months ago, US
officials, the Secretary were saying that Arafat had told them - had been
told by an intermediary, whatever - that the Iranians were willing to give
him more leeway in negotiations. This is a few months ago. This bombing
took place four or five years ago. Now you're saying you're seeing no
change in Iranian behavior. So are you saying --
MR. RUBIN: I'm trying to be as careful as I can --
QUESTION: Hold on --
MR. RUBIN: Okay.
QUESTION: So apparently in spite of these words, pledges, whatever, from
the Iranians to Arafat, they are continuing to try to undermine - to carry
out, support extreme groups in Gaza and the West Bank.
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me distinguish between the three issues, and let's
put weapons of mass destruction aside for the moment and focus on the other
two, which is opposition to the Middle East peace process and support for
terrorist organizations.
We, as you know, like to judge things by actions not words. One of the
indicators that we think is a fair indicator of Iran's support or lack of
support for the Middle East peace process is the extent to which the
designated negotiator, Chairman Arafat, is in a position to conduct
negotiations and have the support of the Arab world and others who are
important in that part of the world, like the Iranian Government.
Secretary Albright said that she believes that Chairman Arafat has greater
space in which to operate because of the changed statements and actions of
the Iranian Government in this discreet indicator, including when he went
to Tehran for the OIC meeting, the meetings he had there, and the lack of
criticism that he received and his general view that he is in a better
position to operate.
There is another aspect to this Middle East peace process, and that is
support for terrorist groups not just in the Middle East, but also - not
just those groups that attack the peace process through terrorist acts, but
support terrorism outside of the Middle East peace process. We have not
seen a pattern of activity in the area of support for terrorist groups that
indicates that they have terminated support. But that doesn't mean that one
can't acknowledge and make clear that in one indicator of the support
for the Middle East peace process, that there have been some modest
signs.
QUESTION: Jamie, on the specific case that this judgment deals with,
clearly a judge has decided that there is enough evidence to make him
believe - him or her believe - I don't know, I haven't read the judgment -
that Iran was behind this particular, or supported this particular act of
terrorism. Does the US Government believe that Iran was behind or supported
this particular act of terrorism?
MR. RUBIN: Again, we would have to study this particular judgment, and I
would have to get a considered answer to the question of how we --
QUESTION: No, I'm not asking about the judgment. I'm asking about the
particular incident of terrorism.
MR. RUBIN: Right, and if I were in a position to tell you in an
unclassified forum what our view was of this, I would have done so in the
previous ten minutes of discussion. But I can say this - that we believe
that it is a fact, a well-known fact, that Iran has in the past provided
financial and other support for organizations like Palestinian Ji'had that
have carried out violent acts of terrorism.
QUESTION: Jamie, on a different subject --
MR. RUBIN: One more, and then we'll switch subjects. Go ahead.
QUESTION: One of the points that was brought up this morning after the
judge handed down his decree was a suggestion by Senator Lautenberg and
others that this provides a legal precedent that's likely - that they
believe is likely and should encourage similar lawsuits. They particularly
mentioned the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. What
would the State Department's view of additional suits of this type be?
Would that be a --
MR. RUBIN: The State Department's view of additional suits would be
significantly affected by the State Department's considered judgment of
this legal opinion. Until we have done so, it would therefore be hard to
make such a sweeping generalization.
QUESTION: Different subjects? The Administration was notified by the Hill
today that there are a group of Congressmen who are going to attach the
Mexico language, the abortion language, to the State Department funding
request for the UN, for IMF, and for other important foreign policy
legislation. How serious do you think this matter is?
MR. RUBIN: We think it's a very serious matter. Secretary Albright
believes that to hold national security legislation hostage to a political
issue like family planning is bad for the United States. It undermines our
ability to operate at the United Nations and, frankly, our view is that
those who would hold this money hostage should let the UN money go. It's
bad for our national security to make these linkages, and the fact is it's
undemocratic for people to hold our national security legislation hostage
rather than letting the votes be tallied. Secretary Albright has made
clear that the democratic way is for an issue of principle like this to be
voted up or down and, meanwhile, to let the nation's foreign policy and
national security business carry on. Without the money that the United
States owes the United Nations, it is harder and harder for us to achieve
support in New York for the goals that the American people expect us to be
pursuing, including containment of the government of Iraq and protecting us
against their weapons of mass destruction, including stopping terrorism
around the world, including a number of activities the UN pursues. It's
harder and harder for us to be able to pursue those legitimate national
security objectives when members of Congress hold legislation hostage to a
family planning dispute.
QUESTION: She was told several times on the Hill in the last couple of
weeks that this was going to happen and that this Administration was either
going to have to deal on this issue or this was going to continue to happen
and the funds were going to continue to be held up. Are there plans for
this Administration to deal or do you think this is just their playing --
MR. RUBIN: Well, we don't know what is going to happen, and what we know
is that this is wrong, and that is our view.
QUESTION: Jamie, just to pursue that, is there any room for compromise as
far as the Administration is concerned? Again, to repeat Betsy, last week
Secretary Albright was told by Chairman Callahan to face the reality that
they would have to deal with it.
MR. RUBIN: I think that Congress ought to face the reality that by
holding up legislation affecting our national security that they are
harming the foreign policy interests of the United States by failing to
provide the money that will increase our leverage in New York in the fight
against terrorism and the fight against rogue states like Iraq.
QUESTION: But if both of you remain inflexible, you just said yourself
that our national security shouldn't be held up by this legislation. And it
seems to me when both sides are at loggerheads, one would want to re-look
at the situation. And Congress has said that for now they are not going to
do that.
MR. RUBIN: The situation can be re-looked at if the members of Congress
will understand that we are prepared to have the votes cast on positions of
principle that differ. That's the democratic way. When you disagree about
something, you vote on it up or down, and not to link the legitimate
national security interests of the United States to an unrelated dispute
over family planning.
QUESTION: Jamie, the Administration is going to remain obdurate in their
position and they're not going to deal with --
MR. RUBIN: I'm saying that the United States Administration believes that
this is harming our national security to link family planning, an issue of
principle, to the pursuit of our national security objectives in the
Security Council in New York on matters like Iraq, on matters of isolating
rogue states. And the sooner that this legislation - this hostage is
released, the better off the national security of the United States will
be.
QUESTION: Is this one of those issues that is keeping her here and
preventing her from going on the Africa trip?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, there are a whole number of issues built into
this calculation, and I don't want to tie them to any one. But this is
certainly one of the issues that she believes that she needs to continue to
work on with members of Congress
QUESTION: Do you have an update on King Fahd's condition?
MR. RUBIN: The government of Saudi Arabia has told us that press reports
of the King having had surgery are erroneous. The Saudis also advised us
that King Fahd is in stable condition and his health is improving. We wish
him a continuing and rapid recovery.
QUESTION: Now, can I follow up on that, please? The press reports
certainly that emanated from here yesterday occurred because the State
Department said that it understood that the King had surgery. When that
statement was made, was that based on knowledge that the US had or is that
based on press reports that weren't acknowledged at the time?
MR. RUBIN: That statement, made by my able deputy, was not the best
statement he ever made.
QUESTION: Is that the same one that's your current deputy?
MR. RUBIN: And he's still my current deputy. In short, I believe that
statement - you know how you are always trying to get us to comment based
on what's the latest thing on the wires. Occasionally, we make our
statements here based on wire reports and we will do our best to refrain in
the future from responding in real time to issues at the risk of then being
told that we made a mistake.
QUESTION: So what's wrong with King Fahd?
QUESTION: Excuse me, can I follow up on that?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: So that statement was in error? Is that what you're saying?
That the United States did not have independent information that the King
had undergone surgery? I'm sorry, I don't really want to make a deal out of
it but -
MR. RUBIN: You don't? It seems like you do.
QUESTION: No. I mean, it's important for us who think it's important to
get it right.
MR. RUBIN: Right. I said what I said today. There has been some work gone
into these three sentences, considered work over the last 24 hours. The
first sentence that I read to you, "The government of Saudi Arabia has told
us that press reports of the King having had surgery are erroneous. The
Saudis also advised us that King Fahd is in stable condition and his health
is improving." If we didn't think that was the best of our knowledge, I
would add something to that.
QUESTION: All right. Can I ask you another subject?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) that one.
MR. RUBIN: Thank you, Mr. Schweid.
QUESTION: The Sri Lankan. Well, I was going to ask you -
MR. RUBIN: Mr. Foley thanks you as well.
QUESTION: I was wondering what you thought the state of his health was,
if he had a cold or something, because he has been apparently ill; however,
leaders never get ill.
The Sri Lankan diplomat going to Baghdad or gone to Baghdad, who does he
report to - the Security Council or to Kofi Annan?
MR. RUBIN: The structure of the relationship is as follows. There are
over 20 commissioners of the special commission, of which Dhanapala,
Ambassador Dhanapala, is now a commissioner. That commission is headed by
the Executive Chairman, Ambassador Butler.
QUESTION: Right.
MR. RUBIN: And so, therefore, the work of Ambassador Dhanapala's special
group is done under the authority of the special commission. We have very
clear assurances that that work will be done and reported to the council
through Ambassador Butler. Now, there has always been a technical fact that
Ambassador Butler sends his reports to the Security Council with a cover
note from the Secretary General saying, I hereby transmit the report of
Ambassador Butler. That has been going on for seven years. I would
expect that to continue.
With respect to how his inspectors will work and who they will take their
lead from, the inspectors in this special group will be experts. The
diplomats will merely observe. So those experts will come from one of two
organizations, either UNSCOM, the UN Special Commission for the Chemical,
Biological and Missiles, or the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy
Agency for the nuclear account. Those inspectors will be led in their work
at each of the sites by a team leader who will be a member of UNSCOM or
the IAEA.
So the long and short of it is that Ambassador Dhanapala operates under the
authority of the Executive Chairman, Ambassador Butler, and was selected,
like Ambassador Butler was selected, by the Secretary General.
QUESTION: Yeah, but it really - you know, not - that doesn't exactly
answer the question. It's the structure. I understand the structure.
MR. RUBIN: All right.
QUESTION: And you understand what we're asking. Is he Kofi Annan's agent
there to report to Kofi Annan, who seems to have another view of the
dispute than the US has educated the public what the issues are?
MR. RUBIN: The answer is that Ambassador Butler is Kofi Annan's agent as
well, because Ambassador Butler was selected by Kofi Annan under that
theory. So the short answer is we don't believe that there is a problem in
the agreement or the procedures set forth to implement the agreement. The
problem isn't going to come in those procedures. The problem will come if
Iraq violates those procedures.
QUESTION: Jamie, there apparently has been a court ruling that will
result in the deportation of six members of the Iraqi National Congress or
the Iraqi opposition, where generally - first of all, what can you tell us
that you know about the details of this, and what does that do to the
Administration's efforts to work better with the Iraqi opposition, as
stated some weeks ago?
MR. RUBIN: Let me give you a little background for people to understand
it properly. It's a very complex issue. After Saddam Hussein brutally
struck into northern Iraq in September 1996, a large number of Iraqis, most
of whom had close connections to the United States, sought our protection.
With the help of the government of Turkey, the United States Government
evacuated over 6,500 Iraqis, mostly Kurds, from Iraq to Guam and then to
the United States. These were mostly Iraqis who were associated with
humanitarian programs in northern Iraq.
This was an honorable and humanitarian effort to protect Iraqis who would
otherwise have been harmed by Saddam's troops. We were aware at the time
that Saddam had many infiltrators in northern Iraq, and to the extent we
could, we would quickly review the backgrounds of these individuals prior
to the evacuation. But because of the urgent circumstances surrounding the
evacuation, we deferred complete background checks. Once the individuals
arrived in Guam, further background investigations were completed
and 25 individuals were identified as persons we believe to pose threats
to our national security. The INS placed these individuals into exclusion
proceedings on the grounds that they could pose a threat to the national
security. They were brought to California for hearings before immigration
judges. These cases are in various stages of the immigration process.
Yesterday, a judge found that six of these individuals were ineligible for
immigration relief based on classified information developed by the US
Government indicating that these individuals posed a danger to our national
security. No final decisions have been made about what the US Government
will do if the exclusion orders in these cases become final. Further
questions about the disposition of these six need to be directed at the
Justice Department.
With respect to how this will affect the prospect of working with
opposition groups, let me say that we have no doubt that the people of Iraq
and the rest of the world would be better off with a new government in
Baghdad, but such an effort is a long-term process and involves many costs
and risks. We have worked with the Iraqi opposition in the past and we are
actively considering ways to do so more effectively in the future. The
Senate, as you know, has put forward some ideas. Some of those are very
interesting to us and we are carefully reviewing them. For example,
Radio Free Iraq is an interesting idea that we are examining.
With regard to humanitarian assistance, this is complicated by the fact
that we have just increased the quota for northern Iraq to $682 million in
humanitarian assistance, and before providing any humanitarian assistance
to such an area, we would want to make sure we were using the money
wisely.
With regard to war crimes, we have supported the calls for an investigation
into the Iraqi regime's war crimes, crimes against humanity, and possible
genocide. In short, there are a lot of ideas out there. We are exploring
them and I don't think the disposition of these cases has any impact on our
ability to work more effectively with the Iraqi opposition that has been -
it's been difficult to work with in the past.
QUESTION: I'm sorry, if I may follow up. You started off with 25 and then
six had sort of reached this level. Do you know what happened to the
balance?
MR. RUBIN: You'll have to check with the Department of Justice on
that.
QUESTION: Do you think that these six necessarily face retaliation or
that their lives may be in danger?
MR. RUBIN: Again, the Department of Justice, in coordination with other
agencies, will obviously be deciding what to do with them. And when those
decisions are made - no final decisions have been made - we'll be in a
position to judge or to explain why we took whatever actions we decide to
take.
QUESTION: You're saying then that these six people were identified as
infiltrators, Iraqi agents?
MR. RUBIN: I didn't say that.
QUESTION: No, you said that we were aware at the time that Saddam had
many infiltrators in northern Iraq, then you described 25 people who were
identified as such and singled out.
MR. RUBIN: No, I didn't say that. Sid, if you're going to read real
carefully and try to catch me, then you should really listen more
carefully. I said that we were aware that Saddam had infiltrators in the
north and we wanted to review people's backgrounds. We didn't have a
chance. When I got to a description of why 25 were isolated, I did not say
that they were isolated because they were, you know, infiltrated by Saddam
Hussein. I said that we believe they posed a threat to our national
security.
QUESTION: So are you saying they were not -- you're just not commenting
on that?
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: Do we have the Korea briefing coming right after this?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. In the back, yes.
QUESTION: Jamie, among the ideas that the Administration is considering
in terms of supporting Iraqi opposition -- of people in the Iraqi
opposition, would supplying arms be one of them?
MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry. Please repeat the question.
QUESTION: You listed several ideas like Radio Free Iraq that the
Administration is looking at and possibly considering for support to help
the Iraqi opposition. Would supporting -- or giving weapons to the
opposition also be one of those efforts?
MR. RUBIN: The question of how we would implement any decision to more
effectively support the opposition is something that is under discussion. I
wouldn't be in a position to describe what tactics we might pursue.
QUESTION: Do you have anything to say about the Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting
and whether there had been any progress on the missile issue in particular?
MR. RUBIN: What I have to say on that is that there will be a press
conference at 4:45p.m. in Room 450 of the Old Executive -
QUESTION: It's 5:30 p.m., isn't it? Are you sure?
MR. RUBIN: I was just - 5:30 p.m. was crossed out and 4:45 p.m. was
written in. So, hopefully, my able deputy wrote that in correctly.
QUESTION: Which one is that?
MR. RUBIN: So I have no comment during an ongoing discussion, and they
will report.
QUESTION: Well, when they (inaudible) START treaty will be ratified, will
you throw your hat in the air again? The Administration?
MR. RUBIN: No, we will throw our hat in the air when the START treaty is
ratified, Barry, as you know. In fact, I doubt we'll throw our hat in the
air at all.
QUESTION: You ought to be pretty tired of it by now.
MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry. Betsy, then Sid.
QUESTION: Iraq yesterday complained that the US was holding up goods
under the oil for food program yet again. Would you agree with their
assessment?
MR. RUBIN: This is another example of Iraq making outrageous allegations
that are not supported by the facts. Since the beginning of the oil for
food program over a year ago, more than 2,400 requests for importation of
humanitarian goods to both the northern and southern parts of Iraq have
been reviewed. Nearly 97 percent of all applications have been approved.
Fewer than 2 percent have been denied. At this time, under phase three of
the program, 144 applications have been approved, four applications are on
hold. Not one has been denied.
The reason why the program has slowed down is because Iraq decided not to
export oil to fill up the bank accounts that control the money that can be
used for humanitarian assistance, and I believe there is a significant
backlog. The UN has over $500 million in contracts ready for approval but
awaiting receipts of funds from oil sales. So if there is a slowdown and if
they are suffering in Iraq, it is the direct cause of Saddam Hussein's
regime, again demonstrating that it cares more about enriching the regime
than it does about purchasing humanitarian supplies.
Sid.
QUESTION: Just to go back to King Fahd. I don't mean to hold anybody up
to any sort of scrutiny because we all know that a lot of people sign off
on this guidance; it's not just one person. Are you saying - there are some
very, very detailed reports from the region talking about - and officials
in this town confirming - that an American team performed some sort of
procedure on King Fahd yesterday.
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: Now, perhaps the Saudis don't think that procedure qualifies as
surgery but, you know, today you are sort of carrying - allowing them to
pass their message through you.
MR. RUBIN: Well, I wouldn't say it that way. What we are trying to do is
answer your question about what we know about King Fahd's health. It's my
understanding that what we said yesterday was based on a press report that
we believe not to be true. Which press report it was we'll have to get you
after the briefing. But we're trying to answer your question about what we
know about his health, and the answer is what the Saudi government has
told us, that the press reports of the King having surgery are erroneous,
that the King is in stable condition and his health is improving. And that
is what we can say today about the state of the health of King Fahd.
QUESTION: Well, that doesn't mean that he didn't have surgery or some
medical procedure which elsewhere might be described as surgery.
MR. RUBIN: I don't know how to answer that.
QUESTION: And that's what you're basing your knowledge on is what the
Saudis are telling you, so as far as your understanding is that you're
accepting -
MR. RUBIN: Should I bring someone out here? Then you can flay him
publicly if it will make everybody feel better.
QUESTION: Jamie, that's not the point, Jamie. You know, it was said as
fact from this podium based on the building that the King of Saudi Arabia,
a man who controls a great deal of oil -
MR. RUBIN: It was "understanding." The word that was used yesterday was
"our understanding." And our understanding today is that the Saudi
government has told us what they've told us, and I've reported that to
you.
QUESTION: So you haven't contacted any team of American doctors?
MR. RUBIN: I have no information on that. I'll have to get it for
you.
QUESTION: Different subject?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: On Asia and Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto is going
to Jakarta on the 14th and the 15th and meeting with Indonesian President
Soeharto. What would you expect of the Japanese Prime Minister this time
and what is your understanding of the current political situation in
Indonesia?
MR. RUBIN: Well, our hope obviously is that any leader who discusses the
matters of the economy with the Indonesian President will stress the
importance of Indonesia carrying out the program the IMF has laid out for
it. And we believe that the IMF has built in flexibility into that program
and the Indonesians have been given an opportunity to agree on modifications.
We have been concerned, we in the United States and the IMF have been,
about the humanitarian impact of the current crisis. So, again, what we
want is anyone who has discussions with the Indonesian leadership to
emphasize that there must be a credible reform program and that we
hope that President Soeharto chooses a cabinet that includes a strong
economic team as a signal of his intention to implement fully Indonesia's
IMF economic reform program.
And as far as we know, that process is ongoing , and that's the message
that we would like to see sent.
QUESTION: Turkish republic of northern Cyprus decided yesterday that they
will not participate in any future negotiations unless the existence of two
states on the island is accepted. In what ways do you think this may have
an impact on the future of Cyprus issue?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I have no comment on that specific report because I
haven't seen it, but I think our position on what is required to make
progress in Cyprus is extremely well known to you, and that hasn't
changed.
(The briefing concluded at 2:20 P.M.)
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