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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #105, 97-07-14

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


1445

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Monday, July 14, 1997

Briefer: Nicholas Burns

ANNOUNCEMENTS / STATEMENTS
1                 Welcome to Visitors
1                 Condemnation of ETA terrorism in Spain
1-2               US donation of emergency food aid to World Food Program
2                 Cyprus Talks concluded

NORTH KOREA 2 Food assistance and four-party talks 2-6 Details of food assistance, WFP 5 Sen. Nunn, Amb. Laney trip to N. Korea 24 Long term food assistance

CAMBODIA 6,10-11 King Sihanouk's statement 6 Status of American citizens 6-7 Persecution of Hun-Sen's opponents 7-8,10 Amb. Quinn meeting with Hun-Sen 8-9,11 Possible outcomes, requirements for resolutions 9 Prince Ranariddh State Dept. Meeting 10 US Aid Programs 11 Critics appraisal of Hun-Sen

CYPRUS 11-12 Expansion of EU to include Cyprus 12-13 Missile System possible threat to Peace Process 13 Amb. Holbrooke travel plans 20-21 Amb. Holbrooke's role in peace talks

CUBA 13-15 Charges that America supports terrorist bombings 16 Implementation of Title III of Helms-Burton act 16-17 Cuban baseball team

IRAN 17-19 Loan from Germany and possible sanctions on Germany

TAIWAN 19 Lee Teng-hui transit visa application

TURKEY 19 Prime Minister Yilmaz vote of confidence

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 21-22 Attendance at Doha economic Summit 21 Implementation of Oslo accords 22 Plans for Sec. Albright to attend summit

COLOMBIA 23 Amb. Frechette statement on conditions for military aid

PANAMA 23 Agreement on multilateral anti-narcotics center


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #105

MONDAY, JULY 14, 1997 1:18 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. BURNS: I was just complimenting Barry on his appearance on television this morning. I don't want to talk about Roger Clemens. I think he's not done yet. Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. I want to welcome Melissa Baker, who's an intern for Theresa Loar in our Office of Women's Affairs. She's from New York, attends George Washington University where she studies political science. Christina Kim is an intern in our Global Affairs Office. She's from Winnetka, Illinois; attends Georgetown. Welcome to both of you.

I have three announcements to make before we go to questions today. The first is to stand side by side with the people of Spain and the Spanish Government in condemning in the clearest and most forceful terms the vicious terrorism of ETA. We extend our sincere condolences to the family of Miguel Angel Blanco Garrido, the young city councilman who was shot and murdered by the ETA terrorists. We understand that His Majesty Juan Carlos will address the Spanish nation today. We are side by side with Spain in opposing terrorism and opposing this notoriously vicious terrorist organization, the ETA.

I also have two other announcements. The first is on North Korea. In response to the World Food Program's announcement July 9 of an expanded appeal for humanitarian food aid for children in North Korea, the United States Government has decided to extend 100,000 metric tons of grain, valued at approximately $27 million. Chronic food production short-falls, which have been exacerbated by flooding in both 1995 and 1996 have resulted in widespread malnutrition in North Korea, and children are among the most vulnerable.

The United States Government assistance in the form of PL 480 Title II Emergency Food Aid will be provided to the World Food Program and monitored in two ways - 45,000 tons of grain will be monitored exclusively by the World Food Program and used to feed children age six and under in nurseries, kindergartens and orphanages. The distribution of the other 55,000 tons will be monitored by a variety of U.S. private, voluntary organizations who will work in conjunction with the World Food Program. This aid will also be directed at the most vulnerable - chiefly children, but also elderly population in North Korea.

The World Food Program has a proven ability to monitor distribution to ensure that aid reaches those who are truly in need in North Korea. The World Food Program has recently tripled its staff in North Korea to monitor the increased donor submissions. Using American private, voluntary organizations to assist will further enhance the monitoring of food distribution inside North Korea.

Now, this commitment by the United States for $27 million of food aid represents more than half of the July 9th appeal of the World Food Program, which I believe was $45 million. It comes on the heels of $25 million in food aid announced by our government in the beginning of this year. So this is a substantial donation by the United States Government. It is donated food. It is not money meant to be repaid. It is, I think, in line with our tradition of believing in the World Food Program and believing that people in North Korea are suffering and they deserve to be helped. I'll be glad to respond to any questions on this.

My third announcement has to do with Cyprus. The United States Government believes that the talks on Cyprus concluded over the weekend were positive and useful talks. We are very pleased they took place. We think that face- to-face dialogue on the issue of Cyprus is quite important. In fact, it is essential.

We know that President Clerides and Mr. Denktash have known each other for 47 years. They hadn't met in three and a half years, and it is essential that they continue to meet face-to-face for the cause of peace. They spent a lot of time together in Trout Beck, at the Trout Beck Conference Center in New York. The United States would certainly support a second round of talks, if that can be agreed to. We hope very much it will be agreed to.

I spoke to Dick Holbrooke just a short time ago. He met with President Clerides this morning. They have a very good meeting. He intends to meet with Mr. Denktash at 4:00 p.m. this afternoon. Dick Holbrooke will be traveling to Western Europe the week after next to consult with our European allies about the Cyprus issue. He does not plan to travel to Cyprus or to the Eastern Mediterranean until at least after the next round of talks, which we assume will be held sometime in August.

Nevertheless, we will remain very interested in supporting directly the efforts of the United Nations. The Special UN Envoy Mr. Cardovez is briefing the United Nations and interested parties including the United States this afternoon. We are looking forward to a detailed, substantive briefing from him on what was accomplished at these talks. We will very much support him and Secretary General Kofi Annan as these talks proceed to a second round, which we hope very much will take place. With that, Barry, I'll be glad to go to your questions.

QUESTION: Nick, is the fact that North Korea is in a dialogue with the United States have any positive impact on the speed and the amount of food assistance the U.S. is contributing?

MR. BURNS: We have never linked food assistance to the political talks. That means that we have never held out as a threat the curtailment of food aid should North Korea not agree to the four-party talks. Similarly and conversely, we have never said that we would reward North Korea if it did decide to go to the four-party talks.

Now, Barry, on August 5th in New York, we are having an important preparatory meeting of the four parties. The first time the four parties will have met on this issue, and this issue - food aid - has not been and will not be linked to those talks. But obviously we have great respect for the World Food Program. They issued an urgent appeal for food because children and the elderly are experiencing famine. We felt, as a leading contributor to that program, historically, that we had to step up to the plate and deliver; and that's what we've done.

QUESTION: Is that - I don't know - country to country, but is that typical of the U.S. response to famine in other countries? Are there other countries struck by famine where the U.S. is not as quick and as - what's the word - as generous?

MR. BURNS: I can't cite any examples, Barry, where we've been asked --

QUESTION: Starvation in Africa.

MR. BURNS: -- and where we've had a tradition of being the largest donor, which we have in North Korea. I know that, for instance, in Central Africa, where there has been starvation because of the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi over the last four years, the United States has contributed $1 billion in food and medical assistance to Central Africa. We've contributed far less to North Korea because the dimensions of the problem are not as great.

But I don't think it would be appropriate to delay food aid in a case where we really thought that there was a famine-like condition present. We have to act out of humanitarian impulses. In this case, we have acted in that fashion.

QUESTION: Where did this money come from? Is there some pre-ordained fund which has already been approved by Congress?

MR. BURNS: Yes. Congress every year passes an appropriation for the various public law food assistance programs. There is public law - PL - there's a PL 480 Title I program. There's a Title II program, which is the grant program. That's the program from which we've taken these funds - the $27 million - to purchase the 100,000 metric tons of grain that we'll be extending.

Now, normally what happens - as you know from our previous discussions of this issue - is that the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which runs these programs, will immediately go out with USAID to contract for the grains to be purchased from U.S. producers and then for ships to be provisioned with the grain to make their way to Nampo, the North Korean port. We'll do that as soon as we can.

Fortunately, some of the food aid that we approved in February of this year as part of our $25 million effort - our previous effort - has just arrived in the past two or three weeks in North Korea, as you know, not only in Nampo, but in the northeastern part of Korea. So there is American food aid that's just arrived there that will help people now. It does take some time to get a lot of food - 100,000 metric tons of grain - from the United States to North Korea. I will try to give you a delivery schedule as soon as we have worked that out with the private contractors. Judd.

QUESTION: Is $25 million the total U.S. contribution since the crisis began? The previous $25 million?

MR. BURNS: No, it's not. In fact, we have responded to several appeals since 1995. I'll bet by the end of this briefing - Nancy, if you wouldn't mind calling Lorraine Toly -- I'll bet we can get a 1995-1997 figure that would include the $27 million we're announcing today. We'll try to get that by the end of the briefing. I should have had that; I should have anticipated that. Yes.

QUESTION: On Asia, I want to just switch to another country in Asia.

QUESTION: One more --

MR. BURNS: Do you want to stay on North Korea?

QUESTION: You may have answered this, because I was out of the room. Just a quick question - who are the private organizations and how are they there - the private, voluntary organizations that will be monitoring?

MR. BURNS: I'll be glad to take that question. We would have to consult with - they would be PVOs - private voluntary organizations - who will effectively be subcontractors for the World Food Program. We'll have to ask the World Food Program which ones they intend to work with, and I will get that to you.

QUESTION: And why did you decide to add on PVOs this time instead of just the World Food Program?

MR. BURNS: The World Food Program has been specially involved in the food shortage for children. They have directed their appeal at children. As you can see, 45,000 tons of the grain will be extended to that. The additional will go to both children and the elderly. There are some PVOs that work with different groups.

QUESTION: Well, you have been so adamant about saying publicly how you have only gone through the WFP because you are so secure in their ability to monitor the program. I just wonder if you feel that you need to bring these extra groups now because there is more and more food aid going to North Korea, and you may be worried that you can't monitor it all. Or that - -

MR. BURNS: No, if fact, I should say the 45,000 tons going to the World Food Program is exclusively for children under six. The additional 55,000 tons is for children and for the elderly. I assume, Carol -- but I can check on this -- it's simply because there are other PVOs - private voluntary organizations - operating in other parts of the country where the WFP has not had experience. But they are American organizations. So we obviously will have confidence in them and their ability to work well. Laura.

QUESTION: Also on North Korea -- former Senator Nunn is traveling to North Korea, I believe, next week. Are you working with him? And is a State Department representative going to travel with him?

MR. BURNS: Yes, former Senator Sam Nunn - Senator Nunn of Georgia and former American Ambassador to South Korea, Jim Laney, who has just stepped down, plan to pay a private visit to North Korea from July 20 to 22, and to our ally South Korea on July 22 to 24, to discuss Korean Peninsula issues. This trip is private. It occurs at the invitation of the North Korean Government. We have briefed by Senator Nunn and Ambassador Laney on the latest analysis we have of the Korean Peninsula issues. We, of course, look forward to hearing their impressions upon their return.

They are going for a general exchange of views on Korean issues with the North and South Koreans. I expect they're going to explain to the North Koreans the fundamentals of U.S. policy, including the historic opportunity we have now to engage with the North and South, with China to make sure that these four-party talks will actually go forward and will lead the way to a cessation of the Korean conflict -- a formal cessation, a peace treaty, after so many years.

I expect they will also discuss food aid, the agreed framework, the importance of maintaining the agreed framework and other issues in U.S.- North Korea relations. Now, they have been briefed by us and they will be accompanied by three people. One of them is a private advisor -- long-time advisor to both men, a Mr. Sukhan Kim -- and two working-level U.S. Government officials - David Straub, who is a foreign service officer in the State Department's Office of Korean Affairs, and also Mr. Richard Finn, who works on Korean issues in the Department of Defense. They will serve as a resource for Senator Nunn and Ambassador Laney.

On previous trips by private Americans, we have routinely sent officers from our Korean Affairs Office because of their language ability and, frankly, because there aren't a lot of Americans who have a lot of experience and in-depth knowledge of North Korea. Our people in the Department have that.

Now, I should tell you that we consider this an important visit. It is a private visit, but it's important because both Ambassador Laney - obviously, he was our ambassador in Seoul for four years -- and Senator Nunn are senior respected figures who can convey a straight message from the United States to North Korea in advance of the four-party preparatory meeting on August 5th. So we do very much support their trip.

Yes, still on - I want to know if there were any questions on this particular one, Jim, then I will go to you. I do have some figures. Let's see if we can make sense of these. Including today's contribution, the U.S. Government total food aid to North Korea this year is $52 million in humanitarian assistance, all through the World Food Program. We gave a total of $8.4 million in humanitarian food aid to North Korea in 1995 and 1996. Right. Of course, you know we have had contributions to KEDO in 1997, but that is separate.

QUESTION: $60 million.

MR. BURNS: That's right, $60 million since 1995. I believe we have now responded successfully and positively to every appeal by the World Food Program in the last two years. Yes, I want to make sure that Jim has a chance to ask his question, unless it is directly related to what Laura was talking about. Jim.

QUESTION: It's also on Asia, but not on North Korea. I wonder if you have seen the statement by King Sihanouk from Beijing in which he seems to acquiesce in the single leadership of Hun Sen, giving the impression to a lot of people that the coup or whatever it is by him appears to have succeeded and his competitor is out of the picture. Would you agree with that analysis?

MR. BURNS: We have seen the press reports of King Sihanouk's statement and, Jim, just before I came out here I saw some recent new wires in the last hour or two which have further comments from King Sihanouk in Beijing about the military situation, about who has won and who has lost, and about the efficacy even of foreign involvement and of emissaries in this. It was quite an interesting statement.

The problem I have is that we have not talked to him directly. We have seen press reports, but I obviously can't confirm the words. So I will have to withhold some judgment about King Sihanouk's statement. We do think he is an important person in this drama -- certainly a legendary historic figure. We think it's appropriate that the ASEAN delegation of foreign ministers seek his views, which they intend to do. We also obviously seek his views as soon as we can do that.

I can tell you for ourselves that we continue to monitor the situation in Cambodia quite closely. We are pleased that the situation of American citizens has improved. We now believe there are only probably around 350 American citizens left in Cambodia. That is down by more than 1,000 people from the start of the hostilities just eight or nine days ago. We are pleased about that.

Phnom Penh has been quiet for the last several days. The commercial and charter flights are leaving the airport. American citizens, we believe, should still leave; the remaining 350 should leave. We believe that they can leave safely and on a regular basis. We are also concerned about reports - and you have seen them and we are attempting to verify them with Mr. Hun Sen, with whom our ambassador met for two hours this weekend - reports that members of Prince Ranariddh's political party have been arrested, that several have been killed.

Now, we have no independent confirmation of these. When I say that what I mean is, we have no literal confirmation because these reports are being denied by Hun Sen and his associates. But they are being claimed by reputable people whom we know. So we continue to want to look into those. But we are deeply concerned about those reports. We are also deeply concerned that journalists and labor organizers and representatives of non- governmental organizations have also been singled out -- people who have been critical of Hun Sen in the past.

Any attempt to arrest or intimidate Cambodians solely because of their political views is completely unacceptable to democrats around the world. It violates Cambodia's constitution, and it violates rudimentary and fundamental international human rights standards. So we reject those efforts. We are concerned that Hun Sen get back to the effort of political reconciliation. When Ambassador Ken Quinn met with him over the weekend, in their very long meeting, he reiterated the major points that we have been talking about publicly - the need for reconciliation; the need for an end to violence; the need to allow Prince Ranariddh's political party to operate freely in Cambodia; the need for elections in 1998 - the ones that Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen had agreed upon shortly before the outbreak of the violence, that would allow the Cambodian people to effectively be the judge of who should be in power in Cambodia.

We intend to maintain our political contacts with Hun Sen in order to communicate this message to him. Ambassador Quinn has been in touch not just with Hun Sen, but with representatives of Prince Ranariddh's party who are still in Phnom Penh and other political forces in the country. So we are very concerned about Cambodia, and we'll keep our eye on it. In the wake of Ambassador Pickering's conversation with Prince Ranariddh, we are putting a lot of stock in the ASEAN mission to Beijing and Phnom Penh and to Europe or the United States to talk to Prince Ranariddh. We hope very much that that will be a successful mission. Sid.

QUESTION: Yeah --

QUESTION: Well, does it look like it's going to complete that - Hun Sen at this point?

MR. BURNS: Well, there's no question that he has certainly achieved a major military victory, because he appears to have smashed the military forces of Prince Ranariddh. There are, I think, in a couple of northern provinces, still fighting and there's still a face-off between the military militia of the two. But pretty much throughout the rest of the country - and certainly in Phnom Penh - Hun Sen has the upper hand.

The question now - and the ball's really in his court, and I think that the world needs to look to Hun Sen now for some answers. What will he do with this newfound power? Will he govern as an autocrat? Will he decide to abide by the clear wishes of the people of Cambodia and allow elections to go forward? Will he allow - as he said over the weekend - for Prince Ranariddh to return to the country without fear of political reprisal? Now, this is going to be a difficult decision if this offer is made because there are reports that military officers and politicians and labor organizers and journalists have been taken prisoner or executed.

So I think that the onus is going to be on Hun Sen to prove, as he says - and as he said to journalists over the weekend - that he intends to govern liberally and intends to allow Cambodians to be free. We'll see. The proof is going to have to be with him because the indications over the last eight days are that he's not off to a good start; he's off to a very poor start.

QUESTION: Did Ambassador Quinn get any reassurances on U.S. demands from Hun Sen? What was the reply? What were you told?

MR. BURNS: I can say this, Carol. Without wanting to go into the conversation in detail, because we do want to preserve its confidentiality, I think Ambassador Quinn heard a lot of positive words from Hun Sen about the five points that we put across. Frankly, when dealing with someone like that in the wake of all these reports of the brutalities of the last eight days. We're going to be much more impressed by his actions to put into place a liberal, democratic government than these nice words.

QUESTION: You can't say anything about what these positive - supposedly positive - indications were?

MR. BURNS: All I can say is that when Ambassador Quinn put forward his points, I understand - without getting into the details - that Hun Sen gave positive answers to the requests of the United States. We may request, of course - the same points that we share with you in public last week - elections, end of the violence, laying down of arms, allowing Prince Ranariddh's political party not only to survive but to compete and to coexist in Phnom Penh in the government. We received nice words, but one will be much more impressed by actions rather than words.

QUESTION: You were calling for a restoration of the coalition. Has he said that he will permit a restoration of the coalition?

MR. BURNS: I believe that as far as he's gone on that question is what he said to some journalists in Phnom Penh over the weekend; which is Prince Ranariddh is free to return without fear of political persecution. But if I were Prince Ranariddh, I might wonder about that commitment.

QUESTION: That doesn't seem like it really answers your question, your demands.

MR. BURNS: I don't think our question has been answered in full. I think that's the clear, outstanding question that remains here in the wake of all this violence and political intimidation. Will Hun Sen allow the situation to what it was before the outbreak of fighting. I think the jury is out on that question.

QUESTION: Did he just give a vague answer to Quinn? Did he say, I'll take that under advisement?

MR. BURNS: I can't get into the specifics of the conversation. I've tried to give you as much as I can from it, and say that we're going to much more impressed by deeds here than words.

QUESTION: Nick, just to be clear, in your five points, you don't call for the restoration of Prince Ranariddh; you call for the participation of his political party. Are you backing off now on Ranariddh being reinstated and you'll be satisfied with the Royalist party being allowed to participate in --

MR. BURNS: Sid, we just met with Prince Ranariddh on Friday, which was a clear expression of our support for him. We believe he is the first prime minister of Cambodia. He was elected in 1993 by the people. We think he has a right to participate in the political system. What we cannot do is get involved in party politics - in his own party's politics - or in politics in Cambodia itself. I can't give you a prescription of what's going to happen.

Our ideal scenario would be the restoration of the status quo politically in Cambodia. Whether that's going to happen or not is a different question because Hun Sen is holding most of the cards now. He's got the power. So we would like, actually, to put the onus and the international spotlight not on us but on him. What is he going to do with all his power? Is he going to govern effectively, positively with it; cooperatively with other politicians like Prince Ranariddh? He needs to answer those questions.

QUESTION: Did the Ambassador -- was that one of the Ambassador's points - we'd also like you to restore Ranariddh to power, or did he just say Ranariddh's party should be allowed to participate? I mean, it's an important distinction in your policy now whether you want the prince back or whether you just want his party to be allowed to participate.

MR. BURNS: Sid, as I said, we would like nothing better than the restoration of the status quo - meaning Prince Ranariddh could return and assume his place as prime minister of Cambodia. We recognize him to be the first prime minister.

When Tom Pickering saw him the other day, I think I told you, the first words were, welcome Mr. First Prime Minister. That was not said without, obviously, intention to show respect and to basically declare a political statement that we think he is the first prime minister. But you have to separate the situation into what one hopes will happen - which is restoration of the government - versus what one expects to happen now. Hun Sen has not, I don't think, done much to indicate to Prince Ranariddh that it's safe to return. There are all these reports of political violence and intimidation and arrests and execution. So we're hoping for the best right now. We're trying to use our influence on Hun Sen to argue for a positive outcome. But whether that will happen or not, I think we've all got to be realistic. It seems that it might be heading down a different path, despite these positive words.

QUESTION: Would you be satisfied - and I don't know how you measure that satisfaction - with an outcome that allowed the Royalist party to stay up and running but kept Ranariddh out, and everything else as you want?

MR. BURNS: The United States is not going to put itself - and will not be - in the position of some kind of mediator where we make these political compromises. These questions are for Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen and others to work out. Our ideal scenario would be to see Cambodia return to what it was before last weekend - a week ago this past weekend. We'd like to see the wishes of the Cambodian people, expressed in the 1993 elections, returned. That is the party that got the most votes, and the individual that leads that party, would go back to Cambodia. But I don't want to leave the impression that that's going to happen today or tomorrow. It doesn't look like to us it will happen. It's going to be an uphill struggle, but we certainly still consider him to be first prime minister.

QUESTION: What did the Ambassador say about aid and sanctions - the possibility of extended aid cuts, international aid cuts and possible sanctions?

MR. BURNS: I don't know specifically what he said to Hun Sen on those issues. I haven't read the "memcon." I don't even know if we have it in the building - a "memcon," a verbatim transcript. But I know what we told Hun Sen and his followers is essentially this - we are suspending our aid program for 30 days. At the end of the 30-day period, we will have reviewed all those programs. We'd like to go forward with programs that don't necessarily benefit the government, but benefit people. For instance, we have a de-mining program that's very important for people.

He has to understand - he, Hun Sen must understand it can't be business as usual with aid, bilateral or other, as long as he's acting the way he is.

QUESTION: I'm just trying to get a sense of whether Quinn was tough with him, whether he just went in and said we don't like it and was just sort of very diplomatic or did he pound his fists on the table. Did he really try to bring U.S. leadership and pressure to bear on this man in this face-to- face meeting?

MR. BURNS: You can be assured - without my betraying - my doing what I can't do, which is read you an account of the conversation, I can't do that. You can be assured that Ambassador Quinn represented American views forcefully and clearly and that Mr. Hun Sen now understands the position of the United States directly from the President's personal representative, Ken Quinn.

Our ambassador is a forceful individual - very experienced in Southeast Asia. He knows these people quite well. He left it abundantly clear that the United States is displeased with what has happened and that we're not going to play ball and have business as usual with Hun Sen as long as he's acting the way he is.

QUESTION: You said that you respect King Sihanouk and that you all aren't clear as to what he's saying, but he's come out and seems to be supporting Hun Sen and recognizing him as the sole leader of Cambodia. If he comes out and continues to support him, and you confirm this, what will your conversation be? Will you continue to yield to the king in this matter?

MR. BURNS: Well, first we can't - I cannot confirm everything that has been in the press. I don't know if it's true or not. Sometimes things are printed in newspapers that aren't exactly right; that's happened a couple of times in modern history. So I want to just be a little bit delayed in our judgment.

Secondly, what I should tell you, Crystal, is that we do respect King Sihanouk. We respect the role he has to play. He's not the only political actor in Cambodia. In fact, he is in many senses the father of modern Cambodia. He was instrumental in restoring Cambodia to its present state after the scourge of the Khmer Rouge. But there are other people that have to be consulted by the United States, such as Prince Ranariddh, such as Hun Sen.

So if one can confirm those remarks, they'd be quite interesting and quite important. But they wouldn't necessarily be the final word because there are a lot of other people who've run for political office, who hold office who are now being intimidated. They should also be consulted.

QUESTION: But you said the United States hopes for one outcome and sometimes thinks about the other outcome that they don't want. So obviously, you've been thinking about this. The United States has been counting on the possibility that they're going to have to deal with Hun Sen one way or the other.

MR. BURNS: Well, we are dealing with Hun Sen. We have not broken relations with him. We are talking to him; we'll continue to talk to him because we must. He holds power in Phnom Penh. But I don't want to jump ahead on a hypothetical question - say what United States policy is going to be a week or two from now. We have constant principles which we have been reiterating to all the political actors there - Prince Ranariddh, Hun Sen and others. We're going to stick by our principles.

QUESTION: And finally, some critics are saying that it might be a good thing that Hun Sen has gained power through a coup, but nonetheless sole power. It appears that he's trying to drive down that road. Critics are saying maybe this is a good thing for Cambodia because power now can rest with one central government instead of a split figurehead where there is conflict. What is your response to that?

MR. BURNS: I don't know what those critics have been drinking. Those critics may like authoritarian governments. They may like the fact that democratic elections have been overturned; that the Paris Peace Accords have been ruptured; that the will of the people of Cambodia as expressed in free, internationally-supervised elections has been violated. If that's what those critics want, I guess in the United States they're free to say because we're a free country, but I don't know that anyone in our government would agree with them. I think they're all wet, those critics. Excuse me, Cyprus, yes.

QUESTION: The second day of the UN meeting in the Trout Beck - the European Union announcement about the acceptance of Cyprus plus five other countries as a new members at the Union. As the United States, do you think it is helpful for the negotiation process? And do you support this kind of announcement from the European Union?

MR. BURNS: Well, I don't know if the European Union made this announcement deliberately to coincide with the talks here in the United States, but the European Union is obviously free to do what it wishes. It's facing some historic decisions about its own expansion, and we took note of those decisions. As you know, we've long supported expansion of the European Union and we've long supported the idea that countries in the Eastern Mediterranean like Cyprus and Turkey ought to be associated with the European Union. That's very important to us.

QUESTION: But before the solution, do you support European Union and the Cyprus integration, before the solution?

MR. BURNS: Are you asking me?

QUESTION: Yes, I am asking you.

MR. BURNS: Before which solution, Savas?

QUESTION: Before the solution in the Cyprus.

MR. BURNS: Lambros is interpreting your question. Is that acceptable?

QUESTION: You prefer prior or after the integration of Cyprus in the EU? This is the question.

QUESTION: Yes.

MR. BURNS: Excuse me?

QUESTION: Prior or after the solution?

MR. BURNS: Now, is that is your question, Savas?

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: That's exactly --

MR. BURNS: So we have a joint Greek-Turkish question? This is excellent. We are making progress. We are making more progress here than - anyway.

That is up to the European Union to decide. The United States cannot decide the timetable of European Union expansion. We have too much respect for the EU to try to do that and give it public advice. We just think that the expansion of the EU is a good idea. We think stability in the Eastern Mediterranean is a good idea.

QUESTION: And also - so sorry. Also at the meeting, the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Clerides, he didn't accept that Russian anti-aircraft missiles pose a threat for the peace forces and the solution. Do you agree with him?

MR. BURNS: Well, all I can say is that we have had a number of conversations with the Cypriot Government about this. We are satisfied now with the pledge by Cypriot Government that no part of this missile system will be introduced into Cyprus for a great period of time. We think the Cypriot Government is handling this responsibly in letting a period of time unfold where we have an opportunity to resolve the problem. We are encouraging Turkey and Cyprus and Greece and others to try to resolve this problem amicably so that there is no resort to any kind of incident that could produce more tension. We have some time to work on this problem. We should all work responsibly on it, we think.

QUESTION: Can you give to us the names of the countries that Mr. Holbrooke wants to visit and the main reason why he is not visiting Ankara and Athens?

MR. BURNS: He intends to visit a number of countries in Western Europe. I know the United Kingdom will be one of them because of the special role being played by Sir David Hannay, for whom Dick Holbrooke has a lot of respect. Dick told me he had not worked out a specific itinerary. So in the coming days when he has, I will give that to you. All I can say is that Dick feels it's not appropriate for him to visit Cyprus or Greece or Turkey at the present time because we want to support the United Nations. If there is to be a second round of discussions in Europe in August -- and we hope there will be, we support that, we very much want that to happen - then Dick feels he ought not to get in the way of that. He ought to just do everything he can to support the United Nations, as he has done over the last eight, nine, ten days.

Then at some point in the future, obviously, he will be traveling to Cyprus and to Greece and Turkey. He is our Cyprus negotiator and will need to talk with all of those governments, and the Turkish community as well, about Cyprus. But he doesn't have a schedule fixed in his own mind yet. He is going to wait and see what happens in the second round of talks, once one is formally agreed to.

I am not sure it has formally agreed to, but the United States very much thinks it is a good idea. So we are kind of pushing. We would like to help push things in that direction.

QUESTION: Nick, do you have anything to substantiate these Cuban charges that there was an American angle to these bombings over the weekend in Havana? The Cubans are saying there might have been some American equipment or devices involved, if not an outright perpetrator?

MR. BURNS: We have checked into this very carefully. Our interest section in Havana has confirmed that there were explosions at the Hotel Nacional and the Hotel Capri in Havana. Cuban authorities have told our diplomats in Havana that there were no fatalities, that two Cuban citizens were slightly injured. I can tell you that we have no information whatsoever here in Washington or in Havana in our interest section about the origin of these explosions. We know nothing about them. No one has told us anything about them, besides the Cuban Government accusing Americans of being responsible. We have no information whatsoever. There is no evidence whatsoever that Americans were behind it. Needless to say, the United States Government had absolutely nothing to do with this.

We condemn terrorism wherever it is practiced. If indeed, this was terrorism -- and right now it's very murky, one doesn't know what caused these explosions -- then we would condemn it. We are very sympathetic to the people who were slightly injured in this attack. We would never support any kind of bombing attack like this, if, in fact, it was a bombing attack.

So I think the Cuban Government, before it starts making wild charges about Americans being responsible for bombing attacks, it ought to do its homework. If the Cuban Government has information about these bombing attacks it would like share with us, our door is open. They can call us any time. If they want to call us at three in the morning, they can call 647- 1512. That is the State Department Operations Center. They can wake up our diplomats in Havana and call them in the middle of the morning if suddenly they have some golden information.

It's a little bit suspicious that they have absolutely no evidence and yet they accuse Americans of being responsible for these bombs. They ought to do their homework, and they ought to treat this responsibly. It is not right to go around accusing countries or individuals of bombing when you have absolutely no evidence to support it.

QUESTION: In May, after the first bombs appeared in Havana, apparently the FBI in Miami checked the same reports. They had someone from the United States or the material was coming from the United States. Apparently, the FBI last month opened an investigation to check these reports. Do you have anything on that?

MR. BURNS: I have nothing on that. But in the current case, I can tell you we just have no evidence whatsoever, no information about these bombings. There were a few Americans in the hotel, we understand. But none of the Americans were injured, fortunately. I don't know who the Americans were. There are a lot of Americans in Cuba these days.

QUESTION: It's not the first time that a group from Florida tried to attack hotels in Cuba --

MR. BURNS: Wait a minute. In our country, if you want to indict somebody or indict a whole group of people - an entire ethnic group in our country - then you better have your facts straight. If you don't have your facts straight, and if the Cuban Government doesn't have their facts straight, you ought to forget about it. You are not going to get any sympathy from us.

If there is any information the Cuban Government has that they think is real and they want to turn to over to us -- if they think Americans are implicated -- we will listen. But there is no evidence; there is no information.

QUESTION: Actually, in 1993 people from a Cuban exile group did attack from a sea --

MR. BURNS: We are not talking about history. We are not talking about 1993. We are talking about something that happened this past weekend. The Cuban Government has launched a serious charge against Americans. It better put up or shut up.

QUESTION: Do they have reason to be suspicious, given the history of the U.S.-Cuban relations beginning with attempts to assassinate Castor?

MR. BURNS: Barry --

QUESTION: Do they have reason to be a little bit --

MR. BURNS: All I can say is this --

QUESTION: -- a little bit, you know, in their whatever their reasons are, is there a history behind this?

MR. BURNS: I think they are definitely paranoid.

QUESTION: Well --

MR. BURNS: They are paranoid for a lot of reasons. They have got a failed system. There is also domestic opposition to the Cuban government in Cuba. It is quite easy to disregard domestic opposition and say, it's the Yankees; it's the Americans who are responsible for this.

QUESTION: Well, given that, this is sort of an understandable reflex, isn't it?

MR. BURNS: If we were in a court of law, which is where you should be in a case like this, if there is any evidence, or if you are a police official, you have to see evidence, Barry. It is simply not good enough to blame Cuban-Americans for something, when there is no evidence or information.

QUESTION: I'm not going to argue with you.

MR. BURNS: If there is turn it over.

QUESTION: Of course.

QUESTION: You're going to meet Alarcon in New York in a couple of days.

MR. BURNS: I'm not going to meet Alarcon in New York. No, I'm not going to meet Alarcon. I have never met him, and I probably never will.

QUESTION: Well, I mean, the State Department officials will meet him. You will not present a list of these opinions to him personally?

MR. BURNS: I think that with all due respect to Mr. Alarcon, I think the ball is in his court here. There is no information or evidence whatsoever linking Americans to these bombings. If Mr. Alarcon has the evidence, he should turn it over when he meets American officials. He's got American diplomats on his doorstep in Havana. They are there to receive the information. They don't have any yet.

QUESTION: Nick, on another subject --

QUESTION: Cuba - related to Cuba.

MR. BURNS: Yes.

QUESTION: There is some - we have some information that the decision has been made to basically ignore Title III of the Helms-Burton again, by the White House. Do you have anything about that?

MR. BURNS: Ignore Title III?

QUESTION: Basically not put it into effect.

MR. BURNS: Well, all I know is that, as you remember, when the President made his initial decision on this, I think back in January of this year, he agreed that we would make six-month judgments on it. The six months is coming due in the next couple of days, I believe. So when a decision is made - and I am not aware that the formal decision has been made yet by the President - then we will present that to you . I even hope to get, perhaps, Under Secretary Eizenstat here in the briefing room to run through that issue with you. But I don't believe - I could be wrong about this - I don't believe a formal decision has been made yet. But I know that it's got to be made in the next couple of days.

QUESTION: And one final questions - Forbes has just announced that Fidel Castro has made the top ten list among dictators and monarchs --

MR. BURNS: Not best dressed?

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: -- as far as being rich.

MR. BURNS: Rich?

QUESTION: Yeah, $1.5 billion --

MR. BURNS: No surprise. In a communist society what happens is, 98 percent of the people get nothing, and the politburo gets everything. That happened under the Soviet Union; it happened in China. It's happening again in Cuba. It works very well for the ruling clique, communism; it doesn't work very well for the vast majority of people.

QUESTION: Nick, Cuba has canceled the visit by a baseball team that was supposed to tour and play a game, citing as one reason the weekend bombing at the Havana hotels. Do you have any comment?

MR. BURNS: How did I know somebody was going to ask me about this? This baseball competition was to be held in Norwalk - Norwalk or Norwich? Norwich, Connecticut.

QUESTION: Norwich.

MR. BURNS: Norwich, Connecticut which is a very peaceful hamlet. To argue that somehow the Cuban baseball team was going to be under threat for walking the streets of Norwich, Connecticut, is a little bit strange. We think that despite all the political problems between us - and they are considerable - that Castro ought to let his players play ball. What he is probably most afraid of is that because they come from a Stalinist society, because he keeps them down on the farms, literally, and doesn't allow them to earn what they are worth in the free market, he is afraid that most of these players or a great number of them are going to walk; they're going to defect to the United States. That is what he is afraid of.

QUESTION: That's the American way.

MR. BURNS: Pardon?

QUESTION: That's the American way. They'll get big bucks.

MR. BURNS: Well, listen. We would gladly welcome more Cubans pitching and playing ball in the American League.

QUESTION: The Yankees --

MR. BURNS: Not for the Yankees, for the Red Sox. That is what he is afraid of. He is using this as an excuse. He is an old pitcher himself, his fast ball has long since died.

(Laughter.)

He still has a few curve balls, which he throws at us routinely. We think he ought to let his players come here and play ball.

QUESTION: On another subject, Nick? There is a report out of Tehran that a German bank called West Deutscheland Bank, West German State Bank is going to give Iran a $90 million loan for reconstruction of an offshore oil field. This would seem to trigger D'Amato sanctions. One, have you heard about the deal? And two, are you considering such sanctions?

MR. BURNS: We are aware of reports -- in fact, over the past eight months -- suggesting that the West Deutscheland Bank has been considering a loan to an Iranian firm in connection with rehabilitation of the Soroush offshore oil field. The law in question -- the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act -- states that any entity purchasing a share of ownership in the development of Iran's petroleum resources or entering into an agreement providing for participation in the earnings of such developments may be sanctionable under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. Any investor in such a project could be affected by the legislation.

What we have got to do, I think -- if this deal does go through -- is assure ourselves of the specifics of the deals and then to see if it does fit in the framework of the sanctions. If it does, I'm afraid the United States would have to take action. We have not yet made that decision because a, we're not aware that this loan has been made -- we know it is under consideration - and b, we don't know all the dimensions of the loan, itself.

QUESTION: One question. You used the word, may. Are you saying that it is discretionary on the part of the U.S. Government?

MR. BURNS: No, I think what that refers to - I think that's lawyers' language for, we need to see the fine print and see exactly. I think the key factor here is the amount of financial assets involved and whether it meets the floor, the benchmark for the sanctions themselves.

QUESTION: What form do sanctions take?

MR. BURNS: I have to go back to the law.

QUESTION: Not this particular case. What do you do to --

MR. BURNS: I would have to go back to the law, Barry, and I'm sure we can do that for you.

QUESTION: It makes it - (inaudible) - for executives and so forth?

MR. BURNS: Yeah, I want to go back to the law, though, and get it. I think it's multi-layered actually. There are several things that happened, and I just don't recall them off the top of my head.

QUESTION: Was this known to the U.S. Government during all the goings on in Madrid, when the Germans and the U.S. were in the same city having a lot of talks? And did anybody raise it with Chancellor Kohl or his people?

MR. BURNS: I assume this has been known to us. I don't know if it was raised with Chancellor Kohl. I assume it's been raised with the German Government. I can't tell you at which level. What I can do is take that question and get back to you.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: Nick?

MR. BURNS: Yes.

QUESTION: Since that's just a straight loan - I understand you don't have all the details - then it wouldn't meet the standard you're talking about - participation in profits or taking a position in the company itself. It's just a straight matter of financing.

MR. BURNS: Well, I don't know if it is a straight loan or not. I just don't know what it is. That's one of the things we'd have to look into if this loan is made. I mean, a loan could be accompanied by a company or a bank taking an equity position in some kind of investment, in which case it would meet the requirements. I just don't want to indict this firm. I have no idea what they have up their sleeve. Howard.

QUESTION: Is Taiwan's president going to be stopping in the U.S.?

MR. BURNS: Lee Teng-hui? No, I don't believe he has any plans to stop in the United States. I've not seen any reference to that. If you're referring to a transit, I have no knowledge. I don't believe he's made any application. I know that there have been some press reports to that effect, but there's been no application to us for a transit visa by the Taiwan authorities.

QUESTION: Are you shocked to think that they would even contemplate something like that?

MR. BURNS: Well, we probably would not be shocked to think that they would contemplate a transit visa for their senior officials because they've done that a lot. But Lee Teng -hui has not been in this country since his famous trip to Cornell, which was over two years ago. I think it was the Spring of 1995.

QUESTION: Can I ask that question a little differently?

MR. BURNS: Yeah.

QUESTION: If you have not gotten an actual application for transit visa, have there been overtures by the Taiwan Government to the U.S. representatives that the president of Taiwan would like a transit visa?

MR. BURNS: I don't know the answer to that question. That's a good question; I'll be glad to take that question. Yes, Turkey, yes, and then Middle East.

QUESTION: The new Turkish government got a vote a confidence last Saturday from the parliament. Do you have a comment on that?

MR. BURNS: Well, we're very pleased to work with Prime Minister Yilmaz. He's an impressive individual. We have a lot of experience working with him. We were impressed by the fact that he does have now an ability to govern effectively. After this period of uncertainty in Turkish politics with the government's composition, it's good to have a partner in Ankara. We look forward to working with him on a variety of issues - bilateral, NATO issues and, of course, the Greek-Turkish issues that are so important to us. Yes, Mr. Lambros, we'll stay on the Eastern Med.

QUESTION: Mr. Cardovez said nothing today during the press conference in New York City on the substance of the talks, but only the procedures that were involved via the subject of Mr. Holbrooke. Do you have anything of substance to tell us, besides you express your support and satisfaction?

MR. BURNS: No, I don't. I decided with Dick Holbrooke today that we would really restrain ourselves and limit our remarks to some of the things that I told you, but I think we told you we felt these were useful and positive talks. They ought to continue.

QUESTION: What was the specific role of Mr. Holbrooke in those talks?

MR. BURNS: Mr. Holbrooke?

QUESTION: Yes.

MR. BURNS: He had no role in the talks.

QUESTION: In this specific one.

MR. BURNS: He had no role in the talks. Mr. Holbrooke did not attend the talks. He wasn't anywhere near Trout Beck. He stayed in Manhattan. He met with President Clerides and Mr. Denktash before the talks began. He is meeting them now as they leave. He is our Cyprus negotiator. He will remain very interested in the developments here. He is supporting the UN, but is not participating in the talks.

QUESTION: Why was Mr. Carey Cavanaugh not present in the open ceremony along with the other representatives?

MR. BURNS: I have no idea, but I can tell you that Ambassador Holbrooke asked Mr. Cavanaugh to be present at Trout Beck in Amenia, New York, to have conversations in the margin, but we were not to participate in the talks because that wouldn't have been appropriate.

QUESTION: As I told you, last Friday, the non-paper was given to both sides was that Boutros Boutros-Ghali - (inaudible) -- 1992, which has been rejected that time, is totally unacceptable. I am wondering what was the role of Mr. Holbrooke to present again this non-paper to both sides?

MR. BURNS: Mr. Lambros, I cannot confirm that non-paper. There was a news blackout. We can't confirm what the United Nations may or may not have done. I would ask Mr. Cardovez that question. I don't even want to accept the premise of your question.

QUESTION: Why? You are involved with --

MR. BURNS: Because it is loaded with political judgments with which I do not wish to associate myself. I mean I frankly don't want to talk about the substance and you do. I can't do that here. I would ask Mr. Cardovez, with all due respect.

QUESTION: On the same subject, can I follow? Mr. Cardovez' document, that famous document they are discussing, suggests that the United Nations prepare a constitution and - (inaudible) -- which is Article Number One listed on the document.

MR. BURNS: I don't know if Mr. Cardovez has said what he did or did not do. This is the problem I have, frankly, with both the questions of Greek and Turkish [reporters] today. That is, I don't know if he said there is a document, if he has told you what the document is. I want to respect his role as negotiator and not try to make his job more difficult. That is all I am saying. Talal, yes?

QUESTION: The United States is exerting a lot of pressure on many Arab countries to attend the Doha Summit. There is a big debate raging in the Arab world about that. Only Jordan until now has declared it is going; even Egypt, a big recipient of American aid, has not declared its position. The critics argue now, why are the Arabs expected to separate between economics and politics when they take their cue from the United States? I can give you an example, the United States apply the same -- Cuba, Iran, Libya, Iraq, Cambodia. Can you answer that, please?

MR. BURNS: Well, most countries act out of self-interest. It is in the self-interest of Arab countries to have an economic relationship with Israel, given Israel's economic strength in the area. We assume that sooner or later, countries will be governed by self-interest. That is the best argument to make for the Doha Summit. It is also a commitment that the Arab countries have made over the last four years to attend these summits in Casablanca, in Amman, in Cairo. They have been very successful. They help Arab countries. They help Arab businesses. That is the primary reason that Arab countries should go.

QUESTION: Also, there was a commitment by the Israeli government to implement the agreement of Oslo and Madrid, part and parcel, and not pick and be allowed to pick what they like and what not they like.

MR. BURNS: And that holds true for the Palestinians, as well. It takes two to tango. There are two parties at the Oslo Accords -- Israel and the Palestinian Authority. You must ask of the Palestinian Authority what you ask of Israel. Our view is that we must be reasonable and we must be encouraging to the Palestinians and Israelis to make progress. By boycotting a summit, you don't add positively to the Middle East Peace process, you detract from it.

QUESTION: But you must agree that the political atmosphere or climate is not conducive --

MR. BURNS: All the more reason to attend the Doha Summit. Countries have to stand up, be courageous, act in their self-interest as well as act to promote the peace process when it has problems. If everyone acted like this, there would never be any progress. It would lead you right back to 1948 which is not in your interest, we believe.

QUESTION: Is the Secretary planning to attend the conference, as all her predecessors have?

MR. BURNS: I don't know if she has made any scheduling decisions about that. Of course, the United States believes in this conference. We will be represented at the highest level. I am not trying to add any uncertainty here. I just haven't talked to her about it. I am sure it is something that is on her radar screen.

QUESTION: With all the focus on it and all the criticism for other countries staying away, the Secretary would make a point of making her first trip to the Middle East --

MR. BURNS: Well, she is in Prague, today. She is actually flying back right now. Perhaps we can answer that question for you this week. There is no reason for me to doubt that we are going to be represented at the very highest level. I can't say for sure where she is going to be until I talk to her or talk to her chief of staff.

QUESTION: You believe the summit will be helpful.

MR. BURNS: Pardon?

QUESTION: You believe the summit will be helpful?

MR. BURNS: We hope very much it will be helpful. We were in Cairo last autumn. I don't know if you were with us, but it was a very successful summit for the Egyptian Government and for the Egyptian people and for Arabs in general. It may be that Arabs are getting just - or certainly true that Arabs are getting just as much out of these summits as the Israelis are. Again, you have to go back to economic self-interest here. It is very important.

QUESTION: Nick?

MR. BURNS: Yes, Bill.

QUESTION: Nick, I would like to ask you about the article Bob Woodward had published yesterday, basically saying that FBI and CIA had cleared the statements that Chairman Thompson had made.

MR. BURNS: I didn't read the article?

QUESTION: You didn't read that article?

MR. BURNS: No.

QUESTION: It was very significant. Let me ask you this. Has State Department cleared or signed off on the allegations by Thompson that the Chinese have been funneling money into --

MR. BURNS: Bill, you know I don't get involved in politics. I am not aware at all if the State Department has been asked about this and I didn't read the article.

QUESTION: Yeah, I read this article.

MR. BURNS: I didn't read the article. I was too busy reading about Roger Clemens' 16 strikeouts against the Red Sox. Yes, sir?

QUESTION: Colombia?

MR. BURNS: Yes.

QUESTION: Over the weekend, Ambassador Frechette said that military aid to Colombia will be withheld until the Colombian authorities sign an understanding [regarding] any alleged violations of human rights by these forces which will get the military aid. If there is any allegations by the church or anything like that, that a specific individual within the Armed Forces has violated the human rights of somebody, that person should be removed from that unit he is serving and transplanted to some other place. Basically, what that does, without due process, without an investigation, what that would do according to the defense minister, and I quote is, he says, "I cannot hand the Colombian system over, the Colombian justice system over to the United States because, basically, there wouldn't be any investigation, any due process." What is your reaction to that?

MR. BURNS: I don't have the benefit of having seen Ambassador Frechette's remarks. I would like to see them, first and obviously talk to our experts in the Inter-American Affairs Bureau and then I will be glad to comment tomorrow at the briefing on this issue. Yes, sir?

QUESTION: Saturday, in Panama, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ricardo Arias, said that last week Panama and the United States came to an agreement to the formation of the multilateral anti-narcotics center in Panama. He said it was a result of a meeting that happened here in Washington. Could you confirm that? Could you give us some details about how it's going to be, this center?

MR. BURNS: I'll be glad to take that question, as well. If you come to the briefing tomorrow, I will be glad to talk to you about that. Yes, sir?

QUESTION: Colombia, again. The U.S. Government asked today the Colombian military to make distinction between guerrilla forces and narco-traffickers as a condition to deliver the proposed aid to Colombia. Colombia says it cannot make any difference in the field. Is this the U.S. requirement to deliver this aid to Colombia?

MR. BURNS: Well, again, I think this is really a variation of the question that was asked before. What I would like to do is have the advantage of seeing our ambassador's remarks before I respond myself. Yes, sir.

QUESTION: I want to go back to food assistance to North Korea.

MR. BURNS: Yes.

QUESTION: Was this - your decision - to that decision is very generous, I think. But it's a so-called short-term assistance, not long-term assistance. But as you know, North Korea has asked for the so-called long-term food assistance for them over and over whenever they had discussions with officials of the United States. Perhaps probably they will ask again on August 5th or when the four-way talks take place in the future. What do you do? Do you accept to discuss on this issue? Or you are reluctant to discuss long-term food assistance?

MR. BURNS: I am sure we are open to discussing anything. But our long- term advice to the North Koreans - or advice for the long term is, reform your economic and political system. The communist economic philosophy has produced these shortages. They have been produced in every country where communism has held sway - Cuba, the Soviet Union, China -- for many, many decades. It doesn't work. So our long-term advice to the North Koreans is, change your system, get rid of communism and allow market economics to take place and you won't see these kinds of food shortages in North Korea.

We can only make these decisions as they come up, as the World Food Program appeals. We have no plans for longer term food assistance that I am aware of. But we remain interested in responding to appeals that we think will help children and the elderly to cope with the clear famine that exists there. Thank you very much.

(The briefing concluded at 2:16 P.M.)

(###)


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