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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #104, 97-07-11

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


1126

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Friday, July 11, 1997

Briefer: Nicholas Burns

ANNOUNCEMENTS / STATEMENTS
1                Welcome to Visitors

CAMBODIA 1 Read-out on Acting Secretary Pickering Mtg. w/Prince Ranariddh 4 --UNSC Draft Statement 7 --Drug Trafficking from Cambodia 7 --Hun Sen's Relationship w/Khmer Rouge 5-6 Secretary Albright's Decision not to go to Phnom Penh 2-3,5-6 ASEAN FM Diplomatic Initiative 3,7 FBI Investigation into Grenade Attack of March 30 7-8 Vietnam Involvement 8 Political Assassinations/Recriminations 9 Departure of American Citizens 9 IMF/World Bank Loans/Multilateral/Bilateral Aid

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 9-13 SFOR Capture of War Criminals 10-11 Detention/Release of Drljaca Relatives 9-11 Russia's Participation in SFOR & IFOR

CUBA 13 Report of Cuban Build-up of Shore Defenses 14-15 Proposed Flotilla of American Citizens 15 Migration Talks

NORTH KOREA 15 World Food Program Appeal 15-16 U.S. Alliance Commitments to South Korea/Japan

UNITED KINGDOM (NORTHERN IRELAND) 16 Marches thru Catholic Areas Cancelled

TURKEY/GREECE 16-17 Reports of Violation of Air Space over Aegean by Turkish F-16 Fighters 17-18 Resolution of Imia/Kardak Dispute

JAPAN 18 Performance of Mr. Irabu of the New York Yankees


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #104

FRIDAY, JULY 11, 1997 1:38 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. BURNS: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to the State Department briefing. I want to welcome two of our summer interns, Michelle van Leewen is an intern in the East Asia and Pacific Bureau. Michelle, welcome -- from the University of Washington Law School. That's Washington in Washington State, right? Terrific. You can brief on Pacific Salmon today, then. Michael Tremonte is here. Michael is an intern in the Office of Legal Advisor. He is from New York City and attends New York University Law School. Did they inform you about that you have to renounce the Yankees before you come into the briefing room? Did they let you know that? Have you done that publicly yet?

(Laughter.)

MR. BURNS: Would you like to stand up and renounce the New York Yankees?

(Laughter.)

MR. BURNS: George, isn't that the rule that you and I decided upon?

GEORGE: Absolutely.

MR. BURNS: It's the rule.

GEORGE: It's the rule.

MR. BURNS: Yeah. We hate the Yankees here. Okay. He just renounced the Yankees. Excellent, Michael. Okay. We're making converts as we go along.

Okay. I wanted to brief you on the meeting that Acting Secretary of State Tom Pickering just concluded with Prince Ranariddh. Acting Secretary Pickering met today with Prince Norodom Ranariddh, the First Prime Minister of Cambodia. Mr. Pickering expressed profound concern at the violence in Cambodia, the loss of life caused by the conflict between the security forces loyal to the two prime ministers. We urge Cambodia's leaders to resolve their political differences peacefully and to abide by the principles of the Paris Peace Accords.

Acting Secretary Pickering emphasized that the apparently deliberate and planned use of force to overturn the results of the 1993 United Nations- sponsored elections in Cambodia was unacceptable to the United States. The principles of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords should be upheld. Certainly, the ability of the political party of Prince Ranariddh to play a role in Cambodia should be sustained and should reflect the fact that that political party of Prince Ranariddh won the most votes during the 1993 elections.

All of Cambodia's political parties, including that of Prince Ranariddh, must be allowed to operate in an atmosphere free of intimidation. In this respect, Ambassador Pickering, of course, reaffirmed the wish of the United States that elections be held in Cambodia in 1998, as the two prime ministers had agreed just a couple of weeks ago. He also went on to say that the United States is a strong supporter of democracy in Cambodia. We are opposed to having senior Khmer Rouge leaders play any kind of role in Cambodian politics. We firmly believe that Khmer Rouge leaders suspected of having committed crimes against humanity should be brought to justice.

He went on to say that the United States welcomes the initiative of ASEAN to delay membership for Cambodia in that association until the Paris Peace Accords and the 1993 election results are observed. We applaud the decision of ASEAN, he told Prince Ranariddh, to send a delegation to Beijing to consult with His Majesty, King Sihanouk.

It was, I thought, a very good exchange of views between the two. I know that Prince Ranariddh is giving his own press conference. I will just give you a couple of highlights from what he told Ambassador Pickering. First, on the subject of the Khmer Rouge, he actually raised that issue -- Prince Ranariddh raised it -- before Acting Secretary Pickering had a chance to do so. Prince Ranariddh said, I have nothing to do with the Khmer Rouge and I will not bring them into positions of power. Needless to say, this was a welcome commitment.

QUESTION: Was that a quote?

MR. BURNS: This was a direct quote. Needless to say, that was a welcome commitment by Prince Ranariddh because we firmly oppose any participation by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodian politics.

He also said something that Ambassador Pickering very much agreed with. That is that the 1991 accords were an international agreement, in which many countries, including the United States, had a great role to play. Therefore, the solution to the Cambodian problem ought to be considered to be an international solution; or at least a solution - a set of problems - on which the international community has a legitimate right to comment.

This is in contrast to the press conference held in Phnom Penh yesterday where Hun Sen said that the problems of Cambodia are an internal matter. Well, the international community helped to bring peace to Cambodia in 1991; we helped sponsor the elections of 1993; and we have delivered over $1 billion in assistance to Cambodia since 1993. It is legitimate for the United States, for ASEAN, for Japan, for Australia and other countries to have an interest. Prince Ranariddh put for that point of view and Ambassador Pickering very much agreed with it.

I said a good exchange of views because it was an opportunity for us to hear at some length about Prince Ranariddh's views. I know he is giving a press conference, but he did signal - he did tell us - that the suspension of aid by the United States was a strong and clear signal that he welcomed. He hoped very much that the Paris Accords could be preserved. He did, obviously, indicate in a variety of ways that he felt that democracy in Cambodia was in danger, grave danger.

He said that members of his government -- some of the members of his military and his government were being held against their will in Cambodia. Other ministers in his government had taken refuge in Bangkok and Singapore and the United States and other places. He cited the March 30th grenade attack -- which, as you know, wounded an American citizen, and thus the FBI is investigating it -- as very grave concern and as a harbinger, perhaps in hindsight, of troubles to come.

He urged that the FBI continue it's investigation into that grenade attack, and Ambassador Pickering said that the United States would continue the FBI investigation. Again, as I said, his statements on Khmer Rouge were most welcome. Ambassador Pickering reviewed the major points that I have already told you about, and he welcomed the statement that was made on the Khmer Rouge. Ambassador Pickering said that we look forward to being in touch, but at the present time, we really were putting great stock in the effort by the ASEAN foreign ministers from the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia to have a round of consultations with King Sihanouk, Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen, and that we would follow those very closely. Obviously looking forward to the Secretary's trip to Malaysia at the end of this month, in just a couple of weeks time, this obviously will be a source of discussion for the United States with our ASEAN partners.

QUESTION: The Prime Minister's statement that he has nothing to do with the Khmer Rouge -- does that square with your understanding of the situation?

MR. BURNS: I think we have spoken just in the past couple of days about our concern that there was a flirtation that had developed between Prince Ranariddh's political party and members of the Khmer Rouge. We obviously welcome the statements made today because, as I said before, we resolutely condemn the Khmer Rouge and all it stands for. We think the influence of the Khmer Rouge has been gradually waning over the past several years. We would like to see that trend continue. We would not like to see the Khmer Rouge feel it is emboldened by the present political crisis. I know that Ambassador Pickering urged Prince Ranariddh to say in public what he said in private to us about the Khmer Rouge. I expect he will do so at his press conference.

QUESTION: I want to ask George's question in a different way. Do you believe him?

MR. BURNS: Well, in diplomacy, it is customary for nations to base their appreciations of situations on evidence and on deeds rather than just on words. The words in this case are welcome because we had not heard these words from him before, at least not in several years, certainly not recently in the last several months. The words are welcome; but what matters more than the words are the deeds. We will, of course, be very sensitive to any attempt by any of the political parties in Cambodia to resurrect the Khmer Rouge and to bring the Khmer Rouge back into positions of influence in Phnom Penh or in any place, any city or province in the country.

QUESTION: I would like to ask sort of a formal question. Do you recognize the government that exists now in Phnom Penh?

MR. BURNS: We recognize the government that was elected in 1993. There are two prime ministers of that government. The first prime minister is Prince Ranariddh. The second prime minister is Mr. Hun Sen. If you want to ask a legal question, we recognize, as you know - pardon?

QUESTION: Go ahead.

MR. BURNS: We recognize countries and not especially governments. That is true in many other countries around the world. Afghanistan is an example of that. So, it is not a question of deciding whether or not we need to make a decision of sustaining formal diplomatic relations. We have diplomatic relations with Cambodia and intend to continue them because it is in our interest to do so.

We still work with and certainly recognize the role that Prince Ranariddh has been given by the Cambodian people in a democratic election. In fact, when he walked in, the first thing that Ambassador Pickering said to him was, welcome, Mr. First Prime Minister; and that was meant quite sincerely. He is elected by the Cambodian people. We don't take away that designation. Mr. Hun Sen is trying to take away that designation, but we're not going to play that game.

QUESTION: Clearly, he can't go back to Cambodia, at least not right now. And consequently, the practical effect of all this is that Hun Sen is running the country. Did Ranariddh suggest at all any thought of setting up a government in exile?

MR. BURNS: He did not mention that. He did mention that he intended to press his case internationally. He said he would be traveling to Southeast Asia in a matter of days to consult with governments there. I think he said he would be attending or at least be present in Kuala Lumpur during the ASEAN meetings. There was talk about a United Nations Security Council statement. There is such a statement, I think, that's been drafted in the United Nations. The United States very much supports that statement. Ambassador Pickering told Prince Ranariddh that we supported it. That statement, we hope, will make some of the same points that we have -- making over the last several days about the inadmissibility of the use of force, the fact that we hope that the peace accords can be preserved.

QUESTION: Are you thinking at all of trying to impose sanctions on - international sanctions on Cambodia? Ranariddh also said yesterday something about pushing the UN, the Security Council to declare sort of a broad-based halt on aid. I mean, obviously you have a temporary suspension. But would the United States support an effort by the UN Security Council to impose a blanket aid cut-off on Cambodia or some other kinds of sanctions?

MR. BURNS: First, I am not aware that the United Nations has taken up any such proposal. Second, the United States has already made its own decision, which we discussed yesterday. Third, it's very important that we give diplomacy a chance to try to do something positive here. That is why the most important thing that the United States believes is happening now - the most important development - is the initiative by ASEAN one, to deny its seat in ASEAN, which is very important, and we support that. Two is to send this high-level and very distinguished delegation to Beijing to consult with His Majesty King Sihanouk, who time and again, has stood for national unity in Cambodia over many decades, and who is a figure of great respect in Cambodia and internationally; and to talk to the two prime ministers -- Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen - to see if there is any way that the 1991 accords can be preserved.

Now, based on the press conference yesterday in Phnom Penh by Hun Sen, that may be a very tough challenge. Hun Sen appears not to be interested in any kind of reasonable compromise that would respect international law, the will of the Cambodian people as expressed in the elections, and the will of the international community in the Paris Peace Accords. But nevertheless, we think it makes sense to proceed with that initiative. Today's meeting was part of the effort to have these contacts with the disputants to see if it's possible to do something positive. Rather than to blindly strike out with sanctions - international sanctions - at this point, we think that diplomacy is probably in the short term the way to go.

QUESTION: Well, are sanctions something that you would in reserve for the future?

MR. BURNS: Well, obviously, there are many options available to countries around the world and to the United Nations. But I think right now, these quiet discussions that ASEAN intends to have is the most important thing that can occur.

QUESTION: Just one more question. Is there any re-thinking here that Secretary Albright probably should have gone to Cambodia, made it possible for herself to go to Cambodia on the last trip, thinking that perhaps she could have been a catalyst to prevent this coup from happening?

MR. BURNS: No, in fact, quite the reverse. I think a lot of us in discussions this week have, frankly, reconfirmed in our minds that Secretary Albright made absolutely the right decision. First of all, let's remember what she was trying to accomplish. She wanted to have a face-to- face meeting with both prime ministers -- with Ranariddh and Hun Sen. She was in personal contact with both of them while we were on the trip in San Francisco and in Vietnam to try to work out a meeting.

Her security advisors told her in no uncertain terms that going into Phnom Penh to the Council of Ministers Building where the meeting was to have been held was not a workable proposition given the security situation where there had been fighting on the streets, where our embassy had taken an RPG round. So the strong advice - in fact, the unanimous advice of her security advisors and of her own senior advisors was to try to arrange an airport meeting. She personally called Hun Sen and Ranariddh and had Ambassador Ken Quinn go in four or five times in the space of four or five days to arrange an airport visit.

Now, I think for reasons of protocol, the Cambodian leaders decided that would not be appropriate. In hindsight, I think the mistake that may have been made was that the two prime ministers were more concerned about protocol, or perhaps about other political factors in Cambodia, than the importance of a face-to-face meeting which could have been held.

Secretary Albright had to do the responsible thing with her staff and with the 12 journalists in mind. Taking 40 or so people into Phnom Penh against the wishes of her security advisors would not have been a responsible decision. She made the responsible decision. This charge -- and I don't say it is yours, Carol, but the one that you mention and other reporters have raised it -- would make sense only if the United States by not going into Phnom Penh then had no diplomatic contact with the Cambodian Government and, thus, had no ability to influence the views of the Cambodian Government. But that is false. Secretary Albright had personal phone conversations where they talked not only about the visit but about our belief that there could be no resort to violence and that the two prime ministers had to cooperate together.

There were four or five diplomatic demarches by Ambassador Ken Quinn during this period which essentially carried the same message. There were repeated public statements by the United States about our position. So there was no confusion about the political message of the United States. Therefore, the logic of this question, I think, is not there; it's not apparent. I think she feels good about the decision and we all do, too. I suppose the 12 journalists who are with her feel the same way. But I don't want to speak for you. Laura?

QUESTION: Nick, given this diplomatic initiative by the ASEAN foreign ministers that you support, what does this effort envision? That the two co- prime ministers sit down at a negotiating table? I mean what do you hope the end result of this diplomatic effort might be?

MR. BURNS: Well, it makes sense to embark on an initiative to try to preserve the Paris Peace Accords and the results of the elections. That is what ASEAN intends to do -- to bring to bear influence by the international community, particularly by Southeast Asian states, on those two questions. We believe that should be supported.

QUESTION: Can you envision at this moment a future role in the Cambodian Government for Hun Sen given his --

MR. BURNS: For Hun Sen?

QUESTION: Yes, given his activities.

MR. BURNS: Well, he does have a role, unfortunately. He's taken that role up by arms. He has given that role to himself against the will of the people and he is playing the role, so that is reality. We have to live with that, but we certainly can bring some pressure on him as we are doing with our own diplomacy this week and in associating ourselves with ASEAN to make it clear to him that it won't be business as usual with him, that he will not have a decent relationship with many countries around the world, if he is not interested in political compromise.

QUESTION: On the subject of the FBI investigation, did Hun Sen ask you to continue pursuing it because he felt - excuse me -- Prince Ranariddh ask you to continue pursuing it because he felt Hun Sen was behind it?

MR. BURNS: He did not explain the rationale behind his request. But it is obvious that we would want to have the FBI investigate because an American citizen was injured in the attack.

QUESTION: Do you think Hun Sen is involved in drug trafficking?

MR. BURNS: Prince Ranariddh alleges that there is substantial drug trafficking occurring, especially in marijuana, from Cambodia. That is what he told Ambassador Pickering. He did not make the charge that Hun Sen was personally behind it. I would have to take the question and seek advice from our experts about whether or not we think Hun Sen has been involved in narcotics trafficking.

QUESTION: The 1970s - the 1997 Narcotics Report talks very vaguely and ambiguously about concerns about corruption and drug trafficking in Cambodia. So if you could answer it more explicitly?

MR. BURNS: Be glad to take that question, Carol.

QUESTION: Did he offer any evidence to the relationship between the Hun Sen and the Khmer Rouge?

MR. BURNS: He did not, no. I think you have seen public statements by Prince Ranariddh just in the last two days about this. But, no, he did not go into that. I don't believe. I just have to look at my notes. I don't think so.

QUESTION: Could you just double-check that, please?

MR. BURNS: I'm pretty sure he didn't, Sid.

QUESTION: Did the question of Hun Sen's relationship with Vietnam come up?

MR. BURNS: No, that did not come up. I think there was a slight reference to Vietnam in the conversation, but it was not a big part of the conversation.

QUESTION: A follow up?

MR. BURNS: Yes.

QUESTION: At the exit of the building, Prince Ranariddh was asked about foreign interference in Cambodia, specifically Vietnam. I believe his reply was he hoped not, that this was not going on. My question to you, Nick, is, does this government have any further knowledge at this hour of Vietnam or any other foreign involvement?

MR. BURNS: Well, if you are talking about nefarious, negative foreign involvement, I have nothing much to say on the issue of Vietnam. We have made our concerns known to the Vietnamese about what is going on inside Cambodia. We expect that the Vietnamese will do what they can to try to play a positive, rather than negative role.

But again, there ought to be international concern and involvement on the issue of Cambodia in general because it was the international accords that laid the basis for the relatively short period of stability that Cambodia enjoyed for four years.

QUESTION: Nick, just one more thing on Cambodia. We seem to be covering this to death. You said that Hun Sen appears to be obdurate in his position for compromise with the Prince. Is the United States worried at all that by having Prince Norodom sort of parade himself to many senior officials in the United States that Hun Sen will be enticed toward more hostility to Cambodians?

MR. BURNS: Well, Hun Sen needs to recognize that we recognize the duly elected government of Cambodia and that he is not the only person in that government. Prince Ranariddh, in fact, is the first prime minister and Hun Sen is the second prime minister. So he surely ought to understand that the United States wants to uphold a legally established constitutional order in Cambodia. If he objects to that, then I think he is showing his true colors.

QUESTION: But he seems to be very frenzied in his temper at the moment. I mean, he is giving press conferences saying that the Prince can come back and stand trial in Cambodia. Isn't the United States worried at all that he might be enticed toward more assassinations of innocent people and opposition leaders?

MR. BURNS: We have warned Hun Sen and his ambassador here in Washington that any attempt to engage in political assassinations or political recriminations - and there is a lot of that going on right now -- is going to be condemned by the United States and many other countries around the world. It is against the Cambodian constitution and it is against the rule of law that had been established there. So, we very much reject it.

QUESTION: Did Ambassador Quinn ever get in to see Hun Sen?

MR. BURNS: Not yet, no. He has not been granted an audience with Mr. Hun Sen. We hope that will be the case because Ambassador Quinn has many issues to discuss with him. We think it would be in Hun Sen's interest to have a direct conversation with the United States.

QUESTION: What are the Cambodians telling you about why he is not being allowed to see him?

MR. BURNS: I don't know, but I saw that Hun Sen had time to visit Angkor Wat for a tourism picture today, so we would hope that he would have time for serious business with the United States, with the delegation of ASEAN foreign ministers who do wish to visit him in Phnom Penh.

QUESTION: Is he sending you a signal?

MR. BURNS: Oh, I don't know if he is sending us signals. I don't know what - he is a very confusing guy. I don't know what signals are being sent, but we do mean to talk to him. Sooner or later, it will be in his self- interest to talk to us. Yes, sir?

QUESTION: How's the evacuation going? Are the Americans getting out?

MR. BURNS: Yes. Just to be absolutely clear, I wouldn't really term it an evacuation in this sense. We are not physically evacuating people by U.S. military means. The airport is open. Commercial flights are now resumed. Charter flights have been ongoing. We think between 450 to 500 American citizens have left over the last several days. There is now ample opportunity for Americans to get out without cause for panic. We still encourage all Americans -- strongly encourage and advise all Americans to leave Cambodia. There is no telling what might happen in the coming weeks. The embassy in Phnom Penh is still available to counsel Americans, to assist them in any way. Our embassy in Bangkok has been busy receiving American citizens and helping them with their onward travel from Bangkok. In fact, our embassies in Bangkok and in Phnom Penh and Hanoi and our Consulate General in Hong Kong have all taken in American citizens and have done an admirable job over the last several days. Yes?

QUESTION: The United States Government has any views of IMF loan to Cambodia? Do you have any opinions?

MR. BURNS: Well, I'd have to check to see if any IMF loan decisions or World Bank loan decisions were imminent pertaining to Cambodia. Obviously, we will look very closely at that question of multilateral aid, as well as the question of bilateral aid, which is now being reviewed for the next 30 days.

QUESTION: Another subject?

MR. BURNS: On Cambodia? We're done with Cambodia. Carol? Yes.

QUESTION: The Russians don't seem to be very happy with the snatch of the war criminal yesterday. They're accusing the U.S. of cowboy tactics. There's some vague reference to possibly withdrawing their troops from the Bosnia effort. What do you think of it?

MR. BURNS: Well, SFOR, I guess, might liken its mission to a mission of being a sheriff in Bosnia. I don't know anyone, I don't know any other country that's seriously argued against this. I think maybe the Serbs don't like it very much. I know the Pale Serbs don't like it. If the Russians wish to associate themselves with the Serbs in Pale, I guess that's their decision.

But it seems to us that here you have the Dayton Accords. The Serbs and Bosnian Serbs signed on the dotted line to turn these indicted war criminals over. They didn't do it for a year and a half. Therefore, it's incumbent upon the international community to do that, given the opportunity. The British had the opportunity; they took it; they performed magnificently. I think all over America, people are applauding what the British have done. Just talking to reporters and talking to average people in my neighborhood, people are applauding what the British have done. People see it's the right thing to do.

You have these notorious people who are responsible for the worst human rights abuses in Europe since the Second World War, since Adolf Hitler, and the British go out and do something positive. We congratulate them, and we would hope the Russians would want to associate themselves with that kind of right thinking.

QUESTION: Go ahead.

QUESTION: But Plavsic didn't like it either - the person you're trying to bolster here.

MR. BURNS: Well, Mrs. Plavsic - Secretary Albright phoned Mrs. Plavsic yesterday morning to explain the operation, to explain what was behind the operation. I know that Mrs. Plavsic was concerned that in the operation, a couple of individuals, including the son of the man who was slain, were taken into custody. Those individuals have now been released. We know that was a particular concern of Mrs. Plavsic. So working with the British and others, we, I think, were able to make sure that two relatives of Mr. Drljaca - including his 17-year-old son - were released. That release was expedited.

We have respect for Mrs. Plavsic. She's under a lot of pressure now. She faces a lot of political pressure from some of the intransigent dinosaurs in Pale - some of the criminal associates of Mr. Karazdic. I think everybody supports Mrs. Plavsic in her role to maintain the constitutional order in the Republika Srpska.

Now, she has dissolved the parliament; and therefore, the United States no longer recognizes the parliament and will not recognize any act of the parliament. So I just want to be clear about the phone conversation, about some of the nature of her concerns. I think at least some of the concerns have been met.

QUESTION: The Russians are also complaining about not being informed in advance. Were they informed in advance? And also, was Madame Plavsic informed in advance?

MR. BURNS: I don't think anybody on the ground in terms of - I don't think any of the Serbs were informed in advance. You wouldn't expect that they would have been informed in advance. As for the Russians, I'll have to refer you to SFOR and to the British; I just don't know the answer to that question.

QUESTION: -- idea of a release, are you - is what you're saying that Plavsic achieved an expedited release of these two individuals, based on her intervention with Albright?

MR. BURNS: Well, not just with the - yes, I think she mentioned that to Secretary Albright, but not just with Secretary Albright. She made this view public. These two individuals were not indicted war criminals. They simply happened - one of them was a son of Mr. Drljaca - so therefore they were detained; probably with a very good cause because they were in the vicinity. I think when it was determined that they were not indicted war criminals -- there was no reason to arrest them - their release was expedited.

So Mrs. Plavsic is in a very difficult position for a lot of reasons. She's under attack by the hard-liners. We hope that her efforts to sustain constitutional norms and constitutional rule will be successful.

QUESTION: But doesn't this - on the negative side, however, doesn't this attempt - the attempted arrest and death of one of these people, doesn't it prove that this can happen and that Karazdic or Mladic could also be killed in the process of capture and become martyrs? Couldn't this be destabilizing?

MR. BURNS: Well, I think most of us feel that it's a very good thing that all these indicted war criminals strewn across the territory of the Republika Srpska, of Serbia, of Croatia - maybe they're going to lose a lot of sleep over the next couple of weeks. Maybe that's a very good thing. Let's keep them guessing.

QUESTION: Nick, Russia's also saying that it's going to have to reconsider - or suggesting it might reconsider its force - its troop involvement in the NATO mission in Bosnia. What does this - is the United States concerned about that? What kind of message would this send to the United States? What comment do you have on that?

MR. BURNS: Well, the participation by Russia in the SFOR operation, and IFOR before, has been very positive. The Russians have acquitted themselves responsibly and well. They have been a very good partner of the United States in SFOR and IFOR. So we very much hope the Russians will stay within SFOR; they're playing an important role.

QUESTION: But they seem to be suggesting they're not happy with the way these criminals were attacked, is what they're calling it. And they're suggesting that they could reduce their involvement and maybe even pull out of the NATO force.

MR. BURNS: It has always been part of the rules of engagement for SFOR and IFOR forces to detain indicted war criminals, should the conditions be favorable to do that. The British took advantage of that yesterday, and we congratulate the British for that action.

QUESTION: I'm a little curious about why you're giving such sympathetic - (inaudible) -- to Mrs. Plavsic. Wasn't she - if I'm not mistaken, she helped plant a lot of ethnic hatred against the Bosnian Muslims during the war, did she not?

MR. BURNS: We have never said that we agree on everything with Mrs. Plavsic. We've had, in fact, quite serious disagreements with her on many issues. When Secretary Albright met her in Banja Luka on June 1, they didn't agree on a lot of issues. But we know one thing - she has pledged to uphold the Dayton Accords and she's pledged to uphold constitutional rule in the Republika Srpska. That's a lot more than Karazdic and even Mr. Krajisnik and a couple of others.

So you have to judge the differences among leaders and that doesn't mean that they're always on your dance card. But it does mean at least you think you can work with them. We can work with her despite the many disagreements we have with her. Yes.

QUESTION: Nick, by putting - you talked about a bunch of people losing sleep. By putting --

MR. BURNS: We're not losing sleep.

QUESTION: Well --

MR. BURNS: It's the indicted war criminals who ought to be losing sleep.

QUESTION: Indicted war criminals. By putting people like Karazdic and Mladic on notice that something like this could happen, why are you not making it more difficult for SFOR people or other forces to pick them up or arrest them? Why is this now a much more complicated problem?

MR. BURNS: Well, I think that Secretary Albright has said a couple of times, just in the last week, that sooner or later these guys are going to get their just desserts. Their just desserts will be a trial in The Hague on the charge of war crimes. That's as much as I'm going to say on this. They're going to have to calculate how difficult that's - they're going to have to worry about the intentions of all of us in the international community. Sooner or later, they're going to be tried for their crimes.

QUESTION: Does any of this raise a greater possibility that people who would have to make the arrests are more likely to be hurt?

MR. BURNS: Well, obviously, there is risk and danger in any kind of military operation such as the one that the British undertook yesterday. But our soldiers are professionals, and the SFOR soldiers are among the best in the world, or are the best in the world, many of them. They are fully capable of defending themselves and carrying out their missions when they are asked to do so. I think the Bosnian Serbs understand that. They understand the professionalism of SFOR.

QUESTION: Nick, why do you want to warn them? Why don't you just go and arrest them? I mean, do you just enjoy torturing them for the time being? Just go and get the guys.

MR. BURNS: Well, we don't mind the latter. But listen, Talal, we're not going to forecast anything in advance. Obviously, there is very little that can be said about that particular issue.

QUESTION: Nick, could you answer a Cuba question?

MR. BURNS: Yes.

QUESTION: There is a report this morning that Cuba is bolstering its shore defenses, and they have anti-ship weaponry which, the story says, could perhaps be targeted at U.S. vessels going in and out of Guantanemo.

MR. BURNS: Well, I can't comment on the report because it is based on a leak of a highly classified intelligence document, per usual. So I can't comment on that. But what I can do, George, is just say that the Cubans are not foolish enough, we think, to fool around with the U.S. Navy or our military forces on Guantanemo because we are a hell of a lot stronger than the Cubans. So they won't do that.

Obviously, we have to be concerned about protecting our military forces and we have done everything necessary to protect our military forces. Now, there is a related issue here - somewhat related, at least it pertains to Cuba. I just wanted to draw you attention to the public statement we issued last evening about the proposed flotilla of American citizens in international waters this weekend to protest the actions of the Cuban Government.

We issued a public statement last night and I can tell you that both here in Washington and also in Havana, we have made very clear to the Cubans that they must exercise discretion and restraint and prudence in reacting to this flotilla. The flotillas previous to this have all been law-abiding. They have not transgressed international law, and the Cubans need to understand this. We expect that the Cubans will act with the utmost discretion, restraint not to use excessive force should any private vessels or aircraft enter the Cuban territorial sea or air space. That is very, very important.

We have likewise counseled the organizers of the flotilla to observe international law and, of course, to stay out of Cuban territorial seas because that, of course, would not be the wise thing to do. But I think the base here is that American citizens have the right in our country to say what they want, to protest, to have a demonstration like this. We support it; we assume it's going to be lawful.

QUESTION: This is a re-run of previous statements which have been issued prior to similar flotillas dating back more than a year?

MR. BURNS: Yes, we took great care with this. We didn't simply pop it out of the computer. We did take great care with it. We have talked to the organizers. We have talked to the Cubans. We would hope that the organizers, especially, as well as the Cubans, would read our statement and take heed to some of the cautionary statements in it.

QUESTION: What about U.S. assets accompanying the flotilla?

MR. BURNS: I'd have to refer you to the Coast Guard. I am just not aware of any plans to do so. Yes?

QUESTION: One of the organizers of the flotilla has apparently said he plans to cross into Cuban waters. Is there any action that this country can take prior to that to prevent that?

MR. BURNS: That will be a legal question. That would have to be determined by the Justice Department or the local law enforcement officials in Miami, where I believe the individual resides. In any case, we very much support the right of Americans to organize a flotilla of this nature, but we would counsel Americans against violating international law. When you enter the territorial seas of another country without the permission of that country, you are violating international law. Likewise, we do warn the Cubans to act with restraint. Now, they did not act with restraint on February 24, 1996. We haven't forgotten that; we will always remember that. The Cubans must understand that they must act with the utmost restraint this weekend.

QUESTION: Is there any recommendation to make to the Coast Guard or any other U.S. authority regarding restraining these individuals?

MR. BURNS: We are working very closely with the Coast Guard and the Justice Department and local authorities on this whole entire issue. I cannot tell you whether we have given any advice on the question of what could possibly be done to prevent a violation of international law. That is a legal question. I am not a legal official.

QUESTION: In a more general sense, what effect do these activities have overall on U.S. policy toward Cuba?

MR. BURNS: Well, I don't think that the organization of a flotilla is contrary to U.S. policy or U.S. wishes. We support the rights of our citizens to say what they want and to demonstrate against an autocratic regime that has clearly failed and that ought to be on its way out, on its last legs, we hope. We have nothing against the fact that people are going to demonstrate. We just want them to observe our law and international law.

QUESTION: On the occasions of previous flotillas, you were more evenhanded in urging restraint by both sides. Now you are being much more adamant about the need for Cuban restraint as opposed to restraint on the part of the flotilla folks.

MR. BURNS: If you read our statement, I think you will see that we call for restraint on both sides. It is very important, given the track record of the Cuban government, which is pitiful on this issue, that we remind the Cubans of their international obligations. It is an outlaw regime. They have broken international law. They did on February 24, 1996. The International Civil Aviation Organization said so in its report, so I don't think it is unreasonable for me to remind Mr. Fidel Castro and his criminal colleagues that they ought to do what's right here and not overreact to this flotilla.

QUESTION: Have you heard anything on the migration talks next week?

MR. BURNS: The migration talks?

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR. BURNS: I don't have anything in particular; but, George, if you are interested, we can certainly get you something on that. Yes. Laura, did you have something?

QUESTION: Any decision on the World Food Program appeal for North Korea.

MR. BURNS: No decision, yet; but I think we are speeding along in our analysis of this request. I think we would like to make a decision shortly, but nothing at this hour.

QUESTION: Today?

MR. BURNS: I don't know if it will be today, but I think it will be shortly given the urgency of the situation. I will try to see if we can do this on a normal working day so that all of you will have a fair chance to report this story.

QUESTION: Another on North Korea?

MR. BURNS: Yes, Bill. Yes, North Korea.

QUESTION: Anybody else? Okay.

MR. BURNS: I'm sure, Mr. Lambros is not interested in North Korea.

QUESTION: Yes, on North Korea, Nick, I'm sorry, I missed your briefing yesterday where you spoke about Mr. Hwang's news conference on Wednesday and the release of the 80-page summary of his debriefing by the South Koreans. And I would ask specifically about Japan. Mr. Hwang continues to talk about the threat that North Korea poses to Japan, that might blackmail the United States from taking action in the defense of South Korea. I would ask specifically, is there anything, any possible attack or strategy that the North Koreans could use that would succeed in keeping the U.S. from defending the South?

MR. BURNS: No.

(Laughter.)

We will defend South Korea and Japan, and no one is going to blackmail us. We are the greatest power in the Pacific. Little North Korea -- North Korea, a failing communist regime, is not going to blackmail the United States on the question of our defensive commitments, our alliance commitments to Japan and South Korea, which have been in place for going on five decades now.

QUESTION: So North Korean strategies then, as Mr. Hwang detailed them, would be faulty, fallacious?

MR. BURNS: Exactly, exactly.

QUESTION: And finally, Mr. Hwang has been accepted by the South Koreans. I think it's pretty clear that they believe him. Do we believe Mr. Hwang?

MR. BURNS: Mr. Hwang is a free man now, and thank goodness for that. He is free to say what he wishes. We have debriefed him. We have interviewed him over the course of several days, and I am not at liberty to tell you our conclusions from that, except to say that he is free to say what he wishes. We are free to say what we wish. I can tell you that the United States will defend South Korea, as well as Japan. We have a couple more questions here. Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Nick, on a different area?

MR. BURNS: Yes.

QUESTION: I may have missed it. But have you all given a reaction to the Northern Irish, Protestant announcements that they will eliminate their marches this weekend for Orange Day?

MR. BURNS: Yes. We welcome very much the decision by the leaders of the Orange Order to forego certain controversial marches that have been scheduled -- parades for this weekend. After the disturbing events of the past week, we hope this decision will help diffuse tensions in Northern Ireland and build confidence between the two communities there. I think I understand that the White House is going to have a statement on this later today. But we are very pleased by this decision.

Now, I know that Mr. Lambros wants to ask about Turkey. We have to get a very important U.S.-Japan issue before we close the briefing. Yes, Mr. Lambros.

QUESTION: Did you check about the violations and infringements of the air space and FIR around the island of Lemnos in the Aegean yesterday by Turkish F-16 fighters when Mr. Pangalos was giving a press conference defending the Madrid agreement on principles between Greece and Turkey?

MR. BURNS: Well, I can tell you, Mr. Lambros, we have asked the Pentagon, we have asked our embassies in the region, we have looked at reports. The only place that we found reports of this violation are in the Greek press.

(Laughter.)

MR. BURNS: But we are open-minded; we are open-minded. So if you have any information that you wish to give us, Mr. Lambros, you feel free. But listen --

QUESTION: In other words, did you receive any complaints?

MR. BURNS: As you know, the United States does not constantly monitory every inch of air space around the world. So we are not the world's greatest authority sometimes on where airplanes are being flown. The only place we have seen reports of this air space violation are the Greek press. We have no independent information to substantiate the reports. Needless to say, we continue to urge Turkey, as well as Greece, to refrain from actions which could increase tensions in the Aegean. We have a very well known record in this. I say this with all seriousness. But we have no information, Mr. Lambros; therefore, I couldn't possibly comment further.

QUESTION: Did the Greek Government complain or ask you about that?

MR. BURNS: That's just it, Mr. Lambros. We don't have a complaint from any government in the region.

QUESTION: In the Sintra conference, Mr. Pangalos stated that Greece is ready to go to the International Court of Justice for the Imia case if - (inaudible) -- will address the issue. Since that is your policy to express many, many times by President Clinton and by you from this forum, I am wondering, Mr. Burns, sending on Imia to the International Court of Justice, that would be the end of the dispute.

MR. BURNS: Well, we take note of Minister Pangalos' statements and that has been the position of the United States that one way to resolve the Imia/Kardak crisis would be for Greece and Turkey to refer it to the International Court of Justice for a consensual decision. That is simply one way that we think might be helpful, but it is up to Greece and Turkey to decide that. We respect their right to decide it.

QUESTION: Then you're saying that would be the end of the dispute?

MR. BURNS: Well, Mr. Lambros, the end of the dispute will come when Greece and Turkey decide that they can put the dispute aside and when they know it's been resolved. So, I couldn't possibly give you a better answer than that.

QUESTION: I am asking you because there are information that you are starting to establish a precedent on Imia as a contested area in order to apply the same decision in the list of other Greek islands in the Aegean. Is correct?

MR. BURNS: No, no. We have not tried to apply this possible option to resolve the problem to other parts of the Aegean. We are simply talking about Imia/Kardak. We have not talked about other disputes.

QUESTION: Why, then, so much discussion about the list of the islands?

MR. BURNS: I have never discussed any lists, ever, from this podium.

QUESTION: We created a whole list of --

MR. BURNS: I've never discussed the list.

QUESTION: Actually, Mr. Kornblum is in charge of the list.

MR. BURNS: There is no list here.

QUESTION: No, no, no. I am saying - (inaudible) -- not over there.

MR. BURNS: You can't even see the islands on the map. You see one big island.

QUESTION: No, no. I am talking about Mr. Kornblum who is in charge of the list of those islands.

MR. BURNS: I have never heard about a list; I have never seen a list; and I've never discussed one.

QUESTION: On Cyprus, finally, the UN Secretary General has given to the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots yesterday the one known paper, Boutros Boutros Ghali's ideas for the solution to the Cyprus issue. Do you have any comment?

MR. BURNS: There is a news blackout in place, Mr. Lambros, until Sunday or Monday. I am going to observe that.

QUESTION: You said you had an important announcement on Japan.

MR. BURNS: I do. I just want to make a magnanimous statement. I have never said anything good about the New York Yankees and I never will. But I must say that Mr. Irabu's performance last evening was most impressive and indicative of the fact that Japan is producing some of the great young ball players now, and we want more of them to come to the United States -- but northeast of New York, no longer just New York City. It was a very impressive performance. I thought I just had to say that. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 2:23 P.M.)

(###)


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