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RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 1, No. 145, 97-10-23Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Newsline Directory - Previous Article - Next ArticleFrom: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty <http://www.rferl.org>RFE/RL NEWSLINEVol. 1, No. 145, 23 October 1997CONTENTS[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA
[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
[C] END NOTE
[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA[01] APPROACHES TO RESOLVING KARABKH CONFLICT CLARIFIEDArkadii Ghukasyan, the president of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh, told an RFE/RL correspondent in Yerevan on 22 October that differences between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh on how to resolve the Karabakh conflict are "to a certain extent" hampering the peace process. Ghukasyan said the international community has given Armenia far too much importance in its peace efforts and has disregarded the unrecognized republic. Speaking to journalists in Yerevan on 22 October, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian said such differences have been exacerbated by the need to choose between a "package" and a "phased" solution. Karabakh advocates the former, and Armenian President Levon Ter- Petrossyan the latter. Meeting with a German Foreign Ministry delegation, Armenian Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan said he personally prefers the "package solution, which he said would provide more reliable guarantees of Karabakh's security, according to Noyan Tapan.[02] ABKHAZ REFUGEES THREATEN TO DEMAND SHEVARDNADZE'S RESIGNATIONBefore leaving for the CIS summit in Chisinau, Shevardnadze met with representatives of the ethnic Georgians who fled Abkhazia during the 1992- 1993 hostilities, including deputies from the Abkhaz parliament in exile, CAUCASUS PRESS reported on 23 October. The fugitives' warned that they will demand Shevardnadze's resignation and launch a campaign of civil disobedience if the president refuses to demand at the summit that the mandate of the CIS peacekeeping force currently deployed along the border between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia not be extended "under any conditions." Shevardnadze agreed to demand the peacekeepers' withdrawal but warned it cannot be implemented immediately.[03] COUNTDOWN TO EARLY OIL IN AZERBAIJANPrime Minister Artur Rasi-Zade told Turan on 22 October that the first oil from Azerbaijan's Chirag Caspian field will begin to flow on 12 November. But a spokesman for the Azerbaijan International Operating Committee involved in extracting the oil said that production will begin as scheduled, in late October. Natik Aliev, the president of Azerbaijan's state oil company SOCAR, told Turan that Azerbaijan is ready to begin filling its section of the Baku-Grozny-Novorossiisk export pipeline and that advance payment for the first 40,000 metric tons to be exported has already been transferred to the Russian pipeline company Transneft. Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, who is also fuel and energy minister, will attend a formal ceremony in Baku on 7 November to mark the opening of the pipeline, according to Interfax on 22 October.[04] KAZAKH OIL ROUNDUPKazakhstan has begun increasing the amount of oil that it exports via Azerbaijan and Georgia, ANS-PRESS reported on 22 October, quoting the president of Azerbaijan's Transchart company, Fuad Rasulov. The oil is transported by tanker to Baku and from there by rail to Batumi. But Kazakhstan has temporarily suspended the export of oil to Iran under a 1996 inter-governmental agreement, Interfax reported. Under that accord, Kazakhstan exports 2-6 million metric tons of crude to Iran annually and receives the equivalent quantity of Iranian oil for sale on world markets. But Baltabek Quandykov, Kazakhoil's new president, told journalists on 22 October that Iranian refineries are unable to process Kazakh crude because of its high mercaptan content.[05] TALIBAN DELEGATION IN ASHGABATA Taliban delegation met in Ashgabat on 20-21 October to discuss possible solutions to the conflict in Afghanistan, Interfax reported. The talks took place within the framework of the UN program for resolving the conflict. The Taliban agreed to talks between all rival Afghan factions and expressed support for the Turkmen proposal to convene a conference of states bordering on Afghanistan. Russian President Yeltsin said in Moscow on 22 October that he supports a multilateral peace conference under the aegis of the UN. He mentioned specifically the initiative of Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev to convene a peace conference in Bishkek, ITAR-TASS reported.[06] AGREEMENT REACHED ON REPATRIATION OF TAJIK REFUGEESTajik, Uzbek, and Afghan officials met with representatives of the UN High Commission on Refugees in the Uzbek town of Termez on 21 October to discuss the repatriation of some 7,000 Tajik refugees currently in Afghanistan, "Nezavisimaya gazeta" reported . Following lengthy talks, the participants reached agreement on opening the bridge linking Termez with neighboring Afghanistan three times a week to allow the Tajik refugees to cross into Uzbekistan on their way home to Tajikistan, RFE/RL's Tajik service reported. The UNHCR will pay the necessary travel expenses.[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE[07] MONTENEGRIN POLICE CLOSE ALBANIAN VILLAGE TO MILOSEVIC BACKERSPolice on 23 October blocked the road to the mainly ethnic Albanian village of Tuzi to an automobile convoy carrying supporters of outgoing President Momir Bulatovic. The previous day in Podgorica, speakers at a rally of 5, 000 Bulatovic backers demanded weapons for supporters of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and his ally Bulatovic. They also charged that "traitors and Muslims" had voted for President-elect Milo Djukanovic. Bulatovic, for his part, called for new elections "as soon as possible." Montenegrin police officials blamed the leaders of the demonstration for what the police called the worsening security situation in Podgorica, an RFE/RL correspondent reported from the Montenegrin capital. The Montenegrin government's Information Department warned its Serbian counterpart in a letter that Montenegro will take "appropriate legal measures" unless the government-backed Belgrade media stop their "unobjective and tendentious reporting" about Djukanovic.[08] SERBIAN OPPOSITION LEADERS TO BOYCOTT ELECTIONSDemocratic Party leader Zoran Djindjic and Democratic Party of Serbia head Vojislav Kostunica said in Belgrade on 22 October that their formations will not take part in the Serbian presidential elections slated for 7 December. The two Milosevic opponents charged that the government has not created the basic conditions for free and fair elections, an RFE/RL correspondent reported from Belgrade. Meanwhile, the Election Commission began to register presidential candidates and will continue to do so until 17 November. A potential candidate needs to collect 10,000 signatures of registered voters to qualify for a place on the ballot.[09] KOSOVO ALBANIANS TO RELAUNCH PROTESTSLeaders of Kosovar students said in a letter to foreign diplomats on 22 October that the students will resume demonstrations on 29 October, an RFE/RL correspondent reported from Pristina. The students want the Serbian authorities to implement a 1996 agreement that provides for restoring Albanian-language education at all levels in the province. The students also demand the immediate restoration of Albanian-language instruction at Pristina University, where for some years professors have taught only in Serbo-Croatian. On 1 October, police broke up the first major protest by Kosovar students in years. The "New York Times" and the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" suggested recently that the clandestine Kosovo Liberation Army may attract increasing support from young people if peaceful protests continue to be broken up or prove ineffective.[10] NATO TO SEND MORE TROOPS TO BOSNIA FOR REPUBLIKA SRPSKA VOTEDiplomats said in Brussels on 22 October that an additional 1,000 SFOR troops will go to Bosnia to help ensure order during the 23 November Bosnian Serb parliamentary elections. The contingent will include soldiers from non-NATO member states as well as from NATO countries. Meanwhile in Sarajevo, spokesmen for the UN's international police force said UN police have found and confiscated illegal weapons from a Serbian police station in Brcko.[11] WORLD BANK PRAISES BOSNIAN PRIVATIZATION LAWOfficials of the World Bank and other international economic organizations said in Sarajevo on 22 October that the laws passed by the mainly Croatian and Muslim Federation's parliament the previous day will go far to help attract foreign investment and promote recovery. The laws deal with the privatization of state firms, the sale of apartments, and the settlement of war-related claims. Observers said the measures are similar to those adopted in many other former communist countries, except that the Bosnian laws also deal with damages and claims stemming from the war.[12] CROATIA HAS NEW COMMUNIST PARTYStipe Suvar, a former leader of the League of Communists of Croatia, said in Zagreb on 23 October that he has founded the Socialist Workers Party of Croatia (SRPH) and that the party will hold its founding congress on 25 October. Suvar added that he expects the SRPH to attract large numbers of women, young people, and members of ethnic minorities, an RFE/RL correspondent reported from Zagreb. Observers noted that leftist parties attracted little support in Croatia as late as 1995, but that Zdravko Tomac's Social Democrats are now the largest single opposition party. Public opinion surveys regularly show that most Croats have difficulty making ends meet.[13] ALBANIAN INTERIOR MINISTER WANTS BERISHA INDICTEDNeritan Ceka on 22 October said Democratic Party leader and former President Sali Berisha freed 52 dangerous criminals by decree in March Ceka said he will provide evidence to parliament soon, "Koha Jone" reported. He added that the prisoners were freed "to sabotage the elections [in June and July] by using terror and violence." Ceka called for a parliamentary commission to be set up to investigate the matter and to press legal charges against Berisha. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Sabit Brokaj accused former army commander General Adem Cobani of having ordered troops on three occasions during the unrest to fire on civilians (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 21 October 1997). Speaking in the parliament on 22 October, he charged that Berisha, who was commander-in-chief at the time, had been involved in the incidents. Cobani also claimed that the army prepared chemical weapons and rockets for use against Vlora, Permet, and other southern towns, "Shekulli" reported.[14] BIG AID PLEDGES FOR ALBANIAThe international donors' conference on Albania ended in Brussels on 21 October with the approval of a $600 million aid package. Of that sum, $100 million is to help cut the budget deficit and the other $500 million to support infrastructure, development, and administrative reform over the next two years. World Bank representatives, however, stressed that the availability of the aid will depend on the government's willingness to close down pyramid investment schemes. The donors earmarked some $1 million for that purpose. A further $30 million is available as humanitarian relief. The IMF said it hopes Albania will cut its inflation from 50 percent in 1997 to 15 to 20 percent the next year. It also wants Tirana to boost GDP growth from 8 percent this year to 12 percent in 1998.[15] ROMANIAN OPPOSITION DEMONSTRATION IN BUCHARESTDefying an order by the Bucharest Mayor's Office, the opposition demonstration against the government's policies was held in the capital's Senate Square on 22 October, RFE/RL's Bucharest bureau reported. That square is the scene of an ongoing hunger strike by the "1989 revolutionaries" (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 15 October 1997). Corneliu Vadim Tudor, the leader of the Greater Romania Party, Adrian Nastase, the deputy chairman of the Party of Social Democracy in Romania, and Adrian Paunescu, the first deputy chairman of the Socialist Labor Party, addressed an estimated crowd of some 5,00O. Scuffles broke out when some demonstrators tried to break the police cordon and join the striking "revolutionaries." Also on 22 October, five of the hunger strikers were hospitalized following 13 days without food.[16] REHABILITATION OF ANTONESCU GOVERNMENT BEGINSProsecutor-General Sorin Moisescu on 22 October launched the procedure for the judicial rehabilitation of several members of Romania's fascist government headed by Marshal Ion Antonescu. Those officials were sentenced in 1949 to prison sentences of between two and 10 years and their property confiscated for "crimes against peace," Radio Bucharest reported. An initiative to rehabilitate Antonescu, as well as those executed with him in 1946 or those whose death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment, has been under consideration by the Prosecutor-General's office for several years now.[17] BULGARIA DISCLOSES NAMES OF FORMER COLLABORATORSInterior Minister Bogomil Bonev on 22 October revealed to the parliament that 14 of its current members collaborated with the communist-era secret police. Two of the named are members of the ruling Union of Democratic Forces. Ahmed Dogan, the leader of the Turkish ethnic party, the Movement for Rights and Freedom, was also identified as a collaborator. Bonev said Dogan worked for the secret services between 1974 and 1988, RFE/RL's Sofia bureau reported. Dogan told Reuters that the list is a plot aimed at removing his party from the political scene. The other deputies identified by Bonev belong to the opposition Socialist Party and the Business Bloc. The list, whose publication is in line with the provision of a law passed in July, also includes seven high-ranking government and judicial officials as well as the directors of two state-owned banks.[C] END NOTE[18] DRAWING BORDERS GEOGRAPHIC AND POLITICALby Paul GobleRussian President Boris Yeltsin's willingness to sign a border demarcation agreement with Lithuania now reflects the convergence of three strands in Moscow's foreign policy in the Baltic region. But when Yeltsin signs the demarcation agreement with visiting Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas during his visit to the Russian capital on 23-24 October, those strands may not be equally obvious, even though all three are likely to prove equally important. First, Yeltsin's decision reflects Moscow's increasing willingness to treat the three Baltic States in a differentiated fashion, rewarding Lithuania, which has been the most cooperative, while putting pressure on the other two. Second, it demonstrates an effort by the Russian government to show it can and will develop better relations with the Baltics if those countries are willing to cooperate. This is especially important in Russian calculations because many in Scandinavia and the West view progress in relations between Moscow and the Baltic States as the "litmus test" of Russia's readiness to be accepted into Europe, as former Swedish Premier Carl Bildt put it. Third, Yeltsin's decision appears to be part of a Russian effort to portray Estonia and Latvia in the most negative light, hoping thereby to reduce those states' attractiveness to Western partners and as potential candidates for membership in the EU and NATO. At one level, those three strands of Russian policy appear contradictory. Obviously, Moscow will have a difficult time in simultaneously presenting itself as a good neighbor and seeking to put pressure on two of the three Baltic States. But at another level, this combination of factors is consistent. Yeltsin and the Russian foreign policy establishment are behaving entirely rationally in treating the three Baltic countries differently. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are three very different countries with very different domestic and international positions. Some Western governments continue to treat them as a unit because of their history of Soviet occupation from 1940 to 1991, but their very individual situations both domestically and internationally justify a differentiated approach. By dealing with the Balts in such a way, Yeltsin and Moscow demonstrate that they recognize not only those countries' specific approaches to domestic issues, such as the treatment of ethnic Russians, but also the very different security problems of the three. In addition, Yeltsin is to be given credit for backing an improved relationship with the Baltic countries without any real danger of having to live up to promises. The leaders of a number of factions in the Russian parliament have already indicated they will not ratify any agreement Yeltsin may sign with Brazauskas. As a result, Yeltsin will have the best of both worlds: approbation from the West without a commitment to follow the strictures of the agreement he appears likely to sign. Moreover, Yeltsin's very positive approach toward Lithuania allows him to place enormous pressure on both Estonia and Latvia to change their positions on a variety of issues or face ostracism from at least some Western institutions. In particular, he may be forcing Estonia's hand to change its approach lest it lose the support of its West European partners, who have already indicated that they want Estonia to begin in December the process of becoming a member of the EU. That apparent calculation is unlikely to prove wrong, especially if Western governments argue that Estonia and Latvia should make the same concessions that the Lithuanians have in order to establish good relations with Moscow. It may also ultimately prove the most critical in the thinking of the Russian government. Both Russian nationalists and the government have continued their criticism of Estonia and Latvia for their attitudes toward their ethnic Russian populations. And thus signing an accord with Lithuania only highlights what Russian nationalists and Moscow see as the lack of progress on this issue in the other two Baltic States. Even if Russia's apparent calculation backfires because the West declines to follow its logic, Moscow has the choice of shifting gears and signing border accords with Estonia and Latvia, as Yeltsin has sometimes indicated he is willing to do. Thus, the Russian government's latest effort to demarcate a region politically as well as geographically appears to be a situation in which Moscow has much to gain and very little to lose. 23-10-97 Reprinted with permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
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