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RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 1, No. 142, 97-10-20Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Newsline Directory - Previous Article - Next ArticleFrom: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty <http://www.rferl.org>RFE/RL NEWSLINEVol. 1, No. 142, 20 October 1997CONTENTS[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA
[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
[C] END NOTE
[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA[01] AZERBAIJAN WANTS "SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP" WITH NATOForeign Minister Hasan Hasanov said on 19 October that Baku wants a "special partnership" with NATO on the basis of Azerbaijan's "strategic position" and its present level of cooperation with the West, AFP reported, citing Interfax. Hasanov had met with U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, in the Azerbaijani capital the previous day. Hunter similarly stressed the importance of Azerbaijan's location and expressed support for Baku's desire for closer integration with the alliance. Meanwhile on 16 October, the Armenian National Committee of America reported that Azerbaijan's annual military expenditure is four times higher than Armenia's and constitutes 2.8 percent of GDP.[02] MILITARY CENSORSHIP PERSISTS IN AZERBAIJANPresident Heidar Aliev's 17 September decree abolishing military censorship in Azerbaijan is being ignored, according to Arif Aliev, the chairman of the independent journalists' union Yeni Nesil. Arif Aliev told "Ekspress- Khronika" on 11 October that military and political censorship persists. He added that of the material excised by the military and political censors' offices last year, 40 percent were on human rights and 25 percent were statements by opposition politicians.[03] ARMENIAN INTELLECTUALS DENOUNCE PRESIDENT'S KARABAKH POLICYMeeting in Yerevan on 17 October, several hundred Armenian intellectuals and opposition leaders condemned Levon Ter-Petrossyan's recent statements on Nagorno-Karabakh, RFE/RL's Yerevan bureau reported. They singled out Ter- Petrossyan's acceptance of the "phased" solution to the conflict, proposed by the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe's Minsk Group, whereby Armenian forces would be withdrawn from occupied Azerbaijani territory before a decision is taken on Karabakh's future status vis-a-vis Baku. Speakers also rejected any status for Karabakh within Azerbaijan. Rafael Ghazarian--who, like Ter-Petrossyan, is a former member of the Karabakh Committee created in 1988 to support the unification of Karabakh with Armenia--suggested that Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan, Karabakh's former president, and the "power" ministers should seek to oust Ter- Petrossyan, according to Noyan Tapan.[04] ABKHAZ UPDATETalks on resolving the Abkhaz conflict scheduled to take place in Geneva from 14-16 October under UN auspices were postponed at the request of the Abkhaz, Georgian Ambassador to Moscow Vazha Lortkipanidze told "Nezavisimaya gazeta" on 18 October. The agenda of the talks included the status of the CIS peacekeeping force currently deployed along the border between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. Tbilisi intends to call for the peacekeeping force's withdrawal at the upcoming CIS summit in Chisinau if Abkhazia continues to block the force's entry into Abkhaz territory to facilitate the repatriation of Georgians forced to flee their homes during the 1992-1993 war. Some 3,000 displaced persons demonstrated in Tbilisi on 17 October to demand that the Georgian government take measures to expedite their return home, ITAR-TASS reported.[05] PRISONER RELEASE UNDER WAY IN TAJIKISTANThe first group of more than 80 Tajik government troops whom opposition field commander Mirzo Ziyeev had held prisoner in Tavil-Dara since 1993 were released on 19 October, Russian agencies reported. United Tajik Opposition chief of staff Davlat Usmon said their release is a "humanitarian action" within the framework of the peace accord signed by the Tajik government and the opposition in May. The release by the Tajik authorities of some 170 imprisoned opposition activists, scheduled for 17 October, was delayed because the Tajik government failed to provide fuel for transportation, according to "Nezavisimaya gazeta" on 18 October. The same day, a bomb exploded outside a department store in downtown Dushanbe, but no one was injured.[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE[06] DJUKANOVIC WINS MONTENEGRIN PRESIDENTIAL VOTEThe Montenegrin Electoral Commission announced on 20 October that Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic beat outgoing President Momir Bulatovic in the previous day's elections by just over 6,000 votes. Belgrade-based Radio B- 92 said Bulatovic has conceded defeat. The turnout was 72 percent. Djukanovic favors wide autonomy from Belgrade, while Bulatovic is a loyal ally of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. Observers expect Djukanovic to concentrate his energies on blocking attempts by Milosevic to increase the authority of the federal government at the expense of that of the two republics. Also in Podgorica, the Interior Ministry charged that the Belgrade authorities sent 11 agents to Montenegro the previous week to disrupt the vote (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 16 October 1997), "Nasa Borba" wrote on 20 October.[07] U.S. CALLS FOR END TO KOSOVO VIOLENCEA U.S. State Department spokesman on 18 October urged the Serbian authorities in Kosovo and the province's ethnic Albanian majority to end violence and resume a dialog. In recent weeks, Albanian terrorists have attacked Serbian police stations and other government installations. At the same time, Serbian police have staged raids on ethnic Albanian villages, and three Kosovars have died in police custody. Albanian terrorists on 17 October attacked a camp near Decani housing ethnic Serbian refugees from Albania. In Pristina, Kosovar shadow-state President Ibrahim Rugova blamed the current violence on what he called police attempts to intimidate Albanians. Rugova added that now may be the last chance to restore a dialog, an RFE/RL correspondent reported from Pristina. Meanwhile, on 18 October, some 13,000 Albanians attended the funeral near Pec of a young Kosovar killed in a raid on a police station.[08] PEACEKEEPERS INSPECT KARADZIC'S COMPOUNDFrench and Italian peacekeepers on 20 October inspected the factory compound near Pale where Bosnian Serb leader and indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic has his office. Observers said the inspection is part of an effort by SFOR to remove from the scene Karadzic's bodyguards and other special police units, which are illegal under the Dayton agreements. Meanwhile on nearby Mount Jahorina the previous day, angry crowds of Bosnian Serb civilians wielding sticks taunted Italian peacekeepers as they attempted to inspect a former police station. None of the peacekeepers were injured.[09] PALE LEADERSHIP UNITES AROUND KRAJISNIKThe steering committee of the governing Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) agreed that the party will take part in the 23 November parliamentary elections. The committee also abolished the post of party president, which had been held by extreme hard-liner Aleksa Buha, and replaced it with a collective presidency. An RFE/RL correspondent reported from Pale that the decisions to participate in the elections and to set up a collective leadership favor the SDS's relatively moderate faction under Momcilo Krajisnik at the expense of Buha's group.[10] WESTENDORP SPOKESMAN ACCUSES BOSNIAN SERBS OF "SABOTAGE."A spokesman for Carlos Westendorp, the international community's chief representative in Bosnia, said in Sarajevo on 19 October that the Pale- based Bosnian Serb leadership committed "sabotage" when it disabled a television transmitter broadcasting programs of the rival Serbian network, based in Banja Luka. The Pale Serbs had used the transmitter, located at Veliki Zep near the military stronghold of Han Pijesak, to broadcast their hard-line programs on 16 October. NATO troops took control of the facility two days later and broadcast Banja Luka's programs. But Pale loyalists meanwhile removed some key parts, thereby rendering the transmitter inoperative. Meanwhile, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook on 19 October pledged $50,000 in aid for Banja Luka Television.[11] SKINHEADS KILL ROMA YOUTH IN BELGRADEA group of skinheads murdered a 13-year-old Roma boy in central Belgrade on 18 October, an RFE/RL correspondent reported from the Serbian capital. "Dnevni telegraf" wrote that the boy appeared to have been killed solely because of his ethnic origins. The opposition Democratic Party said in a statement that the Interior Ministry has been so involved in politics in recent years that it has neglected protecting average citizens. Spokesmen for other human rights groups said the killing reflects the growing polarization of society.[12] ITALIANS RAISE ALBANIAN REFUGEE SHIPBrindisi authorities said on 20 October that an Albanian refugee ship that sank in March has been raised and is being towed to the Italian port. The ship is believed to hold the bodies of at least 80 people who perished when the overcrowded vessel suddenly sank. Authorities will seek to determine how the ship went down. Many of the 34 Albanian survivors charge that an Italian navy vessel deliberately rammed the Albanian ship. Italy denies the claim. At the time of the sinking, thousands of Albanians were fleeing the anarchy in their country by seeking passage to Italy. The Italian navy had received orders from Rome to discourage additional refugees from landing.[13] ROME, TIRANA SEEK $300 MILLION FOR ALBANIAItalian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini, addressing an international conference on Albania that took place in Rome on 17 October, said Albanian Prime Minister Fatos Nano's goal of raising $300 million for his country over the next 18 months is realistic. Dini stressed, however, that foreign support for Albania will depend on the degree to which the Albanians help themselves. World Bank Vice President Johannes Linn added that his goal is to raise $1.5 billion for Albania over five or six years, provided that Albania continues to promote democracy and institutional reforms. On 22 October, donors will begin pledging specific sums at a conference in Brussels.[14] ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT ANNULS AGREEMENT WITH 'REVOLUTIONARIES'...The government on 18 October annulled an agreement recently reached with one of the organizations representing the "1989 revolutionaries." It explained its decision by noting that the organization does not represent all the "revolutionaries." It also said the amended law abolishing the privileges to "revolutionaries" will not be subject to an emergency debate. Meanwhile, some 60 "revolutionaries" are continuing their hunger strike in Bucharest. Dan Iosif, the chief spokesman of the group, said on 19 October that the strikers will use Molotov cocktails if police try to disperse the group. He also said the hunger strike will continue for 200 days, after which the strikers will set themselves ablaze, RFE/RL's Bucharest bureau reported.[15] ...APPROVES DRAFT LAW ON OPENING SECRET POLICE FILESThe government on 17 October approved a draft law on access to the files of the former secret police, RFE/RL's Bucharest bureau reported. Under the bill, the name of the informant would be erased from copies of the files, but people who can prove they suffered on account of the information contained in the files could ask for the identity of the informant to be revealed. Access to the files would be monitored by a nine-member National Council supervised by the parliament. The bill also stipulates that officials, from the presidential to the local government level, are required to declare whether they collaborated with the secret police. Those who admit to collaboration or those found to have made false declarations will be requested to resign. If they refuse to do so, their names will be published in the official government journal "Monitorul oficial."[16] ROMANIA'S FORMER POLITICAL PRISONERS DIVIDEDAt a congress in Bucharest on 19 October, the Association of Former Political Prisoners in Romania (AFDPR) elected Cicerone Ioanitoiu as chairman. Ioanitoiu was backed by Ion Diaconescu, the head of the National Peasant Party Christian Democratic (PNTCD). Meanwhile, former AFDPR chairman Ticu Dumitrescu, whose membership in the PNTCD was recently suspended (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 2 October 1997), plans to hold a rival congress in Brasov on 23-24 October. Dumitrescu criticized the government draft on opening secret police files, which is different from the draft submitted by him to the parliament. He said parliamentary oversight of the body monitoring access to the files amounts to "political supervision," which he said, is bound to impair the process of revealing all available information on the files.[17] MOLDOVAN PRESIDENT ON UPCOMING CIS SUMMITPetru Lucinschi told ITAR-TASS on 17 October that he plans no "special initiatives" toward a settlement of the Transdniester conflict at the CIS summit scheduled for 22-23 October in Chisinau. He said that the presidents of Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine will meet with the Transdniester leadership during the summit and that he hoped they will agree to some "concrete measures" on the demilitarized zone. Meanwhile, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the extreme nationalist Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), said he has designated Aleksandr Saidakov, a former Minister of Industry in the Tiraspol separatist government, to set up a branch of the LDPR in the region.[18] COUNCIL OF EUROPE RAPPORTEURS IN MOLDOVATwo Council of Europe rapporteurs told journalists in Chisinau on 17 October that while Moldova has made progress toward democratization and bringing its legislation into line with European standards, much remains to be done in implementing legal reforms. They noted there is "regrettably little progress" in finding a settlement to the Transdniester conflict, which, they said, depends primarily on Russia and the withdrawal of the Russian military from the separatist region, RFE/RL's Chisinau bureau reported. They also commented that in solving the problem of the Bessarabian Church, the rights of association and freedom of worship must be strictly observed.[C] END NOTE[19] THE SECURITY NATO CAN'T PROVIDEby Paul GobleEver more East Europeans recognize that there are threats to their national security that NATO membership, in itself, will not solve. That recognition has not made most East Europeans any less interested in being included in the Western alliance. But it has transformed discussions about NATO in Eastern Europe and led an increasing number of countries in the region to take steps aimed at promoting their national security regardless of whether NATO invites them to join. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and then of the Soviet Union, virtually all countries in the region saw NATO membership as the foundation of their future security. Many even tended to view NATO membership as a panacea for all their problems. If they got in, they would be taken care of and their security would be assured. But if they did not, then they would be left without hope of a secure future. Such perspectives helped frame the debate about security in many of those countries, but three developments have helped change both the understanding of NATO and the role those countries can play in promoting their own national security. First, countries in Eastern Europe have had to deal with a West that has been anything but unanimous about the desirability or even the possibility of expanding the alliance eastward anytime soon. Many Western leaders have worried about the dangers involved in offending Russian sensibilities, and many Western populations have been concerned about the costs involved, which many in the West are reluctant to pay now that the Cold War is a thing of the past. As a result, East European countries have had to think about a future in which only a few may become members of the alliance soon and in which many of them will never join. Second, NATO's outreach programs such as Partnership for Peace have taught many East European leaders just what NATO can do and even more important what it cannot. As ever more of them understand, NATO is a military defense alliance intended, in the first instance, to prevent or, in the worst case, to respond to military aggression. Its goal is not to deal with violence within countries. And as the West's reluctance to become involved in Bosnia has shown, the alliance remains hesitant to deal with such violence. Moreover, NATO, as a political and military organization, provides neither the structure nor the weapons to combat other threats to national security that many countries in that region now face. The Western alliance cannot prevent illegal migration or develop a legal or judicial system for countries lacking such systems. Nor can it create a stable banking system or tax regime, without which any government is at risk of subversion. At best, the Western alliance can create a climate in which governments and peoples can take those often difficult steps. Indeed, many East European countries have learned that NATO member states face many of the same threats--such as illegal migration, organized crime, and subversion of banking systems--without being able to count on Brussels for a solution. Third, ever more East Europeans recognize that the threats that NATO cannot defend against are precisely the ones they must overcome and that the threat NATO was intended to combat is for most of them less immediate. Virtually all East Europeans continue to fear the possibility that Russia will once again seek to dominate the region; they thus see NATO membership as a guarantee against that possibility. But ever more of them also understand that the threat to their countries over the next decade is less likely to take the form of an invading army than that of the subversion of their banking systems or economies. They also recognize that improving their own domestic situations will have security consequences: it will attract ever more Western investment, and that investment will tend to provide a bulwark against the more immediate, non-military threats. Again, this new understanding in Eastern Europe has not made the governments and peoples there any less interested in joining NATO. Nor has it made NATO any less important for the future of Europe. But it has meant that the countries of the region now recognize just how much they must do to promote their own security rather than waiting for someone else to do it for them. Paradoxically, that, in itself, makes them even better candidates for inclusion in the Western alliance. 20-10-97 Reprinted with permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
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