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USIA - U.S. Views Current Situation in Cyprus, Eastern Mediterranean, 97-02-07

United States Information Agency: Selected Articles Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The United States Information Agency (USIA) Gopher at <gopher://gopher.usia.gov>


U.S. VIEWS CURRENT SITUATION IN CYPRUS, EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

(Interview with State Department's Carey Cavanaugh) (1820)

The following interview between Carey Cavanaugh, director of the State Department's Office of Southern European Affairs, and USIA Staff Writer Rick Marshall took place in Washington Feburary 7.

Q: You recently visited Cyprus, Turkey and Greece. How do you evaluate the current situation in the region and what role does the United States have to play there?

CAVANAUGH: "The United States' aim in this corner of Europe is to help advance peace and stability. Southeastern Europe, sadly, has a very difficult history, and it has been marked by a lot of tension and a lot of conflict. The problems we are dealing with today -- the situation in Cyprus and the situation between Greece and Turkey -- are long-standing irritants to moving ahead in the direction we believe these countries can go: making a very fundamental and important contribution to both peace and stability but also economic prosperity and development of a whole variety of regions.

The potential engagement of Turkey to the east and Greece to the north in helping rebuild the New Independent States, the Caucasus, and the former Yugoslavia is substantial. But to achieve that potential we have to find a way to move past the historic problems that have divided these countries. It is for this broad reason, and these strategic interests, that the United States is so set on working -- and working now -- to find solutions to these problems.

We saw a year ago a very dangerous situation develop between Greece and Turkey when the two countries came to the edge of conflict over the question of ownership of two uninhabited islands in the eastern Aegean. This year, already, we have seen the same types of tensions growing between the two countries and Cyprus over the decision to purchase Russian missile systems by President Clerides.

Last year the United States engaged heavily and effectively to defuse that crisis. American engagement this year was just as quick, and I think you have seen once again that there is an important role for the United States to play here, to keep the region stable and to put off the likelihood of conflict.

We've been working for over a year to put together a settlement process for Cyprus in conjunction with our international partners -- the United Nations, the United Kingdom, the European Union and a whole variety of players who have all expressed the same interests -- to find a way to bring the two community leaders in Cyprus together in direct negotiations. As always, this effort has proven to be very complicated. That's no surprise. We knew it would be complicated from the beginning. But it has suffered because of outside events, changes of government in Turkey and Greece, the heart attack that the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktash, suffered, and this rising tension in the region.

Last year there was more conflict on Cyprus than in any other year since 1974. This year begins with a lot of tension on the island surrounding the missile procurement decision and the public response of Turkey that it might take aggressive action if those missiles come to the island. The United States made very clear, and very publicly, that we thought the missile purchase decision was a mistake, a step down the wrong path, and we thought there was no justification for any Turkish aggressive response, and that none could be accepted.

I think our position, which was raised by (State Department spokesman) Nick Burns here and repeatedly in the field by our ambassadors during my visit, made it clear that nothing should happen now on the island. I think tensions dropped because of that.

During my trip, I was able to obtain on Cyprus assurances that not a single component of that missile system would be brought to the island for 16 months, and commitments by the leaders of both communities to give their full political support to the immediate implementation of tension-reduction measures along the cease-fire lines.

Q: Could you explain those measures more fully?

CAVANAUGH: This is a U.N. package of proposals which includes very strict rules of engagement where force would only be used when there's a threat of loss of life. That includes provisions of unloading ammunition, so that while soldiers and sentries will still have ammunition on their person, it would not be in their weapons ready to fire. These are all steps, in effect, to move people back from the edge on the island and avoid an accidental incident. The third element was to "de-man" some of the sentry positions along the cease-fire lines, pulling them farther back. We've seen in the past this has happened in Cyprus and it has been conducive to enhancing stability along the cease-fire lines.

We saw with the reports yesterday (Feb. 6) of shooting and the possible wounding along the Green Line, how important these types of measures are. We have been disheartened to see, already this year, a substantial increase in shooting incidents, often just random shooting along the cease-fire lines. This raises political tensions. There's no reason for it.

Q: Were these proposals agreed upon?

CAVANAUGH: They were not in final form, and so there was no ability to sign on to a document. But the negotiating process has already been started to get to a final document, and what they agreed to at the time was to give it their full political support. I think this was the most you could ask them to do, because you couldn't ask them to sign a piece of paper that wasn't finalized.

The U.N. is engaging in this very energetically. We've spoken to the Secretary General and his under secretary about these measures. They're very encouraged by the political support they've gotten from the parties to pursue them, and they've instructed U.N. officials on Cyprus to engage as quickly and as steadfastly as they can to get them wrapped up. The reported incident yesterday only underscores how important this effort is.

Q: Press reports at the time of your visit suggested that President Clerides agreed not to station Greek planes on the island, at least for a certain time. Is this accurate?

CAVANAUGH: There are two issues under consideration regarding aircraft. One concerned stationing Greek fighter airplanes at Paphos. Another was the question of overflights by both Greek and Turkish planes. I believe there's been some confusion in the press over the two issues.

On the first, we had firm assurances from President Clerides that there will be no basing of Greek fighter aircraft at Paphos before March of 1998. He recently made an announcement that made clear that preparations for such basing won't be completed until then.

On the overflight moratorium of Greek and Turkish aircraft, we see this as a very useful step to both reduce tensions on the island and to show the commitment of Greece and Turkey to helping promote the settlement of the island's problems. It also addresses the same concerns that the government of Cyprus has raised as justification for purchasing the missile systems. If there is a moratorium in place that would not have Turkish aircraft flying over the island of Cyprus, there is no reason to have the missile system that could shoot down Turkish aircraft flying over Cyprus.

Q: Has there been an agreement on the moratorium?

CAVANAUGH: We discussed it at all three stops -- in Athens, Nicosia and Ankara. We had general support from President Clerides on this and we had support from the Turks on this measure. But President Clerides went to Athens for a meeting with the Greek government and at the end of that session, he announced that he was unable at that time to sign on to it.

What I think we see is that it's difficult to take the step of stopping the overflights, but that increasingly all the parties recognize the importance of moving in that direction. I hope that in the near-term this is a move that can be possible.

Q: I understand that the British Cyprus coordinator, Sir David Hannay, was here recently meeting with Secretary of State Albright and other U.S. officials. What was the nature of his discussions?

CAVANAUGH: He was here to continue consultations that we have on a regular basis with all of the players on Cyprus on possible next steps. He met with Secretary Albright, Under Secretary Tarnoff and myself. He made clear the British view of the need to engage the parties in talks as soon as it's possible and underscored the importance of a peace process toward helping move forward Cyprus' accession to the European Union. The United Kingdom has stated repeatedly that it would be "immeasurably more difficult" for Cyprus to enter the EU without a settlement. And I believe his principal task was to underscore the importance Britain attaches to a concerted effort to make peace happen.

Q: Do you think Cyprus' EU negotiations make the chances of coming to a settlement more favorable now?

CAVANAUGH: The Clinton Administration is committed to doing what it can to help advance efforts toward the settlement of Cyprus. We have made it clear -- and Secretary Albright underscored this in her confirmation testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that the United States cannot do this alone. We need the support of the parties and their partners in this process. They need to take concrete steps to help reduce tensions and create an atmosphere that would make direct talks both sustainable and capable of success. Without their active support and engagement, it is difficult to see how any initiative could be successful.

The European Union made a commitment to begin accession talks with Cyprus six months after the conclusion of the Inter-Governmental conference. This means that early in 1998, officials from the EU and Cyprus should sit down to begin this process. It may take a long time. What that has done, though, is create an added impetus this year to try to get the parties to move toward settlement. We recognize -- and other EU members have emphasized to us -- that solving this problem before that process begins is the most logical step toward bringing greater peace and prosperity to the region.

While the efforts for Cyprus are clear, the United States has emphasized to the European Union and its members the importance of also enhancing the EU's relationship with Turkey. We were strong advocates of the EU's customs union with Turkey in 1995 and hope to see that relationship expanded and deepened. The European Union, we know, has some difficulty in doing this, but we think that, too, is a fundamental component of helping find a solution on Cyprus and also helping to defuse the current tensions between Greece and Turkey.


From the United States Information Agency (USIA) Gopher at gopher://gopher.usia.gov


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