5-6 Secretary Albright's Scheduled Meetings During Trip to Spain and
France
14-16 Comments on Mrs. Plavsic Cooperation With ICTY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB # 4
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 10, 2001 12: 45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. BOUCHER: All right, ladies and gentlemen. It's nice to see you all
here in our new briefing room. Let's go to work. I don't have any
announcements or statements. I'll be glad to take your questions.
Jonathan.
QUESTION: Yes. Mr. Ross -- could you fill us in on the latest? I
understand he has --
MR. BOUCHER: I'm not Mr. Ross.
QUESTION: -- postponed his visit indefinitely. Could you tell us what
he's waiting for or what you're waiting for? And also, what exactly is your
aim now? Can you say on the record that you've basically scaled back your
aims to get this presidential statement on where the negotiations
stand?
MR. BOUCHER: No, I can't say that because it's not true. Let me run
through it with you. The trip by Ambassador Ross to the Middle East is not
canceled. His visit is on hold. The President wants to see if there is
progress on reducing the violence in the region. The Palestinians and the
Israelis are currently engaged in security discussions. There have been
actually some encouraging contacts in that regard. We want to see how those
talks progress.
The President still hopes to narrow the gaps and reach an agreement between
the parties in the short time that's available, and when Dennis Ross goes
to the region that is what he will attempt to do.
QUESTION: So you're working -- can you explain, because clearly there is
some work going on on a document explaining where you stand? Are you doing
the two in parallel, or how are you approaching it?
MR. BOUCHER: The work that's going on is on the parameters that the
President put out. We have talked about the reservations and narrowing the
reservations on those parameters, so the point is to go there and narrow
the differences.
The Secretary told you quite clearly yesterday we're not looking for
something big; we're working to do two things, I would say. One is to
establish the environment for negotiations, and that is why especially I
think you've heard from us in the last week a lot about the security
environment and the need to take the steps that would establish the proper
environment for negotiations; and then second of all, establish the basis
for agreement in the parameters. And that is the effort underway. It
remains focused on those two goals.
QUESTION: Are you talking about kind of a final framework agreement?
MR. BOUCHER: Once you get into framework agreements, you get into thin
FAPS and thick FAPS and all those other sort of stock words that have been
used in the past. We're looking to establish a basis for agreement between
the parties on the parameters of the peace.
QUESTION: So, I mean, basically it's a lot more than just a presidential
that the Administration is still hoping it will be able to accomplish?
MR. BOUCHER: We are looking to reach agreement between the parties in the
short time available, and that is what we will continue to try to do with
the trip by Ambassador Ross. But we have made quite clear, through the
President's discussions with Chairman Arafat last week about security steps
and improving the environment, and through the discussions that we have had
here, that establishing the environment for peace is as important as
establishing the basis for a peace agreement.
QUESTION: Richard, so does that mean that something like a statement of
principles would be something that you would accept if that is what you
could come away with, as opposed to an agreement that would lay out the
total parameters of an agreement?
MR. BOUCHER: I'm not trying to speculate on 18 different possibilities. I
am here to tell you what we are actually doing, which is trying to reach
agreement.
QUESTION: Richard, are you concerned at all that because of the little
time -- only 10 days -- that is left in the Administration, and the fact
that this trip is being -- that it has been put on hold and is unlikely --
I mean, there is no way he could arrive until there is only eight days left
in the Administration basically now, if he left at the earliest possible
time -- are you concerned at all that people are going to think that you
are kind of basically just throwing in the towel here?
MR. BOUCHER: I guess we are always concerned about what people might
think, but frankly we don't act --
QUESTION: I'm talking about people that -- not like us, but people,
leaders --
MR. BOUCHER: Well, not like you. People with open minds that listen to
what we say?
QUESTION: Well, that would be us. (Laughter.) I'm talking about people
that perhaps have closed minds or more closed minds than we do who are out
there in the region, or are interested parties and interlocutors that you
have dealt with.
MR. BOUCHER: Okay, I understand the point: What is the effect of this on
the parties? I think the important thing -- and we are obviously in touch
with the parties so we talk to them directly about what we think can be
done, what should be done -- I think there's a couple of things to remember
now.
Yes, the time is getting short. The time for decision is certainly now. But
also the time to implement the steps to establish a better security
environment is now. We have known for the last few months as the violence
has continued, and continued to carry a tragic toll with it, that you can't
make peace in an atmosphere of violence. It is much more difficult. And a
lot of our efforts over the last few months have been indeed focused on
creating the environment for peace. That remains a key focus.
So in terms of the message we're sending to the parties is you have to take
the steps to create the environment for peace and you have to decide on the
parameters for peace. And that is the focus that we have now.
QUESTION: When you say that time is getting short, are you confident that
the Bush Administration will work as hard as you guys are on this? Have you
had conversations with them on this?
MR. BOUCHER: Well, I mean clearly the Middle East peace process has been
a top priority of successive administrations, be they Republican or
Democrat. Clearly peace in the Middle East has been a top priority for the
United States because it fundamentally is in our interest. But just as
clearly, the parties themselves have to make the key decisions and have to
do what it takes. So I'm certain that it will be a priority for the new
Administration, but it also needs to be a subject that the people in the
region decide upon.
We have made clear that the specific ideas, or the package that the
President presented, does not last beyond his term. Should the new
Administration decide to pick it up, that's fine; should they decide to
start with a clean slate, that's a different way of doing things. But
clearly these ideas are presented by the President and expire with his
term; therefore, it's time for the parties to decide on them, as well as to
take the steps necessary to have a chance at reaching agreement.
QUESTION: I think you touched on this, but could you explain in greater
detail why you're concentrating now on reducing violence when experience
has shown that violence does not prevent successful negotiations taking
place? And when a comprehensive agreement would in fact end the violence
automatically in itself, why are you stressing this?
MR. BOUCHER: I suppose the problem is "automatically;" that the
experience of recent months has indeed showed that it's not impossible to
discuss the peace process, but it's certainly much more difficult. And in
terms of getting confidence from the people on both sides of an agreement,
of a peace process, it's certainly necessary for both sides to see that the
advantages of peace are going to be real. And so I think we have indeed in
the last week-- but also in the weeks before that, and frankly the months
before that -- emphasized again and again the need to take steps to reduce
the violence and to see the leaders in fact take the steps that we've
discussed with them.
QUESTION: Has the Secretary talked to anyone in the region in the last 24
hours?
MR. BOUCHER: I forgot to check. I'm going to have to check on that. I'm
sorry.
QUESTION: Richard, you said that the package doesn't last beyond his
term; these ideas expire with his term. But Barak himself has spoken about
a presidential statement, and other people have spoke about this setting a
benchmark for the next Administration. Do you mean to say that such a
benchmark would be purely voluntary from -- I mean, it would be something
that the next Administration could take or leave at will, but the ideas
would still be around?
Could you explain the apparent discrepancy between these two?
MR. BOUCHER: You keep coming back to an approach that I think is not the
way I've really described it. Reaching agreement between the parties in the
short time available, if that can be done, you would have something the
parties themselves have agreed to and said, yes, this is the parameters of
peace; this is the basis of a serious final negotiation. That remains the
goal: get the parties to agree to what is the parameters of a negotiation.
QUESTION: Okay. But when you talk about this agreement, you're not
precluding an agreement which contains points of disagreement, so to speak,
where you say this is where we stand, this is where we disagree? There is a
difference between that kind of agreement, that kind of document, similar
to the one in the Syrian case about which there was so much argument in the
past, and a formal agreement which is implementable starting from the
moment of signature.
MR. BOUCHER: Well, I mean that's where the word "parameters" came from.
We, I think, did this about a week ago and talked about it. The President
has talked about it as well, and others, that the agreement on the
parameters of a negotiation still means there has to be a negotiation. And
I think my eloquent quotes on the subject were picked up in The Washington
Post the other day, so I won't bother repeating the parameters-references-
reservations-suggestions sentence.
But the point is that, no, this is not the end of the deal; this is
agreement on how to frame the negotiation. There are still matters to
negotiate, if they agree on the parameters.
QUESTION: Are you suggesting, then, that if you are successful in getting
them to agree to parameters, that those are somehow non-binding past the
20th?
MR. BOUCHER: No.
QUESTION: Okay. So if they can agree --
MR. BOUCHER: If they don't agree upon them, they expire with the
President.
QUESTION: Okay. If they do, then they are binding?
MR. BOUCHER: If they do agree upon them, then that's a different thing.
It's something the parties have agreed to as the basis for a negotiation.
QUESTION: And you expect them to stick with that?
MR. BOUCHER: To stick with that, yes. But that is the goal, is to get --
that is why the goal is to get them to reach agreement because, once they
have agreed on these things, these things are things that they have agreed
upon.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Well, that one is getting in the papers.
MR. BOUCHER: That one is going in the papers, too?
QUESTION: It's still a little confusing because if you say that this is
the parties' process, and the ideas are out there and they can agree to it
if they wish, then the ideas are out there for -- it's their process for
them to agree. So how can the ideas expire with the President if they are
not the -- if it's not an agreement signed by the United States?
MR. BOUCHER: Let me piece this out. The President has put forward certain
ideas and suggestions, okay. The new President can pick those up. The new
Administration can pick those up and say that's what we want to use too, or
not. The President has put forward certain ideas and suggestions. If the
parties agree to accept those as the basis for their negotiation of a peace
agreement, then they become the basis for negotiation; they are no longer
just parameters or ideas the President has put forward. So the situation
changes.
I guess what you are asking about is: Is there a third possibility? The
President put forward ideas; the new Administration doesn't decide to make
them the centerpiece of their effort, but one of the parties decides to
take those ideas as the basis for -- promote them as the basis for a
negotiation. I suppose that is a permutation that is possible. But in terms
of United States sponsorship and what President Clinton has done, the time
to decide on that is, we believe, now.
QUESTION: Has a meeting with Foreign Minister Ben-Ami been scheduled yet
in Paris?
MR. BOUCHER: The final time is not scheduled yet, but there is an
understanding that the Secretary will be able to see him in Paris on
Friday. They will meet. He is in Europe, in the region, and so they will
meet in Paris on Friday. It seemed to be an opportune time for them to meet
and discuss the current situation in the region.
QUESTION: Okay. And what about Nabil Shaath, who will also be in Madrid
when -- or almost exactly the same time as she is?
MR. BOUCHER: I'm not actually aware of his travel plans, but we don't
have anything at this point to announce on any meetings with Palestinians.
QUESTION: While you're on that point, quickly, what about a meeting with
Ivanov?
MR. BOUCHER: There will be a separate discussion with Ivanov between the
Secretary and he in Paris. Because of some of the schedule changes it looks
like it will be Thursday, but we're not certain of that yet.
QUESTION: In Iraq, do we know whether or not Saddam Hussein is alive or
dead? I mean, there have been reports that he might have died and that a
film was shown that reportedly showed him several years younger than he
actually is? I'm just wondering whether you --
MR. BOUCHER: Is this last week's rumors that he was dead, or is this a
new set of rumors that he was dead? I mean, last week there was a whole
series of rumors that he was dead that we never had any sort of --
QUESTION: I know you would never discuss rumors --
MR. BOUCHER: Well, we hear rumors just like you guys do. I think we were
quite clear last week --
QUESTION: We hear reports, not rumors.
MR. BOUCHER: -- we had nothing to substantiate those rumors or reports.
QUESTION: Nothing to substantiate them?
MR. BOUCHER: Yes.
QUESTION: Do you have any evidence that he's still alive?
MR. BOUCHER: I'm not exactly sure when the last time was that he made a
personal appearance, but I can probably check and see if we've seen him on
TV lately in person -- I mean, in his present -- I'm not doing too well on
the English today. It's the intimidation of the briefing room. If we've
seen him live on TV recently or something like that.
QUESTION: New subject? In Peru, one of the presidential candidates,
Alán Garcia, has been calling for a US-sponsored "Plan Peru" along
the lines of Plan Colombia. Does the Department think that a Peru-specific
program of this nature would be necessary, and would it be willing to
recommend to the next Administration that this be looked into?
MR. BOUCHER: I hadn't seen the suggestion. I'm not really in a position
to comment either on particular discussions in the Peruvian election, which
I don't want to get in the middle of, nor on the sort of budget proposals
of a future administration.
What I will say is that currently in our efforts in South America, in Plan
Colombia there is a substantial component of several hundred million
dollars of what we call Plan Colombia that in fact is for neighboring
countries. And we work very closely with Peru. Part of that money goes to
Peru, and we work very closely with Peru to make sure that the effort is
regional and that we don't push the drug production out of one place and
have it spill over into the neighbors.
So certainly we've paid a great deal of attention to neighbors in the
region as we proceeded with Colombia, and I would expect that would be part
of the future as well.
QUESTION: Have you guys heard these reports about Usama bin Laden
partying it up at a relative's wedding, his son's wedding? Do you we have
any confirmation that these would be genuine? Do you know about it?
MR. BOUCHER: We've seen the reports. I don't think we have anything
ourselves on his particular whereabouts. Let me just double check that
one.
QUESTION: Looking healthy, as the report said.
QUESTION: Well, can we assume you're not going to offer any congratulations?
MR. BOUCHER: No. I mean, actually, there have also been some reports
recently that he was leaving Afghanistan for some other country, and we've
seen those from time to time as well. We obviously don't have a way of
commenting or confirming on any particular matters on those reports, nor
his exact whereabouts.
What we do know is that he has been indicted in connection with the
bombings in East Africa; the Taliban has been the subject of UN resolutions
because they have been harboring him; he needs to be turned over to
justice. And wherever he happens to be or whatever activity he happens to
be engaged in, that remains the obligation under the UN resolutions. We'll
continue to press for that.
QUESTION: How do you explain to the continuing critics in the entire
Europe that your weapons you used in Kosovo caused already serious concern
to the hundreds of European soldiers?
MR. BOUCHER: I think you've seen the Secretary discuss this over the last
few days; you've seen the Pentagon discuss it in quite detailed fashion.
NATO is certainly meeting on the subject. NATO has had meetings almost
every day at the Council. They had another meeting today in Brussels. The
North Atlantic Council perm reps had a meeting with some experts that we
sent over there. So they are certainly discussing it. NATO as an organization
takes it seriously, is looking into it, continue to work on it and continue
to cooperate with various scientific studies that are going on.
But we would note that the science in this situation -- and there have been
a great number of studies because these weapons have been part of the
standard inventory for many years -- the science in these situations does
not show adverse health effects. And we have seen in recent days, I think,
World Heath Organization experts and others say that there was no real
noticeable health effect from them.
So I think we will continue to cooperate with all the various studies that
are being done and looked at. NATO is going to meet now with troop-
contributing countries in the coming days to see what information they have,
and NATO has set up a group to continue to work on the issue. But at this
point that the evidence is that there is no evidence that there is an
adverse health effect.
QUESTION: Well, would you explain the US document, as it was reported
yesterday in The New York Times extensively, did you inform the NATO
members countries that those weapons fired only by American planes
contained uranium, and not only just "dangerous material"?
MR. BOUCHER: You can ask that one at the Pentagon because that is more
specifically a guns-and-bullets type of question, and they will answer that
better than we can. But as I said, depleted uranium weapons and armor have
been a standard part of our inventory for many years, as well as at least
one other allied government -- and, in military terms, who cooperate in
NATO, I'm sure they are all quite aware of that fact.
There is standard guidance that is issued to troops going in to former war
zones, places where ordnance might be, and shells and things like that, on
how to act, how to operate. And that guidance was indeed issued for people
going into Kosovo. But in more detailed terms, yes, I'm sure all the
militaries of various allies know about each other's weapons. I mean, we
make a point of being able to operate together.
QUESTION: But The Washington Post reported today that only US and Great
Britain rejected the proposal by the rest of the NATO members that this
specific uranium-type weapon not to be used anymore in the European
theatre. I'm wondering why this was rejected. Is it so useful?
MR. BOUCHER: That's, again, a military question the military has to
answer in terms of the utility of these weapons. They obviously play a
special role. And as I said, we -- the ones who have used these, the ones
who have had this, whether it's the armor or the bullets in our inventory --
have not found any adverse health effects. We have studied many times. We
are as concerned about our troops and our allies' troops and the civilian
populations as anybody. And on that basis NATO will continue to look at
this, but the studies just don't show it.
QUESTION: Richard, it's --
QUESTION: Why, then, you do not release the document? Is there any
specific reason not to?
MR. BOUCHER: I would invite you to go to the Defense Department website
and look at the links to, I think, 20 or 30 different scientific studies of
this matter that you can read as long as you like.
QUESTION: Well, Richard, if you're so confident of the fact that there is
-- that the scientific studies show no adverse health effects, don't you
agree that it does seem a little bit odd that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
would issue instructions to US -- to troops entering armored vehicles that
have -- abandoned armored vehicles to wear gas masks and cover all of their
-- cover exposed skin?
MR. BOUCHER: Once again, check with the Pentagon. I think there have been
standard instructions about people going into former war zones --
QUESTION: Yes, but these are going into -- but going specifically into --
MR. BOUCHER: -- where various kinds of ordnance have been used. I'm not
going to try to do that from here.
QUESTION: But going specifically into vehicles against which these kinds
of weapons have been used. Why would these instructions be given if there
was no adverse health risks?
MR. BOUCHER: I'm not going to try to explain from here the exact nature
of the guidance the Pentagon issues to their soldiers as they go into
places where conflict has occurred, where various kinds of weapons have
been used. That is clearly a matter that the people who do this have to
explain. I just want to make clear that we do issue that kind of guidance,
and that is the context that that was indeed done in the case of Kosovo.
QUESTION: The only reason I ask is because I was told you were prepared
to answer that question.
MR. BOUCHER: Well, then there is another person who is wrong.
QUESTION: Can you tell us what the position of the United States is on
the sale of missiles today for use on the F-16s? Are there some types of
missiles which you would not approve for sale?
MR. BOUCHER: Well, as you know, we generally don't talk about what we
would not approve, but I am happy to talk to you about what we have -- the
sales that we welcome.
First of all, the context, which I guess you skipped over, is that
Government of Chile has decided on Lockheed Martin's F-16 as its next
generation fighting aircraft. We are very pleased that they have done that.
It was chosen on the basis of its technical merits in a very competitive
selection process.
The package will include the AMRAAM missile, but in keeping with our
worldwide policy on the introduction of new technologies and capabilities
in any given region, the actual physical delivery of the missiles would be
deferred until there was a comparable system introduced into the region by
some other country, so that these would be potentially available to the
Chileans, but wouldn't actually be delivered unless there was an introduction
of a similar weapon by another country.
QUESTION: I don't understand why you could answer that question, which is
obviously about guns and bullets, and not answer the previous questions.
MR. BOUCHER: Matt, this is a foreign policy question of a military sale.
If you ask me how many fins and wires does an AMRAAM missile have on it, I
won't be able to tell you and I won't try to explain to you. If you want to
ask me what kind of damage an AMRAAM missile can do, I'm not going to try
to explain it to you. If you want to ask me how far they'll fly or how to
pick one up or how to approach one in a war zone after it's been fired, I'm
not going to be able to answer that question.
QUESTION: No, what I want to ask you is what the foreign policy
implications are for possible adverse health effects from American -- from
American depleted uranium ammunition.
MR. BOUCHER: I think we talked about that at great length. This is
something we're working on with our allies together at NATO; we're
cooperating with the studies. We are quite aware of the studies. NATO is
taking a responsible view of this because we and NATO are as concerned
about the health and welfare of our soldiers and of civilian populations as
anybody is.
And the foreign policy effect is that we're concentrating on cooperating
with our allies to deal responsibly with an issue, but we have to point out
again and again that the scientific experts, be they our own people or be
they people like the World Health Organization experts, don't see an
adverse health effect and in fact don't see -- in some of the statements
I've seen, don't see any particular increase in cancer or leukemia
rates.
QUESTION: Can I go back to the criminal impact? Could you explain the
basis for the refusal to deliver them until -- is that a legal requirement
of some kind or is that -- how firm is that?
MR. BOUCHER: It's a policy that we have, that we have had in previous
years, that's basically a policy choice that says we do not like to
introduce new capabilities or technologies into any particular region. We
are aware that governments sometimes want to be able to deal with what they
perceive as future needs, and therefore are willing to say that this
missile can be considered part of the package. But until there were actual -
- an actual situation where another country were to introduce such missiles
into the region, we think it's prudent to hold off in actually delivering a
missile that might constitute a new technology.
QUESTION: Well, say you came up with a contract to sell AMRAAMs to
Brazil. Would that then satisfy the --
MR. BOUCHER: Introduced into the region by another country; i.e., not the
United States. If somebody else sells something similar to a country in the
region, we would go ahead with the sale. We're not going to, you know, sell
it to one country and so, okay, that means the other country gets it, and
now that the other country gets it, you get it, too. No, it's not a shell
game. It's if somebody else sells such missiles into the region, then we
would deliver ours to the Chileans.
QUESTION: The policy, then, seems like it's to insure twice as much
possible damage that these things could do, yes?
MR. BOUCHER: I would describe the policy as being a responsible, prudent,
well-considered, thoughtful policy, and I invite you to put that in the
headline.
QUESTION: That it would actually double the number of AMRAAM-type
missiles that are in a specific region?
MR. BOUCHER: That avoids wherever possible the introduction of new
technologies into the region, but yet cooperates with responsible civilian
governments on their defense needs.
QUESTION: So nonproliferation of AMRAAMs is not part of the nonproliferation?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't want to turn this into an argument, but I don't see
how you can describe not selling something, not delivering something, as an
escalation of proliferation. If it doesn't go there, it doesn't go
there.
QUESTION: Are you selling the F-16s because Peru bought some Russian high-
performance fighter jets? Is this the tit-for-tat thing?
MR. BOUCHER: No. The Chileans have spent a number of years looking at
their defensive needs and at their aircraft needs. They have done detailed
technical comparisons. The basic technology in Chile's current inventory is
Mirage and F-5 fighters. The technology dates from 1960s. These aircraft
are no longer in production, so the decision to buy F-16s came as a result
of the evaluation of competing aircraft in line with a defensive need to
replace those.
Our understanding is that if the F-16 had not been selected in this
competition, some other advanced aircraft would have been selected.
QUESTION: What can you say in response to Chilean officials who say that
if they don't get the missiles they'll have to reconsider the whole deal
and they'll go and buy somebody else's planes?
MR. BOUCHER: Well, I described the situation as regards to missile. I
don't have any official reaction from the Government of Chile. I guess if
there was one, we would comment on it then.
QUESTION: But would you budge if they kind of played hard --
MR. BOUCHER: Once again, I've described our policy, I've described the
status. I'm not going to speculate on next steps.
QUESTION: Is Chile were to buy similar missiles from somebody else, could
they then buy yours? I'm sorry, I have to ask. It's really annoying
you.
MR. BOUCHER: I don't think that's a scenario that we would contemplate. A
lot of times missiles and airplanes go together, so the scenario of buying
a missile for an airplane you don't have so you can get a missile for an
airplane you do have is a little complicated.
QUESTION: Richard, does this policy of not providing armaments that have
not been introduced into the region before, but you promise such AMRAAMs to
Chile in connection with the sale of F-16s, does this policy apply to the
Middle East and South Asia, and is this a part of the policy of the
Munitions Control Board?
MR. BOUCHER: Requests for the sale of defensive weapons go under policy
review that is indeed a case-by-case review. All around the world, when we
have a particular sale in mind, or a request for a sale, we will look at it
based on the defensive needs of the recipient country. That means, frankly,
we sell some things to some countries that we don't sell to other
countries. That is quite clear with regard to NATO; it is quite clear with
regard to Israel.
In some countries we have technical cooperation programs that we might not
have with other countries. So it is very much a case-by-case situation
based on what we consider to be the legitimate defensive needs and of
course the laws that govern this. In this particular situation, with regard
to this region, we have taken a decision that we should not try to
introduce new technologies in this region.
But again, there was a presidential decision in 1997 that said that our
arms transfer policy to Latin America would be the same as the rest of the
world, and that is that arms transfers would be reviewed on a case-by-case
basis. And that is what we have done.
QUESTION: Can I ask a follow-up on that? Sorry, but could I ask about the
onward use of such weaponry? Is there any occasion when the United States,
after providing weapons, has had to withdraw them or penalize the country
with regard to their use made against civilians or against friendly
countries, that sort of thing?
MR. BOUCHER: That's kind of an exhaustive question that is -- I can't do
the entire history of ever anything like that ever in the world. I just
don't have that.
QUESTION: Is there any other use for the F-16s, or is it essential to, I
guess, their effectiveness that they have these US missiles?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't particularly know what other armament the F-16 might
carry. That's, again, one of those technical questions that I have to leave
to the experts.
QUESTION: Because, in effect then, what you are saying is you will sell
them these planes, but they can't use the planes then until they get the
missiles, and they can't get the missiles until another country in Latin
America presumably gets them from another country.
MR. BOUCHER: I think you are making a couple of technical assumptions
there that I am not prepared to make because I am just not competent to
make them. And I think you can either find from the Pentagon or ask the
Pentagon about the various uses of F-16s, even if they don't have
missiles.
QUESTION: Richard, the region you're talking about where this policy
exists is Latin America, or is it the cone?
MR. BOUCHER: The region where the President's policy of trading arms
sales, like to the rest of the world, a case-by-case basis, is Latin
America as a whole. In terms of this sale and the AMRAAM missile, the
region is the southern cone, in terms of the introduction of other missiles
like this.
QUESTION: Okay. Do you know -- do you have it there -- where else this
policy is applied? What other regions?
MR. BOUCHER: Do you mean with regard to this particular missile? Where
else they have taken this --
QUESTION: Well, I thought the policy was, you don't -- I didn't think the
policy was exclusive to AMRAAMs; I thought it was exclusive to all kinds of
new technology in certain regions, this being -- the southern cone being
one of them?
MR. BOUCHER: This --
QUESTION: But if there is a policy that specifically relates to them --
MR. BOUCHER: The policy relates particularly to missiles, to these -- to
AMRAAMs in terms of not introducing new technologies. Are there other areas
where we have taken that stance with regard to a particular sale? I don't
really know. But yes, generally, I think, as we approach these sales --
again, on a case-by-case basis -- there is a desire not to necessarily
introduce new technologies unless we felt that the defensive needs required
it.
QUESTION: New subject?
MR. BOUCHER: Please.
QUESTION: Can you tell us any more about the circumstances of Mrs.
Plavsic's departure from Bosnia yesterday? Have there been any conversations,
indirect or direct, between her and US officials on -- (inaudible) -- or
have you had any contact with the ICTY people on how they plan to deal with
her?
MR. BOUCHER: I think there is not a lot I can say on either of these. We
have certainly consistently encouraged cooperation with the Tribunal by
anyone who had an indictment or a reason to be there. We certainly welcome
her courageous decision to cooperate fully with the Tribunal and to
recognize the legitimacy of the Tribunal. We hope that her action would
serve just as an example for others.
The Tribunal itself, I think, has issued a release where they described the
voluntary surrender, the charges, the indictment of the 7th of April, and
they say that initial appearance with the Chamber is expected to be on
Thursday, the 11th of January. And we certainly support their work
extensively, and we support the courageous decision that Mrs. Plavsic has
made to appear.
QUESTION: Would you support a decision by The Hague to offer her some
kind of immunity or some kind of plea bargain, if you will, if she were to
hand over valuable information about Milosevic or some of the others that
are being indicted?
MR. BOUCHER: Those kind of decisions are for prosecutors to make, and I
think we leave it to them to handle the judicial process there.
QUESTION: But would you support --
MR. BOUCHER: We don't speculate from here on things that they may or may
not do.
QUESTION: Can you clarify whether she was or was not indicted? I have
seen reports that it was a secret indictment.
MR. BOUCHER: She was indicted, and the indictment was kept under seal.
She was indicted on April 7th. It was issued under seal on April 7th of the
year 2000. She was indicted for genocide, crimes against humanity,
violations of the laws and customs of war, and grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 and '92. The indictment was
issued under seal on 7 April 2000, and it alleges that she committed these
crimes along with Momcilo Krajisnik, who is currently also in the
Tribunal's custody.
These are accusations that stem from her being in a position of responsibility
as a member of the Bosnian-Serb leadership during the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 1991 and '92. She was in a position of authority, along with
Karadzic and Krajisnik over the Bosnian-Serb forces that committed crimes
alleged in the indictment.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) -- summary of the statement put out by the Tribunal,
right?
MR. BOUCHER: It's half and half. Half from them and half from us. But it
explains that matter, everything, thoroughly.
QUESTION: Do you have anything on this American who has been kidnapped or
has gone missing in Chechnya?
QUESTION: Actually, if I could just ask one more question about Mrs.
Plavsic. If it's a secret indictment, and she in effect turned herself in,
how did she know she was indicted?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't think that is a situation I can clarify for
you.
QUESTION: Why not? No, Richard, why not?
MR. BOUCHER: It's a reasonable question, but it involves -- I mean, it's
ultimately a question that she would have to answer about how she knew and
how it occurred.
QUESTION: Excuse me?
MR. BOUCHER: Her or her lawyers.
QUESTION: Could you say with secret indictments in general, though, how
does the person find out? I mean, I thought the whole purpose of a secret
indictment is so that the person indicted could be apprehended.
MR. BOUCHER: So we can apprehend the individual and so that they won't go
hide once they know they are indicted.
QUESTION: Exactly.
MR. BOUCHER: In some cases, those situations change.
QUESTION: What does that mean, that they change?
MR. BOUCHER: No, I'm not trying to explain on her behalf how she learned
of her indictment and the procedures by which she surrendered voluntarily
in The Hague.
QUESTION: Can I ask one more on Ms. Plavsic? Just to try and understand
thinking of the reward that you put out for the arrest of Milosevic,
Karadzic and others, I believe. If somebody who had been secretly indicted
were to come up with information leading to their arrest and/or conviction,
would that reward apply?
MR. BOUCHER: Didn't we answer the question at the time?
QUESTION: Yes. I remember her asking myself.
MR. BOUCHER: That if you give information on where you are, can you get
the reward for turning yourself in?
QUESTION: No, not for yourself. Well, that as well, but for somebody
else. If you -- if somebody who's been indicted --
MR. BOUCHER: The answer to that is no, I think.
QUESTION: But for example, in this case, were she to provide information
leading to the conviction of Karadzic --
MR. BOUCHER: Oh, you mean, can an indicted person get a reward for
turning in somebody else?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. BOUCHER: That's another variation that I haven't explored. I will try
and see.
QUESTION: Can we go back to the Chechnya question?
MR. BOUCHER: Okay, Chechnya. Asked about the situation of the American
who is missing. Here is what we know. There is an American humanitarian
assistance worker who has been working for Medecins Sans Frontières,
the Holland branch of that organization, who has been abducted in
Chechnya.
There was another American working with Action Against Hunger, and then
others in a group that were with them who managed to escape. The American
who escaped was taken to a Russian military base and was questioned about
the incident, but he has now been released.
Our Embassy in Moscow is in touch with the Russian authorities. We will
certainly continue our efforts to establish the whereabouts and certainly
the welfare of this American citizen and try to secure his release. But
that is about all we know at this point.
QUESTION: Do you have a name?
MR. BOUCHER: Yes.
QUESTION: Can --
MR. BOUCHER: No, I can't give it to you. We don't have any privacy
waivers at this point. But we do know who he is and who he worked for,
things like that.
QUESTION: Do you know where the one that was released is now? The one
that was released by the Russian --
MR. BOUCHER: Yes, after he left the Russian military base. No, I don't
know his precise whereabouts. I assume he is in a safe place with his --
QUESTION: But safe. Not missing?
MR. BOUCHER: No, he is not missing. He is --
QUESTION: Do you know where the Russian base was?
MR. BOUCHER: No, I don't know exactly. Somewhere near where the incident
occurred.
QUESTION: Are you assuming that the first one, the MSF one, has been
abducted by Chechen separatists?
MR. BOUCHER: We do not know who is responsible or their motives at this
stage.
QUESTION: So there has been no request for a ransom or --
MR. BOUCHER: Not that we are aware of.
QUESTION: Do you know -- do you have any details of the circumstances of
the abduction, what exactly he was doing at the time?
MR. BOUCHER: I think they are sketchy. They were traveling, I think, in a
three-car convoy or motorcade, and they were attacked by armed gunmen, and
one of the cars was stopped and the other cars got through. And this
American who was taken was in the last car that got stopped.
QUESTION: For the inauguration of Bush, President Bush, are there any
foreign dignitaries expected, either heads of state or foreign ministers?
MR. BOUCHER: No. The standard practice -- and this has been followed in
the past -- is that foreign delegations have not been invited to Washington
for the occasion. Delegations have not been invited this time. It is the
longstanding United States Government practice that foreign Ambassadors
accredited to the United States represent their chiefs of state and
governments at the inaugural events, and that is the guidance that has been
issued again this time to diplomats here, as well as to all our posts
overseas, to tell people who might inquire.
QUESTION: How long -- (inaudible)? You said long-established?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't know exactly when, but I think that has been the
practice for a number of years, many years.
QUESTION: Is it a security thing?
MR. BOUCHER: It's just a matter of protocol and handling, and different
countries do this in different ways.
QUESTION: So where will these Ambassadors be seated during the actual
inauguration? Do you have any idea?
MR. BOUCHER: No.
QUESTION: And after the inauguration, is there any sort of itinerary for
the first sort of international visitors who might be coming to the United
States to meet the new President? Do you have any information about any --
you know, Tony Blair, various other people -- intending to visit the United
States?
MR. BOUCHER: That will come out of the new President when we have one --
the new White House when we have a new President.
QUESTION: Richard, do you have an update on the investigation into the
threats in Italy, specifically against the US Embassy in Rome? There had
been some talk that perhaps it was related to al-Qa'ida and --
MR. BOUCHER: You want me to talk about an update on the threats that we
didn't talk about?
QUESTION: Well, I'm just wondering if you have made any progress in the
investigation, or if there is still --
MR. BOUCHER: I don't have any more information on that to report to you.
I think we reported to you on Monday that our Embassy was open again. We
opened our Embassy because we have had excellent cooperation with the
Italian authorities, both in looking into the possible security concerns,
but also especially in terms of taking care of enhancing the security of
our Embassies, our diplomatic facilities there.
So we have been able to, we think, resolve that particular situation
sufficiently to be able to open our Embassies again and operate in the
environment, but I'm not able to go into any more details as regards the
threat.
QUESTION: I believe that somebody in the building was preparing something
on reports of a large number of people abducted in Southern Sudan. Did that
ever reach you or -- no? Okay.
MR. BOUCHER: I don't have anything on that. I will be glad to get it for
you. Thank you.
(The briefing was concluded at 1: 40 P.M.)
