U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #40, 99-03-30
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
865
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Tuesday, March 30, 1999
Briefer: James P. Rubin
SERBIA (KOSOVO)
STATEMENT
1,6 Secretary's call to Montenegro's President
1 Prime Minister Primakov's trip to Belgrade
2,4 Milosevic's proposal / Rambouillet Status
2,8-9,12 Genocide unfolding in Kosovo
3,10 Overthrowing of Montenegro Government
3,4,5 Reports of atrocities / Assassination of ethnic Albanians
5,13,14 Status of Kosovar Liberation Army / Crimes against humanity
MONTENEGRO
10,11 Toppling of the Government / Autonomy from Belgrade
ALBANIA
11,12 Number of Refugees / Aid to Refugees
CROATIA
12 Visit of Foreign Minister Granic
MACEDONIA
7,12 Inflow of Refugee
BOSNIA/KOSOVO
13 Similarities and Differences
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
15,16 Implementation/Commitments of the Wye River Memorandum
16 Closure of Offices
CAMBODIA
17 Khmer Rouge Leaders / Cut off of US Aid
NORTH KOREA
17-19 US-DPRK Missile Talks
18 Agreed framework / Food aid
NIGERIA
19 Readout of Secretary's Meeting with President Elect
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #40
TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 1999, 2:50 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing.
Before addressing the question of the meeting between Prime Minister
Primakov and President Milosevic, let me say that Secretary Albright called
to President Djukanovic of Montenegro on March 29 to express her deep
concern about the large inflows of displaced Kosovar citizens and the
effects they could have on political, economic and social stability in
Montenegro. She indicated that we will be increasing our humanitarian
assistance to Montenegro to help care for displaced Kosovars. We are also
going to work intensively with UNHCR.
She commended President Djukanovic of Montenegro for his steadfast
leadership through difficult times, and underscored that American support
for Montenegro is strong and unwavering. She told President Djukanovic
that she remains concerned about a possible attempt by Belgrade to oust his
government. Any attempt by Belgrade to overthrow the democratically-
elected government in Montenegro would only fuel wider regional instability,
lead to deeper isolation for the Yugoslavian authorities, and escalate the
conflict with NATO.
We are focused on preserving democracy and stability in Montenegro and we
have worked closely with NATO to exercise restraint and care in targeting
Yugoslav military capabilities in Montenegro. NATO is not conducting air
strikes against the people of Montenegro and Serbia, but against President
Milosevic's ability to inflict more human suffering, repression and
violence against the people of Yugoslavia.
With that statement, let me say with regard to the questions all of you
have been asking all day with regard to Prime Minister Primakov's trip to
Belgrade, President Clinton spoke to Chancellor Schroeder in the last hour,
and Secretary Albright spoke to Foreign Minister Fischer as well as Foreign
Ministers Vedrine and Cook. With respect to the President's call, my
understanding is that the President and the Chancellor indicated that they
see eye-to-eye on the need to continue in a determined fashion NATO's
military operations against the brutal forces conducting this crackdown in
Kosovo.
With respect to the details of what the Prime Minister received from
President Milosevic, let me say that we regard this suggestion as falling
far short of what is necessary in order for NATO to stop its air campaign.
We have said what is required. Clearly, the proposals put forward by
President Milosevic fall far short of what we think is necessary. Our
position is clear: Milosevic must halt the offensive against the Kosovar
Albanians, withdraw his forces, and embrace a settlement based on the
Rambouillet framework.
QUESTION: Could you give more details on the Milosevic proposal?
MR. RUBIN: As far as I understand it, it's an indication that says he's
prepared to pursue a political solution and indicates that if the bombing
stops, then he would be prepared to reduce his forces and talk about a
political solution. This is far short of what we think is necessary. We
do appreciate the effort that Prime Minister Primakov made, and any
movement towards our demands would be positive; but we regard this as
falling far short.
QUESTION: What's the status of Rambouillet at this stage? I'm thinking
specifically of the component which gives the Serbs sovereignty over the
territory and ensures it by giving them control of the border posts. As we
know now, their stripping all expelled refugees of all their papers. So if
you have Serbs controlling the border posts, then they'll never come back
in.
MR. RUBIN: We do believe that all the refugees must be able to return to
Kosovo.
QUESTION: To follow up, does the Rambouillet plan, in that regard, make
sense at this stage?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we don't think simply the fact that the Serb authorities
have stripped people of their papers is going to prevent our determination
to allow people to return to their homes.
QUESTION: You didn't mention this, but the reports from Europe say that
Milosevic suggested a cease-fire. Is that part of your understanding?
MR. RUBIN: It was unclear to me, in my debriefing of what has been
proposed, where exactly a cease-fire does or does not fit in. But
regardless, we regard the proposals as woefully inadequate. They fall far
short of what is necessary for NATO to stop its air campaign.
QUESTION: And on a related subject also, to Milosevic, has this
government made a determination whether what is going on in Kosovo now
amounts to genocide?
MR. RUBIN: As I indicated yesterday, and you were here, I said that we
have very clear indicators that genocide is unfolding in Kosovo. We are
looking at a mixture of confirmed and unconfirmed reports at this time.
But we don't see any need to await confirmation of genocide; clearly, there
are crimes against humanity occurring in Kosovo. Our response to this
criminal activity by Milosevic's forces is taking place right now. The
full response we are now embarked upon with our NATO allies is fully
justified by the crimes against humanity we know are being committed.
QUESTION: Did the Secretary speak to Foreign Minister Ivanov; and if so,
did she get a more direct idea of what exactly the proposals are?
MR. RUBIN: As of 3:00 p.m. today, she has not yet spoken to Foreign
Minister Ivanov. The meeting just broke a few minutes ago between Prime
Minister Primakov, Foreign Minister Ivanov and Chancellor Schroeder and the
German Foreign Minister. She immediately got on the phone with Foreign
Minister Fischer and then spoke as well to Foreign Ministers Vedrine and
Cook. She has not yet spoken to Foreign Minister Ivanov.
The descriptions -- our understanding of this proposal is that they are not
based on the demands the international community has set forth.
QUESTION: Today is like the fourth or fifth time in a row that you've had
a strong warning from Milosevic about Montenegro, and this one seems to be
even stronger than the previous ones. Is the US aware of any plot by
Milosevic to try and overthrow the government there?
MR. RUBIN: We have concerns in this regard. We do have information
suggesting this is a possibility, and we are determined to make clear our
views about it in advance if it is going to occur.
QUESTION: Yesterday you said something like, Milosevic is in danger of
losing Kosovo; and today the President, as you know, said that the prospect
of international support for Serbia's claim to Kosovo is jeopardized by his
current actions. Could you explain what is being said here?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. The fact of the matter is there are some terrible
crimes going on in Kosovo. The Serb authorities are committing forced
expulsions. We have evidence that houses are burning throughout Kosovo.
People are being forced out of their towns and pushed towards the border.
We have reports of possible atrocities in many different situations. What
has happened is that through this brutality, the Serb authorities are
radicalizing the population of Kosovo and making it all the more difficult
to imagine a circumstance where the peoples can begin to live together
again. We're not saying that's not possible. But clearly the radicalization
grows with each atrocity and each brutality the Serbs conduct.
QUESTION: Does that also mean that the United States may not feel as
strongly about opposing Kosovo's independence and keeping it within Serbia
as a result of these actions?
MR. RUBIN: Our position on independence has not changed.
QUESTION: You are talking about all the refugees have to be returned to
Kosovo; but according to all wire reports, all the houses, the villages
burned by the Serb's forces. If they return to Kosovo, they don't have any
sanctuary.
MR. RUBIN: Well, what we have said is that the Serb forces have to
withdraw; the Serbs have to pursue a peace settlement based on the
framework of Rambouillet. There were 250,000 displaced persons last fall.
When the situation improved, they were able to return to their homes. What
we're saying is we're determined that they will be able to return to their
homes.
QUESTION: I wonder if you can help me with the middle ground between two
of your responses. You say that the population of Kosovo may become so
radicalized that it would no longer be able to tolerate control by Serbia;
yet, at the same time, the United States does not support independence. Is
there something in between there that you are leaning towards that you
could tell us about?
MR. RUBIN: No.
QUESTION: They seem to be contradictory. How do you square that?
MR. RUBIN: There is something in between.
QUESTION: There have been reports out of Europe that some of the ethnic
Albanians involved with the peace process have been assassinated and are
even being targeted. Do you know if there is anything like a hit list, or
are these people just being picked up in the general sweeps that are going
on; and what are we doing about it?
MR. RUBIN: Well, obviously, we're getting a lot of reports of these
kinds of assassinations and target lists. It's very difficult to confirm
each one of those reports. We've had some conflicting reports, for example,
on the status of Mr. Agani in the last 24-hours and others. Clearly, there
are people being killed in Kosovo for who they are and their ethnicity and
their moderate position and their role as intellectuals and others. That
is clearly going on.
We are continuing, as I think the Pentagon indicated, an air campaign that
is now increasingly focused on a wider range of targets, including the
capabilities to conduct these kinds of crackdowns and interfering and
disrupting the ability of the Serb forces to conduct these crackdowns. As
far as these types of crimes are concerned, we are collecting and will
continue to collect all the evidence we can to make sure that those
responsible are brought to justice. And we are going to share that
information with the War Crimes Tribunal.
QUESTION: Jamie, yesterday you said that the ambassador had talked to
Thaci. Has she talked to him?
MR. RUBIN: The Secretary.
QUESTION: Right, I'm sorry. You said that the Secretary had talked to
Thaci the day before. Has she talked to him again?
MR. RUBIN: No, he called into the Department today and he provided
another chilling account of what's going on in Kosovo. He basically
indicated that the situation is worse today than it was yesterday.
QUESTION: Could you elaborate on that -- why it is worse, how it is
worse?
MR. RUBIN: He said that the killing is more widespread; that there is
shelling of a whole series of towns; that the Kosovar Liberation Army is
doing the best it can under the circumstances but that it's becoming
increasingly difficult. He indicated that people were being held in the
soccer stadium in Pristina; that people were being held in two other
locations; that several thousand people who had been evacuated from a
particular town, whose name I don't have in front of me, are missing; and a
number of other reports of that nature.
QUESTION: Are you able to confirm any of these reports, like the people
being held in the soccer stadium, which would be an open target, I
presume?
MR. RUBIN: We've heard a lot of reports of that. I'm not able to
confirm it. What I am able to confirm is that there is widespread fires in
Kosovo in many different towns, and the refugee flows we're able to confirm
on our own. But as far as that particularly incident, I'm not.
QUESTION: You dismissed what Milosevic offered through Primakov as
woefully inadequate and falling far short, and you restated what seems to
be the standing US position without any wavering in it. However, did
anything occur on the edges of this situation? Has Primakov made any
headway to start any sort of a helpful or constructive dialogue? Is there
any room, do you see any give at all in Milosevic's position; or is this a
one-shot deal that is flatly off the mark?
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't rule out efforts to continue to convince President
Milosevic to reverse course. We're not going to dissuade people from doing
so, if he really will reverse course. But what I've said is that the
position as we understand it is woefully inadequate; it falls far
short.
QUESTION: Do you know if the Russians have said whether they will make an
effort?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any information on their intentions.
QUESTION: I mean, they didn't tell the US they would?
MR. RUBIN: Oh, she hasn't spoken to Foreign Minister Ivanov yet
today.
QUESTION: Primakov has a history of freelancing when on these diplomatic
missions. Is there any indication that he did come up with any ideas of
his own, other than the message he was supposed to deliver?
MR. RUBIN: Well, he wasn't going at our behest, so he wasn't delivering
our message. As I indicated yesterday, the United States and Russia have
very different views about the appropriateness of the use of force. So I
don't expect him to have gone in there and made the case that we would have
made for why the use of force is justified.
Primakov and Foreign Minister Ivanov were well aware of the West's and
NATO's position with regard to what President Milosevic needs to do to
reverse course. The proposal that President Milosevic proffered falls well
short of that.
QUESTION: Given the history of fairly good relations between the United
States and Russia, would you have expected Prime Minister Primakov to at
least telephone some official in this country before he went to Germany or
after he went to Germany? What do you make of this extended pregnant
period of time before the Russians contact you, and the Secretary's
inability to get a hold of Ivanov?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I didn't say she was trying to get a hold of Ivanov, so
that information you suggest is incorrect.
Let me say this -- Secretary Albright has been in regular contact with
Foreign Minister Ivanov in the last couple of days. She spoke to him
yesterday; she spoke to him the day before yesterday; and she spoke to him
on Friday. So we've been in regular contact with Foreign Minister Ivanov.
As I indicated to you, the meetings just took place with Foreign Minister
Fischer and Chancellor Schroeder just in the last hour and a half. Foreign
Minister Ivanov was meeting with Prime Minister Primakov and Chancellor
Schroeder and then German Foreign Minister Fischer called her immediately
afterwards. So we got a read-out through that mechanism. I don't think
the Russians had any doubt that the first person that Foreign Minister
Fischer was going to call was going to be Secretary Albright, and I would
expect Secretary Albright to be in touch with Foreign Minister Ivanov
shortly.
QUESTION: No ill feelings, then?
QUESTION: During Secretary Albright's conversation with President
Djukanovic, did she explain what is viewed by the Montenegrin people as a
contradiction -- on the one hand the United States expressing strong and
unwavering support for the leadership of Montenegro, yet on the other,
bombing various sites within that province?
MR. RUBIN: I think the leadership in Montenegro understands there are
certain targets -- particularly air defense targets -- that are in
Montenegro that we can't responsibly leave off our list. But what we have
said is we are exercising restraint and care in the targeting of FRY
military capabilities in Montenegro.
QUESTION: Is Montenegrin leadership to understand that the bombing
campaign in Montenegro is not finished as far as NATO is concerned?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not in a position to specify future targeting.
QUESTION: One other question on Pristina. From the Thaci conversation or
anything else, can you say anything more about what's going on in Pristina?
There are some reports that an ethnic cleansing campaign has begun there in
a couple of quarters where they are literally clearing everybody out, all
the Albanians out. Do you know anything about that?
MR. RUBIN: Yesterday, Mr. Thaci told the Secretary that Pristina had
become kind of a dead city. We have also received reports since then of
people being moved out of certain neighborhoods of Pristina, and we've
received some horrible oral reports about what is going on there.
QUESTION: It looks like the Macedonians have again restricted the inflow
of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Does the United States take a position on
this? Are you in favor of completely unrestricted inflows?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we have been working very closely with Macedonia
throughout this crisis. There were times when refugee flows were
restricted and then opened, and we obviously want to do all we can and work
with the Macedonian Government to do all we can to make it possible for
refugees to be cared for and fed and sheltered.
QUESTION: Have you asked them to --
MR. RUBIN: I don't know what specific direct contact we've had, but we
obviously want to be able to work with them in making it possible for the
refugees to be taken care of.
QUESTION: There have been reports that the Serbs are holding back men in
Kosovo, not allowing them to leave. But I believe last night, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, someone from that group, said that some young
women -- reports that young women are being held back as well. Can you
elaborate on what you're hearing?
MR. RUBIN: Again, we all, I think, are dealing with the same database of
reports, oral reports, that some women are being held back and possibly
raped. I mean, it's all very horrific. I just don't have any confirmation
of it.
QUESTION: Can we bring two things into this discussion? The Yeltsin
speech, the Yeltsin message to the nation, would seem to be heavily
critical of the Kosovo operation and conciliatory, for instance, on arms
control. Is it about what you expected from the Russian leader; have you
had a chance to appraise it? Secondly, this is, I guess, a question for a
therapist but if you could indulge the question, is there any size-up here
of why Milosevic offered what he offered? Is he beginning to feel the pain,
or is he playing some game where he will move back about a quarter of an
inch if he can get the bombings stopped? What is he up to, do you
suppose?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm neither a psychiatrist nor a criminal psychiatrist.
Let me say that it's not possible for me to ascertain what his motivations
are. The fact of the matter is that the Serbs know precisely what they
need to do, and they know how to go about doing it. If they choose to
reverse course, then NATO's bombing campaign will stop.
With respect to President Yeltsin, he also indicated that Russia did not
have any intention of being dragged into this conflict. He indicated there
were certain things they were going to continue to work with the United
States and the West on -- certain things that they fundamentally disagreed
with. It's much like my answer to someone's question yesterday about our
views about the effect this is having on the US-Russian relationship. That
is very simple: we fundamentally disagree about the question of whether we
should have stood idly by and watched, by doing nothing, when President
Milosevic and his military and police forces conducted this massive
crackdown on Kosovo.
We think that NATO did the right thing by making sure that Milosevic and
his forces pay a heavy price for this kind of brutality and barbarism. The
Russians have a different view. Meanwhile, we have common interests on
arms control, on highly enriched uranium agreement that was worked on, on
the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. As you know, the IMF Director
was in Moscow yesterday, working on economic matters. So we will continue
to work together where we can and try to overcome the differences where
they exist. They clearly exist on this subject.
QUESTION: Jamie, when you say that NATO and the United States expects
Milosevic to agree to a cease-fire, withdraw his troops and embrace the
settlement of the Rambouillet framework, are we to understand that to
include NATO-led implementation force and, obviously, the cease-fire?
MR. RUBIN: Well, our view hasn't changed on this. In the absence of an
implementation force, we have no reason to believe that any agreement would
work; because in the past, President Milosevic has not implemented
agreements that did not have an implementation force to ensure that they
were implemented.
QUESTION: The rhetoric coming out of NATO in Brussels seems to be getting
harsher. Yesterday it was, this is compared to possibly the greatest
humanitarian catastrophe since the end of the Second World War. Today it's
being likened to 1975 and Cambodia. Does the State Department or the US
share specifically these analogies that are being made in Brussels?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't want to comment on every comment a spokesman
makes in another part of the world. Let me say that clearly some terrible,
terrible things are going on in Kosovo. We're talking about forced
expulsions; we're talking about rape; we're talking about mass murder;
we're talking about hundreds of thousands of people being moved out of
their homes. It's a terrible, terrible thing. Crimes against humanity are
occurring, and there are indications that genocide is occurring. There is
no need to compare it.
QUESTION: You used genocide -- indicators of genocide yesterday. The
White House spokesman, when asked about it, said he'd like to look into it;
it has legal implications. Today he said exactly what you said yesterday.
It's a term of art but also a legal term. Is there any serious analysis
being made within the Administration if this indeed is genocide under
international law? Because if it is, there are all sorts of implications.
MR. RUBIN: Let me say we have been and are taking significant action
through NATO right now to confront the criminal conduct of the Yugoslav
Army and police in Kosovo as a result of the campaign that's going
on.
Declaring it genocide wouldn't change our determination to continue to
pursue action through NATO.
I fear for my legal hide.
QUESTION: No, you used the phrase "mass murder," and Strobe Talbott, in
The New York Times this morning used a phrase, "frenzied slaughter." It
implies that you actually have some examples, some facts that you haven't
quite maybe given us all the --
MR. RUBIN: Well, I've given you as much information as I can, Roy. I
will continue, during my briefings, to provide you as much information as I
can in this forum. We are making judgments based on a variety of reporting,
a variety of our own information; and we have come to the conclusion that
crimes against humanity are occurring.
QUESTION: Jamie, to just follow up on that earlier point, you say you're
taking action within NATO. What do you mean by that?
MR. RUBIN: The air strikes that are being conducted every day, the
determination we have to see this air campaign through to the end.
QUESTION: In terms of using any sort of prosecutorial means to go after
Milosevic or any other members of the Serb leadership, are you doing
anything --
MR. RUBIN: No, I think you're mixing apples and oranges there. What I'm
saying is that the fact that we know crimes against humanity are occurring
has caused us to take military action against the Serbs in a massive air
campaign that we're determined to see through the end. Whether or not the
formal definition of genocide has been met, there are indicators that
genocide is occurring, and our reaction would be the same.
As far as the criminal aspect of this is concerned, let me say this -- we
are determined to use all of our available resources to try to determine
what's going on there, to try to find the evidence and to make that
evidence available so that those who are conducting this criminal campaign
are brought to justice.
QUESTION: Do you know what the legal implications are of a finding of
genocide?
MR. RUBIN: My understanding is it would be no different than what we're
doing right now, which is conducting military operations against the Serbs
in Kosovo.
QUESTION: No, no (inaudible) prosecution. The United States took a long
time subscribing to the concept of genocide because isolationists felt it
would involve the United States in all sorts of international disputes that
maybe the US would have a different view of. So if it's genocide, that
means the US is obliged by treaty to support, as you said, war crimes, et
cetera. It's more than just bombing the Serbs.
MR. RUBIN: It's also to take action, and we are taking action. Our
legal scholar in the second row has nodded his head, so I feel much
better.
QUESTION: Going back to October '98 and the Holbrooke-brokered truce, up
until the start of the bombing, the human rights groups list several
hundred people, a number of incidents -- several hundred horrific incidents
where approximately 200 or 300 people were killed. Since the bombing began,
you've got mass displacement, hundreds of people being killed and so on and
so forth. Is there any concern that the NATO cure is worse than the
problem to begin with?
MR. RUBIN: We think it would perverse in the extreme to blame NATO for
the conduct and barbarity of President Milosevic's forces. This campaign
has been going on for 14 months. There are thousands of people that died
over the last year; hundreds of thousands that were forced from their
homes. In January of this year, there was a massacre at Racak. We had
every reason to believe that President Milosevic had both the intent and
the capability to conduct offensive operations during the very time we were
negotiating in France. Prior to the NATO air strikes, this offensive
operation began.
Has it intensified? Yes, it's intensified. The difference now between now
and the last 14 months is that President Milosevic's forces are going to
pay a heavy, heavy price for their intent and their capability to conduct
this kind of crackdown.
QUESTION: Did the North Atlantic Council today reach any consensus on
approving a third phase for the air campaign?
MR. RUBIN: I don't want to get into phases. I believe agreement was
reached, but you would have to check with NATO.
QUESTION: Can we go back to Montenegro for a second? Two questions --
you said that there are indications that Milosevic might be trying to
topple the government there?
MR. RUBIN: Over the last couple of years, there's been many indications
that he has worked with certain allies in Montenegro to destabilize
President Djukanovic. We have indications in recent days that that is a
risk. It justified the Secretary writing Djukanovic a letter, justified
her speaking to him yesterday and making clear the points that I made clear
to you.
QUESTION: Okay, just to flesh it out a little more and then to follow up,
can you say a little more about these indications?
MR. RUBIN: No.
QUESTION: Okay. There's also reports out of Montenegro that the
Montenegrins have been doing some things bureaucratically within their
government to separate them bureaucratically from Belgrade -- some legal
changes, some parliamentary changes -- that are viewed as quite provocative
in Belgrade. Can you talk about that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, all I can say is that we believe that President
Djukanovic has been pursuing a democratic program in Montenegro, and has
been trying to disassociate his government from the criminal program that
has been pursued by the Yugoslav authorities in Kosovo. So the fact that
Montenegro is taking steps to disassociate itself from the policies that
are being pursued in Kosovo, we regard as a good thing.
QUESTION: Do you think that Montenegro might deserve, perhaps, some sort
of greater autonomy from Belgrade?
MR. RUBIN: We haven't changed our position on the status of Montenegro.
QUESTION: I'm not sure I've ever heard your position on the status of
Montenegro. Do you have it?
MR. RUBIN: It's on the record and it remains unchanged.
QUESTION: Which record is that?
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: The record we'll provide you after the briefing.
QUESTION: Do you have any refugee counts going into Albania? There have
been reports today that it could be up to 100,000.
MR. RUBIN: UNHCR reports an additional 5,000 have fled into Albania
since yesterday's reports. This means that some 70,000 refugees have moved
into Albania since March 24, bringing the total to over 83,000 refugees.
In addition, some 20,000 have moved into Montenegro in the past several
days, bringing that total up to approximately 45,000. UNHCR also reports
there are approximately 25,000 refugees in Macedonia, and some 15,000 in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
We continue to work closely with UNHCR and other relief organizations to
increase their capacity to respond to the conflict. Secretary Albright was
informed the European countries are going to be taking significant steps in
the next couple of days to assist the refugees. And as you know from the
briefing yesterday, we are stepping up our efforts as well.
QUESTION: Do you have anything out of the pledging conference in
Geneva?
MR. RUBIN: I have no new information on that.
QUESTION: Is this in addition to the $8.5 million announced on Friday?
MR. RUBIN: As I indicated, as Julia Taft indicated yesterday, there will
be reprogramming monies available in addition to the $8.5 million.
QUESTION: Along the lines of the refugee assistance for Montenegro,
Macedonia, Albania, whomever, have you gotten any requests from any of
those governments for American troops to help out with refugee assistance?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of that. Let me say that we are going to be
putting together a plan to try to assist the refugees as best we can.
QUESTION: Given the reports of genocide and the war crimes that you say
are occurring, how is the United States encouraging regime change in
Belgrade, and are you seeking regime change there?
MR. RUBIN: I have nothing new for you on that. We're conducting a
massive air campaign. It's been in operation many days, and it will
continue until either President Milosevic reverses course or the military
objectives are met. Secretary Albright has been very heartened in her
discussions with her counterparts that what has happened in the last few
days is the images that have been seen around the world of the terrible
brutalities and atrocities of the Serb regime have only redoubled the
determination of NATO's leaders from all 19 countries to continue this air
campaign until it's completed.
QUESTION: Could I follow up? Did you anticipate anything like the scale
of what has occurred and the need for a NATO response?
MR. RUBIN: Absolutely. I think we understood completely that the
offensive that we expected this spring, knowing of what happened last fall
when 250,000 people were moved out of their homes and put into the hills,
that we could be dealing with a situation of this magnitude.
QUESTION: Jamie, the Croatian Foreign Minister is coming in to see the
Secretary tomorrow. That brings to mind the Bosnia situation and the
apparent lack of spill-over. So it's sort of a two-part question. Is the
Secretary is it just he that's coming, or is the Secretary going to have
now consultations with other Foreign Ministers in the region in Washington?
And if Milosevic is keeping his part of the bargain in Bosnia, why do you
suppose he is, or is he?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we don't believe Milosevic has been a helpful influence
on the situation in Bosnia in recent months; on the contrary, he's played a
negative role in trying to stir up political opposition to the agreement
there. Nevertheless, we have NATO's SFOR force on the ground that is
ensuring its implementation and is there to provide a secure environment
for the peace process to work.
The Secretary will meet with Foreign Minister Granic here in Washington.
They will meet at the State Department tomorrow late in the morning. The
Secretary plans to review developments in Kosovo and to express appreciation
for Croatia's forthcoming stand on NATO operations there. She will also
review US-Croatian relations and discuss issues related to implementation
of the Dayton peace accords.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) -- permission for using their airspace -- have they
given permission?
MR. RUBIN: You would have to check that with the Pentagon.
QUESTION: Could I ask another question about the goals, as they now seem
to be emerging, of the Milosevic campaign? One of the often discussed
theories is that he may be trying to clear Kosovo -- certainly at least the
top third of Kosovo -- and to resettle that with Serbs and to have the
bottom two-thirds either an empty space or whoever is left there. Is there
any indication that you've seen that this is actually his goal, his
policy?
MR. RUBIN: As far as what his intentions are, I do not want to make any
specific comment. All I can tell you is what we've seen; and what we've
seen is people kicked out of their homes, tens of thousands of people on
the move, terrible reports of atrocities. But I don't want to speculate
further.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) -- partition, because this might also be, at the
end of the day, if negotiations ever take place, this is obviously going to
be a proposal that people will be making -- to partition Kosovo into a Serb-
ethnic --
MR. RUBIN: Our position on basic political configurations in the former
Yugoslavia hasn't changed. I have no new positions to provide you.
QUESTION: Follow-up on the previous topic of the alleged Serb atrocities.
In light of the reports that you're getting, how realistic is it to work
with Milosevic after the campaign ends on peace in Kosovo?
MR. RUBIN: Well, clearly, as the President indicated, the international
community is finding his policies increasingly abhorrent. On the other
hand, he does now control the military force in Kosovo and in Serbia, and
he is in charge. Meanwhile, we are pursuing a democratization policy in
Serbia to assist in various ways those who are trying to pursue democracy
so that some day Serbia can really be a democracy.
QUESTION: On the KLA, are you getting any reports or information on the
status of the KLA now, in light of the Serb offensive? How viable an
organization is it now politically and militarily?
MR. RUBIN: Well, clearly, they're having a tough time right now with
over 10,000 Yugoslav forces involved directly in an offensive, supported by
another 30,000 in the region. They are outgunned substantially with heavy
equipment -- 300-plus tanks -- heavy other artillery and armored vehicles
that they don't have. They're having a very tough time of it.
QUESTION: Jamie, going back to Bosnia, even the President talked about
the similarities between Bosnia and Kosovo. While a lot of analysts think
there are similarities, some think there are big differences; one being
that while the bombing back in '95 eventually led to Milosevic backing down,
in part that's because it came four years into a war -- both sides were
tired and exhausted and ready to go to the peace table. But here both
sides may not be so willing and they're probably willing to keep fighting.
What do you say to that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, there are similarities and differences between Bosnia
and Kosovo. One of the big similarities is the brutal policies of
President Milosevic. One of the differences is that the international
community acted very early on in making sure that we didn't stand idly by
as millions of refugees were kicked out of their homes, as they were in
Bosnia. The international community got together and is making sure that
President Milosevic and his forces pay a heavy, heavy price; that they
can't conduct the kind of grisly policies in Kosovo with impunity that they
conducted in Bosnia with impunity for many years. That's one of the big
differences.
As far as where it will all end up, we're determined to continue this air
campaign until President Milosevic reverses course or its objectives are
met. That will be different than Bosnia.
QUESTION: Are you really saying that we stood idly by for three years
while millions were evicted from their homes in Bosnia?
MR. RUBIN: Well, the air strikes didn't get conducted until 1995.
QUESTION: What does the US make of these appeals by certain prominent
Serb politicians that NATO should stop this because they are brother
Christians for this coming Holy Week -- not just a Christian holiday but
also a Jewish holiday?
MR. RUBIN: I retract the word "idly."
QUESTION: Does that mean you didn't hear the first part?
MR. RUBIN: I heard your question.
QUESTION: Okay. What do you make of these calls? And then an adjunct to
that, the Vatican and the Pope have also said that it is bad for this
bombing to be going on during this most holy of weeks.
MR. RUBIN: I understand that many of these people didn't think the
bombing should start. So that's important information as to the motivations
of the speakers who disagree on the rationale and justification and need
for the air campaign to begin with.
As far as the religious question is concerned, let me say this -- we
obviously respect all religions of the world, and we are going to pursue
this campaign based on what's going on on the ground. If President
Milosevic is going to be pursuing these crimes against humanity regardless
of religious holidays, it would be very unseemly for the West to take into
account that the people on the ground aren't getting any advantage
of.
QUESTION: The Administration has said the NATO argument is with Mr.
Milosevic. Yet every day in Belgrade there are these large gatherings,
there are rock concerts and so forth, where thousands and thousands of
people come out in support of the policies, wearing targets and so forth.
So isn't, in fact, part of the argument with the Serbian people?
MR. RUBIN: The argument is with President Milosevic and those who
support his policies, not the Serbian people. I don't believe that all the
Serbian people support his policies. Clearly, there was to be expected a
certain backlash in the short term. But as people learn more about what's
really going on and to the extent they are not blinded by the propaganda
and disinformation spewing out of Serbian television, they will find
themselves in less and less support for the policies of President
Milosevic.
QUESTION: Can we go to another subject? About US policy on an Israeli
withdrawal, one reason being that the Israeli Cabinet took those accounts
very seriously and it became notations in their meetings yesterday. Could
you run us by it one more time? We know there's a parallel situation; if
the Palestinians do something, the Israelis have to do something --
somebody has to do something first. There's still an impression -- I don't
know how widespread in Israel -- that the US view is the Palestinians have
to move first in some additional security areas before Israel would be
considered obliged by the US' reading of the Wye agreement to continue the
withdrawal. Could you (inaudible) or any version, obviously we can put to
rest maybe for a day?
MR. RUBIN: Okay, let me say this. Yesterday, I was asked about a report
in a respected newspaper by a very respected reporter, based on a
conversation with a senior administration official. I disputed the report
because the senior administration official, whoever he or she might be,
isn't always right.
Our view -- the view of the State Department and the Secretary of State --
is that our position on implementation of the Wye River memorandum has not
changed. The issue is not who goes first. Rather than focus on sequence,
the government of Israel should focus on implementing their obligations.
We're calling on both parties to focus on a serious process of implementing
their responsibilities. If we had a serious process under way, one in
which both sides were fulfilling their obligations, we would not be having
this discussion.
On the issue of implementation, our position is as follows. During phase
one, both sides work together to fulfill their obligations under the Wye
River memorandum. Under phase two, the Palestinians have fulfilled some of
their commitments, particularly with respect to fighting terror. There are
other commitments under phase two that they have yet to fulfill. The
Israelis, for their part, have not fulfilled any of their commitments under
phase two.
Our view is that both sides should move forward in a parallel phased
approach to fulfill all of their commitments under the Wye River memorandum.
In short, if we had a serious process engaged right now, we wouldn't be
engaged in discussion of sequence.
QUESTION: Today surfaced again another old problem that you might have
something on, the US view on: Palestinian offices in East Jerusalem.
There's a dispute over them. The Prime Minister is outraged or something,
very angry about the situation. There seems to be two types of offices,
those that go way back and efforts, perhaps, to establish some presence in
East Jerusalem currently. Does the US have a view on this current
dispute?
MR. RUBIN: We have seen reports of the closing of offices associated
with the Palestinian Authority in East Jerusalem. As with other issues
relating to Jerusalem, we regard this is as an extremely sensitive matter.
We urge both sides to avoid steps that further complicate an already
volatile issue, and we do understand that both sides are in contact about
it now.
QUESTION: Do you have any interpretation of Oslo and Wye and Hebron, all
the above, that bears on whether these offices are supposed to remain
open?
MR. RUBIN: Not in front of me.
QUESTION: Jamie, on Israeli withdrawal, I seem to remember that when this
came up at the time, you said that --
MR. RUBIN: Which issue?
QUESTION: The question of the next Israeli withdrawal.
MR. RUBIN: Okay, we were just on the offices here. You're stepping back,
okay.
QUESTION: I seem to remember that you said that you didn't see any
justification for delay in the withdrawal. Now you seem to be saying that
the Palestinians also have to take some --
MR. RUBIN: I don't think that's exactly what I said when this first come
up. I think I've been quite clear: we want both sides to fulfill their
obligations. We believe that the Palestinians have moved forward on some
of their obligations, including fighting terror. Both sides now need to
focus on fulfilling their obligations.
QUESTION: Could you be more specific on what the Palestinians need to
do?
MR. RUBIN: All the obligations and the Israelis --
QUESTION: What are they?
MR. RUBIN: I'll be happy to provide you a copy of the Wye River
memorandum.
QUESTION: I have it, but you are the judges of what they have completed
and what they have not.
MR. RUBIN: What I said is some of their obligations, including fighting
terror, they have been implementing. Let me say, our interest here is not
to get into a public squabble and a public scorecard. Our interest is in
getting both sides to approach this matter seriously.
QUESTION: One more on it.
MR. RUBIN: Okay.
QUESTION: Which comes to mind -- and I won't get into the difficult
background because I think you know it, and I know it. Is any assurance in
the midst of going out, or has any assurance gone out to the Palestinians
on the withdrawal? Should I go a little further?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: All right, you don't want the Palestinians to be making
unilateral statehood declarations. It's my understanding part of the deal
is that the US, who will submit a statement, that it intends to see Israel
to continue to withdrawal. Has any assurance like that gone to them?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard about that deal.
QUESTION: See, they are concerned also about yesterday. They think that
means you've eased back on withdrawal.
MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard about that deal.
QUESTION: But you're not easing back on withdrawal, that's clear.
MR. RUBIN: Our position remains unchanged.
QUESTION: Yes, Jamie, I have two questions, one on Cambodia and one on
North Korea. There was a Reuters report this morning which said that
Senator Mitch McConnell apparently told Hun Sen in Cambodia that if Khmer
Rouge leaders are not tried in an international tribunal, there could be a
complete cut off of US aid to Cambodia. I was wondering whether that
reflects Administration policy?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware that we coordinated that with Senator
McConnell.
QUESTION: Okay, and then also, do you have anything on the conclusion of
the missile talk sin Pyongyang?
MR. RUBIN: With respect to the missile talks, let me say that we do have
a comment on the missile talks. The US and North Korea met March 29-30,
for another round of missile talks. The talks occurred in Pyongyang in
North Korea, and the US delegation was led by our Deputy Assistant
Secretary Robert Einhorn. The talks were business like, substantive and
detailed. The entire range of missile proliferation issues were discussed
and covered. We used the talks to press our serious concerns about North
Korea's development, testing, deployment and export of missiles and missile
technology and to call for tight constraints on these activities.
In particular, we stressed that further launches of long missiles or
further exports of such missiles or their technology would have serious
negative implications for US-North Korean relations. The sides agreed to
hold another round of talks as soon as possible. We will work out the
timing and venue through the New York channel.
It's not surprising to us that we have not yet reached an agreement. For
those of you who ask me about the Kumchang-ni talks time after time after
time, you know that negotiating with North Korea is a marathon process with
our marathon negotiators, and they are determined to continue to pursue our
objectives.
QUESTION: This is a follow up to yesterday question, that the Japanese
Government has now confirmed that the two ships they shot at were North
Korean. Is there a US reaction; and also, did they discuss this at the
missile talks?
MR. RUBIN: The United States remains seriously concerned about the
incursion of the two unidentified ships into Japanese waters. We have been
in close consultations with our Japanese allies on this issue, and we
continue to cooperate with Japan on this matter. As regards whether this
came up in our discussions with North Korea, we do not wish to comment on
this kind of detail of our diplomatic exchange.
QUESTION: Jamie, when you say that further launches would complicate --
MR. RUBIN: Serious negative implications for US-North Korean relations.
QUESTION: Does that include attempts to launch communication satellites
or other types of satellites?
MR. RUBIN: Well, what we're talking about is long-range missiles, and we
define that our way. A long-range missile is a long-range missile, but I
will try to get a technical answer for you.
QUESTION: But when you say that's serious implications for North Korea,
does that mean you're going to cancel the potato program?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we have developed an ongoing process with North Korea,
a step-by-step program including the agreed framework and all that goes
with it that has very serious programs. We have this food aid; we have a
lot of other programs. We have always made our policy on food aid based on
humanitarian concerns. I don't want to be more specific on what a serious
negative implication would be, other than to say that it would have serious
negative implications.
QUESTION: I understand you didn't reach agreement in these talks, but can
you tell us whether you saw any progress? And can you in some way describe
the response of the North Koreans to these points that you put to
them?
MR. RUBIN: Well, from our perspective, we achieved the objective of
pressing our concern about the North Koreans' indigenous missile activities
and missile exports and of calling for tight constraints on these
activities. We've only had four meetings to discuss this important and
complex issue. We don't think it's surprising that we have not yet reached
agreement. They did agree to hold another round of talks as soon as
possible, so we're able to continue the process.
It would not be appropriate for me to get into the details of the talks;
however, we made our concerns very clear. We have made clear our concerns
with both missile exports and with indigenous development and deployment
activities. Both elements must be addressed. We've also made clear to the
North Koreans the US is not prepared to "compensate" North Korea for
stopping destabilizing missile sales it should not be making in the first
place.
QUESTION: Can you give us any readout on the meeting with the President-
elect of Nigeria today?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, the President, I think, will be meeting shortly or is
now meeting with the Nigerian President, so I don't want to give you too
much information about that pending that meeting; except to say that
Secretary Albright did discuss bilateral issues, including regional
security and the challenges Nigeria faces as it moves to inaugurate its
first democratic government in over 15 years.
Nigeria is Africa's most populous country. A successful transition to
civilian democratic rule there will impact not only Nigeria but the whole
region. We hope to work with Nigeria to ensure its successful transition
to the economic, political and social leader it can and should be in
Africa.
The discussions will be wide-ranging, focusing on how we can best work
together with the current government of Nigeria and the President-elect on
the challenges and opportunities Nigeria has at hand. These include
economic reform, reconstituting democratic institutions, improved
cooperation in counter narcotics efforts and Nigeria's role in regional
peacekeeping.
QUESTION: Did you say the Secretary will be going to his inauguration?
MR. RUBIN: I have no detail on that plan or non-plan.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 3:45 P.M.)
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