U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #33, 99-03-17
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1141
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Wednesday, March 17, 1999
Briefer: James B. Foley
STATEMENTS
1 US Condemns Belgrade's Latest Attack on Independent Media
SERBIA (Kosovo)
1,2,7,8 KVM, Peace Accord, Paris Negotiations
1,3,6 Racak Investigation, Forensic Report
1 ICTY and the Hague
3 Noncompliance of October Agreement
3 Implementation of Political Agreement
3 Serb Military Buildup
4 Rubin's Travel to Paris
5,7 KLA Self-Rule Plan
9 Embassy Withdrawal of Personnel from Belgrade,
9 Serbian Economy
5,7,8,9,13 NATO-Led Peace Implementation Force
MEPP
10 Dennis Ross' meeting with Chairman Arafat in Madrid
10 Arafat Visit to US
11 Unilateral Declaration of Palestinian Statehood
11 Ambassador Indyk's Travel
BRAZIL
12 Secretary Albright's Meeting with Brazilian Foreign
Minister Lampreia
SLOVENIA
13 Meeting with Slovenian Foreign Minister Frlec, NATO
Membership, US-Slovenian Relations
13 Peace in the Balkans
CHINA
14 Promotion of US National Interests, Human Right's Practices
15 National Security Issues, Non-Proliferation, US Commercial
Interests, WTO Agreement,
15 Espionage Issue, Theater Missile Defense
DPRK
15 Missile Negotiations
16,17 Cost of Pilot-Agricultural Program (Potato), World Food
Program,
17,18 Four-Party-Talks in Geneva
IRAQ
18,19 Cooperation with Sanctions Committee, Pilgrims Travel to
Haj
19 Proposal to Expand Oil-for-Food Program
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #33
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 1999, 1:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. FOLEY: I'll be posting a statement on Belgrade's latest attack on
independent media. Let me just read briefly from it, and you can get the
rest in the Press Office.
The United States strongly condemns Belgrade's recent actions against
independent media in Serbia. Serbian authorities brought court proceedings
and heavy fines against multiple independent media publications over the
weekend. Two Albanian language Kosovo newspapers were fined on March 13.
Meanwhile in Belgrade, authorities brought charges against three independent
papers. Verdicts were handed down, also on March 13, inflicting fines on
Danas, Glas Javnosti and Blic.
The United States Government calls on the authorities in Belgrade to end
their attacks on the independent media. It is essential for Belgrade to
respect the principles of a free and open press if it hopes to climb out of
its self-imposed cycle of violence and repression.
QUESTION: Does the State Department have any observations on the forensic
report and on Mr. Walker?
MR. FOLEY: Yes, I do. We received a four-page summary of the Finnish
forensic team's report on the Racak killings. We've not yet seen the full
text or the full autopsy reports on the 40 bodies that the team had access
to; but again, we have seen the summary. The report concludes that the
victims were unarmed civilians, including several elderly men and a woman
and that they died at approximately at the same time.
The 22 bodies discovered in a gully were most likely shot exactly where
they were found. No ammunition or traces of ammunition were found on the
victims and conclusive lab tests showed no trace of gunshot residue; that
is, none of the victims had fired weapons. The clothing of the victims,
which did not appear to have been altered or tampered with, showed no
identifying badges or insignia of any military unit.
The summary itself makes clear that the Finnish team's medical autopsy
reports are not equivalent to a full-scale criminal investigation, and that
the facts can only be derived from such a full criminal investigation.
Therefore, we call once again upon the Belgrade authorities to comply with
UN Security Council resolutions and allow the International Tribunal -- the
ICTY in The Hague -- to conduct a full and impartial investigation of this
and other possible crimes against humanity in Kosovo.
Now, you asked about Ambassador Walker. We believe the findings of this
report support Ambassador Walker's on the ground conclusion on the day of
the massacre, which was also the conclusion of the UN Security Council,
namely that a massacre was committed at Racak. Bear in mind that Ambassador
Walker and other members of the OSCE KVM - Kosovo Verification Mission -
arrived in Racak, as I said, on the morning the bodies were discovered. We
fully support Ambassador Walker and the brave verifiers of the KVM who make
up the OSCE mission. They're working in very difficult and challenging
circumstances.
QUESTION: Also on that part of the world, there are reports the Serbs
appear to be preparing for war rather than preparing to sign any documents,
with the build-up of as many as 30,000 troops plus armored vehicles.
MR. FOLEY: Well, it doesn't appear that they're preparing for peace or
preparing to sign peace accords in Paris, certainly. In terms of what their
actual intentions are, that's difficult to read. But in terms of what
they're doing with their forces, that is deeply troublesome.
Based on preliminary field reports today, the KVM believes that the Serbian
military continued moving reinforcements into Kosovo overnight. Just
outside of Kosovo, Serbs have positioned some 18,000 to 21,000 troops.
Significant troop movements are reported along the Albanian border and the
road to the Macedonian border and near Pristina.
The KVM observed two VJ convoys in Gnjilane, which included 80 armed
civilians. Yesterday, KVM observed a train transporting into Kosovo a large
FRY armored element, including seven T-72 type tanks. They also reported
that additional tanks are positioned near Podujevo, indicating that two
armored brigades have now deployed in the province.
Reporting from other sources provides disturbing evidence of a large-scale
mobilization and force build-up taking place within the FRY. I believe Mr.
Bacon spoke to that at the Pentagon yesterday. The United States is deeply
concerned by these deployments of additional FRY forces into and around
Kosovo. This is a clear case of non-compliance with the October agreement
signed by the FRY. It also certainly flies in the face of the Rambouillet
process, currently continuing in Paris. Indeed, we see two parallel
movements - one on the ground, one in Paris - that point only in the
direction of continuing Serb refusal to deal with the underlying problems
and to insist on a continued militarization of the conflict.
QUESTION: The Paris conference - this may be a moot point eventually, but
for the moment it's not. If the Serbs will not sign, will the Kosovars go
ahead and will the Kosovars be asked to sign anyway?
MR. FOLEY: Well, you may be the only one in the room -- I don't know if
there were others -- who have not watched their TV screens in the last half
an hour. While I was preparing for the briefing, I had my eye on the TV
screen because the three negotiators in Paris gave a press conference in
the last hour. I believe it was Ambassador Petritsch himself stated very
clearly that the Kosovars will be invited to sign the accord at the
close of this round of talks in Paris.
QUESTION: Jim, if I could ask, you said two brigades have come over from
Serbia across the border into Kosovo; is that correct?
MR. FOLEY: Yes.
QUESTION: That's of course in violation of the agreement that Mr.
Holbrooke made.
MR. FOLEY: Yes, it is.
QUESTION: I want to ask, is it all but over at Rambouillet?
MR. FOLEY: Well, again, I'd refer you to the voluminous interviews or the
lengthy press conference that just took place I was watching, as many of
you were. I just saw Ambassador Hill say that we've not seen really any
willingness on the Serb side to engage. They are clearly nearing the end of
the Paris talks. Certainly the intention has always been that the talks in
Paris would not last more than a few days. If the Serbs continue to
refuse to discuss the agreements seriously, we do not expect the talks to
continue much longer.
QUESTION: Jim, I'm just wondering, the Racak investigation is now out. I
suppose you saw the TV footage of Serbs -- basically Serbian troops,
burning houses, stealing televisions, waving to the cameras, showing
absolutely no respect towards threats NATO keeps making. You said
repeatedly they're violating the October accord. What is - troops --
there's plenty of targets there outside Kosovo; there's plenty of targets
inside Kosovo - heavy targets, tanks, artillery pieces - all, as you say,
in violation of the October agreement. What's preventing NATO from acting
to back up its threat or to enforce the agreement?
MR. FOLEY: Well, let me point out, first of all, that during the
negotiations in Paris, today, Ambassador Hill, in addition to discussing
with the other negotiators the political agreement and the implementation --
especially with the Serbs -- also took the opportunity to express the
United States' deep concern over the Serb military build-up in and around
Kosovo. He reminded the Serbs of the consequences of non-compliance with
the October agreement.
These consequences are spelled out in the NATO decisions of January 30. The
Activation Order that was decided on January 30 remains in effect. There
are two triggers, as you know, for NATO military action. One is having to
do with the negotiations themselves in the event that the Kosovars say yes,
which they now have, and the Serbs say no, which they continue to say. The
other trigger is a large-scale violation of the commitments that Milosevic
gave to Generals Nauman and Clark in October. On both scores, we are
seeing increasing evidence that the Serbs are meeting the criteria for
triggering a NATO response.
The negotiations continue. As I indicated, they will not last much longer,
but our focus at the moment remains on squeezing out every chance of
achieving success at the negotiating talks. But certainly, the consequences
of a Serb "no" at the conclusion of these talks and the continued
mobilization and violations of the October agreement on the ground do not
bode well. President Milosevic needs to be aware that the consequences will
be very serious if these two factors continue much longer.
QUESTION: Do you think in any sense American credibility is on the line,
having, as you say, in both instances said if the Serbs do what indeed
they're doing, they face NATO attack; or is it too early, on the theory
that maybe there will be an incredible about-face? Is that what you're
holding out for - some 11th hour change of heart?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I think your formulation, a little provocative, is
probably accurate because it would be a dramatic about-face because they've
not shown any signs of serious engagement. What they're doing on the ground
shows a spirit to the contrary.
I would say that NATO's credibility, of course, has been tested many times
in its near-50 year existence, and we don't need to measure NATO's success
on the basis of any one issue. But certainly NATO has made clear its
determination to act in the event of either of these two circumstances
continuing. Secretary General Solana actually has been authorized by the
North Atlantic Council to engage in military action if this continues. So I
don't challenge the premise of your question.
QUESTION: Has any decision been made about whether the Secretary would go
to Brussels were the talks to end, were Milosevic not to --
MR. FOLEY: Betsy, that's a number of hypotheticals down the road. I'm
certainly not aware of any such plans.
QUESTION: Could I just ask a footnote question - what the spokesman, Mr.
Rubin, is doing unannounced in Paris?
MR. FOLEY: Sure. Well, as you know, Mr. Rubin actually wears two hats
here in the State Department. One is as Department Spokesman; but he's also
one of the key policy advisors to Secretary Albright. In that capacity, she
asked him to go to Paris. Actually, my understanding is that it came up
several weeks ago when she was in Rambouillet. Mr. Rubin had developed a
rapport with Mr. Thaci, so she asked him to go there and meet with him and
to convey on her behalf an invitation to members of the Kosovar Albanian
delegation to travel to Washington, which we expect to happen at the close
of this round of talks in Paris.
QUESTION: Let me get this out. Two days ago Mr. Cohen, Secretary of
Defense, said we are pursuing diplomacy at this point but NATO has not
decided to try to intervene in the non-permissive environment at this
point. I would ask, what will that involve? If it comes to that, where will
that have to go and who will have to approve it? Is it just Javier Solana
or is it the NAC or can you tell me?
MR. FOLEY: To approve what?
QUESTION: To approve a non-permissive environment, which apparently the
Serbs are anticipating will happen, by the movements of their troops.
MR. FOLEY: I don't understand - to approve a non-permissive environment.
QUESTION: For NATO to approve a non-permissive environment, what will
have to happen?
MR. FOLEY: I don't see a question there.
QUESTION: A non-permissive deployment is what I mean.
MR. FOLEY: Oh, deployment. Well, no, we've ruled out a non-permissive
deployment.
QUESTION: Fully? I mean, if something happens that the Serbs do not
perform at Rambouillet, do not cooperate then --
MR. FOLEY: Well, I think as far as the United States is concerned, the
President has made clear that he has no intention to deploy American ground
forces to Kosovo in a non-permissive environment. We would participate, he
has indicated, in a NATO-led peace implementation force in the event of a
signed agreement by both sides.
QUESTION: Let's go back. The spokesman, Mr. Rubin, went to convey this
invitation on behalf of Secretary Albright.
MR. FOLEY: Yes, and to meet with Mr. Thaci.
QUESTION: Does this just - do you have any details on it? Is it just Mr.
Thaci?
MR. FOLEY: No, it would be more than him. I don't have the list of who
would be coming, but I think it would be a representative group of Kosovar
Albanians.
QUESTION: Okay, and they would be --
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. FOLEY: I didn't give a day; I don't think we have a day yet. After
the talks are finished.
QUESTION: What is the purpose of that?
MR. FOLEY: Well, as envisaged in the accords, the KLA will be transformed
into a politically oriented organization. They have sought discussions and
assistance from us in this regard, with an eye toward their future role
under a peace accord in Kosovo.
QUESTION: There must be something afoot. I mean, beyond that do you plan
any - I don't know what it's called - any sort of an arrangement like you
have with another non-state, the Palestinian Authority? Some sort of a
working relationship to bolster them, to show backing for them in their
political pursuits?
MR. FOLEY: Sure, we want to develop a good relationship with them as they
transform themselves into a politically-oriented organization under a
Kosovo living in peace under the terms of the interim accord. We want to
develop closer and better ties with that organization.
QUESTION: It might take some formal structural --
MR. FOLEY: I think that's getting ahead of the day. For example, we don't
have a peace accord yet. We want to, even in the meantime, continue to
build on the good relations we're developing with them.
QUESTION: You don't have a peace in the Middle East yet either, but
you've done that with the PLO. I just wondered if you were going to do it
with the Albanians. There's a certain parallel there. They're emerging and
you support their political destiny, as the President has spoken of the
destiny of people seeking whatever --
MR. FOLEY: We support peace and stability --
QUESTION: You also support their self-rule aspirations. You support
everything --
MR. FOLEY: Yes, we support enhanced autonomy for them to run their own
lives free of Serb repression.
QUESTION: That sounds parallel to what's in the Middle East, doesn't
it?
QUESTION: Can we go back to the release of the forensic report? Is there
some concern on the part of the US that the timing of the release of this
report, coming during the second round of talks as the Serbs are refusing
to engage so far, is going to keep them or discourage them from engaging
even more - the release of this pretty incriminating report?
MR. FOLEY: I think if there were any word that the report were not being
released for tactical advantage, that the talks would give occasion to a
very serious question on the part of some of your colleagues. I don't think
that we can criticize the fact that the forensics experts have finished
their work. I have no information on the timing of the release of their
report, but I would not want to make any connection with the talks going
on.
QUESTION: Let me just follow up. Is there concern, though, on the part of
the US that this is going to make it even more difficult to get the Serbs
to engage?
MR. FOLEY: I really don't think so. The Serbs have not engaged. It's not
as if they were poised or something to engage. In any event, it's a matter
that we believe needs to be further investigated under a criminal
investigation.
QUESTION: I don't know whether you can answer this, but aren't you all at
all concerned about this embrace of the Kosovar Albanians? I mean, there's
all sorts of allegations about their ties to illegal arms trade, the
narcotics trade. I mean, they sort of went from militant group to self-rule
and visit to the White House without ever going to the fighting stage.
Isn't there a political liability for the Clinton Administration?
MR. FOLEY: Are you suggesting they go through more fighting? I don't
quite understand your question.
QUESTION: No, it was just a miraculous transformation. It took Yasser
Arafat three decades.
MR. FOLEY: First of all, Sid, our aim is to bring peace to Kosovo, to end
this conflict before it continues and possibly spreads and certainly, in
the meantime, causes much more mayhem and humanitarian dislocation. Part of
the accords that the Contact Group has proposed envisages the transformation
of the KLA into a political actor. We believe that we have a lot of advice
and a lot of help that we can provide to them as they become precisely
the kind of political actor we would like to see them become under the
three-year interim period that will be implemented by a NATO-led force.
The security environment will be assured by the NATO led force. The KLA
will not need to and will not be permitted to continue as a military force,
but they will have an opportunity - the entire people of Kosovo - to
realize their political aspirations for self-government and a better life
under a completely different context. If we can help them and they want us
to help them in that effort of transformation, I think it's nothing that
anybody can argue with.
QUESTION: By chance you folks aren't considering imposing the self-rule
plan all by yourselves without Serb consent, are you? It sounds like you're
getting close to it. Frankly, I didn't think that would be germane until
the description of the Kosovar -
MR. FOLEY: To impose what, Barry?
QUESTION: The plan. You have a plan, a six-nation plan; the Albanians say
yes, the Serbs say no. You've already asserted the right, under international
law, to bomb the Serbs for refusing to agree to something on their own
territory. So it isn't a big step, I suppose, to also impose the plan.
MR. FOLEY: No, it is a big step.
QUESTION: Well, is that what you're thinking about?
MR. FOLEY: I've made very clear, in response to Bill's question today and
on previous occasions, that there is no such plan on the part of the United
States to seek to impose a peace settlement, at least not certainly using
US ground forces. We aim to persuade the parties to agree to the Contact
Group plan and to invite a NATO-led peace implementation force under a
permissive environment. I've not seen any talk anywhere and our discussion
about the transformation of the KLA has nothing to do with any such notion
or idea.
QUESTION: What happens if the Serbs never - even if they are hit with air
strikes by NATO and still refuse to do it, does it keep going on? I mean,
we get into an Iraq situation or -
MR. FOLEY: You're asking a profoundly hypothetical question; and profound
or not, I'm not willing to walk down that path. I will say this, though,
I've seen --
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. FOLEY: I don't want to speculate on what might happen. NATO has made
its decision. If we continue to have Serb intransigence, NATO's decision
becomes extremely relevant. What may happen in the event of military action,
I'm not in a position to predict; but neither is President Milosevic in a
position to predict. What I will say is the one thing that people can count
on, what President Milosevic can count on, is what happens if the Serbs do
reverse course and accept the Contact Group proposals.
We will have peace in Kosovo. We will have a NATO force providing security
not only for the Kosovar Albanians, but for the Serb minority. We will have
a Kosovo that is enjoying self-government but remains within the FRY. I
think President Milosevic and other people in Belgrade ought to understand
that this is an agreement that they can count on, in which the future can
be chartered and anticipated. Whereas, if we go another path the consequences
are very unpredictable and very risky from his point of view, I should
think.
QUESTION: Just a couple of familiar bases. Your description, which is
essentially the progression of a concept that time is running out and the
Serbs better watch out, do the allies share - totally -- and the Russians --
share the various analyses you've given us of the situation? Has the
Secretary made those familiar telephone calls?
MR. FOLEY: Well, the Secretary has spoken with Foreign Minister Vedrine
this morning. I don't have a read-out on that conversation. She may be
speaking with other colleagues at another point in the day. But in terms of
the NATO allies, I've seen no evidence that there's dissent with the
decision that the NATO allies made on January 30. The Russians are a
different issue, of course.
QUESTION: No, I'm into the decision, I'm sorry. I mean, the appraisal of
how the Serbs are moving, violating the cease-fire, et cetera.
MR. FOLEY: I think the EU negotiator talked about -- an hour ago -- a
clear violation of the October agreement, he noted, apart from what's going
on in the peace talks.
QUESTION: Doesn't Serbia win if there's a non-compliance or there's no
treaty? If there's a bombing penalty that comes from NATO; if NATO has to
pull out its verifiers before the bombing, and the United States will not
force its way in militarily -- and nobody else in NATO is going to go with
out us -- doesn't Serbia win? Don't they have the whole darn Kosovo again
the way they had it?
MR. FOLEY: In terms of one of your points -- our personnel on the ground -
let me just say that planning for the withdrawal of embassy personnel, if
need be, is well underway. Withdrawal will occur if the situation warrants
it.
In terms of your larger question, though, about whether Mr. Milosevic wins
if this thing is not settled in Paris at the negotiating table, I think
it's inconceivable to me that he can win under any definition. I tried to
describe a different scenario where he and his people of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia can count on peace in Kosovo; can count on Kosovo
remaining within the FRY during the three-year interim period; can count on
the protection of the Serb minority in Kosovo; can count on an end of this
incredible drain of Serb resources.
Our understanding is that the Serb economy is in very, very pathetic shape
right now and that their financial wherewithal is dwindling. This is not
something they can sustain and sustain. I think it's well-known that
President Milosevic is regarded as a tactician and not a strategist, and
maybe looks to the next day and not the day after. But the day after does
not bode well for him and his country if this is not settled rapidly at the
negotiating table.
QUESTION: Do you all have any refugee camp people who have been displaced
by the current --
MR. FOLEY: I'll have to get that for you; I don't have the latest
figures.
QUESTION: I know (inaudible) time and patience is running out and I know
you never want to do a deadline, but I think Wolfgang Petritsch earlier
today was saying we now have hours. I mean, is tomorrow the --
MR. FOLEY: I didn't see that. What he said --
QUESTION: He said it's hours in an interview with CNN I.
MR. FOLEY: I understand the talks were nearing their end is how he put
it. I was watching him. If he said hours in another context, I didn't see
that. But clearly, I was very clear myself that we don't expect the talks
to continue much longer unless the Serbs reverse course.
QUESTION: Is tomorrow the last day?
MR. FOLEY: I don't have that information.
QUESTION: Can you go over what you said about planning for withdrawal of
embassy personnel is well underway?
MR. FOLEY: I have nothing more specific; just that we're continuing to
look at and refine our plans as needed.
QUESTION: Just your embassy, or does that include verifiers and
others?
MR. FOLEY: You'd have to ask the OSCE about that.
QUESTION: And are these the same plans that were made for the last
time?
MR. FOLEY: Essentially, yes.
QUESTION: Let me just clarify, Solana is correct, I believe, this week,
isn't he, when he says the monitors are brought out by an extraction force
now in Macedonia?
MR. FOLEY: That depends on the circumstance. They can be withdrawn by the
OSCE in an environment that permits that.
QUESTION: I mean if the situation is difficult.
MR. FOLEY: The NATO force in Macedonia is an extraction force in
extremis.
QUESTION: Can I switch to a subject? What is Dennis Ross doing in
Madrid?
MR. FOLEY: I don't know if he's still there. He was yesterday. He may be.
He's returning today, let me correct the record. He traveled to Madrid
yesterday to consult with Chairman Arafat on the peace process and on the
Chairman's upcoming visit to Washington. He, as I said, is returning to
Washington today. It was decided that a meeting prior to Chairman Arafat's
visit to Washington would be useful, and this meeting was arranged for that
reason.
QUESTION: Are they talking about what's on the table? There are no new
ideas, no new initiatives coming from the American side?
MR. FOLEY: No, I'm not aware of any initiatives. Often when a visiting
foreigner is going to meet with the President or an important meeting with
senior American officials, you try to sit down and discuss what's going to
be discussed and prepare such a meeting. That's what Ambassador Ross was
doing.
QUESTION: And did he relay the sense of the American Government that it
would not be a good idea to unilaterally declare statehood on May
4?
MR. FOLEY: Certainly he is. I read in the newspapers this morning that
someone on Capitol Hill called the Administration position on this
ambiguous; because the House, of course had a vote yesterday on this
subject. There's never been any ambiguity about the American opposition to
unilateral actions, including a unilateral Palestinian declaration of
statehood.
QUESTION: But the Administration has also said it's only understandable
that people express their aspirations.
MR. FOLEY: That's a different matter.
QUESTION: Well, perhaps that's what they think is a little ambiguous.
MR. FOLEY: No, we believe - we can't tell people to stop thinking what
they think or wanting what they want.
QUESTION: But in any event - speaking of what they'd like to have.
MR. FOLEY: What has to be done is that the question of statehood or the
political future of the Palestinian Authority is something to be decided at
the negotiating table.
QUESTION: All I'm saying is if you see a distinction between somebody
saying I'm going to establish a state come what may in May and someone
saying we're determined to have a state, and you think there's a world of
difference between the two.
MR. FOLEY: That's not ambiguous.
QUESTION: Okay. Let me ask you about what parallel consultations you may
be doing with Israel. First, your two key players have been abroad - both
unannounced, by the way. Indyk went to Syria and Jordan, which sort of is
in the neighborhood where Israel lives. Ross went to talk to Arafat. Isn't
somebody missing from this picture - some country missing from this
consultation picture?
MR. FOLEY: Which country?
QUESTION: I think Israel, no?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we remain in close contact with the Israeli Government.
QUESTION: Oh, I know, I know; and with Australia, too.
(Laughter.)
Because you've had your people out on the road, don't they have time to
talk to the Israelis on their own turf?
MR. FOLEY: Happy St. Patrick's Day to you, too, Barry.
QUESTION: No, no, no, I'll be at the embassy and I'll join you tonight
and we'll raise a cup of (inaudible) I guess.
(Laughter.)
But the question is, why are you icing Israel until after the election?
MR. FOLEY: No, I don't accept the premise of that.
QUESTION: It's a very simple question.
MR. FOLEY: I don't have the exact information on Ambassador Indyk's
schedule or itinerary, but I think we made clear when he was out in the
region that he would be meeting with Israelis on a subsequent occasion. I
can check to see if we have anything more on that.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - no date for that yet.
QUESTION: Might you be staying away from Israel because of the elections?
You don't want to be seen - -
MR. FOLEY: Well, I don't accept the premise of the question. Let me check
to see what the schedule is of our senior officials and negotiators.
QUESTION: Do you have a read-out on the Secretary's meeting today with
the Brazilian Foreign Minister?
MR. FOLEY: I have limited information and I will be eager to provide that
to you, but it is limited.
As you are aware, the United States enjoys excellent bilateral relations
with Brazil. The Secretary meets with Foreign Minister Lampreia frequently
to exchange views on a wide range of topics. Today they discussed a number
of important issues before the UN Security Council, including Kosovo, Iraq
and Cuba. They also exchanged views on the improving financial situation in
Brazil, and the Secretary reiterated US support for Brazilian efforts to
manage the crisis.
In addition, they reviewed a wide range of bilateral issues. As in past
meetings, the discussions were cordial and productive, led to a fuller
understanding of areas of mutual concern. As you know, Brazil is currently
on the UN Security Council and so we had a lot of business to discuss in
that regard.
QUESTION: Not to be contentious, but the Secretary - there's been a lot
of her events on the schedule the last few weeks and none of them have been
open to anything but cameras. No reporters have been allowed there to ask
questions. Is that a new policy she's setting, no more reporters speak at
photo -
MR. FOLEY: Not at all.
QUESTION: Perhaps we could -
MR. FOLEY: Well, we tried to ensure that - I don't know what my boss,
Jamie Rubin's, exact definition is, but the Secretary be available to take
questions on a fairly regular basis. She traveled to Independence on Friday
and met with the traveling journalists during that visit. But in terms of
anything scheduled this week, I'm not aware. It is something that we do
keep in mind.
QUESTION: Well, NATO was a piece of cake, I mean, the expansion of NATO -
all the controversy has been squeezed out of that long ago.
MR. FOLEY: There were no ground rules when she met with the media.
QUESTION: I understand. But Kosovo is sort of pregnant with expectations
now.
MR. FOLEY: She talked about the Kosovo issues.
QUESTION: We could wait till the Sunday talk shows, but is it possible
that she might actually talk to print reporters this week about Kosovo?
MR. FOLEY: Which print reporters, Barry?
QUESTION: The people that cover the State Department, present and
unpresent.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. FOLEY: I'll take it up with my boss, certainly.
QUESTION: There was also a meeting today with officials from Slovenia,
and some officials close to that delegation say that the Secretary told
them Slovenia would be the next country invited to join NATO. Do you have
any response to that?
MR. FOLEY: I would be surprised if Slovenian officials were saying that.
We expect the open door to be reaffirmed in Washington during the summit at
the end of April. The Secretary stressed that to the Slovenian Foreign
Minister. She discussed the excellent state of US-Slovenian relations, not
only the US commitment to the open door but our support for Slovenia's
NATO aspirations and our partnership with Slovenia's efforts to strengthen
regional stability and cooperation in Southeastern Europe and to bring
peace to the Balkans. I was at that meeting and, yes, they did discuss the
NATO summit. They did discuss the open door. Quite a bit of the discussion
focused on the situation in Kosovo -- the fact that Slovenia, while of
course it has a European vocation and aspirations to join Euro-Atlantic
institutions, also can bring a lot of positive influence to bear in the
Southeastern Europe region. They had a very fruitful discussion on Kosovo
as well.
QUESTION: But did the minister say that they would come to the summit?
There are 25 non-members invited, not all expected -- because that would
register interest.
MR. FOLEY: I don't believe that came up. I was there, and I don't recall
it coming up.
QUESTION: That description you just read out sounds remarkably similar to
the one that was released yesterday in this joint-statement with the
Lithuanian. Did US have a preference over between Slovenia and Lithuania in
terms of the next member of NATO?
MR. FOLEY: I think these issues will be addressed at the summit. I think
that's what the summit is going to do is concentrate on defining a
mechanism for helping prepare aspiring members to ready themselves for
membership. A membership action plan is envisaged, but I don't want to get
too far ahead of the summit news at this point.
QUESTION: Moving to China, it seems every day Republicans and even some
Democrats are attacking the Administration over these espionage issues. Now
there's some concern that politics is creeping into the debate. I just
wonder, in this building is there concern that this whole issue over China
is getting too politicized right now?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I don't have a formal statement for you on the issue,
but the phenomenon of China becoming a political football in American
politics is not new by any means. It goes back to the late 1940s and crops
up from time to time. I think that as far as policy-makers are concerned,
especially in this building -- Secretary Albright - I think we have to have
our eye on the ball, which is promoting US national interests in our
relationship with China, which is a country of great significance with
which we have difficulties, disagreements and also important issues
that we need to work on together.
So I don't think we're going to be deterred from pursuing the national
interest in our relationship with China.
QUESTION: But the whole politicization that's going on right now, how is
that going to make it more difficult for you?
MR. FOLEY: Well, let me stress that Secretary Albright, as Jamie Rubin
has told you, when she was in Beijing she made clear to the Chinese
leadership the deep concern over the reverses of China's human rights
practices over the last half-year have caused anguish across the board in
the United States; it's not a partisan issue. It's not a Congress versus
the Administration issue. There is a genuine consensus that China has moved
in the wrong direction on human rights.
In terms of the other issues we deal with - national security issues -
whether it's Korea, South Asia, non-proliferation, we continue to work with
the Chinese because it's in our interest to do so. We can find common
ground with China on some of these issues. It's important for world peace
that we do so.
We also have important commercial interests in China. Jamie Rubin spoke
about that yesterday - that we believe that the WTO agreement, if it can be
negotiated such that the US exporters enjoy real access to the Chinese
market, will help the American economy and American workers and businesses.
So there are a lot of areas where we need to work with China on. But that
does not in any way mean that we are not keenly aware of problems in the
relationship, aware of such matters as the espionage issue that you're very
familiar with that we need to be very vigilant about, and aware of the gulf
that separates us on human rights.
QUESTION: The New York Times had a very long piece Monday about China and
the issues and others. They quoted Chinese officials saying they would have
to respond to this missile defense program of the Administration's by
developing better and more effective long-range missiles, which, of course,
is why the ABM Treaty was passed in the first place - not to set off an
arms race. Is there any effort on the US' part to persuade them not to take
that kind of approach; that the missile defense is not really related
to China, it's related to imagined or rogue regimes?
MR. FOLEY: I don't think you were on the trip of Secretary Albright to
China recently, and I think Jamie Rubin has spoken about that trip from
this podium following their return. As I understand it, not having been on
the trip myself, Secretary Albright spoke very clearly to the Chinese, who
raised concerns about the prospect of theater missile defense. She
explained that this is a system that's not been technologically established
yet; that we're working on it; that we haven't made a decision in that area,
but that we and our allies have legitimate security concerns about the kind
of proliferation that's occurring, especially on the part of states that
really do not play by the rules internationally; and that we have an
obligation to pursue that technology and to pursue the security of
ourselves and our allies.
She also pointed out to them, though, that in this environment what North
Korea does can have an accelerating impact on our thinking and planning in
that regard and that the state of relations, including the security
dimensions to the relations across the Straits are also an important
factor.
QUESTION: To follow, what's the state of play with regard to the missile
negotiations with the DPRK?
MR. FOLEY: Well, Mr. Rubin announced yesterday that those negotiations
would resume, I believe, on March 29 in Pyongyang. That's the state.
QUESTION: And is there a possibility of getting Mr. Kartman to come visit
with us in the near future?
MR. FOLEY: I would have to check to see if we're going to make a senior
official available to brief in the coming weeks before that. I wouldn't
rule it out.
QUESTION: Do you all have a handle on the real costs the pilot potato -
MR. FOLEY: I don't have the cost yet. I think what we're hoping to do is
maybe by next week
QUESTION: Small potatoes.
(Laughter.)
MR. FOLEY: Hey, this is St. Patrick's Day; let's be careful on potatoes.
They're important, that's what I'm trying to say.
QUESTION: The reason I ask is, there is a common theory out there today
that says that the cost of this program will far exceed the $300,000 that
North Korea had initially asked.
MR. FOLEY: You're talking about $300 million, I think.
QUESTION: I'm sorry, $300 million - had initially had asked for.
MR. FOLEY: Yes, I don't know what the cost of the potato -- of the pilot
agricultural program would be, and I think we hope to have someone expert
in the area be in a position to brief you on that, perhaps as early as next
week.
But you're right that the North Koreans did demand a large monetary payment
that we rejected. They also tried to link different forms of payment to
satisfying our concerns, our suspicions about the suspect site. We rejected
that. I think we've been very clear on that.
QUESTION: Do you have any idea how soon the US will complete the delivery
of the 500,000 tons pledged last year? I understand, most of it is gone,
but not all of it.
MR. FOLEY: Right, that's true.
QUESTION: Also, there seems to be a decision pending on a request for an
additional $200 million --
MR. FOLEY: $200, 000.
QUESTION: $200,000, I'm sorry, unfilled pledges. Any notion of the
timing? I know it's not linked, but any notion of when this might be
done?
MR. FOLEY: You're paying attention, Barry.
QUESTION: I've got the line down straight, yes.
MR. FOLEY: Again, as we've stated many times, our provision of food aid
is based on humanitarian concerns, and we've responded to appeals from the
World Food Program in the past. We expect to respond similarly to
anticipated appeals from the World Food Program in the future. You're right,
last year on two occasions we responded to World Food Program appeals. I
believe, in the early part of the year, we pledged 200,000 tons; and in
September, following the latest appeal, we pledged 300,000 metric tons
of food, the last of which will soon be delivered to the DPRK.
That last appeal by the World Food Program in September was for - I don't
have the exact amount -- but in any event, there are 200,000 metric tons
that are still unmet from that last appeal, and we're going to evaluate a
further response to that appeal and announce our decision as soon as it's
made. We would expect that the WFP, the World Food Program, will issue a
new appeal later this year, and we'll consider a response at that
time.
QUESTION: You say later?
MR. FOLEY: I don't have that.
QUESTION: No, I mean, I think they make their assessments in the
spring.
MR. FOLEY: It's almost springtime.
QUESTION: That's what I mean. I wondered how imminent the possibility of
doing something about starvation is.
MR. FOLEY: I don't have that. You might ask the WFP.
Barry, are you bringing us to an end?
QUESTION: No, no, no.
MR. FOLEY: Okay, I see your body language.
QUESTION: I'm going easy on you because it's St. Patrick's Day.
MR. FOLEY: Thank you, Barry; God bless you.
QUESTION: Are there any other plans for more North Korean meetings
between now and the next Four-Party Talks, besides the missile meeting in
Pyongyang?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I think in New York, the channel remains open. I have
nothing to announce, though, in terms of further meetings. I'm not aware.
The date for the Four-Party Talks - can someone help me? -- they're late
next month in Geneva. Missile talks March 29, he mentioned that as
well.
QUESTION: Jim, I just need to have something cleared up because some of
the wires are reporting that there was food distributed this year. Was
there no food at all distributed this year?
MR. FOLEY: No, the distinction is this -- apparently, there was an
erroneous report that the United States has already agreed this year, 1999,
to provide food aid through the World Food Program. I think it was a
garbled report based on Mr. Rubin's statement yesterday that we provided
half a million tons last year. But the shipments have continued into this
year - the shipments that came about from our responses to the World Food
Program request in September. As I indicated a minute ago, those final
shipments, I think, are about to be made to complete that commitment.
QUESTION: Last week, I believe, there was a human rights convention in
Geneva, I think.
MR. FOLEY: Right.
QUESTION: Will the United States get more detailed in their objections to
China's human rights abuses?
MR. FOLEY: Well, as Mr. Rubin's indicated, I believe as late as yesterday,
we've not made a decision yet in that regard in terms of how we're going to
handle that issue in Geneva.
QUESTION: The Iraqi pilgrims - there are 18,000 of them - blame the
United States for holding up their money in the sanctions through the Oil-
for-Food thing.
MR. FOLEY: Which money? I really don't know the issue.
QUESTION: Well, they need money to go to Mecca.
MR. FOLEY: Well, I'm not aware of that report. But the fact is, as Mr.
Rubin stated very, very clearly yesterday, that Iraq can cooperate, if it
chooses, with the sanctions committee in order to get the green light to
allow pilgrims to go to the Haj. We support that. They've chosen, at least
by air, to subvert their obligations under Security Council resolutions.
In terms of the issue involving pilgrims traveling by land, I'd have to
refer you to the UN. I'm just not aware of the issue, but I'm sure we're
not blocking what pilgrims need to undertake their pilgrimage.
QUESTION: Speaking of the green, would you take an Irish question?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I might be inclined to refer to the White House because
I understand that Mr. Steinberg has given an extensive briefing on the
visit of the Prime Minister. Secretary Albright met with the Prime Minister
yesterday. She's participating actively in a whole series of White House
meetings with the different leaders this afternoon, and she's having lunch
now with Speaker Hastert, who's hosting the Irish visitors.
QUESTION: But it is, of course, the 17th of March.
MR. FOLEY: Very good.
QUESTION: Let me just ask on Iraq. There was really a lot of criticism
from both Republicans and Democrats today of the proposal to expand the Oil-
for-Food program. How concerned is the State Department about criticism
coming from both sides? Will that opposition impact getting this proposal
underway at the UN?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I think if we're being criticized from both sides, we're
probably getting it about right. I think we made clear we want to make sure
that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people are met and that Saddam
Hussein is the one who has, in many cases, prevented assistance from going
to the Iraqi people and certainly has failed to cooperate adequately with
the UN and the Oil-for-Food program. We want to make sure, by increasing
the ceiling of Iraqi oil imports in the Oil-for-Food program, to ensure
that what the Iraqi people need in terms of food, medicine, humanitarian
supplies goes to them. We also want to ensure and we will ensure that it
goes to the people of Iraq, and it doesn't go to Saddam Hussein and his
government for his purposes.
So we can say to the Congress that we will ensure that Iraqi imports
continue to be monitored by the United Nations and that Iraqi exports will
be monitored similarly and that these moneys continue to be escrowed for
humanitarian purposes.
Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 2:00 P.M.)
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