U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #31, 99-03-15
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1215
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Monday, March 15, 1999
Briefer: James P. Rubin
SERBIA (KOSOVO)
Interim Agreement:
1-2,6-7,10-11 Kosovo Albanian Acceptance (Thaci Letter of Acceptance / No
Conditions / International Community Acceptance
1,4 Senator Dole's Role
2-3,6-7,11 Signing of Agreement (Secretary's Travel / Kosovar
Albanians to US)
1,4,6,10-11 Serbia's Next Steps
8 Implementation
8 Changes to Agreement
9-10 Expectations / Secretary's Efforts With Congress and in
Rambouillet
11 Timeline
NATO:
4-5,7,11-12 Implementation of Military Action / Use of Force Option /
Resolve to Act / Legal Precedence
9 Updates: Fighting / Bombings
11-12 Responsibility for Massacre of Kosovar Albanians
KOREA (NORTH)
12-13 Status of Talks re Suspected Underground Site / Weekend
Contact
ISRAEL
13 Use of Torture Addressed in Human Rights Rpt / Connection
to Wye Agreement
13-14 AmCit Anwar Mohammed Detained / Consular Visits /
Complaints of Mistreatment & Filing Protest
CHINA
15-17 Climate for Upcoming Visit of Premier / US Engagement in US
National Interests / No Changes in US Policies
16 US Position on Accession to WTO
17-18 Espionage Case / Chinese Denial / US Steps to Insure
Security at Sensitive Facilities
TURKEY
18 US Condemns Weekend Bombings / Counter-Terrorism
Cooperation With Allies
UK (NO. IRELAND)
18 Visitors to US
CUBA
18 Dissidents Sentenced
DEPARTMENT
19 Status of Amb Holbrooke's Nomination to USUN / Helms-Biden
Bill re US Arrears and US Dues
IRAQ
19 Scott Ritter's Allegations re CIA
HAITI
19-20 USAID Sponsorship of Program to Distribute Info on Family
Planning
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #31
MONDAY, MARCH 15, 1999, 1:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: On the first subject at hand, Secretary Albright spoke to
Hashim Thaci, chairman of the Kosovar-Albanian delegation in Paris
yesterday. He followed that up with a letter to Secretary Albright
announcing his readiness and the readiness of his delegation to sign the
peace accords for peace and self-government in Kosovo.
We consider this a welcome development and an important step forward in the
negotiating process, one that furthers prospect for peaceful resolution in
the Kosovo conflict.
Now it is up to the Serb side to accept the proposed interim agreement. If
they refuse to do so, the responsibility will clearly lie with Belgrade and
Belgrade alone. We have every reason to believe that this is a substantial
step forward by the Kosovar Albanian side in agreeing to the peace
accords.
Let me say, in that regard, that Secretary Albright, obviously, has worked
very hard on this but in particular, she asked me to publicly thank Senator
Dole for the extensive efforts that he has made in recent days and weeks,
both in his trip to the region, in his repeated conversations with members
of the Kosovar Albanian delegation, as well as his appearances on Albanian
language television, all of which have helped the Albanian delegation
consult with its public and with relevant constituencies; the result of
which is that they have made this important announcement today.
QUESTION: Secretary General Solana spoke this morning and in fact
announced that the Albanians were signing on. But he said they had
conditions. He said the primary one was the NATO deployment; but he spoke
pluraly of conditions. It stands to reason, of course, unless the Serbs
sign on and accept NATO deployment, you don't have an agreement. But are
there conditions? Is there something here that - no loophole here or
there?
MR. RUBIN: No loophole, no hidden conditions. They have been very clear
all along that they wanted to ensure that this agreement had a NATO-led
implementation force. For those of you who've had a chance to look at the
agreement, it clearly does. So they have had concerns that they sought to
highlight and emphasize and make clear as they've gone through the process.
But there are no hidden conditions, and we are not aware of any discussions,
privately, publicly on this side, that change the fact that they have made
a decision pursuant to what they told the Secretary in Rambouillet, which
is that they had agreed in principle; they wanted to consult. They've done
those consultations; they've met at various levels in Kosovo, the result of
which is they've made this important announcement today.
QUESTION: Can I ask you also, again just to clear up a little blurring
here, in the letter, as I think we were told, Thaci is talking about
signing this -- he would like to in Albright's presence at a time and place
of her choosing. I don't know how literal that was. Is she planning some
meeting? Is she planning to go to Europe to see these people, the Serbs or
the Albanians?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say that I think from the tone of the letter, it's
quite clear that the Kosovar Albanians are quite supportive and thankful to
the Secretary of State for the work that she did on their behalf in
Rambouillet, which has now paid off with this announcement. They are
obviously trying to make that point as clearly as they can in many
different ways - diplomatically, privately, publicly. This clearly is part
of that. The Secretary has no plans to go to Europe at this time.
QUESTION: Might they come here?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to rule anything out for the future. All I'm
saying is that to the extent that the question was will she be now going to
Paris to join in some signing, she has no such current plans.
QUESTION: Just to clear up some confusion first, the letter went to all
the foreign ministers.
MR. RUBIN: I don't know. I'm not their press spokesmen. I don't know what
other ministers received what letters or what letters were sent by the
Kosovar Albanian delegation. What I know is that the Secretary spoke to Mr.
Thaci yesterday. They had a lengthy conversation. He made clear that having
gone through this consultation, they had agreed to the accords and said
that he would be formalizing that in a letter which the Secretary
has a signed letter from Mr. Thaci dated today.
QUESTION: I just say that as a way of sort of clearing up the comment
about signing in your presence. At least out of Europe what they're saying
is that was to all the foreign ministers; so it wasn't something that
necessarily requires the Secretary --
MR. RUBIN: It is correct that he made a point in his telephone conversation
that he would welcome the opportunity to sign such an agreement in her
presence. I don't know whether they blessed, faxed it and changed the
headings for other foreign ministers or the Contact Group or what their
exact mechanical word processor system is. But I think it's pretty clear
that they made this decision at the urging of the United States - by
Secretary Albright's work, by the work of Senator Dole. Mr. Thaci made that
clear to her in the conversation yesterday. But as far as the logistics
of the paperwork, I just don't know.
QUESTION: To get to a real question, there's also some suggestion, at
least in Washington, you don't want them now to actually sign it because
that would take away any flexibility you might have on some of the small
points in the negotiations with the Serbs.
MR. RUBIN: Look, we'll make a decision in the coming days on whether it
needs to be technically signed or not. But in either case, one can make
changes, subject to the agreement of the Kosovar Albanians. If they've said
yes to the agreement and the Serbs have a few fixes that would lead to
their yes and are technical and minor and the Kosovar Albanians don't have
any problem with, terrific; then we have an agreement by both sides.
If they signed it and the same situation pertained, you could sign it
again. So it's really not that important. What was important was after a
long period of time, working very hard and pulling out all the stops, was
to have them make the decision, which they've now made.
QUESTION: Okay, but just to go back, the original - sort of the original
formulation or explanation the Secretary gave was, you get a yes from the
ethnic Albanians and a no from the Serbs, then NATO will act. How do you
sort of -
MR. RUBIN: Prepared to act.
QUESTION: How do you finesse that now?
MR. RUBIN: We can take yes for an answer. This is a yes.
QUESTION: Yes, but it's not a signing. I mean, if somebody wanted to nit-
pick, they can say -
MR. RUBIN: This is a yes. We don't have any reason to believe that there
are any nit-pickers in the alliance or in any of decision-making community.
QUESTION: I don't understand why it was so - I mean, signed documents
seem to be pretty important in the history of diplomacy, including the
documents -
MR. RUBIN: It may be signed tomorrow or the next day, I don't know. The
point is up till now, Mr. Thaci, as the chairman of the delegation, has let
his position be hung out there without any final decision. He was the one
at Rambouillet who insisted on going back to Kosovo and having consultations.
The others were pretty much ready to go.
So until his phone conversation with the Secretary, we had different
indices of what their position was. One was a report the KLA commanders
gave to Ambassador Hill about the KLA commanders general staff decision. I
reported that to you last week. Mr. Thaci had spoken to various members of
the Administration at lower levels than the Secretary last week, all with
the right sounding words but never these words. So now Mr. Thaci, the
leader of the delegation, the one who represents probably those most
skeptical about the agreement, has stated in clear, unequivocal, unambiguous
terms that they've agreed.
The question of whether one signs - remember, if there's a signing ceremony
at this stage, it's with one side. The Serbs haven't even engaged on key
elements of the document. So signing ceremonies that carry with it the
diplomatic weight that you're describing normally occur when both sides are
signing them, not when one side is signing them. This is somewhat of a
unique case because we have tried to bring to bear the use of military
power, if necessary, in order to compel the Serbs to sign the agreement or
to agree to the agreement.
So I grant you that there is some new precedence being set in the mixing of
force and diplomacy. But as far as the weight that comes with signing, that
is usually when both sides sign. I've not been to too many arms control
treaty signings where the US signed and the Russians didn't, or the Chinese
signed and the US didn't or anything like that.
QUESTION: One more, can I just finish this out? Dole last week had some
pretty strong words about his concerns that he was being jerked around by
the KLA and that they were playing games and manipulating the situation. I
just wondered - I mean, you seem pretty confident that they're now
serious.
MR. RUBIN: Yes, Senator Dole spoke to the Albanian delegation on the
telephone as a group a couple of hours ago, in the last hour or two. I
think he's quite pleased. I think this is what we were looking for. We
sought a yes and the international community has now taken yes for an
answer.
QUESTION: Can I ask you just quickly - you were speaking on another
subject to Carole just now. Did you literally mean the Serbs haven't even
engaged --
MR. RUBIN: Seriously on certain parts of the text.
QUESTION: You said "key."
MR. RUBIN: Key parts, which would be the implementation part, the
military implementation part.
QUESTION: You're still talking about the military part?
MR. RUBIN: Right. We could talk about the political part, maybe after the
briefing.
QUESTION: Jamie, you left me with the impression that a Serb refusal to
sign the document alone would be sufficient cause to start air strikes. Is
that what you mean to say?
MR. RUBIN: You're trying to put words in my mouth; I didn't use those
words. What I said to you was that we've been very clear on this; I think
the President was very clear on this. I'll be happy to get you a copy of
that transcript. I think NATO's January 30th decision was very clear on
this. I think everybody's very clear on this, that if the Serbs are
responsible for the failure to agree to this peace plan, that there are
serious consequences that flow from that; that NATO is prepared to act.
NATO Secretary General, who has the authority to make the decision, has
spoken to that quite clearly.
QUESTION: Well, this morning he spoke to it again and he gave the
impression, at this breakfast, that what would trigger the bombing would
not be a lack of signature but rather either an actual humanitarian
catastrophe or an imminent threat of a humanitarian catastrophe.
MR. RUBIN: Well, one of your colleagues is shaking his head. Perhaps you
all went to a different breakfast but --
QUESTION: No, we went to the same breakfast. He never cited the series -
that's still one other trigger.
MR. RUBIN: That's another trigger, yes.
QUESTION: You've got about three triggers now. I'm waiting for the bombs
to fly.
MR. RUBIN: Well, some of us don't want to see bombs fly; some of us want
to see an agreement struck and the process - that isn't our objective, to
see bombs fly.
QUESTION: I understand, but the cease-fire trigger threshold has been
crossed. And if the Albanians sign and the Serbs don't ,that --
MR. RUBIN: I'm glad you've made that judgment.
QUESTION: Wait a minute, what about if the Albanians sign and the Serbs
don't? No one's looking for bombs to fly, I'm sure.
MR. RUBIN: No, you just said you were.
QUESTION: I meant looking up, expecting to see bombs flying.
MR. RUBIN: I see.
QUESTION: But the notion was that if the Albanians signed then the Serbs
are going to be hit and hit hard.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: You're throwing things out there. Is there a question behind
all these opinions being expressed?
QUESTION: It was the original question: would you agree that despite what
Barry interjected, the Secretary General said this morning, which is that --
MR. RUBIN: Not despite. Look, I think I can answer your question.
QUESTION: Okay, let me finish the question and then you can answer it,
okay? The immediate cause for bombing would be either to respond to or to
avoid a humanitarian catastrophe. He did not mention signing as a specific
cause. Would you agree that is now --
MR. RUBIN: When I've read the transcript of the breakfast I'll be happy
to answer your question.
QUESTION: Well, I'm asking you, is that now the threshold - that it would
have to be a threatened humanitarian catastrophe?
MR. RUBIN: No, that's not the sole threshold, no. That's not what the
position of Secretary General Solana; it's not what your colleagues think
was said in the breakfast; it's not our understanding of his position. It's
your interpretation of what you heard. So let's all look at the transcript
again and then we'll make a decision as to what we think we heard.
QUESTION: What happens if the Serbs come out and do the same thing that
the Albanians have done - say they agree but they don't sign? Is that
enough to get them --
MR. RUBIN: That would be great. Then we could have the two parties that
would be agreeing meet in a room and we give them pens and then they would
sign. I suspect right now one of them would sign and the other would not
find their way to the room.
QUESTION: But before it was actually signed, is that enough to get the
Serbs off the hook from NATO?
MR. RUBIN: I think if we had a letter from President Milosevic or the
President of Serbia that says, we've now studied this agreement and all its
parts and we agree to it and we're prepared to sign it whenever you tell us
to, that would be a major and significant breakthrough that I don't think
we're expecting in the near future.
QUESTION: Jamie, last week you said the international community would be
in the best position to put pressure on Milosevic if the Albanians had
signed. So now we don't have a signature. Is there concern on the part of
the international community that the Serbs might say, well, you still don't
have a signature from the Albanians so we don't have to respond to this
pressure or threats yet?
MR. RUBIN: These are terms of art. They do mean something, but I do think
people tend to get a little over-focused on them.
The international community has taken this as yes for an answer. The
British Foreign Minister, the French Foreign Minister, all the people at
Rambouillet who were involved and now the people who are at Paris who are
involved have all made clear they regard this as the response that we have
all been seeking from the Kosovar Albanians; they've now said yes.
The question of when and where it would be signed is, on the one hand, a
question of whether one would want to have a one-party signature event--
and one might - or whether one would want to have a two-party signature
event, in which case we are not there yet.
So I think the international community is satisfied. I've heard nothing to
suggest from the European allies or the relevant negotiators there's any
doubt that this is what we've been looking for from the Kosovar Albanians:
agreement to the 83-page text in all its parts. Now the pressure has indeed
shifted, and I think the spotlight is going to shine very brightly on the
Serb side to agree to this agreement.
QUESTION: Jamie, now that we've moved one step closer to, as you say,
putting pressure on the Serbs to get an agreement, if Milosevic doesn't
sign, what kind of a NATO military campaign is the US looking for? Is this
something that you see as being short, limited, or without a future end
date in sight?
MR. RUBIN: I think you're covering the wrong building. Military campaigns
are run by the Pentagon, not the State Department. If you have specific
questions about military questions of how long, what type of targeting,
those kind of military objectives, I'd welcome you and your colleagues
addressing those questions to my colleagues at the Pentagon.
As far as the general principle is concerned, we have made clear that a
failure by the Serbs to agree to this plan carries with it very serious
consequences. The President has said there would be little option left but
to use military force. Secretary General Solana has agreed with that.
That's the clear position of the US Government as a policy matter.
With respect to specific questions as to who would be hit, how long would
they be hit for, what type of bombs would be dropped, which planes would
drop them or any of those questions, that would not be properly addressed
here at the State Department.
QUESTION: On the policy matter, Solana said this morning that he believed
that if the campaign were to go forward, that it wouldn't just be to get
Milosevic to sign the document to get him back to the table; that it would
be actually to inflict serious damage on both the Yugoslav military and the
special police. Is that also the opinion of the United States?
MR. RUBIN: The idea that military force can compel a particular adversary
to agree has not been something that we have said is a sure thing. What we
have said is that if we don't get a peace agreement now, what we're surely
going to face in the spring or the summer or the coming years is a massive
crackdown involving the deaths of many, many thousands of people in Kosovo
and the potential humanitarian catastrophe that we saw last fall.
So rather than waiting until that has occurred to respond, what we have
said is that it would be right and proper and appropriate for NATO to be
prepared to take military action -- in the first instance, to convince
President Milosevic to agree, but if he didn't agree, to diminish his
capability to conduct those kinds of crack downs that I described to you.
But beyond saying that as a general policy matter, I wouldn't be able to
specify any military specifics.
Right now, today is Monday. The Kosovar Albanians have just agreed to the
agreement. We are now in a negotiating mode. We are in Paris; Ambassador
Hill is in Paris. He is trying to get the Serbs to agree. They have still
not engaged seriously on the military implementation question - the crucial
question of will this political accord be implemented in a real way.
Milosevic has a habit of signing agreements and then not implementing them.
The reason why we are insisting on NATO implementation is because we
want to see this agreement implemented, and NATO is the only organization
that we think can ensure that.
So we're in a negotiating mode. We've gotten a step forward by the Kosovar
Albanians. I grant you it was long awaited, but it is a step forward. It's
the kind of step we've been looking for for some time.
QUESTION: Jamie, this may be too recent for you to have seen, but the
Yugoslav news agency is reporting that all parties - US, EU, Russia - have
decided to withdraw military annexes from the agreement in an attempt to
get an agreement. There are reports -
MR. RUBIN: You'd have to stop trusting the Yugoslav news service.
QUESTION: No, we're checking it elsewhere, obviously, because obviously
it has a domestic angle.
MR. RUBIN: Sure, let's save everybody a lot of time. No.
QUESTION: No tinkering with the military part of this document - no
changing, no major changes?
MR. RUBIN: Tinkering, now that's a different. We've always said that this
is an 83-page document with 83 times 200 words, that's 16,000 words, if my
math is quick and correct. I'm not going to say that no words can change,
either in the whole document or in the military section. But the principle
of a NATO-led military implementation force with the authorities,
capabilities that we have described that's in the document is not a subject
that the United States or our European allies have changed their position
on.
QUESTION: Nor the principle, I ask, that the Serbs withdraw virtually all
their troops except border troops?
MR. RUBIN: The basic outlines of the deal remain in place. There has been
no discussion of this in Rambouillet. We would be thrilled - or in Paris -
to have a discussion with the Serbs, in which they said, well, we'll accept
NATO-led forces, but we want this and this; then we would have to talk
about that and the Kosovar Albanians would have to talk about it. There is
no such discussion going on, and you shouldn't trust the misinformation
put out from Belgrade, which is common and normal.
QUESTION: : On the bombing over the weekend in Kosovo -
MR. RUBIN: This is the other kind of bombing that I can have a position
on.
QUESTION: Right. Does the Clinton Administration have an opinion on who
carried that out, the attacks on markets?
MR. RUBIN: Let me take this opportunity to give you a little bit of a
situation report and then get to your question. The latest reports we have
from Kosovo say there is fighting today in the Podujevo and Dus near Klina
in southwest Kosovo. Serb border forces reportedly killed 14 Kosovars in an
ambush earlier today near the border. Over the weekend, violence flared
again in Kosovo. On Saturday, seven died and more than 30 were injured in a
series of bomb attacks, which took place at busy markets in the towns
of Podujevo and elsewhere.
Responsibility for these bombings has not yet been determined. We condemn
these cowardly and senseless acts, which have taken the lives of innocent
residents of Kosovo. We call on all parties to the fighting to exercise
restraint and let their delegations work in Paris towards achievement.
There were also reports from the verifiers of heavy Yugoslav military
action yesterday morning, involving tanks and mortars in western Kosovo,
south of Klina. Reports say that four KLA soldiers died in this action. No
new fighting reported in areas, where we saw heavy action last week.
That's basically our situation report from our monitors in the field.
QUESTION: The Secretary's had to endure quite a bit of personal criticism
over the past couple of weeks.
MR. RUBIN: Some from people in this room, yes.
QUESTION: Some people in this room. People have said that this is taking
too long, that threats are being made and then withdrawn and then brought
back again, that she hasn't been there enough. All kinds of things that
have been said about -
MR. RUBIN: Or too much.
QUESTION: Or too much. What's her response to the fact that this has been
a drawn out process? It's taken longer than was hoped, obviously. Perhaps
we're only just halfway there now.
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this -- it has always been our expectation that
this would be an extraordinarily difficult process. Perhaps when we let our
hopes get ahead of our expectations - and we communicated that to all of
you, some of your expectations grew. That is a lesson for us in terms of
the public aspects of this difficult kind of negotiation.
But in terms of the substance, we tried to do something unique, which is to
get a head or the curve; to put together a very complex set of negotiating
documents with the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs; to work with the
Congress to commit American forces to participate in a peace keeping
operation; to get the NATO alliance ready to act for a rather unprecedented
-- (inaudible) -- which would be that one side wouldn't sign a peace
agreement.
Those are things that haven't really been done before. In other cases, wars
have gone on for many, many years before serious determined efforts to make
peace were able to bear fruit. Nevertheless, we thought this was appropriate
and correct. I think in the last few days some important elements of the
policy have advanced and, hopefully, those who follow it will take as much
note of the positive developments as the negative developments, although
that may be asking too much.
On Friday, the Secretary worked very, very hard - on Thursday rather - to
get a large number of members from Congress to support the Administrations
basic policy by committing to US ground troops. There didn't look likely to
be a lot of support for that policy but she made several dozen phone calls,
met with very large groups of members from Congress, and the House of
Representatives voted in favor of American participation, which is no easy
thing for those of you who understand the politics of foreign policy
as well as you understand the diplomacy of foreign policy.
On the Kosovar Albanian side in the last few days, we have had difficulty
in the last few weeks, rather, in getting them to the moment they are now.
It required an extraordinary amount of work. But the work the Secretary did
at Rambouillet has now come to fruition. They indicated in their phone call
to her that they said it wouldn't have been possible for them to make this
decision had she not gone to France and spent that kind of time with
them and then spoken to their leaders and then asked Senator Dole
to speak to their leaders. So had she not engaged in this work, I
do not think we would have had this Kosovar Albanian agreement.
With respect to NATO's credibility, the use of force and all of that
question, again it's a question of whether the objective is bombing or
whether the objective is the peace talks. There is the tendency, understandable,
for people to get overheated when the question is, are we about the bomb
something. It did seem that the Kosovar Albanians were going to be able to
do three weeks ago what they did today. Had they done so, the elements
were clearly in place for a very significant military campaign and also
significant military pressure to be placed on the Serbs. Clearly, we're
heading back towards that kind of situation.
But for their own reasons - and again, it's really easy to say, well, why
didn't they sign. They are primarily the victims in this case. They've been
the ones who have been suffering ten to 15 years' worth of abuse from the
Serbs. They decided, as a democratic entity, they wanted to go back and
consult. They wanted to talk to their people, talk to the leaders, and make
sure that if they signed the agreement it would stick. They made the case
that their yes was real at Rambouillet but it was conditioned upon this
consultation. They've now conducted it; they've now indicated that they
are ready, willing and able to sign. That makes it more likely that
if the peace agreement is signed by both sides, that the Kosovar Albanians
are going to implement what they sign. On the Serb side, all you have to do
is make a decision very vertically, with President Milosevic making
decisions all by himself. So it's a different situation; it's complex.
These people have a lot of animosity. There's a congressional component;
there's a European component; there's a NATO component; there's a public
diplomacy component. That's the modern world.
I think Secretary Albright has been determined, since she left France, to
work to get this achievement from the Kosovar Albanians. We have it. She
worked very hard to get the positive vote in the House; we got it. Now we
need to keep moving forward, hopefully to get to a yes by both sides and
NATO's implementation of the agreement. That is extraordinary difficult
work and she's determined to keep doing it.
QUESTION: Just to follow up on that would she consider going to see
Milosevic in Belgrade?
MR. RUBIN: I think the last time that we had to address this question,
our formula that we ended up with, to the satisfaction of everybody was, I
wouldn't rule that out; so let me stick with that.
QUESTION: What's the time line for all this, for the Serbs to even agree
or to sign on?
MR. RUBIN: Well, clearly, we don't want this to go on indefinitely. I
think the President spoke to this today. I wouldn't want to get more
specific than he was. Clearly, it can't go on indefinitely. The Contact
Group expects the Serbs to signal quickly whether they are ready to
negotiate seriously.
QUESTION: Do you think that all members of NATO remain firm in their
resolve in using military force were it to come to that?
MR. RUBIN: I think that the nature of any 16-nation alliance or any large
group of people there are going to be a range of views in terms of
enthusiasm, seriousness and concern. That has been true in NATO and will
always be true in NATO. But the basic decision by all NATO countries has
been made, and we have no reason to believe that any NATO country is
walking away from that decision. Secretary General Solana was very clear
with Secretary Albright in their meeting today, and clearly with the
President, that NATO is ready and prepared to act if necessary.
QUESTION: Have you heard about a report - I believe it's by some
Europeans - which challenges the US assertion that the Serbs were
responsible for the deaths of those 45 Kosovar Albanians.
MR. RUBIN: In Racak?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. RUBIN: We don't have any information on that. I've seen nothing in
our internal documents to suggest we're rethinking the responsibility for
Racak?
QUESTION: Have you seen the press reports on those?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen that; I'll check on it. But I see nothing
leading up to that press report to suggest that we have any reason to
change our view.
QUESTION: Following up on what you've already spoken to, earlier today in
the press conference that Clinton had, he responded to a reporter on the
possibility of bombings. He admitted that there wasn't much precedence for
this. I'm wondering, if it should come to NATO bombing and NATO decides to
in fact take that action, is there any source or principles of international
law that can be pointed to, to base that action on?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get our lawyers working on that. We may need to
publicize that more widely soon. Good question.
QUESTION: I was going to switch over, speaking of delegations and groups
hoping to realize fruition of their work, could you give us an update on
the talks --
MR. RUBIN: Another long-suffering diplomat in New York; is that who
you're talking about?
QUESTION: Yes, sir.
MR. RUBIN: Bilateral talks on the suspect underground site at Kumchang-ni
commenced February 27; they will reconvene later today. As you know, we're
seeking steps by the North Koreans to remove fully our suspicions about the
site at Kumchang-ni. We have long said that if the agreed framework can be
put clearly back on track and were to be fully implemented, that we are
prepared to improve political and economic relations in the context
of their implementation of this agreement and as the North Koreans
addressed other issues.
That's been what we've been after for many years now. I can report that
further progress in our talks did occur on Saturday; but again, it's a
difficult thing to talk about publicly, as the negotiations continue. Our
view is the same -- that we need access to these sites; we need to remove
our suspicions through onsite inspections that will confirm that this
location is not going to involve something that would affect the viability
of the agreed framework. That's what we're seeking to do.
In the meantime, the negotiators are working hard, and I don't have
anything more substantive and detailed to provide you.
QUESTION: Have talks already started today, or is it a little bit later
in the day?
MR. RUBIN: I think they were supposed to start around now, but I don't
know whether -- it's in the last half hour or so, but this time of
day.
QUESTION: Access to the site, is that still a few -
MR. RUBIN: That's what the subject of the discussions are, yes. Until
that's nailed down, nothing is over till it's over in this business. Even
then, it's not over.
QUESTION: Did they meet Sunday as well as Saturday?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think so. Might have been informal consultations. I
think the delegations stay in regular touch with each other by phone even
if there isn't a formal meeting. I'd be surprised if they didn't.
QUESTION: I know you can't get into the details of the progress that's
being made, but would it be fair to say that it's substantive progress?
It's not just the fact that they're willing to sit there at the negotiating
table?
MR. RUBIN: No, no. This is substantive progress, not procedural
progress.
QUESTION: Right.
QUESTION: Could I switch to another subject here? Human rights report --
for the first time in 22 years, the Department has identified the word
torture with the regard to the practices of Israel against Palestinians
prisoners. I'm asking this in terms of the Wye River Memorandum and the
fact that the FBI and CIA are now involved very closely in all of these
security matters. What is the Department's attitude towards the torture by
Israel and the Palestinian Authority? Have they raised it since Wye?
I'd like a follow-up question, if I could.
MR. RUBIN: The human rights report focuses on our concerns are human
rights policies and practices by the various countries or others that we
study and report on. I don't believe the Wye agreement was focused on that
question. It was focused on fighting terrorism, and it did have mechanisms
for discussing particular concerns more broadly. So I don't know that
there's necessarily a connection between the peace accord, on the one hand,
and our bilateral work with each of those two parties to put forward
our view on what's acceptable and what's not acceptable. I'm not sure
those two mix quite as clearly as you describe it. But let me get a more
considered answer for the record for you.
QUESTION: I see a contradiction there, is the idea. The other question is
about the September 1 note on Hashem Mufleh, a young man who's now being
sentenced to three years after torture and an extracted confession and he's
an American citizen. You have no response to that from the Israel
Government after five months. Is the Department pursuing this, and are you
intending to pursue also the Anwar Mohammed who was here this last
week after having been released by the Israelis, after 40 days of
torture. Are you intending to protest that particular incident?
MR. RUBIN: The gentleman involved that we have a Privacy Act waiver for
is Mr. Mohammed, so in that regard, I'm in a position to provide you
information. That is, that a US citizen Anwar Mohammed, 27, of Florida was
held in detention in Israel from October 28 to December 7 on suspicion of
membership in Hamas and nationalist activities.
He has made inquiries with our consulate in Jerusalem and the State
Department here in Washington regarding procedures to follow to file a
protest. We have provided him information on steps to follow, but he has
not yet completed this process. We stand ready to assist him in this
process and to proceed with his protest once it is complete. Mr. Muhammad
was released without formal charges being filed on December 7. We
understand he returned to the US sometime in early January. The consular
officer visited him in detention in November and December. During the first
visit, Mr. Mohammed spoke of mistreatment, specifically being made
to sit in a low chair with his hands handcuffed behind his back.
The consular officer asked whether he wished to pursue a protest; Mr.
Mohammed said no.
During the consular officer's December 3 visit, Mr. Mohammed spoke of
violent treatment by fellow prisoners, whom he characterized as informants
working with Israeli authorities. He said these individuals had forced him
to admit throwing stones during the intifada when he was 17. He told our
consular officer that once he was released he wanted to protest the
mistreatment. After his release, he asked the consulate general about the
procedure to follow and we provided him instructions.
Our consular officers continued to monitor his case, as he remained in the
West Bank for some weeks after his release. In late December the family of
Mr. Mohammed made expressions of appreciation for all that the State
Department had done for him. Once in January and once in February, our
consular officer at the Department tried to contact Mr. Mohammed at his
home in Florida to pursue his protest. He did not return those calls, and
we understand that on one occasion he was traveling in Latin America.
He did contact the State Department in early March. A representative of Mr.
Mohammed requested an appointment for him on March 9. During the snowstorm
in Washington, we were unable to meet with him that day but responded that
we would be happy to at the earliest possible date.
That's the work that we've been doing to try to assist him in his efforts
to file a protest.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - conditions of the detention?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know whether we've spoken to this in the human rights
specifically. Clearly, one has to make an assessment of what the facts are
before one can make a judgment. But we've had no trouble in assisting him
in his protests so that the facts can be determined.
QUESTION: Was there a proper notice to the United States by the
government of Israel?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think there was any question raised about the consular
access, to my knowledge.
QUESTION: New subject - on China, yesterday's news talk shows were full
of --
MR. RUBIN: Chock full.
QUESTION: Chock full of growing criticism, especially from those
Republicans running for Congress of --
MR. RUBIN: Running for President.
QUESTION: Excuse me, running for President, that --
MR. RUBIN: We can stop the question there; I think it says it all,
really.
QUESTION: But there are others, in fact, today on the Hill who specifically
criticizing this Administration's policy on China, knowing that the Premier
of China is due to arrive here in several weeks. Have our expectations for
what can come out of this summit diminished? In light of reports of spying
on behalf of the Chinese Government, is the Administration thinking about,
considering tweaking its policy on China in any way, shape or form? Two
separate questions.
MR. RUBIN: Yes, on the summit, when Secretary Albright was in China, we
talked to this extensively. We made clear to Premier Zhu and others that
the climate in Washington was not a particularly warm one. At the time,
that was primarily because of the human rights crackdown. Because of that,
we let him know that this was not going to be an easy trip for him. What we
signaled to them then was that not only should they be working assiduously
with our trade negotiators on trying to move forward on the World Trade
Organization accession talks, but that the more they can do to improve
their policies on human rights and on non-proliferation the better for the
climate of this visit. Secretary Albright was quite candid and straightforward
with him about the climate.
Now since that time, obviously, at a political level the climate has
deteriorated significantly further. Nevertheless, we believe that our
policy is the right one for advancing the national security of the citizens
of the United States, which is our job. We have a very realistic view as to
what will happen in China; but we have to ask ourselves the question of
what will advance the security of the United States. In that regard, we
believe very strongly that engaging with China and working with them on
problems like North Korea that we were just speaking about, on problems
like India and Pakistan, on problems like missile transfers, nuclear
transfers, all of the areas where our national security could be jeopardized
by other countries developing weapons of mass destruction or increasing
their capabilities, working with China is the best way to improve our
national security when it comes to subjects like stopping North Korea
proliferation, stopping the dangers of missile transfers around the world.
That advances our interests.
Similarly, it advances our interests to work with China on drug smuggling,
where we have had some effective cooperation; to work with China on
fighting terrorism, where we've had effective cooperation. So those are
clear-cut examples of why we think you need to work with China. We know the
policy is controversial. China policy has been controversial in Washington
for pretty much the whole time I've been here; that is, throughout the '80s
and the '90s. That has been for a variety of reasons. Sometimes it's
Democratic Administration who have a particular position and Republican
Congresses who have one position; sometimes that switches. That's the
nature of the beast in this case. So we're not surprised by it.
With respect to changing our policy, I've heard nobody suggest that we are
going to change our determination to try to advance America's national
interests by stopping non-proliferation, working with the Chinese on
subjects like North Korea.
With respect to a concrete policy question, let me just say that on the
World Trade Organization, for over 12 years we have held talks with China -
first over accession to the GATT, then over accession to its successor, the
World Trade Organization. We are now closer to an agreement than we've ever
been before. We continue to explore the possibility of reaching an
agreement on China's accession to the World Trade Organization. This has
been done by both Democratic and Republican Administrations.
The goal is very clear - we want to open Chinese markets to American goods,
which is in our national interest. That is why we pursue the WTO agreement.
We believe that a commercially meaningful accession package would be good
for the United States. We would obtain better access for our products
within the Chinese market, and China would receive strong incentives to
abide by the trading rules that most of the world follows.
We do not see World Trade Organization accession as a referendum on Chinese
activities in other areas. When we have differences with China, we seek to
work with them directly. We want to continue to engage on issues where we
have differences, work together where we can work together. So for example,
we will not step back from our support for the World Trade Organization
accession negotiations at a time when China may actually be willing to open
its markets. That would be self-defeating and contrary to our interests.
QUESTION: If I could just follow up on that. I realize that you said that
you had lowered --
MR. RUBIN: I promise not to be as long in my answer to your follow-
up.
QUESTION: Okay, that you had told the Chinese, the Secretary had told
Premier Zhu that this was going to be a tough summit already. Now that the
allegations about spying have come out, have those expectations been
lowered further in the Administration's eyes?
MR. RUBIN: It would be hard to lower them further. I mean, she was pretty
clear that the climate was not positive on human rights grounds. He can
read the newspapers; he can watch those same Sunday TV shows or at least
get his summary from the Chinese information service of those Sunday
programs. I think he's spoken out about this and he understands this. I'm
sure our embassy is doing its job to let him know what's going on here in
Washington as much as they're finding out from China what's going on
there. They're letting him know that this is the reality.
But what I'm trying to say is that if we want to advance the national
interest of our citizens, which is our job, and the Chinese want to advance
the chance of China entering the world and being part of the normal trading
system, a way to do that would be to finish, to complete the talks on the
World Trade Organization. We want to pursue that regardless of our concerns
about other problems. We obviously consider the espionage case a very
serious matter.
We have conveyed firmly to the Chinese that we expect the Chinese to
respect US laws and cooperate fully with the investigation. But it's not
possible to speculate as to what the results of an investigation of
possible illegal activities would result in, except to say that we think
the Chinese understand our grave concern about the matter.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - what do we expect to come out of this summit,
other than getting China -
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, part of the process of having an engagement
policy is to have regular high-level meetings with or without grand signing
ceremonies. That's what it means to have an engagement policy. There are
many countries in the world that we meet with who we have engagement
policies with who, when they meet, they don't necessarily yield a concrete
signing of a new agreement.
Part of what our relationship with China means is that we can have the
Secretary of State go to China, meet with the President, the Prime Minister,
the Premier, the Foreign Minister regularly instead of seeing that as it
was just a couple of years ago, as a situation where it was a make or break
every time; but rather to normalize the process and regularize the process
by which high level meetings take place. So that is the first point about
the Zhu visit.
The second point, I think clearly we would like to see a focus in the days
leading up to that visit on the details - the hard-nosed-devil-is-in-the-
details-details of the trade negotiations so that we can achieve the
objective I described.
QUESTION: Zhu had a press conference today and made some rather muscular
statements, including denying very strongly that China has even a need to
spy on the United States. I'd be interested in your response to that. Also
he sort of hinted that he might be coming with some concessions that could
make a WTO agreement possible.
MR. RUBIN: Well, on the WTO agreement, I think I've spoken to that. We'd
like to see them make the decisions so that we could have this agreement on
commercially viable terms. That would be very important for our national
interest.
With respect to his denials, I believe that Foreign Minister of China
denied the same point last week. Whatever I said to that applies equally
today. I haven't seen the words in which he denied it, but we obviously
think this is a very serious matter. Various officials have been talking to
this in the last few days. I don't think the fact that another Chinese
official has denied it is going to change our view at all.
QUESTION: Does the Administration think it's serious enough to take such
steps as stopping certain types of research by Chinese students in this
country, cutting off visits to weapons labs by PLA officials, things along
those lines?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say that we have been taking a number of steps in a
comprehensive and systematic way to ensure that strict procedures have been
followed at the nuclear weapons labs following briefings in July 1997.
There are a lot of things that the Chinese cannot do in this country and a
lot of programs that are not available to them.
With respect to what new policies or practices or procedures may arise out
of this, I don't have anything for, you other than to say that we're
determined to be as careful as we can to ensure, within the limits of what
can be done, that our secrets are protected and the Chinese understand the
seriousness with which we consider this issue.
QUESTION: Do you have any reaction to last weekend's fire bomb attack to
the marketplace in Istanbul and several other attacks?
MR. RUBIN: A car bomb went off this morning near the EU Mission in
Ankara. We have seen reports that one person was injured but have not been
able to confirm details about this attack. On Saturday, several Molotov
cocktails were thrown through a window of an Istanbul department store,
causing the entire building to catch fire; 13 people died in that tragedy.
We understand there have been several smaller instances over the weekend.
The United States strongly condemns such acts of terror and expresses its
sympathy to the victims' families.
QUESTION: This urban terrorist is very active in Europe in some European
countries. The US is very sensitive and very supportive in the fighting
with the terrorism, especially with Turkey. Did you use your diplomacy
channel to urge these European countries not to give safe haven to assist
in these terrorists?
MR. RUBIN: We have a whole elaborate policy on fighting terrorism that
involves regular counter-terrorism cooperation with our European allies on
a number of different levels. We work with them very closely and have been
for some time. I'm sure that any and all terrorist acts that arise will
find its way into that system by which we cooperate with our allies.
QUESTION: Northern Ireland. People are coming this week. You don't have
anything?
MR. RUBIN: I'll get back to you on that one.
QUESTION: Cuba dissidents - Cuba announced sentences on its four most
prominent dissidents today. It came out very soon -- right before the
briefing started.
MR. RUBIN: We'll get you something on that.
QUESTION: Could you comment on reports that Ambassador Holbrooke's
nomination is in jeopardy because of attempts by the Administration to
amend the Helms-Biden bill?
MR. RUBIN: I would be delighted to comment on those reports. We have had
no such indication. The Administration stands behind the Holbrooke
nomination and hopes to have him in place as our permanent representative
to the UN as soon as possible. We believe key members of Congress
understand that the two-year-old Helms-Biden package needs to be updated
and will not use this issue to try to slow or derail Ambassador Holbrooke's
nomination.
Let's remember that this is a two-year-old bill, and our view about this
had preceded Ambassador Holbrooke's nomination and will presumably sustain
itself through and during and after Ambassador Holbrooke's nomination. That
is because of the passage of time, because of changed circumstances at the
United Nations and because of lost leverage at the UN for our failure to
pay our dues, that we need to make adjustments. We lost negotiations to
reduce our annual assessments for UN budgets in 1997, when no arrears
funding was approved. This lost opportunity has cost us millions of
dollars. Last year we also failed to win election to a UN expert body;
again, because of our failure to pay our dues, despite a vigorous election
campaign. Many delegations told us that our arrearages were the cause.
So we have a very strong view on trying to pay our dues. We have a very
strong view on getting Ambassador Holbrooke confirmed, and we think those
two should work hand in hand.
QUESTION: Jamie, there's a new work of non-fiction in the bookstores
today written by Scott Ritter. Before the book came out -
MR. RUBIN: Non-fiction?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. RUBIN: I'm sure it belongs in the fiction section.
QUESTION: In his book, among his charges that CIA operatives had
compromised his verification mission in Iraq. Do you have any -
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I don't want to help him sell any books.
QUESTION: Jamie, I've saved this for last. The Miami Herald has a story
out today about Senator Helms accusing the Agency for International
Development in the Clinton Administration of subsidizing witchcraft in
Haiti and demanding that it be stopped.
MR. RUBIN: Let me say that I have something on this. I don't have
anything on the Cuban prisoners, but that's the way the system works
sometimes. That is true. We've heard about this. In the past -
QUESTION: Which? The complaints, or the -
MR. RUBIN: That there is such a complaint.
(Laughter.)
The US Agency for International Development has sponsored in Haiti an
International Planned Parenthood Foundation program -- I think that's what
you need to remember - to utilize traditional Haitian health practitioners
for distributing information on family planning. You're starting to get the
politics of this?
(Laughter.)
Traditional practitioners are the first point of conduct for many Haitians
in seeking health care; that's a reality. The successful program attempt to
train these practitioners in identifying the symptoms of life-threatening
illnesses, including complications of child birth.
While some traditional practitioners may have participated in voodoo
ceremonies, USAID funding has not been used to support those practices. I
knew we'd get to that if I read long enough. USAID no longer funds the IPPF
local affiliate in Haiti, which is the International Planned Parenthood
Foundation. We don't fund it any longer.
So the point is that we are not using our funds to promote voodoo. We are
using our funds to promote information about an issue that's obviously very
politically sensitive in this country and elsewhere. So sometimes you get
these -- what do we call them -- red herrings that get attached to real
concerns.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 2:10 P.M.)
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