U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #104, 98-09-08
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1133
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Tuesday, September 8, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
ANNOUNCEMENTS
1 BURMA: Detention of Opposition Leaders
2 NIGERIA: Release of Ogoni 19
BURMA
1-2 Possible deportation of Aung San Sui Kyi
MEPP
2,3-4 Dennis Ross travel to the Region/Time of Departure/Issue of
Gaps/Phases and US Position/Process and Agreement
IRAN/AFGHANISTAN
4,5,6-7 Continued conflict/Significant Iranian Troop
deployment/Security Council 1193/Expression of US
Concern/Assurances & Statements by Senior Iranians/US
Interests/Osama bin Laden/Military Deployment/US Air
Strikes and Defense (Comparison) and Differences/Missing
Iranian Diplomats/Dialogue among the UN, Taliban and Iran
IRAQ
7,8,9,10-11 Situation update and MKA's remarks about Scott
Ritter/International involvement and inspections/Role of
USG/Issue of unilateral action/Secretary 's
Testimony/Rumors that Secretary tried to stop
hearings/Reports of Naval seizure of wheat/Medical
contacts and oil-for-food program/Visit of Iraqi Kurdish
Leader and PUK Leader to US/Reasons for Visits
SECURITY OF EMBASSIES (STATE DEPARTMENT)
11,12,13,14 Inspections of posts/Assessment teams/Proposal to
Congress/Operation status of embassies/Definition of
"closed" and "adjusted" embassies/Rumors of incidents
happening at many embassies (copy cats)/Situations that
can lead to change of status at an embassy/Bonn embassy
and movement to Berlin
GEORGIA
13 Rumors of arrest of Pakistani national
N. KOREA
14,15-16 Missile launch and Japan fly over/Bilateral and Regional
concerns/Inability to confirm claims of satellite launch
and/or orbit/Notice to Mariners/Current and Future
Meetings/Agreed Framework and the topic of missiles/US
View on Kim Jung-Il being election
CAMBODIA
16-17 US deployment of recent shootings of protesters and other
acts of violence/Opposition forcesand government violence
against them
COLOMBIA
17-18 Reports on agreement by Pastrana and coca leaf
growers/Reports re: Liberation of American citizens
TURKEY
18 Rpts Secretary signed off on the sale of armored personnel
carrier and riot gear to Turkey
ISRAEL
18-19 Reports of the torture of American-Palestinian Citizen
Visit of Turkish Prime Minister to Israel
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #104
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1998, 1:35 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Welcome to the State Department briefing. On a personal note,
let me say that I want to thank those of you who sent my wife and I a
bottle of champagne - we enjoyed it - and secondly to say that it's
obviously been a lot of fun here in Washington. I think that's the last
time I try to schedule my wedding in August.
(Laughter.)
As I've seen from reading a month's worth of newspapers, it was a lot more
dangerous here than it was dodging lions and buffalo and crocodiles where I
was. Let me start with two announcements - one in the good news and one in
the bad news category. On the subject of Burma, the US deplores in the
strongest of terms the September 6 detention of well over 100 opposition
figures, both elected members of parliament and party rank and file. This
action is a violation of the basic rights and freedoms of the Burmese
people and of internationally recognized human rights.
Resolution of the political impasse in Burma will require real substantive
dialogue with the democratic opposition, including Aung San Sui Kyi and
representatives of the ethnic groups. Arbitrary detentions are unjustifiable
and will only worsen rather than solve the political crisis. We urge the
government of Burma to release these individuals immediately and to take
action to solve the nation's serious political problems through serious
substantive negotiations with Aung San Sui Kyi and her party.
We have protested these actions to the Burmese Government through our
embassy in Rangoon. We will continue to work with like-minded countries to
press the Burmese Government to take positive action, including the release
of individuals and the initiation of a genuine dialogue with Aung San Sui
Kyi and other NLD leaders.
Are there any questions on that subject?
QUESTION: There's been some talk of perhaps deporting Aung San Sui Kyi.
What would the United States do if that kind of an action were taken?
MR. RUBIN: I don't want to prejudge what we would do. Let me say, as the
statement I just read indicated, we're looking at this issue with great
concern. We're looking at ways to ratchet up the pressure on the government
of Burma. Clearly, their idea of dialogue that was floated earlier in the
month has proven to be not serious. I gather that when they were rounding
people up in the middle of the night they said publicly their rationale
was just to have a dialogue with these leaders. This was rounding up people
in their 70s and 80s at 3:00 a.m., 4:00 a.m. in the morning.
So clearly, the government there is not approaching this problem in
anything resembling a constructive way. And a decision to deport Aung San
Sui Kyi would only ratchet up the international response.
On the good news side, let me say the United States welcomes the unconditional
release of the Ogoni 19 by the Nigerian Government. We applaud the
continued efforts of the current Nigerian leadership to rectify the abuses
of the previous regime. Those released yesterday were arrested in 1994,
along with Ken Saro-Wiwa, for alleged complicity in the deaths of four
Ogoni* leaders. Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others, as you may recall, were
executed in 1995.
We look forward to the release of all political prisoners which will lend
further credibility to Head-of-State Abubukar's promise of political
reform. The government of Nigeria would further raise popular confidence by
issuing a report listing the political prisoners who remain, who have been
set free, and a schedule of release for those who remain in detention.
QUESTION: Jamie, is Dennis Ross on his way in?
MR. RUBIN: Dennis Ross is on his way to the Middle East. He is traveling
at the recommendation of the President and the Secretary of State to
respond to the request of the parties, and he will be there for a few days
to meet with Israeli and Palestinian leaders and obviously try to - I'm
trying to get my lingo back - but close the remaining gaps and narrow the
remaining differences.
QUESTION: When did he leave?
MR. RUBIN: I believe he is leaving this evening to begin his work
tomorrow, or late this afternoon.
QUESTION: But I had a couple of questions on this. You sort of half
answered one of the questions when you spoke of remaining gaps. This isn't,
I take it, a trip where he simply goes with an invitation and comes back?
Because when the trip was announced - if that is what a backgrounder with
three or four favorite newspapers is considered -- last week when we were
traveling with the President, it was said he would be back in a few days.
That implies that he's not really going to do a lot of heavy mediating; and
of course, that would raise the possibilities that just a simple mission
like, come on to the US; we want to have the talks here.
MR. RUBIN: Without commenting on any of the press practices at the White
House that I'm sure you've had plenty of chance to express your views about,
let me say that Ambassador Ross does not think he has a simple mission.
There are gaps; this is an extraordinary complex exercise; there are an
enormous number of issues involved in the security, the further redeployment,
et cetera. While there may have been progress on some of the issues
in recent weeks, as I've said before, and I think Dennis made clear to me
when I last spoke to him, is that if there is not goodwill, details can
become insurmountable obstacles. So there's plenty of work to do, and I
would not read the phrase "a few days" to indicate that we are on the verge
of an agreement, because we are not.
QUESTION: Let me ask you the other question - trying to get a feel for
what's the tactic; what's the US stance now. We've had, I think, every
conceivable version. The last was let the two of them deal with it,
essentially, because it's going to be up to them in the final analysis; we
are available if they need our help, but let them do it. Before that, it
was greater intervention; before that, before that, before that. It sounds
like the US is back in the ball game now instead of letting the two sides
come to their own terms.
MR. RUBIN: The stage we're at is that it's appropriate for Ambassador
Ross to be talking to both sides; that's the stage we're at. You go through
different periods where you think that Ambassador Ross can make progress by
feeling out the two sides on a specific issue; maybe making some suggestions
that they can agree on; where Secretary Albright may need to engage and
try to get agreement on issues where decisions need to be made - big
decisions; or where the parties need to talk to each other because if they
don't talk to each other, our intermediary role won't help them solve the
problem.
The stage we're at now is that it's appropriate for Ambassador Ross to be
continuing the tireless efforts that he's been making over the recent
months to try to advance this process and to bring with him recommendations
from the Secretary on how to advance or close some of the gaps and perhaps
overcome some of the obstacles; that's the phase we're at.
If we get to another phase -- the Secretary's involvement, the President's
involvement, the parties going back to talk to each other - we'll tell you.
But right now the right phase is for Ambassador Ross to do the work with
them on the ground in extensive discussions.
QUESTION: Jamie, you say that there's an enormous numbers of issues that
have been left unsettled. About three months ago, after the famous London
meeting, there was basically one issue: do they accept the American plan or
do they not? Has the United States backed away from the original simple
argument?
MR. RUBIN: I've missed the questions where the questioner knows the
answer to his question. As I indicated probably more than two dozen times
before I left, there's a difference between an agreement in principle on
some principles and an actual agreement where all the excruciating details
on security, on timing, on pacing, on whether things are front-loaded are
put on paper and agreed to. There was an issue of, in principle -- the
outlines of the American ideas were accepted in principle; and they
were - and we made very clear they were.
Since that time, there's been significant movement on the key issues,
including the size of the further redeployment. So since that time, we have
made progress. A lot of those who were puzzled by the reasons why we didn't
call this quits I think shouldn't be puzzled now that they increasingly
realize - as representatives from the relevant governments have made clear -
that on some of the big issues, there has been remarkable progress in the
last number of weeks.
QUESTION: What if Mr. Ross does not succeed in narrowing the gaps;
because, I mean, we've seen some reports that both sides now are starting
to blame each other. What if those gaps won't be narrowed?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we'll have to see. I think finger-pointing wouldn't be a
new exercise in the Middle East. But the question is, what are the
negotiators doing and what is the substance? On the substance, I think
we've made clear that there has been progress - and significant progress on
some of the key issues.
Now turning that progress into an agreement is a difficult task; because,
as I indicated earlier, in this particular negotiation, with the breakdown
of trust and confidence that's occurred over the last year, small issues
can take on monumental implications for each side. Small issues can be
sufficient to derail the whole process. How issues are presented - the
words that are used to describe things - become excruciatingly important in
the end game, in the final phases.
That's what they're going to be working on. I think Ambassador Ross is not
going there expecting to achieve a breakthrough imminently. On the other
hand, I think he has a fair degree of optimism coming from the progress
that's occurred over the last several weeks.
QUESTION: What can you tell us about what's been going on between Iran
and Afghanistan?
MR. RUBIN: Do you want to stay on the Middle East?
QUESTION: No.
MR. RUBIN: Okay, go ahead, Carole.
QUESTION: So what can you tell us about what's been going on between Iran
and Afghanistan? Are you concerned that there's going to be some sort of a
conflict?
MR. RUBIN: Fighting continues between the Taliban and the opposition,
Northern Alliance. But we are unable to confirm any recent significant
changes on the ground. As we've said for some time, it looks like the
Taliban had made major gains at that time and now controls some 90 percent
of the country and all urban areas.
With respect to the question of Iran, let me say this - we understand that
Iran has deployed significant numbers of troops and equipment on its border
with Afghanistan. There is a significant deployment there involving heavy
equipment, large numbers of troops. There was an exercise that it was
ongoing, and now that exercise has apparently ended, but the troops remain
and the forces remain. So clearly this is a matter of serious concern, and
it's something we're watching extremely closely.
Let me also note that there were remarks over the weekend by senior Iranian
officials ruling out confrontation with the Taliban. Our view, as stated -
and the world's view as stated - in Resolution 1193 of the Security Council
is that all parties should refrain from interfering in the internal affairs
of Afghanistan and should allow for safe passage out of Afghanistan for all
Iranians missing in that country.
We are urging restraint by all sides. We want Afghanistan's neighbors to
refrain from taking actions that could further enlarge or inflame the
conflict, and obviously to respect its international borders. We are aware
and have spoken to this - reports that there are several Iranians,
including diplomatic staff, at the consulate in Mazar i Sharif have been
missing since the Taliban captured that city and may have been killed. We
cannot confirm these reports; and we want to remind the Afghan factions
that the holding of diplomats for any reason and at any time is unacceptable
given their protective status under international law.
So we certainly understand the concerns about these reported holding of
diplomats. On the other hand, we want to make very clear that we do not
support any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.
QUESTION: Would the United States express its concerns to Iran via its
diplomatic channels in
(inaudible).
MR. RUBIN: We don't speak about what we do or don't do through those
channels. I think it should be apparent to the Iranian Government from what
I've said and what others have said publicly, our views on the use of
military force inside Afghanistan by a neighboring country.
QUESTION: And the assurances by senior Iranians that they don't intend to
--
MR. RUBIN: These were public comments that they made.
QUESTION: Have the United States - would you - do you have any --
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware that this issue has caused a large ramp-up in
the communications between us and Iran.
QUESTION: No, but I'm sorry --
MR. RUBIN: I'm trying to be as helpful as I can; I thought that was
pretty forward leaning.
QUESTION: No -- the statements by the Iranian officials, do they sort of
comport with what the United States knows in terms of the kind of
deployment and the sort of readiness of the troops on the border?
MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry.
QUESTION: Do you see any evidence that there is activity with Iranian
troops that is at odds with the statements by the senior officials that
they're not going to get --
MR. RUBIN: We believe that they have the capability to engage - I've just
said they've deployed a very large force of equipment and people in and
around Afghanistan, near the border of Afghanistan. So they have the
capability to engage and to act; and we're concerned about that - deeply
concerned. Their expressed intentions, as opposed to their capabilities,
are the ones that, as best we know, were expressed publicly. Whether they
will act on their capabilities or whether they will act on their intentions
is what remains to be seen.
QUESTION: Jamie, can I ask you what the US interest is in this?
MR. RUBIN: Our interest is certainly the principle that borders should be
respected; that there is clearly an international principle that countries
shouldn't invade their neighbors -- that's certainly one of the principles
that is applied here. In addition, Afghanistan is obviously a place where
great instability could exist even further if there was the use of force;
but it's also a place where the status quo is extremely dangerous as
evidenced by Afghanistan's refusal to reign in Osama bin Laden and
other terrorist organizations. So there's a whole myriad of interests
we have in the issue.
With respect to the non-use of force and the non-interference of Iran in
the internal affairs of Afghanistan, I think that's a general principle
that we have an interest in upholding.
QUESTION: Have you had any reason to reconsider what seems to be the
Administration's reading of a glimmer of moderation in Tehran?
MR. RUBIN: The two are not related in our view. For those of you who
wrote about or read or still care about the Secretary's speech and the
President's comments on this, what we talked about were political changes
that remain in terms of the numbers of people that voted for President
Khatemi; substantive changes that were made in their policies. We listed
those and I don't intend to list them again and save everybody time. Those
still occurred. What we've now seen is a military deployment that may or
may not yield a decision that we would oppose -- that is, the use of
force inside Afghanistan.
QUESTION: Given this country's recent experiences with Afghanistan under
the rationale of self-defense, do you think Iran would have justification --
MR. RUBIN: I knew that was coming.
QUESTION: It's too easy to avoid. Do you think Iran, which has discussed
I believe its Chapter 7 self-defense passages - do you think they --
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen the Iranian justification for an action they're
now saying they're not going to take. Hypothetically there is a difference;
and the difference is what we were talking about was preemptive action. The
briefers who spoke to you at the time used their words very carefully --
and I don't want to be perceived as changing their words, but -- to prevent
an imminent attack on the possible United States citizens or our country
as opposed to concern about something that happened in the past;
so that is a difference.
Frankly, if the - (inaudible) - becomes the diplomats, we think that the
right course now is for the two sides to talk to each other, for the UN to
engage and for them to try to figure out what happened to these diplomats;
and if they're alive, to have them released; and if they are not, for
evidence to be provided what happened to them. So we think there are
channels of diplomatic communication which are appropriate to handle the
reported missing of these diplomats.
QUESTION: This is wildly hypothetical, but would the United States sit
back and discuss the situation if ten of its diplomats were being held
hostage in, say, Afghanistan?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I will stick with your preambular phrase that it's
wildly hypothetical. But again, we think that if indeed there are diplomats
being held by the Taliban or people associated with the Taliban that what
should happen now is there should be dialogue between the UN, the Taliban
and Iran to resolve the situation and not the threat of a massive incursion
into Afghanistan.
QUESTION: Scott Ritter says the Secretary of State obstructed concealment
inspections in order to allow the US to buy time to extricate itself from
itself the bad deal it bought into when it agreed to Kofi Annan's
negotiated resolution. What is the long-term plan to stop this cycle of
aggression and concession?
MR. RUBIN: Well, those are terms of art that are quite loaded. One of the
more interesting set of readings I did was on the subject of Iraq in
reading different accounts of what's transpired in recent months. Let me
just make a few points on that.
Number one, there's been a lot of reporting that the Secretary said Scott
Ritter doesn't have a clue about our policy. Those of you who feel
compelled to write about the subject, I hope will show some balance and
some fairness in recognizing that comment was made after a series of
laudatory comments about the work that Scott Ritter had done and in
specific response to an obviously outrageous and ridiculous quip that the
United States has stopped more inspections than Saddam Hussein. If that is
one's view, then one's view doesn't understand American policy.
So those of you who do feel the need to continue to write about this, I
hope will show at least the minimum level of fairness in explaining that
was the context of that comment.
Secondly, there seems to be a series of misunderstandings that keep being
repeated by certain officials and others - not officials of the government -
and analysts and occasionally even a journalist or two. We have taken the
view that if and when we are going to get into a confrontation with Iraq,
that the political leadership of the United States along with the political
leadership of other countries in the Security Council should try to do it
not only at a time and place of our choosing, number one, but number two,
in a way that maximizes international support.
That is an international political issue that we are concerned about. That
is a different issue than an inspector is concerned about. He is correctly
concerned about whether he gets in to get his inspection, and if not, why
not. The views of the United States Government, on the other hand, are
about if we are going to get into a confrontation with Iraq, making sure
we've done all we can to lay the diplomatic ground work to make sure that
Iraq is perceived by as many countries as possible as to be the cause
of the problem and not some particularly aggressive inspection that we in
the United States support but other countries may not support.
So sometimes inspectors who are focused on their job don't understand the
extent to which other countries in the Security Council don't support their
job. We support the job of the inspectors. We want them to get in to where
they need to go; sometimes, other countries don't. So if we have to make a
tactical political choice - do we want a confrontation over Iraq's
intransigence or an inspection which the United States supports, maybe the
British support but maybe others don't - that's a high political judgment
that can best be made by those who are in contact with the members of
the Security Council and the highest levels of the United Nations
system.
That's what this is about - it's a different tactical judgment as to what
would best force Saddam Hussein to respond and what would best put the
United States in a position to act using force if necessary or any other
mechanism.
What we've seen is when the Secretary did make a tactical judgment about
what should happen in early August, it was designed to keep Iraq on the
defensive. What you've seen now is increasingly, in the last few weeks, the
Russians, the French, the Chinese and others supportive of the position
that we want them to be supportive of. That's our job; Scott Ritter's job
is to try to get in to do inspections; other inspectors' jobs are to try to
uncover weapons of mass destruction. Inspectors during this period
uncovered the fact that VX was being produced, the fact that Iraq had lied
about how much weapons of mass destruction it used during the Gulf
War. All those inspections conducted by other inspectors have gone
forward. So this is a tactical issue that has surprisingly blown way out of
proportion.
QUESTION: Will the US undertake unilateral action if the Security Council
should prove to not have the will to enforce disarmament?
MR. RUBIN: We'll have to see. The position of the United States is that
we are acting now in New York, working on a resolution to suspend
indefinitely sanctions reviews. Saddam Hussein clearly wants sanctions
lifted, so this is something he clearly doesn't want to happen. We have
seen, as I suggested, greater support for that kind of a step now because
Iraq has made clear its blatant non-cooperation with the Security
Council.
If these steps and other diplomatic steps do not yield a change then the
President and his National Security Advisor will have to make decisions as
to when and where to act. But the point is that Saddam Hussein shouldn't
choose the terrain; Saddam Hussein shouldn't decide when American forces do
and don't get deployed. The United States should try to make sure that when
and if we get into a confrontation - as we inevitably do and have on
dozens of occasions with Iraq over the last six or seven years - that
as much as possible that it is on our terms and with the maximum chance for
Saddam being blamed and not narrow issues of inspections being a matter of
controversy.
QUESTION: New subject?
QUESTION: No, still on - when will the Secretary testify to this joint --
MR. RUBIN: My understanding is that the Secretary is expected to testify
on Thursday. Again, for those of you who may write about that, I sure hope
that you call those who are involved. The United States Administration, the
Secretary did not try to cancel or stop hearings. If you write that, you
will be wrong. The United States has - sorry, the Administration has made
clear that full public discussion of the extent of our cooperation
with UNSCOM tends to buy into these very arguments that I was talking
to you about where countries' support of Iraq or countries on the fence
regard UNSCOM as an American operation. That makes it harder to get support
in the Arab world, support in the Middle East and sometimes support in
major European countries for action if necessary.
So we had concerns about public hearings, not hearings. Those were
expressed. We never - and let me emphasize this word - to my knowledge
asked that Mr. Ritter not be able to testify; that's nonsense. As you know,
Secretary of State was out of town last week. So some decided they wanted
to go forward with the hearings without the presence of Administration
officials, and then others seem to want to write down whatever some
congressional staffer tells them about how the hearings were created, which
always puzzles me.
QUESTION: On the same subject, but a different aspect, a United Nations
official based in Baghdad reports that the US Navy seized an Iraqi cargo
ship with 15,000 tons of wheat, apparently under the oil-for-food program.
What is that all about?
MR. RUBIN: I've heard that report; I don't have any information on it.
I'll try to get it for you after the briefing.
QUESTION: Also on Iraq, an Iraqi official has been complaining again that
the United States has been delaying medical contracts under the oil-for-
food program.
MR. RUBIN: Again, I don't have any - I think I may have a little bit of
information on this. What tends to happen is that we allow all the food
that we think is appropriate - all the contracts to go through - 99 percent
of them, but there may be problems with one or two where it's either with
companies that we know are involved in weapons of mass destruction or
equipment that we don't regard as medical or other equipment.
I will have to check and find out what the specific hold-up that they're
referring to is. But as I understand it, we've been letting most of the
contracts through and occasionally we have a question and then they re-
examine the paperwork and then we approve it. These statements tend to be,
in our view, designed to publicly question the support of the United States
for feeding the Iraqi people. And I think those of us who have worked on
this have said very clearly for some time that had it not been for the
United States, there would not be billions of dollars worth of food
and medicine in Iraq because it was the United States that started
these programs and started the resolution and these statements are, in our
view, designed to cast doubt on that objective fact.
Same subject?
QUESTION: Different subject.
MR. RUBIN: Let's stick on Iraq.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - Iraqi Kurdish leader is coming to Washington, DC
this week and I believe they are meeting for the US - (inaudible) - to some
peace - (inaudible) -- . Do you have any reaction or do you have --
MR. RUBIN: We will host KDP leader Massoud Barzani for a visit September
9-11. We will host PUK leader Jalal Talibani for a visit September 14-16.
He'd been invited by Deputy Assistant Secretary Welch to visit Washington
when David Welch was in northern Iraq in July. There are four main reasons
for this visit; we want to foster cooperation. Over the past six months,
the Kurdish parties have made excellent progress working together to
resolve practical problems. Since February, they have held more than 20
joint leadership meetings. When David Welch was in northern Iraq in July
both parties asked us to do what we could to encourage this dialogue and
this is part of that process.
In addition, we want to discuss reconciliation. The two relevant parties
have been at peace with each other since November 1997 when we helped to
arrange a cease fire. They may now be ready to make significant progress
towards a permanent reconciliation; one that is fully consistent with
Iraq's territorial integrity.
Thirdly, we want to address humanitarian concerns. In contrast to reports
of problems encountered in government controlled areas of Iraq, in the
north the UN Oil-for-Food Program has made notable progress and food and
medical needs have been addressed, and working together with the UN, the
Kurds are ready to begin rebuilding their infrastructure - schools, roads,
electricity, etc.
We also want to listen to the real voices of the Iraqi people. Both of
these leaders represent the interests of millions of Iraqi Kurds. In
extraordinarily difficult circumstances they are working to cooperate with
the international community and we hope that they will have a chance to
talk to a wide spectrum of people in Washington and real leaders will be
heard from. They are scheduled - the visits for two consecutive weeks and
we are prepared to facilitate leader-to-leader meetings, even though they
are on consecutive weeks, after the two bilateral visits are concluded
if the two sides wish to meet.
QUESTION: In these meetings are there other than the US officials -- for
example, the British and the Turkish officers - do you think that they will
join to these meetings?
MR. RUBIN: I know that those two governments are in regular contact with
us about this issue. I don't know what the roster is for these meetings;
I'm sure that at some point those relevant officials will either be
consulted with or involved. But those are the purposes --
Iraq, are we done with?
QUESTION: Jamie, there was a report this morning about Diplomatic
Security officials fanning out, looking at embassies which may or may not
be having security problems. There was also, in the same report, a
suggestion that the Administration has readied a proposal for Congress
concerning construction or upgrading.
MR. RUBIN: Shortly after the bombings, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
began a worldwide review of security at US diplomatic missions overseas.
This review is still ongoing. As part of the review, Diplomatic Security
teams - six of them - were sent out to conduct firsthand security surveys
of a number of posts. I'm not in a position to name them, but they involve
a couple dozen posts around the world.
These assessment teams arrived back in Washington over the weekend and are
in the process of finishing their security survey reports. Obviously, we're
not going to comment on where they went and what problems they found that
we want to work on; but that is what the status of their work is.
This kind of work, again, is an ongoing process. One is constantly updating
and continuing an effort like this. Security reviews are only one phase of
the comprehensive assessment.
With respect to a proposal for Congress, I do know the Secretary and senior
officials of the Administration have been in close touch with Congress on
different options. I think a final package may go as early as this week.
But they've been briefing members of Congress and their staffs about the
different needs that we have.
Obviously, we want to do all we can to take advantage of the climate that
is very favorable for support for this important function.
QUESTION: How many embassies are closed today?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I asked that question because it has been a month and
it's a little puzzling to me exactly how everything is worded. So I have a
current list that I'd like to share with you as best as I can.
There are five posts that were closed for reasons unrelated to security -
namely the terrorism security issue - namely posts like DROC, Kinshasa;
Congo, Brazzaville; Guinea-Bissau; Somalia; and Sudan. Sudan, again, the
reasons for that closing you're familiar with. But as far as current
situation is concerned, in Eritrea, Ghana and Togo there were ordered
departures in June in Eritrea; in late August in Ghana; and late August in
Togo. This involved changes in the status, but still ensure that there are
operating posts.
Let me emphasize, just because one shifts the exact mix of people and the
pattern of operation doesn't mean we've closed embassies, and we have not.
The word "closed" is a word that we regard as one you should only use if
it's actually closed. You will make that decision, but the people who work
in the State Department feel very strongly that if they're going to go
through the effort of being open for emergency services, that that
should be known. So emergency services are available in Eritrea, Ghana
and Togo.
As far as I understand it, in Africa the rest of the missions are open and
fully staffed. In Latin America all diplomatic missions are open and fully
staffed. In East Asia the same applies. Albania - public operations were
temporarily suspended and there was an ordered departure in August 1998. In
Europe all other diplomatic missions are open. Newly Independent States -
all missions open and fully staffed. Middle East - this list indicates all
missions open and fully staffed. In South Asia, there were ordered
departures from Embassy Islamabad, Consulates Karachi, Lahore and
Peshawar - minimal consular services are available and emergency services
are available. As you know, the Afghani embassy was closed in February
1989. That is the current list as I've been able to put it together. If
there are some words a little wrong because I'm not using the latest lingo,
please bear with me.
QUESTION: On that subject, has there been an incident at the embassy in
South Africa today?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of one.
QUESTION: There were reports of maybe a device in the trash can or
something.
MR. RUBIN: By the way, on that subject, as the people who have been
briefing me indicate, there are regular things that are happening all over
the world. A number of incidents occurred after the bombings of the embassy,
where there were copy-catters and others trying to spook embassies. We have
gone through numerous occasions where calls were made and people tried to
determine and ascertain the seriousness of it. But I had the relevant
people in my office just a short while ago and they didn't mention
anything on South Africa.
QUESTION: On the rearrangements, if you don't want to call them closings,
at the embassies in Africa --
MR. RUBIN: Go ahead, but the reason we don't call them closings is
because there are people there.
QUESTION: Then what do we call them?
MR. RUBIN: We call them adjustments in --
QUESTION: Adjustments - all right, adjustments.
MR. RUBIN: -- adjustments in their posture, but it's a very important
difference; if people are going to be there and are going to do their work
and have a different status from a fully open and fully staffed embassy, it
would be unfortunate if they were regarded as closed.
QUESTION: But these three embassies are rearranged - adjusted due to
security threats?
MR. RUBIN: Their status have been adjusted, yes.
QUESTION: OK. Why - since there's a confrontation situation between
Eritrea and Ethiopia - why did you shift Eritrea and nothing on Ethiopia?
MR. RUBIN: The exact reasons for some of these are not things we normally
talk about publicly, and from the question you've asked it should be
evident that the reason for our action wasn't just because there was a war
between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
QUESTION: Georgian TV - the former Soviet Georgian TV is reporting today
that a Pakistani national was arrested outside of the embassy in Tblisi.
Can you comment on that?
MR. RUBIN: I have no information on that; I'll try to check for you. As
you must've seen over the last month, a lot of this information can come in
real time and it's often difficult to answer it.
QUESTION: The two dozen - or roughly two dozen embassies that were
selected - or countries that were selected around the world - how did they
get on that list? What was the criteria?
MR. RUBIN: I will have to get an expert to answer, but my understanding
is you always have priorities; you have levels of concern that exist and in
an era where you don't have total ability to do everything you want to do,
you have to prioritize. That's based on threat assessments; based on what
the facilities are that are there; based on direct threats that you might
be aware of or reasons to believe that a particular location is more
vulnerable than another. So there are a whole myriad of factors. Clearly
these two dozen or so facilities were ones where, in the current environment
in the aftermath of these bombings, we thought it was appropriate to do a
very hard look. and that's what they're doing.
QUESTION: Is there a chance that these embassies after the reports are
finished this week might be closed?
MR. RUBIN: Well again, closed is, as I've indicated, is a pretty dramatic
step and we tried as best as we can to have embassies open in some form or
another everywhere we can in the world. And so even where we had problems -
security problems - in some of the places I've talked about, they weren't
closed, and so with respect to what might happen with those two dozen
or so embassies, I can't answer because it depends on the judgments. But
what I could say is that that would be a last and extreme measure to close
an embassy.
QUESTION: So in essence they might be moved - the people who were in the
building might be moved --
MR. RUBIN: Adjustments - adjustments are made all the time; I've been at
places where one thought that a particular location involved some risk, and
the security officers adjusted their patterns so people came in from
different entrances. So it's not a simple question of do you move the
building; there are procedures that can be adjusted to avoid the need to
move buildings. There can be adjustments of which type of services are in
which type of buildings where you think that those places where Americans
are would be more likely to be threatened, et cetera. So you make
a whole series of judgments, and I just can't speculate as to what the
final ones will be on that one.
QUESTION: One of your larger forthcoming building projects is moving the
embassy that's in Bonn to Berlin. That's a fairly - you have a model of the
proposed structure downstairs. What's the status of that project?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to check; I don't have a --
QUESTION: New issue?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, go ahead.
QUESTION: Okay. Thank you. On the issue of North Korea and Japan --
especially the missile launch over Japan - what's the United States' take?
Could this have been an accident or a satellite launch or was this just a
premeditated show of force? Or do we know yet?
MR. RUBIN: On the subject of North Korea, we have had a series of
meetings going on in New York over the last week. The delegations have
returned to Washington to report on the status of the talks to our
leadership, to the Congress and to our allies. The DPRK Vice Foreign
Minister returned to Pyongyang on Monday to report to his government.
In these talks, what we've been trying to do is to seek concrete steps to
assure that there is full compliance with all aspects of the agreed
framework. This is absolutely essential. We have also sought to make
progress on a number of other issues of bilateral and regional concern,
including missile proliferation, terrorism and a resumption of talks aimed
at reducing tensions and achieving a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.
The talks have made progress on a number of these issues, but I'm not in a
position to discuss the details. Let me emphasize that those are the broad
areas and some of the specific objectives that we had.
With respect to the missile test, obviously our people have been assessing
this and as best as I understand it, the people who assess this have not
been able to confirm North Korean assertions that it launched a small
satellite on August 31, 1998. They have not observed any object orbiting
the Earth that correlates to the orbital data the North Koreans have
provided in their public statements, nor have they observed any new object
orbiting the Earth in an orbital path that could relate to the North
Korean claims.
Obviously we're continuing to look at this; it's an important question as
to whether or not there was a satellite launched. Nevertheless, there was a
missile launched that demonstrated the capability to deliver a payload at
very long range. So that was the matter of concern in combination with the
North Koreans' active missile program and previous missile tests that we've
seen.
With respect again to the question you've asked, what I've tried to do is
be as specific as I can. We cannot confirm the presence of a satellite
orbiting in the path that the North Koreans said there should be, nor were
we able to observe any satellite being released during this missile test.
We are continuing to watch the situation closely; obviously we want to get
to the bottom of this question and we'll continue to work it as best we
can.
QUESTION: Isn't it normal to have some kind of notice to give - some kind
of notice if you're going to launch a satellite --
MR. RUBIN: I'm not an expert in this area. I'd have to --
QUESTION: -- any kind of missile over somebody else's airspace?
MR. RUBIN: There is a NOTAM* -- a notice to mariners -- and I believe
that was done. But as far as the requirements for notifying about space
launches, I just don't know.
QUESTION: And harm to the KEDO program?
MR. RUBIN: In fact, if I could be - my guess would be that there is no
organization that purports to control who or release information about
space.
QUESTION: But it would be termed or deemed a hostile act to do so without
notice?
MR. RUBIN: I think we've spoken very clearly on what we think about that
test.
QUESTION: What you're saying is that it could've been a satellite launch
but it didn't successfully go into orbit.
MR. RUBIN: I don't want to myself draw conclusions. What I'm trying to
give you is the best evidence we have. My understanding is there isn't a
conclusion yet. The evidence is that there was nothing released that we can
see or saw, and there is nothing that is now orbiting that we can see or
saw. So that is what we know. It's an important question and we're going to
continue to study it carefully; and there are, therefore, several
possible explanations that ensue. But I want to tell you what we know
and that's what we know. We haven't been able to confirm that.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - meeting - US-North Korea?
MR. RUBIN: I think I just spoke to that when I indicated that there have
been a series of meetings; that progress was achieved at those meetings,
both with the specific objective I indicated of making sure that we've done
- that we're seeking concrete steps to assure that there's full compliance
with all aspects of the agreed framework with North Korea and that the
other subjects - missile proliferation, bilateral issues, terrorism and the
four-party talks - get back on track. That is both the procedural
agenda and one of the substantive points. Progress was made and consultations
are now going on in Washington and with our allies. But with respect to any
agreement, all I can tell you is that progress was made and we are now
discussing at the political level what work was done.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - further meetings?
MR. RUBIN: No.
QUESTION: What's the relationship between the full compliance with the
framework accord and the launching of the missile if it has no nuclear --
MR. RUBIN: Well, the agreed framework is with respect to nuclear
materials, nuclear reprocessing, nuclear reactors and not missiles. That
doesn't mean we don't have a very strong and powerful interest in trying to
get North Korea to control itself when it comes to both its own missile
capability and anything it might export. But it doesn't, at a negotiating
level, have a - there is nothing in the agreed framework about missiles
other than that we should talk about missiles. It may have been at
the back end somewhere that we should talk about it.
QUESTION: I was just wondering if there was a US view on Kim Jung-Il
being elected the Chairman of the National Defense Committee, and if
there's any concern that this is having any more weight on the military
side of the society.
MR. RUBIN: The United States notes that Kim Jung-Il is already commander-
in-chief of the Korean People's Army and Secretary General of the Korean
Workers Party. He has also been named to the Chairman of the DPRK's
National Defense Commission.
I'm not going to speculate about the meaning of this decision. We have
believed and continue to believe that Kim Jung-Il is in charge of the
government there.
QUESTION: In Cambodia, yesterday, the army used gunfire to break up a
demonstration that was protesting the results of the election. There were
reports of, I think at least one or two persons killed and several more
wounded. Does the government have any statement?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I have a lot of information on the facts there, and we
can probably give you some of that off-camera. But as far as our view on it,
our ambassador has been in contact with all the parties to head off further
violence. The embassy has issued a message to American citizens to avoid
the demonstration areas where this violence took place. We deplore the
widespread use of violence in Cambodia, particularly the recent grenade
attacks on Hun Sen's residence and at a protest led by Sam Rainsy at
the Ministry of Interior.
We deplore the use of racist rhetoric which inspired the killing of five
ethnic Vietnamese, and we also deplore the use of force by the Cambodian
Government in breaking up demonstrations, denying opposition parties their
freedom of expression. It is time for the Cambodian political crisis to be
resolved in a non-violent manner through dialogue. We urge the parties to
conduct their activities in accordance with those principles.
QUESTION: It sounds like, from your comments, that you really see the
opposition as the main catalyst in all of this violence. Is that where the
blame is?
MR. RUBIN: No, no, the violence is the use of force by the government in -
we believe these people have the right to freedom of expression. They
should be able to protest, and we deplore the use of force by the Cambodian
Government. So on the contrary, with respect to how you resolve the crisis
politically -- as opposed to the question of whether people have the
right to protest - we think that they all need to take this opportunity
to talk and to resolve it.
QUESTION: Can you preview her speech tomorrow - the Secretary's
speech?
MR. RUBIN: Broadly speaking, it will be a security-oriented speech. It
will include discussion of Iraq; it will include discussion of the threat
of terrorism and the threat of missile proliferation.
QUESTION: Do you have anything new in any policy --
MR. RUBIN: That will be for you to judge; you're the journalists. You get
to make all the judgments - write it down, put it on the air - we just are
here to help.
QUESTION: This is on Colombia. There have been some reports on a couple
of agreements that the leader of the FARC President Pastrana went through.
One of them is supposedly President Pastrana has agreed not to touch the
coca leaf growers --
MR. RUBIN: I've heard a little bit about this, I'm not just fully
familiar with it after a very long absence. I'd encourage you to speak to
my deputy, Mr. McClenny, after the briefing.
QUESTION: On camera later?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, sure.
QUESTION: Yes, a follow-up -- what happens if that's true; and what
impact would it have - that decision?
MR. RUBIN: I'd recommend, again, that you put that to Mr. McClenny.
QUESTION: Comments about the liberation of American citizens through the
weekend from guerrillas?
MR. RUBIN: The gentleman who was freed, you're talking about?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. RUBIN: We obviously are pleased that he is free. As far as the
specifics of it, Mr. McClenny will get that for you.
QUESTION: Okay, thank you.
QUESTION: Just a quick one -- has the Secretary signed off on the sale of
armored personnel carriers and riot gear to Turkey?
MR. RUBIN: I've heard that that issue is under active review, and I don't
think any decision has been made.
QUESTION: By the Secretary?
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: And would that not represent something of a change since
countries that you find have human rights problems aren't supposed to get
riot gear and such?
MR. RUBIN: The specifics of this are very complex and I'd rather give you
a considered answer. With respect to the state of the decision-making, it's
under active review on the seventh floor.
QUESTION: Two human rights questions - a very quick one and one to take.
An American-Palestinian citizen has been held since August 18 by the
Israelis and apparently has been subjected to torture. It took ten days for
the embassy to get to him; he's been shifted to Ashkelon and his incarceration
without charges has been extended for 30 days. Could you give me a report
on that?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I'll get one for you.
QUESTION: And secondly, concerning the visit of the Turkish Prime
Minister to Israel today, Israel and Turkey are saying that one of the
reasons for the alliance and axis -- which Netanyahu got into some problems
in using that term with the Turkish military because they don't like that
term with regard to their relations with the Arab states. He said one of
the reasons for it - the Turkish Prime Minister said in Jordan - was
because of the fact that seven European countries are now sanctioning
military sales to Turkey and we have some reservations ourselves. Would you
comment on the Turkish --
MR. RUBIN: I'd have to look into the background of that. I will try to
get an answer for you.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 2:30 P.M.)
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