U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #96, 98-08-06
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
935
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Thursday, August 6, 1998
Briefer: James B. Foley
STATEMENTS
1 Ethiopia: Expulsions of Eritreans
IRAQ
1-2 Chairman Butler's Report to Security Council Today
1,2-3 Memorandum of Understanding Between Iraq and UN Secretary
General
2,3 Iraqi Behavior and Compliance
3 MOU and Oil For Food Program
4-5 Prospects for Use of Force
5 Chairman Butler and UNSCOM Team Performance
5-6 Prospects for Lifting Sanctions
SERBIA (Kosovo)
6 Secretary Albright's Message to President Milosevic
6-7 Prospects for Military Intervention
7 Ambassador Holbrooke's Comments re Cooperation
BOSNIA
7-10 German Refugee Policy/Return of Bosnian Refugees
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
10 Palestinian Authority's Cabinet
10-11 Secretary Albright's Conversations with PM Netanyahu and
Chairman Arafat
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
11-12 Reports of Two American Oil Company Workers Kidnapped
12 Status of Departure of Americans
12 Situation in Kinshasa
12-13 Rwandan Troop Deployments
CAMBODIA
13 Update on Election Results
CHINA
13-14 Reported Warning to US re Taiwan
KOREAS
14 US-Republic of Korea Non-Proliferation Task Force Meeting
COLOMBIA
14-15 US Meetings with President-Elect Pastrana
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #96
THURSDAY, AUGUST 6, 1998, 1:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. FOLEY: Good afternoon, later than usual; I apologize. Welcome to the
State Department. I have no announcements to announce; but I do have an
announcement that we'll post after the briefing concerning the expulsions
of Eritreans from Ethiopia by which the US Government is expressing
concern.
With that, George, I'll go to your questions.
QUESTION: The White House is saying that the announcement yesterday by
the Iraqis is totally unacceptable; but Mr. Butler says he doesn't see a
crisis situation developing. I suppose those two statements aren't mutually
exclusive, but could you shed some light --
MR. FOLEY: Are not, did you say?
QUESTION: Are not mutually exclusive. Could you shed some light on what
the thinking is here?
MR. FOLEY: We're not calling it a crisis at the moment simply because the
events have just happened in the last 24 hours, and we're certainly going
to need time to digest the latest events and to analyze them. In particular,
we want to see the results of Chairman Butler's report to the Security
Council today; we want to consult with other members of the Security
Council to determine how the international community is going to respond.
I think one cardinal point, though, to keep in mind is that if you read the
statements coming out of Baghdad yesterday, there is an obvious effort -
and it's not the first time - on the part of the Iraqis to characterize
this as a confrontation between Iraq and the United States; and we
categorically reject that characterization. The fact of the matter is that
the confrontation, if there is one, is between Iraq and the UN. Iraq is
subject to Security Council resolutions; Iraq signed a Memorandum of
Understanding earlier this year with the Secretary General of the United
Nations; Iraq is apparently reneging on its commitments to the Secretary
General. So it is decidedly an issue, in the first instance, between
Iraq and the United Nations.
But just to review where we are today - and I would caution you that we
won't be making definitive characterizations today in advance of completion
of the Security Council meeting with Ambassador Butler. But what I can say
is that clearly, the Iraqi action does violate the February 23 Memorandum
of Understanding signed by Secretary General Annan and Iraq. It also
violates Security Council resolutions, including 687 and 1154.
Clearly the Iraqi goal is to force the international community to abandon
the sanctions regime created in 1990. The Iraqi leadership wants to regain
control of Iraq's economy without disarming. As we've always said, they
want to have their cake and eat it too - to retain their weapons of mass
destruction programs and escape from UN sanctions. They can't have it both
ways. That's been the case since the end of the Gulf War and that's not
going to change. The aim of the international community is to face the
Iraqi leadership with that stark choice: the need, if they want to see
sanctions lifted, to definitively abandon their programs of weapons of
mass destruction and that is not going to change.
We will not allow Iraq to succeed in breaking the sanctions. We will oppose
any change in the sanctions regime until Iraq fully complies. We are
confident that we will have the international support necessary to achieve
this aim.
QUESTION: Does the United States believe that this is just Iraqi behavior
as usual and Iraq's trying to call the UN's bluff and the international
community's bluff again and playing a game of chicken, if you will?
MR. FOLEY: Certainly, it's part of a pattern. We've seen this time and
again. I think the conclusion is inescapable -- we've certainly reached
that conclusion on previous occasions - that Saddam Hussein does not want
to give up his programs of weapons of mass destruction; for various reasons,
these programs are dear to him. At the same time, he abhors the sanctions
regime. The sanctions regime has succeeded in keeping him in his box,
keeping him from threatening his neighbors, keeping him from overcoming the
isolation that his invasion of Kuwait brought upon him in his regime.
So certainly from time to time, he does try to challenge the inspection
regime and try to provoke crises with the hope that the support for the
sanctions regime will diminish or that the sanctions regime will be
overcome. But again, he does this from time to time, having failed in the
interim, to come clean on his weapons of mass destruction. I think it is
always a risky business to try to put yourself in Saddam Hussein's head to
try to analyze whether this is someone operating on a rational basis.
Certainly his aims are clear-cut: he wants to get out from under sanctions.
But why he chooses a particular moment to do what he has done on previous
occasions is difficult to gauge.
I think we can expect erratic behavior, unpredictable behavior on his part;
but what we ought to expect from the international community -- what I can
assure you you can count on from the United States - is steadiness of
purpose. We are going to ensure that the sanctions regime remains in place
and that the status quo does not change, absent real compliance on the part
of Iraq.
I think it's only speculative at this point, but clearly, Secretary General
Annan's agreement -- the Memorandum of Understanding reached with Iraq back
in February - put Iraq on the spot. If you'll recall, the United States
applauded the Secretary General's efforts, supported the Memorandum of
Understanding because it called for compliance on Iraq's part with UN
Security Council resolutions. But we also made the additional point that we
felt that the Memorandum of Understanding needed to be tested to test
Iraq's bona fides, its willingness to comply.
Chairman Butler of UNSCOM actually put Iraq to an honest test by offering
an accelerated work program plan of action by which Iraq would have the
opportunity to answer the remaining questions; to allow UNSCOM to verify
the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction; and, therefore, enable
and accelerate consideration of the lifting of sanctions.
I think, again, it's speculative at this point, but the fact is that they
were put to the test, and that's a test that Iraq is clearly unwilling to
meet and to pass; and having been placed in that position perhaps explains
why yet again, as you say, not for the first time Saddam is trying to
provoke a crisis.
QUESTION: Jim, just real quickly, does it seem to you - to the US - that
he's more obstinate this time around than he has been, let's say, in
February?
MR. FOLEY: It's too early to say.
QUESTION: What could he gain? Is he trying to gain time to hide the
evidence, say of his warheads and his - the gases that have been analyzed
in those warheads or what?
MR. FOLEY: Again, it's only speculation at this point. It would seem, on
the basis of this having happened many times before, that his aim is to
escape from sanctions. He's sick and tired of the isolation; he's sick and
tired of the inability of the Iraqi regime to rebuild its power potential -
its power projection potential; he wants to flex his muscles and re-enter
the international stage. That seems to be what's behind this, as also
behind previous occasions of recalcitrance.
QUESTION: Is there any direct link between the oil-for-food deal and his
living up to the MOU?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not sure I understand the question.
QUESTION: Well, in other words, if he does scrap the Memorandum of
Understanding, is it still possible that the oil-for-food operation could
continue separately?
MR. FOLEY: I'd want to check before giving you a definitive answer; I'll
give you what my understanding is, which is that that program will continue,
because we always maintained that the oil-for-food program was a separate
issue from the inspections regime, from the overall sanctions regime. We
regarded the humanitarian plight and needs of the Iraqi people as an
imperative that we needed to respond to, and that the Iraqi people indeed
should not be punished for Saddam Hussein's misbehavior and worse
on the international scene. So my understanding is that the oil-for-
food program will continue.
Of course it's a carefully monitored program; it's a program that ensures
that while on the one hand, humanitarian assistance, food and medicine is
able to go to especially Iraqis in need - pregnant women, children, the
elderly and across the board - at the same time that those moneys are
carefully monitored by the United Nations to ensure that there is not
diversion to Saddam Hussein's weapons programs or other unjustified
ends.
QUESTION: You've said that we're not in a crisis yet. Before Mr. Annan's
visit to Baghdad in February, the aircraft carriers were on station in the
Gulf all prepared to act. Will you draw a comparison between now and then;
what are the differences now?
MR. FOLEY: I think the difference now is simply that we're only 24 hours
into the situation created by the Iraqi announcement. As I said, our focus
now is on the United Nations, is on the Security Council and what we,
together with our friends on the Security Council, decide to do in
response. It's too early to say what those responses might be.
But we're not calling it a crisis because, frankly, we don't want to play
into Saddam Hussein's hands. Clearly, he's in a box; he's trying to squirm
his way out; he's trying to provoke a crisis, provoke some kind of a
response that he thinks would allow him to create diversions and perhaps
lessen support for the sanctions, which is, again, his aim - namely, to get
the sanctions removed.
We're certainly not going to play into his hands. We're going to ensure
that we have the capability - and we do have the capability, a robust one -
in the Gulf, which is superior to the force levels and capabilities we had
there before the last crisis, last fall. We're going to ensure we have what
we need to meet any contingency if we deem there to be a threat to our
interests or a threat to Iraq's neighbors. So we certainly don't rule out
any options. But we're going to take this cautiously. We're going to act
in a way and in a pace that's in conformity with our interests; and
we're not going to allow Saddam Hussein to call the shots or to dictate our
moves.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - what you were saying there about the forces that
we have on hand. Are you saying that the forces that the United States has
on hand in the Gulf are equivalent to what were there in February or
whenever that was?
MR. FOLEY: No, I didn't say that. I said they were superior to what was
there before the crisis - the last crisis occurred, beginning in October.
We had a subsequent build-up, and there have been force adjustments. But my
understanding is that the residual force in the region is indeed more
powerful than that which we had prior to last October and November. We
certainly have an extra strike capacity. I refer you, though, to the
Pentagon for the actual details.
QUESTION: I will ask them, but do you know if it includes a carrier task
force?
MR. FOLEY: Yes, it does.
QUESTION: Jim, you talked about steadiness of purpose and you don't want
to call this a crisis; but in the past, the US has essentially been forced
to play into his hand by responding on more than one occasion - not just
last winter. How do you refrain from doing that without --
MR. FOLEY: Well, you've seen, certainly, that in various and previous
crises, we've had to build up our forces in the Gulf. What we have done is
to ensure, following the last crisis - diffused by Kofi Annan's agreement
in Baghdad - we've ensured that we maintained, while coming down from those
high levels, that we've maintained a capability, as I said, superior to
what was there in firepower prior to last fall. So we maintain the range of
options that we can turn to if necessary on short notice.
QUESTION: Notwithstanding that answer and notwithstanding your finely
worded statement that you're not letting him call the shots, it still is a
reactive policy, is it not? I mean, the amount of force you have in the
region now is not greater than what you had after the build-up; it perhaps
is greater than what it was before the build-up, but --
MR. FOLEY: I think, Charlie, that the key element is the strike
capability that we have there. I'd have to refer you to the Pentagon for
the specifics, but the President has assured that we have a real-time
capability to respond to any contingencies that could occur in real time.
We certainly have reinforcement capabilities as well. But the point about
reactive, I would argue the contrary. I think that our policy, dating back
to the end of the Gulf War, spanning two Administrations has been
steady. The key element is the sanctions regime and the willingness
of the international community to back up the sanctions regime. That's
what's put Saddam in isolation; what's kept him in a box; and which has not
varied. He has reacted - and I say that he's been the reactive one from
time to time - to try to escape this. He has never succeeded in escaping
the containment that we've successfully maintained; and that is not going
to change in the current circumstances either.
Other questions on this issue?
QUESTION: You said that the US is confident of the support of its allies.
What do you think of the Russian comments putting part of the blame on
Richard Butler for this crisis?
MR. FOLEY: We have full confidence in Chairman Butler and the UNSCOM
staff. They have proven themselves to be professional, objective and
dispassionate disarmament experts. We have full confidence in both Chairman
Butler and his UNSCOM team.
We think that, indeed, Chairman Butler has gone the extra mile to lay out a
work plan and the possibility -- and he's been explicit on this - a road
map that could lead Iraq to the lifting of sanctions if they made that
existential decision to give up their weapons of mass destruction programs.
We've not seen any indication on the Security Council of any nation
questioning the need for Saddam Hussein to give up his weapons of mass
destruction before there is a consideration of the lifting of sanctions.
QUESTION: One more. What is the likelihood now, considering this
confrontation, of a lifting of the sanctions the next time they come up for
review in October?
MR. FOLEY: Well, it's obvious that if Saddam Hussein is arresting
cooperation with UNSCOM or in some ways trying to subvert the UNSCOM regime
or stopping inspections -- we understand that there is some willingness to
allow ongoing monitoring, but that is obviously willfully insufficient -
but if he's arresting the continuation of the inspection regime, then he
has succeeded, in one sense, in delaying the possibility that sanctions
relief will be considered. And that is not the first time that he
has acted contrary to his stated interests.
But again, I think this is understandable if you go back to the premise
with which I began my response, which is that he wants sanctions relief,
but he wants to keep his weapons of mass destruction programs. Until he has
solved that conundrum, he will only find the prospect of sanctions relief
moving further into the distant future.
QUESTION: New subject - has the Secretary sent President Milosevic of
Yugoslavia a message warning that he could face NATO air strikes if he
doesn't back off in Kosovo?
MR. FOLEY: There were, I believe, press reports concerning a letter that
were untrue. There was not actually a letter that Ambassador Hill delivered
to President Milosevic yesterday; there didn't need to be a letter. The
question is not the vehicle, the question is the message. I can tell you it
was a very forceful message in which the Secretary expressed her shock and
dismay over the effects of the ongoing Serb military offensive in
Kosovo in which she, through Ambassador Hill, talked about the imperative
need to end the offensive actions; to allow Kosovar Albanian displaced
persons to return to their homes; to allow humanitarian agencies, non-
governmental organizations access to displaced persons, to civilians, to do
their humanitarian work.
Ambassador Hill conveyed to Mr. Milosevic Secretary Albright's strong view
that the ongoing Serb offensive and the unacceptable actions that have
taken place in the context of that offensive only increase the chances of
there being military action on the part of NATO; it increases the heat on
him -- President Milosevic. Ambassador Hill conveyed that warning in very
clear terms to President Milosevic - that he is increasing the possibility
of Western military intervention unless he halts the offensive, allows
displaced persons to return to their homes, allows them to receive
humanitarian aid, allows humanitarian access and creates the environment
necessary for negotiations to start and go forward with the prospect
of success.
QUESTION: Can I follow up on that? Are we still saying that Milosevic -
that the Serbian troops should also withdraw from Kosovo?
MR. FOLEY: Well, that has been a demand of the international community in
the form of the Contact Group going back many months, and that hasn't
changed.
QUESTION: And one further thing on that - NATO, according to some
analysts - the Kosovar Albanians are looking at the prospect of NATO
military involvement as a chance for them to actually gain a move toward
independence. They're sort of leaning on this NATO, rightly or wrongly,
looking at the NATO possibility of involvement as a sort of green light for
their independence movement. How do you respond to those --
MR. FOLEY: Wrongly. We do not seek military intervention; we seek a
diplomatic solution. Ambassador Hill's highest priority at the moment, in
addition to trying to ensure that the humanitarian situation is urgently
addressed, his highest priority is to do whatever he needs to do on both
the Serb and the Kosovar Albanian side to get negotiations started. We want
to see those negotiations take place, and to see them succeed. We do think
that there's a chance that this can happen, provided that the Serb
offensive ends and that President Milosevic creates the environment
conducive to negotiations.
I can't, for obvious, reasons, talk about scenarios of military intervention.
Certainly NATO is currently looking at a range of options to develop
flexible ways to use air power, for example, with the aim of ensuring that
we can meet any contingencies and to remind Mr. Milosevic that, indeed,
military action will be forthcoming if there's not an improvement. But I
can't describe what form it would take and what the timing would be; but I
can say that it would aim to support the political and diplomatic
objectives of the international community, which do not include independence
for Kosovo.
QUESTION: Jim, Dick Holbrooke said last night that one of the missing
factors that is making it difficult, he says Milosevic wants to cooperate,
he wants to negotiate, but there's such disarray and division among the
Kosovars in finding some representative group of people who can negotiate
with Milosevic. Does the State Department see Mr. Holbrooke as being right
on about this?
MR. FOLEY: I would say two things about that. First of all, President
Milosevic has said that he's willing to negotiate. That is somewhat
encouraging; it's belied by the actions of the Serb military and police
forces currently in Kosovo. On the Kosovar Albanian side, Ambassador Hill
is working very hard. I believe he's gone back to Pristina today - I'm
sorry, he's in Skopje today, and he'll be going to Pristina tomorrow for
intensive political discussions, the aim of which is indeed to try to help
the Kosovar Albanians put together a negotiating team that's an effective
one, that represents all Albanians, that can take decisions and can move
towards peace.
It's not an easy effort, but he achieved some progress, I believe, in the
last week or so. There is what looks like an agreement in principle; the
devil is in the details, and he's working on them. But he's working hard,
and we're hopeful that we can succeed on that side. But the chances of
success are dimmed by the ongoing Serb actions in Kosovo, which have to
stop. That is our number-one priority at the moment.
QUESTION: New subject. I think you're familiar with the --
MR. FOLEY: I'm ready for you.
QUESTION: Good - the exchange between Germany and the United States on
the US allegations that Germany is dumping Bosnians and therefore spoiling
chances for democratic transition in the September elections. Anyway, the
German Interior Minister is back and he's saying that the US accusations of
dumping and coercive repatriations are absurd, and that in fact --
MR. FOLEY: Is this a quote from today or --
QUESTION: This is today. Yesterday was the --
MR. FOLEY: I've not seen that.
QUESTION: -- Commissioner for Refugees; today is the Interior Minister.
MR. FOLEY: I've not seen those comments.
QUESTION: Anyway, he's saying that Germany's policy is still one of
voluntary return. Do you have evidence that there has been coercive
repatriation by Germany of Bosnian refugees, so-called "dumping"?
MR. FOLEY: I have kind of a long answer for you. Let me make, as a
preliminary point, what is an important point, which is that Germany has
been extremely generous in hosting large numbers of refugees from the
former Yugoslavia and providing substantial humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance. Germany has accepted more refugees from the former Yugoslavia -
a total of approximately 450,000 - than any other country. Of these,
approximately 350,000 came from Bosnia. Over time, many have voluntarily
returned. So far this year, 75,0000 Bosnian refugees have returned from
Germany - 25,000 in July alone. About 140,000 currently remain in
Germany. Most of these are from areas where they would now be in the
ethnic minority were they to return.
We have expressed our concern to the German Government regarding the policy
of returning Bosnian refugees to areas other than their original homes by a
combination of time-limited financial incentives and, in some cases, direct
deportation. I don't have figures for you on that, but I have talked to our
experts on the matter and am assured that there have been instances of
direct deportation.
There is, however, a heavy incentive policy. I think that, as you'll see as
I continue my remarks, our concern is about more than the modalities of
their return; it's about where they're going and the effect of their
return. So I think our focus is a little different. This policy appears to
be at variance with the internationally agreed-upon policy of facilitating
the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes of origin.
The UN High Commission on Refugees, the High Representative in Bosnia, Mr.
Westendorp, and the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina have all expressed
similar concerns on this issue. These are not United States concerns as
such.
International policy set by the Peace Implementation Council, the High
Representative and the UNHCR is clear: refugees and displaced persons
should be able to return to their original homes. Our particular concern at
the moment is that uncoordinated refugee returns could impede our peace
implementation efforts in two ways. First, refugees returning to areas
other than their original homes often take up residence in the homes of
other refugees or displaced persons, undermining our efforts to facilitate
minority returns and rebuild multi-ethnic communities. Secondly, returnees
are often not properly registered in their temporary residences for
the upcoming elections, which has been leading to problems for the OSCE
elections supervision effort.
Germany is a key partner with whom we cooperate across the board on a full
range of policy issues. We have worked together closely in Bosnia, where we
have had considerable successes. We certainly share Germany's interest in
helping refugees return home as quickly as possible, and appreciate greatly
Germany's humanitarian assistance to refugees in Germany and in Bosnia. We
will continue to work closely and in cooperation with the German Government
on this issue. We hope sincerely that the German Government will review
its policy in light of the concerns that we and others have expressed and
coordinate the refugee return process very effectively with the UNHCR, the
Office of the High Representative and the Bosnian Government.
QUESTION: Specifically, do you have independent evidence that the Germans
are doing what you say they are doing?
MR. FOLEY: I answered that question.
QUESTION: Would you provide numbers?
MR. FOLEY: As I said, we understand that about 75,000 Bosnian refugees
have returned from Germany this year so far through August 6; and of these,
about 25,000 in July - a pretty significant number in July.
QUESTION: Yes, but are they coercive, non-voluntary?
MR. FOLEY: I did, if you'll check my remarks, answer that. As I just
mentioned to Jim, what we've said is that there's a time-limited financial
incentive program, and there have been instances of direct deportation as
well. I don't have figures for you as I indicated.
QUESTION: This is complicated and I want to make sure I get it right.
Again, quoting the German Interior Minister -- and if you don't have a
direct response for this, maybe you could get one. He says that of the 75,
000 refugees returned to Bosnia in the first seven months of this year,
only 1,200 were forcibly expelled and most of those had been convicted
criminals. Does that agree with -
MR. FOLEY: I thought you were questioning my statement that there were
forcible returns.
QUESTION: Well, he says that there were 1,200 but those were special
exception cases - convicted criminals basically.
MR. FOLEY: As I said, I don't have the figures for you, but I think our
point, as I indicated, is not the focus on the modalities of their return,
but rather on the effect of the return of displaced persons and refugees to
areas which are not their original homes; that what needs - after all, we
understand Germany's concern and the burden - the heavy burden that they've
borne - a heavier burden than anyone else. We understand their desire
to deal with this problem. But Germany, as do we and other members of the
international community, have an equal stake in the kind of Bosnia that we
hope to leave behind at the end of the international involvement there.
The aim is a single Bosnia-Herzegovina with two multi-ethnic entities.
Actions which are uncoordinated, which send refugees not to their original
homes but rather to places where they are in a majority and complicate the
efforts to return other minorities to those places play into the hands of
the hard-liners and move us away from the creation of a truly single Bosnia
with two truly multi-ethnic entities. We think what needs to be done is to
achieve a phased and orderly return process. We want to work with the
German Government and with others on this.
This is really maybe the single most challenging aspect remaining in the
area of Dayton implementation is refugee returns. It's not an easy issue;
it requires working with the entities and the governments involved and we
hope to make progress on this, but we're not going to be able to make
progress on this if we further add to the problem of displaced people not
returning to their homes of origin.
QUESTION: I have one final question. Did the Secretary take this up with
Gerhard Schroeder yesterday in their meeting?
MR. FOLEY: The issue did come up, yes.
QUESTION: The Palestinian Education Minister, Hanan Ashwari, resigned, as
you know, I'm sure; and she criticized Arafat for what she cited as
corruption in his government and also the lack of progress in the peace
process. What does the United States think about her resignation and do you
feel as though it's going to harm what work -
MR. FOLEY: There has been a formation of a new Palestinian Authority
Cabinet, and our view is that this is an internal matter for the Palestinians
to decide. I wouldn't have any comment on the revised cabinet or on any
particular cabinet member or former cabinet member.
QUESTION: Democratic Republic of Congo -
MR. FOLEY: Do we have anything more on the Middle East?
QUESTION: Can you tell us what's happening as far as the US is concerned
with the talks; and also bring us up to date on any conversations that the
Secretary has had with either the Prime Minister or the Chairman?
MR. FOLEY: Secretary Albright has spoken to both Chairman Arafat and
Prime Minister Netanyahu in the last few days or so. These were useful
conversations in which she urged both leaders to make additional efforts to
achieve an agreement. We certainly think it is important that they do so.
We are trying to get an agreement which would enable resumption of
permanent status talks. If we conclude that this is not possible, we will
say so and explain why; but we're not there yet fortunately.
We believe it is still possible to reach agreement. I would characterize
the conversations as positive in the sense that there's a belief on all
sides that while differences remain and differences have not been bridged,
it is yet within their grasp to reach agreement and to eliminate those
differences. So the Secretary urged them to keep at it; they agreed to keep
at it; and we have no substantive news to report. We're keeping our eye on
it; we're staying in touch with both sides in order to determine whether an
agreement can or cannot be reached and if we reach the conclusion that
an agreement can't be reached, we will say so; but we're not there
yet.
QUESTION: Do you agree with reports in the Israeli press that the
conversation with Prime Minister Netanyahu was less than friendly?
MR. FOLEY: I can't characterize the private conversation between
Secretary Albright and Prime Minister Netanyahu. We don't have illusions
that though the gaps are not large, that they may turn out to be unbridgeable.
That would be unfortunate, but we'll draw the necessary conclusions if that
is the case.
We have not concluded that agreement can't be reached. The Secretary thinks
that if they keep at it, they make concrete proposals, they deal with each
other directly, that it is still possible to close those remaining gaps.
But I can't give you a forecast. We're not abandoning this current phase of
our effort, but we're not far from declaring our judgment on it. But don't
ask me when, in terms of hours or days. Obviously we're in the end phase
of our current effort, but we want to see them reach agreement. That's
what's important, not the procedure, not what we say or do; it's important
that they reach agreement and it is still possible.
QUESTION: Did they agree to have another meeting?
MR. FOLEY: I can't comment on the substance of their talks. The Secretary
urged them to keep at it, in the vernacular, as I said, and that's our
understanding of what they're going to do.
QUESTION: Is it okay to change the subject?
MR. FOLEY: It's okay with me.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Your assessment of the latest events in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, and the capture today of two American workers who work for the
Chevron Corporation - do you know anything about that, if they're still
alive? And my two-fold question would be, James Rubin has called the DRC a
strategic location because of its oil and mineral resources. Is that worth
a continued US economic presence there, despite the violence?
MR. FOLEY: We consider, as Mr. Rubin said the other day, that the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is a strategically important country in
Africa - not only because of its mineral resources, but because of its
human potential and because of its size and its potential impact on
surrounding countries. So I wouldn't reduce it to one element.
Your report about Chevron employees being in danger or kidnapped is not
something that I've heard, so it's something that we'll look into after the
briefing and get back to you if we have anything. We're very concerned
about the security of Americans - that's our number-one concern everywhere
in the world. We issued an announcement, I believe, a couple days ago
advising Americans not to travel there, advising Americans - this was a
travel warning issued on August 5 - Americans to depart the country if they
are able to do so. The embassy is in contact with the American community
through the warden network. What I can tell you is that today the
airport remains open. There was, I think, a Sabina flight that took
out about 25 - is that right - American Embassy personnel and dependents.
Thus far, only about 15 to 20 private Americans have expressed a desire to
leave. Again, we're urging them to leave; we're in communication with them
and communicating to them the possibilities of leaving. There are about 500
private Americans in the Democratic Republic of Congo - about 300 are in
Kinshasa, 200 in the provinces. Again, we're continuing to make, through
our embassy, arrangements for the ordered departure of all embassy family
members and employees in non-emergency positions from the Democratic
Republic of Congo. The departing employees are headed for the US, but the
plans of private American citizens departing are unknown. American
citizens are not obligated to inform the embassy of their destination,
but are encouraged to do so if they depart.
As to the situation itself, our information is that Kinshasa remains tense;
however, no gunfire was reported today in the city. The government has
reportedly lifted the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew, which has been in
effect since Monday. Our embassy reports that Congolese of Tutsi origin are
being rounded up in Kinshasa and taken to various holding areas. You'll
have noted a statement that I issued last evening in which the United
States expresses our concern about the deteriorating security situation -
in particular urging the government in Kinshasa to afford the necessary
rights and protections to all Congolese citizens and to resolve the
internal situation by peaceful means.
Clashes between Tutsi and non-Tutsi military forces continue in Eastern and
Southwestern Congo, including Kisangani and Kitona. I think you'll have
noted also in the statement that I issued yesterday that we reported our
concern over reports that Rwandan troops are involved in military
operations in support of the Congolese military rebellion against President
Kabila. I reiterate what we said yesterday, which is to urge all countries
in the region to respect the territorial integrity of the Congo, refrain
from becoming involved in the conflict and respect international law.
QUESTION: Do you have anything on the magnitude of the Rwandan troop
deployment in the east?
MR. FOLEY: Several days ago, the Rwandan Government publicly denied
involvement in the fighting, and claimed that its troops were not in the
Congo. We have seen reports and heard of eyewitness accounts of Rwandan
troops in the Congo, but we cannot confirm that. They have said they're not
involved. We urge them privately, publicly last night, and I repeat
publicly today, not to involve themselves in across the border. This is an
internal Congolese military rebellion as best we can judge. We oppose
violence, be it domestic origin or regional origin. This is not the way
to solve the massive problems facing the Congo today. We think that
elements in Congo need to work toward national reconciliation, toward
addressing the problems of democratization and development by peaceful
means.
QUESTION: Does this mean the US doesn't support Kabila's allegations that
Rwanda is, I guess, supporting or making the Tutsis in the region rally
against Kabila?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I was very careful to say that we've seen reports, we've
heard of eyewitness accounts that at least in the eastern portions that
there may have been Rwandan troop involvement. They have denied that. We
have not been able to independently confirm it, but we've made clear that
this is something that should not happen; and that's where we are today.
We're obviously monitoring this very closely, and hope that there are no
developments in that direction.
QUESTION: New subject -- can you comment on Cambodia's election
results?
MR. FOLEY: Yes. I understand what was released yesterday from the
National Election Commission were what they call preliminary final results.
It sounds like a contradiction in terms, but nevertheless, the important
point is that Cambodia's National Election Commission is conducting a
recount of the ballots in several districts in response to complaints of
polling and counting irregularities from opposition party leaders Sam
Rainsy and Prince Ranarridh. International observers including representatives
of the US National Democratic Institute are present for all the recounts.
We are encouraged that the Cambodian authorities are investigating these
charges; however, until allegations of election irregularities have been
resolved and final results announced, it is certainly premature for us to
discuss where we go next on Cambodia. In terms of the formal declaration,
it's important to recall that the final results will be announced by the
Constitutional Council in keeping with the Cambodian constitution.
QUESTION: Do you know when that might be?
MR. FOLEY: I couldn't tell you.
QUESTION: On China - China and Taiwan on or about the 28th of last month,
did the State Department receive some notice from the Chinese Government in
the form of a warning concerning giving umbrella military protection or
selling military weapons to Taiwan - something that may have been pointed
at the United States Government specifically?
MR. FOLEY: No, I'm not aware of any such demarche.
QUESTION: Nothing?
MR. FOLEY: No.
QUESTION: This would not be a demarche - this would like a press
statement or something like that.
MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware of it.
QUESTION: Nothing?
QUESTION: Korea - yesterday and the day before yesterday, you had a
meeting with the South Korean Government regarding missile development.
Today you had another session regarding whether you lift the sanctions on
North Korea. Do you have any -
MR. FOLEY: Another session with whom?
QUESTION: Another session regarding sanction -
MR. FOLEY: With whom? The US and --
QUESTION: With South Korea in Hawaii.
MR. FOLEY: My information is that the US-Republic of Korea non-proliferation
task force met August 4 and 5 -- I'm not aware that they were meeting today
-- in Honolulu. This was the fifth round of our non-proliferation task
force, which was broadly mandated to discuss the wide range of issues
relating to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems. The talks covered the full range of non-proliferation
issues of mutual interest in great depth and they were very constructive.
Any other questions?
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. FOLEY: They discussed the range of issues - implementation of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, the proliferation threat from the North
Koreans and missile non-proliferation issues, including the Republic of
Korea's interest in the missile technology control regime.
QUESTION: Has a new day dawned in relations with Colombia, especially
regarding the press conference with Mr. Pickering participating and Mr.
Pastrana and a few others? I believe that was on Monday. Are things really
upbeat and have relations changed?
MR. FOLEY: We're certainly encouraged by the statements and the contact
we've had with President-elect Pastrana. We don't want to comment on his
plan of action before he takes office - I believe it's tomorrow - but we're
sending an important high-level delegation down there as witness to our
desire for a really close, productive, cooperative relationship. We believe
it's turning a new page for Colombia, and certainly a new page towards
better relations between the United States and Colombia.
QUESTION: Mr. Pickering, as the hero of El Salvador in the '80s - is he
taking a hands-on role in the Colombian matter?
MR. FOLEY: Mr. Pickering is involved in - as Under Secretary of Political
Affairs -- in the range of our bilateral relationships around the world,
including Colombia. He takes an interest wherever we need his able hands,
you can be sure of that.
Is that it?
QUESTION: Who's heading the delegation?
QUESTION: McLarty.
MR. FOLEY: George Gedda is, I'm sure, a reliable source on this, but I'll
try to verify after the briefing.
Thank you very much.
(The briefing concluded at 2:10 P.M.)
|
