U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #85, 98-07-14
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
332
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Tuesday, July 14, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
BELARUS
1-4 U.S. Response to Violations of International Law
2,3,4 --Travel Restrictions on Belarusian Officials
2-3 --Suspension of Programs
3 Status of US-Belarus Relations
NARCOTICS
4-5,13-14 US View of Netherlands Anti-Narcotics Efforts
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
5-6 Israeli-Palestinian Upcoming Meeting/Level of Meeting
6-8 Reported Israeli Acceptance of US View on Changing PLO
Charter
8-9 Status of US Diplomatic Efforts/Secretary's Contact with
Parties
COLOMBIA
9 President-Elect Pastrana's Efforts to Set Up Peace Talks
9 US-Colombia Bilateral Relationship
ECUADOR
10 Elections in Ecuador
CHINA
10 Senator Lott's Remarks re Transfer of Sensitive
U.S. Technology to China
11-12 Alleged US Technology Used in China's Missile Systems
RUSSIA
12 Political Stability in Russia
INDIA
12 Reported US Barring of Indian Scientists from US
INDIA/PAKISTAN
12-13 Pakistan Proposal for Bilateral Test Ban Treaty
CUBA
14 Next Steps in Helms-Burton
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #85
TUESDAY, JULY 14, 1998 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. Today
is Tuesday; that would make yesterday Monday.
QUESTION: And tomorrow Wednesday.
MR. RUBIN: Precisely.
Over the past several weeks, the regime in Belarus has orchestrated a
campaign that challenges one of the basic principles of diplomatic
relations. By its actions, Belarus has denied the legal right of
nations to conduct their diplomatic business without interference or
intimidation from host governments.
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which Belarus
subscribes to, embassy, chanceries and residences of ambassadors are
protected by the principle of inviolability. They cannot be entered by
host governments without permission, and they must be protected by host
governments. These norms of behavior are essential to the conduct of
normal diplomatic business. They are not privileges to be doled out by
a host government, but rather basic legal rights that must be protected
in a world based on international law.
Three weeks ago, Belarus took the unprecedented action of forcing
ambassadors of the United States and a dozen other countries to leave
Minsk. The Lukashenko regime did this through a crude campaign of
harassment, carried out under the guise of conducting urgent repairs to
utilities in the neighborhoods where the ambassadors resided. In
reality, the repairs could have been conducted in an orderly fashion
without disrupting the activities of the diplomats residing there, had
that been the issue; but it was not the issue.
What the Lukashenko regime really wanted was to evict the diplomats and
restrict their diplomatic freedoms and activities in Belarus,
effectively impairing their ability to monitor the steady slide of
Belarus away from democracy and respect for fundamental human rights.
The United States and the other countries represented in Minsk have
attempted to resolve these matters in a reasonable fashion. The
Lukashenko regime seems intent on exacerbating the problem, and again
today, President Lukashenko made excuses instead of addressing the
fundamental problem.
Last week, Belarus took the further step of tearing down fences and, in
effect, seizing control of our ambassador's residence. Belarus has
refused the right of the governments involved to post their own guards
and to protect their compounds. This new violation was tantamount to
forcible seizure of a diplomatic compound. Such behavior cannot be
tolerated.
Over the past week, the United States and the nations of the European
Union communicated with each other and privately to the Lukashenko
regime that failure to restore the security of the residence would force
us to respond. The European Union is imposing travel restrictions on
most senior Belarusian Government officials; visas will be denied to
those officials or their replacements.
The United States fully endorses the restrictions that the European
Union is imposing, and will likewise restrict the travel of Belarusian
officials to the United States. Each travel request, except those to
international organizations in the United States, will be examined with
the presumption of denial. We will be suspending the small number of
programs in which officials of the Belarusian Government participate.
These include exchange programs, certain assistance activities and the
remaining low level military-to-military programs.
It is not our intent or desire to see Belarus isolated from the rest of
the international community. By its own actions, the Lukashenko regime
has isolated Belarus. We again call upon Belarus to respect its
international obligations, to respect foreign missions, as well as the
fundamental human rights of its citizens, and rejoin the Euro-Atlantic
community of democratic nations.
QUESTION: What about the folks here - I came in a couple of minutes
late, but did you speak of the diplomats they have here already, the
embassy - is there any -
MR. RUBIN: We are not taking steps in that regard, to my knowledge.
What we are now doing is creating a list which includes Lukashenko, all
the leaders of the presidential administration, all ministers, certain
deputy ministers, the head of the KGB and their equivalents in other
agencies. All of these officials will be covered by the presumption of
denial policy.
In addition, we are proceeding from presumption of denial for all
requests for travel to the United States by Belarusian Government
officials except, as I indicated, for travel to international
organizations.
QUESTION: So they'll be at the UN?
MR. RUBIN: Assuming if they wanted to show up; if they want to
participate in the international community, which they have not signaled
they want to. We have also suspended programs that, although relatively
small, did involve a selective engagement policy -- including a DOD
joint contact team program designed to foster cooperation and openness
between the US and former Warsaw Pact countries; educational and
exchange programs involving government officials attending higher
institutions of education and English language programs; and US
bilateral financial assistance for Belarusian participation and
Partnership for Peace activities under the Warsaw initiative program.
QUESTION: Let me ask you just one quick one about - maybe it sort of
sounds like fishing, but is there any Russian input one way or another
on this, given Belarus' affinity and almost nostalgia for being part of
Russia, or the Soviet Union with Russia? Has Russia weighed in one way
or another? Has it been positive, negative or not particularly
influential in this?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think it's been particularly influential. The
Russians have agreed with us on the principle and made those points to
the Belarusian authorities; but obviously that has not yielded
significant change.
QUESTION: Can you quantify this in any way? Are we talking three dozen
officials? Have they made --
MR. RUBIN: I gave you a list that included the president, included the
leaders of the presidential administration, all ministers, certain
deputy ministers, the head of the KGB. So we're talking about several
dozen people here.
QUESTION: Have they made a lot of trips to the United States?
MR. RUBIN: I'd have to get that for the record. But certainly as we
saw, President Lukashenko regarded this as a painful sanction; he made
that clear today in his comments that I saw in some news agency's
account.
QUESTION: Same subject - if what Belarus has done is tantamount to
preventing the United States and the European Union from practicing
diplomacy, I'm not clear why the United States doesn't do the same thing
to the Belarusian diplomats here in this country now. Is that the shoe
next to drop?
MR. RUBIN: Well, first of all, as you know, we have told the ambassador
that it wouldn't be a good idea for him to come back to the United
States; so their ambassador is not now able to function in the United
States, and therefore interferes with their ability to conduct bilateral
diplomacy. With respect to going further to some break in diplomatic
relations, we certainly hope it will not come to that. However, the
actions of the Belarusian Government have effectively brought our
relationship to a standstill; and they know what they need to do to
return to a more normal relationship. Obviously we will be looking at
additional options, but I'm not going to speculate as to what they might
be.
QUESTION: I think Jim's point probably includes why you're not
impinging on their folks here the way American diplomats were clearly
curbed there; and, indeed, of the fact that a Belarusian might come here
to go to Disneyland in three months. Your retaliation seems somewhat
softer than what they did to the US.
MR. RUBIN: I think that's not correct. What they did to the US was
deny the American ambassador's residence access. So the ambassador -
not all the people who work at the embassy there - they're still there;
we have a Chief of Mission there. And we similarly denied, or made
clear to them, that it would be a bad idea for their ambassador to come
back here. So in that sense, it's precisely analogous.
But more so even than that specific proportionate response, we've now
taken another response, which is to effect the ability of the leadership
to travel to Europe and to the United States.
I can assure you that they like to be able to travel to Europe and the
United States; and so this stings well beyond their ability to impinge
on our effective diplomatic operation in Belarus.
QUESTION: Is this being coordinated with the European Union? Are they
taking similar steps?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Jamie, this includes their family members as well?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware that this, at this point, includes family
members. This is designed to include the specific individuals
themselves.
QUESTION: Just for clarification, Jamie, this affects only the
ambassador's residence? The mission still, as you said before, is
working -- US diplomats are working there?
MR. RUBIN: Correct. Any more on the Belarus situation? No. Any other
topics?
QUESTION: I have a question about drug policy. General McCaffrey last
week on CNN called the Dutch drug policy an unmitigated disaster. Is
that the US point of view of Dutch drug policy?
MR. RUBIN: In the course of a trip to Europe, General McCaffrey will be
stopping in the Netherlands to meet with Dutch officials and drug
experts. He hopes to learn firsthand about Dutch drug policy.
The United States and the Netherlands have a close working relationship
in the fight against drug trafficking and related money laundering in
Europe, the Caribbean and Latin America. We highly value this
cooperation.
US and Dutch domestic policies concerning some issues do differ. But
our close coordination and shared goals overshadow any differences of
emphasis we may have. We fully appreciate and respect that each
country's circumstances will shape its approach to our common global
drug challenge. We clearly do not wish to be perceived as interfering
in Dutch domestic policy.
QUESTION: So does it mean that you disagree - that it's not an
unmitigated disaster? Was General McCaffrey wrong?
MR. RUBIN: I think what I said was that we do have a close working
relationship; that we value this cooperation; that we do have
differences on US and Dutch domestic policies concerning some issues.
But our close coordination and shared goals overshadow any differences
in emphasis we might have.
QUESTION: Can we go back to the Israeli-Palestinian thing? Yesterday
--
QUESTION: McCaffrey is going there to discuss these differences or to
learn about the Dutch drug policy?
MR. RUBIN: Well, it's my understanding that he's not going solely to
the Netherlands. It's a general trip in Europe where he will stop in
the Netherlands. I'm sure they will discuss both domestic policies of
the United States and The Netherlands and the global fight against
terrorism - I'm sorry, against drugs.
(Laughter.)
The drug czar has not become the terrorism czar.
QUESTION: This Israeli-Palestinian likely meeting - anything more on
it? Is the US hosting it, by any chance? Do you know the location?
And while we're at it, have we put to rest or do you need to say
something about the Palestinian request that the US lay out its - make
public its proposal, which of course, the Administration has been
threatening to do if things really ran aground?
MR. RUBIN: On the first question, it is our understanding that a
meeting will be held; that the Palestinian Chairman Arafat and his
people are in China right now and are expected back Wednesday-Thursday,
and that soon after that such a meeting will be arranged.
In short, we believe that there will be a meeting between the
Palestinians and the Israelis in the coming days. That is not a meeting
that we are hosting; it is a meeting of direct contact that we believe
is an important part of our efforts to try to get the two sides to agree
on a way to put the peace process back on track.
With respect to any decision we might take, hypothetically, in the
future, all I can say is that we are now focusing on the job at hand.
The job at hand is to see whether, through these bilateral contacts that
I just described, as well as contacts we would have with the Israelis
and the Palestinians, whether we can put together the package that puts
the peace process back on track. We have not made a decision about what
to do if we are unable to do that, if the mediation effort is unable to
do that. If we make a decision that we have said we are unable to do
it, we will let you know and act accordingly.
QUESTION: Jamie, I know you've described this meeting as a ministerial
level between the Palestinians and the Israelis; and they're going to
announce it when it's going to occur and Arafat's still in China and
what have you. But would you say it's possible that Netanyahu and
Chairman Arafat might meet face-to-face during this meeting?
MR. RUBIN: We're not aware - certainly, the discussions that we've had
with the two parties does not indicate that the intention is to create a
meeting at the leadership level in the coming days. That doesn't mean
it can't happen. We take the position that Palestinians and Israelis
should meet more rather than less; and so we wouldn't have a problem
with that. It's just our understanding that in the current phase, the
likelihood is to be a meeting not of the character that you described.
But the participation and timing and whereabouts is something that
really they ought to discuss for themselves.
QUESTION: On the same subject, and Israeli newspaper is reporting today
that the Israeli Government has accepted the American view on changing
the PLO charter. Has there been such a notice to the United States that
the Israelis have, in fact, accepted that deal?
MR. RUBIN: With the exception of yesterday's discussion about the
American position on the charter, I think we've been very assiduous and
careful in not getting into detail about the specific elements of the US
ideas, including that issue and what positions the two sides may or may
not have taken.
We have said that the Palestinians accepted the ideas in principle, but
we haven't gone into detail along those lines; and I don't intend to
break that precedent, especially in the final phase of this effort, the
end game that we've talked about.
QUESTION: Without getting into the details, has the Israeli Government
signaled to the US Government any change in its views?
MR. RUBIN: Again, when it comes to the specifics of the further
redeployment, the timing, the size, the elements of the anti-terrorist
infrastructure we're trying to create, when it comes to the question of
the time-out, when it comes to all the details, including the issue that
you mentioned, we are keeping those discussions private.
QUESTION: Not meaning to be tedious, but using a phrase "in principle"
may not be the best way to address this issue, because the Israeli
position is whatever the Palestinians have "in principle" said they
would do, they haven't done enough in fact to meet their concerns. So
could you just roll back - I realize it's nit-picking, but would you
roll back and tell us if the US view is that the Palestinians have not
only "in principle" done right on the charter, but in action have done
right? You get me, don't you, why I bring it up? Because you use the
phrase --
MR. RUBIN: On the charter? Now we're on the charter again?
QUESTION: Yes, because you use the phrase "in principle," and I don't
know if you want to let it sit there.
MR. RUBIN: I was talking about the set of ideas.
QUESTION: I know, but you see why I asked you - because it's, to the
Israelis, more than a matter of principle; it's a matter of actually
doing things to tear it up, nullify it and grind it into the ground.
Okay? It's action, not principle they're looking for.
MR. RUBIN: As I said to you yesterday, through the decision in 1996 and
the letter provided the beginning of this year, we think the
Palestinians have gone a long way towards meeting the problem. If the
Israelis have additional ideas, they should address those directly; and
I would expect they would if there were a meeting of the kind that I
discussed.
But let's bear in mind that we are in a discussion precisely because
there is no peace process being implemented, including the additional
measures to fight terrorism that we think are necessary and important
that will be put in place as a result of agreement of the American
ideas.
So one of the reasons, for example, why we think it's so important to
have these ideas agreed to is so that additional measures like the
across the board anti-terrorist infrastructure can be put in place and
that terrorists can be prevented from doing their dirty business. That
would happen better if the agreement were reached. Similarly, there are
other concerns that both sides have with respect to the further
redeployment and other issues that would be implemented if the agreement
were reached.
I suggested to you yesterday that included in the array of issues that
constitute the American ideas is the question of the PNC and how that
issue could be moved down the field considerably more.
QUESTION: Are you saying that the Palestinians can do more and they
will do more if Israel agrees to an additional withdrawal and if you
agree with that approach?
MR. RUBIN: No, if someone is seeking to suggest that we don't think the
Palestinians should be doing 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days
a year fighting terrorism now, that is not our position. Our position
is they should be doing that now.
But as a practical matter, both sides have not fulfilled their
commitments under Oslo; and that's well-known, and both sides have
acknowledged that. So the fact of the matter is that the sooner we get
these American ideas agreed to, the sooner that both sides' issues of
concern can be addressed through implementation of such an agreement.
QUESTION: When you say both sides have acknowledged, you mean the
Palestinians have acknowledged they haven't fulfilled their obligations
on countering terrorism?
MR. RUBIN: Well, the Israelis haven't pursued a further redeployment.
And the Palestinians, in our view, have not done all they could do to
fight terrorism. You'll have to ask them about their views.
QI'm not really arguing with you, honestly. Your statement was, both
sides have now acknowledged.
MR. RUBIN: I'm saying the Israelis --
QUESTION: The Palestinians haven't stood up and said, we're not doing
as good a job as we should. The US says they're not; the Israelis say
they're not, but they haven't --
MR. RUBIN: Both sides have either acknowledged their own doing - have
either talked about the other side's failure to implement or talked
about their own, and you'll have to get them to describe for you how.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - giving you another shot at --
MR. RUBIN: I certainly wasn't meaning to suggest that the Israelis and
Palestinians agree on the extent to which each other are not fulfilling
Oslo.
QUESTION: But Jamie, -- (inaudible) - there is an equivalency here
between a nation giving up territory it controls and a movement agreeing
to do better at stopping terrorist attacks against this nation. I don't
see how you can make those two things equivalent?
MR. RUBIN: I think, Sid, that you could probably recount for me the
number of times the Secretary of State has said there is no moral
equivalence between those two things. So why you're asking me the
question, I don't know.
QUESTION: Well, because there is a difference between words and
actions, as this discussion started out --
MR. RUBIN: If you'd like to have a debate with me after the briefing,
I'd be happy to.
QUESTION: The Secretary has said no matter what the outcome of this US
set of ideas, that the United States will remain engaged in the region.
How would that work? If it doesn't work out, you'd go back to the
drawing board and come up with more?
MR. RUBIN: I'd rather not speculate for you now what we will do if it
doesn't work out. We try to as best we can to retain a certain degree
of optimism in this business when you're working tirelessly to try to
put the two sides together. So rather than speculate for you what won't
happen and what we will do if that doesn't succeed, we'd rather focus on
working to make it succeed.
QUESTION: Can you say whether those American mediators who, of course,
usually don't telegraph where they're going and when they're going -
would it be fair to say they're going to take a pause at least for a few
days to watch the outcome; or will simultaneously the US pursue its
mediation efforts?
MR. RUBIN: During the period when the Palestinians --
QUESTION: -- the meeting period, yes.
MR. RUBIN: My impression is that our able team -
QUESTION: And tired team.
MR. RUBIN: -- and tired team is in daily and regular contact with both
sides, and that that would continue through as long as we are continuing
this effort.
QUESTION: Has the Secretary spoken to either the Prime Minister or the
Chairman in the last couple of days?
MR. RUBIN: No, I don't think so.
QUESTION: Another topic - Colombia. The peace talks - (inaudible) -
Germany - that seems that the new President of Colombia, Pastrana, has
chosen Germany instead of the United States to participate in the peace
talks. That doesn't mean that he doesn't trust the US in terms of the
peace negotiations. And also the recent editorial in the Colombian
newspaper is saying that Pastrana chose Germany because the United
States has all interest in the war against drugs in Colombia.
MR. RUBIN: And so the question is?
QUESTION: What is your position in this Germany participation in the
peace process?
MR. RUBIN: We want the Colombian Government to decide how to proceed
with making peace with the rebels; that is not up to us to decide how to
proceed. We've made very clear we're prepared to be helpful if the
Colombian Government wants us to be helpful. So whether they choose to
meet in Germany or some other country is not really relevant to what we
have said. What we have said is we want to be of assistance if they ask
and we want to be helpful if they want us to be, and we will respond to
any suggestions they might have of how we can be helpful.
With respect to our relationship with Colombia, I think I made very
clear when the new President was elected that we see the opportunity to
open a new chapter in our relations with Colombia across the board. It
is true that drugs and cooperating in the fight against drugs is an
important part of that, but it is certainly by no means the only part.
QUESTION: Has there been any contact with him?
MR. RUBIN: I'd have to check who has - I'd be surprised if our Embassy
in Colombia hadn't been in touch with him; I believe they have. But
whether there's been contact with the officials in Washington, I'd have
to get back to you.
QUESTION: The last one, in this hemisphere, do you have any reaction to
the Ecuadorian elections or any comments on that?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say that with respect to the elections in Ecuador,
the Department of State extends its warmest congratulations to the
Ecuadorian people on the occasion of their presidential election on July
12. We understand that official results will be released on Wednesday,
July 15.
QUESTION: Just to see if this is the place for the answer - it may not
be and that's fine - probably the White House is the place. Senator
Majority Leader Trent Lott in a speech today said Senate investigators
have determined that China received sensitive technology and military
benefits from US satellite exports. He also went on to call the
Administration export controls for satellite wholly inadequate. The
democratic leader found some politics in the statement. Can you - is
this the place to deal with the substance of that, since State is so
actively trying to stem proliferation of dangerous technology?
MR. RUBIN: Certainly we're doing that. On the other hand, as you
rightly indicated, we try as best as we can to keep politics outside the
briefing room, and the State Department and I will continue to do that.
Let me make two points.
Number one, we do believe that being able to have a policy which allows
for the launching of American satellites is in the national interest of
the United States.
It's in the national interest of the United States for four reasons:
because it promotes the competitiveness that we believe is an advantage
for the United States -- it's an area of competitive advantage for
communications technology. Number two, it promotes openness in China.
As we saw with the President's trip, the more communication there is in
China and the more technology for communication, the greater the
likelihood that the Chinese people will see and have an opportunity to
see and hear a wide variety of views. Thirdly, it's part and parcel of
our engagement policy; and that is that we want to engage the Chinese
across the board to promote improvements in the areas of concern to the
United States. And finally, it's an important part of our non-
proliferation policy to the extent that allowing these kinds of
satellite launches can be used to encourage China to improve its non-
proliferation practices - that is, not providing assistance to other
countries in the missile and nuclear and chemical and biological areas -
that's important to the United States.
With respect to the substance, our view hasn't changed; and that is that
we do not believe that this policy has contributed to China's ability to
launch ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons; that capability
was there before. The experts have testified, from our perspective, of
what the various incidents have and haven't done, and that has not been
their conclusion.
With respect to the overall question of the investigation and other
statements that the Majority Leader said, I think it's best left to the
White House to respond. But that is still our view on the policy and on
the specific incident.
QUESTION: Jamie, sort of a related matter - there was a story today in
one of the local newspapers saying that the satellite program had
enabled or had pushed China down the road to deploying multiple warhead
ballistic missiles. If you could address that --
MR. RUBIN: Yes, this is not a new issue. I can't, obviously, comment
on any alleged intelligence reports that allegedly found itself to an
alleged newspaper in an alleged city in an alleged country called the
United States. But let me specifically deal with the question, and tell
you that the United States has not authorized the providing of China
with technology useful in upgrading its ballistic missiles; nor, to my
knowledge, is there evidence that the US actually provided China with
technology for the delivery of multiple satellites.
The dispenser for iridium satellites was built by the Chinese, using
Chinese technology; it was not American technology for dispensing
satellites that then could be useful for dispensing warheads on a
multiple warhead missile. By definition, because it was Chinese
technology that created the satellite dispenser, it reflects Chinese
capabilities; and the United States, to my knowledge, has not added to
those capabilities.
QUESTION: Can these multiple satellite dispensers also function as
multiple warhead --
MR. RUBIN: As I understand it, there are many technical steps that need
to go between that. The objectives of a MIRV capability and a satellite
dispenser capability are significantly different. The release of a
satellite in orbit does not require much accuracy and allows for a wide
margin of error. A MIRV capability requires extreme accuracy for re-
entry to ensure the warhead hits its target. If it doesn't, it can burn
up in the atmosphere. Thus, the standards and requirements for release
of satellites into orbit are far, far lower than those necessary for a
MIRV capability. That's a technical matter.
As I understand it, in this case, the satellite dispenser that was used
in the launch of Motorola iridium satellites was designed, developed and
produced by the Chinese, and that Motorola provided only the technical
data sufficient to ensure that the satellite would work with the Chinese
dispenser system. So these are the technical reasons why we don't
believe that the charges by some experts about what the result of all
this is not - are just --
QUESTION: And in just sort of a step back in sort of a broader picture,
do you or the Administration see a use, a reason for China to have a
multiple warhead missile in a time when the rest of the world is kind of
going the other way?
MR. RUBIN: Well, certainly, it is our view that we are moving in the
direction of disarmament, not escalating the arms competition. And in
our efforts with the Russians, we have made great strides in reducing
the size and the capabilities in the offensive area of strategic nuclear
forces. And to the extent possible, we would like to see all countries
in the world moving in the disarmament direction, not in the nuclear
arms race direction, as part of not only a reduced risk for each
country, as evidenced by the de-targeting agreement that came up in
China, but also by the signal it sends to other countries around the
world that nuclear weapons are not going to make you safer, nuclear
weapons are not going to make your standing in the international
community increase. So that is our general view.
QUESTION: There's a very disturbing article in the USA Today headline:
"Fraying Economy Feeds Rumors of a Coup in Russia." Mr. Yeltsin took
these rumors seriously enough to state - and I quote - "We are strong
enough to curb all plans for seizing power and all other extremist
plans" - something he said yesterday. Mr. Rubin, is the State
Department concerned that there is - I understand the Russian military
is quite disenchanted - is there a possibility of some kind of movement
again in Moscow?
MR. RUBIN: Moscow is a place where a lot of rumors begin in this area,
and we hear rumors all the time in this area. But as far as I know,
President Yeltsin is working very closely with his government to try to
help the Russian economy come out of the situation it's been in. The
IMF has expressed its confidence in the Russian Government's commitment
to take the necessary fiscal and structural measures to address Russia's
economic difficulties; and obviously, therefore, they believe the
government is in a position to act and to have its actions implemented,
which means they are stable.
QUESTION: Jamie, another thing - there's a report in the Indian press
that the US is keeping Indian scientists, including the head of the
Atomic Energy Commission, from entering the country - some sort of - if
you'll pardon the expression - fallout from their nuclear explosion. Do
you know anything about it?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of that particular report.
QUESTION: I don't mean to blind-side you but I just became aware of it.
MR. RUBIN: I'm sure that I will get you an answer as soon as we can
talk to our visa people.
QUESTION: Pakistan has proposed talks with India on a test ban -
bilateral test ban treaty. Does the United States have a view on that?
MR. RUBIN: Our view is very clear - that Pakistan and India should not
deploy ballistic missiles and not conduct further testing of nuclear
weapons and not weaponize its ballistic missiles or deploy its nuclear
weapons. That is our view. We think that that is something that's
going to take time to implement and we're working very assiduously on
it. Deputy Secretary Talbott will be leaving this weekend for visits
with both Pakistani and Indian officials in Pakistan and India to try to
advance our objectives in this area.
To the extent they talk to each other and move towards commitments that
are demonstrable and verifiable in this area, that would be a help not a
hurt.
QUESTION: Would the United States be willing to supply verification
technology in such a case?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we would certainly not, as you know, Jim, from the
discussions we had at the time, not be willing to supply technology or
expertise to lock in in any way the Indians or the Pakistanis as nuclear
powers. We are not going to provide that. To the extent we might
provide assistance in the confidence-building area, such as helping them
to ensure they don't have miscalculations or bad warning about
conventional developments on the ground, that's something we're prepared
to look at.
As far as if your question is verification technology for a bilateral
CTB between the Pakistanis and the Indians, that's beyond my competence.
QUESTION: Going back to the drug issue, it still remains very hard to
see for me how these harsh words that have been traded over the last
couple of days are just policy differences between allies - domestic
policy issues. I mean, General McCaffrey has blasted the Dutch
Government's policy on CNN; the Dutch Ambassador wrote an official
letter of protest, saying he is confounded and dismayed and astonished
by the timing of these remarks. Today, again, General McCaffrey in
Sweden makes further remarks criticizing The Netherlands.
I mean, this does not look like the way that allies treat each other's
domestic policies and little minor differences in that regard. So I
wonder is the United States actually afraid that the Dutch drug policy
is in a way having a negative effect on international efforts against
drugs, or that the Dutch drug policy is sort of having a negative effect
on internal US debate on drugs?
MR. RUBIN: I'm surprised that you think that my answers to the previous
set of questions didn't answer your question. We obviously have
differences in how we approach drugs and domestic policies; and we, as
friends, are also democracies and believe in the ability to have a
difference expressed publicly. So the fact that we expressed our
difference publicly, I don't think should be exaggerated.
The question is, what is our overall view? And our overall view is that
US and Dutch domestic policies concerning some issues may differ, but
our coordination and shared goals in the fight against drugs overshadow
any differences of emphasis we may have on domestic policies.
QUESTION: But, Jamie, aren't those differences generally conveyed in a
different manner than in the way General McCaffrey has chosen to?
MR. RUBIN: I think you seem - and I certainly can understand it - to
want to talk a lot about General McCaffrey's comments and why he said
what he said; and I've said what the State Department view is. If you
have further questions about why General McCaffrey said something in a
specific way or might he have said it in a different way, I suggest you
get on the horn and call General McCaffrey.
QUESTION: Has there been any contact with the General while he's in
Europe?
MR. RUBIN: We're still on General McCaffrey?
QUESTION: Yes. Has there been any contact in the sense that you've
asked him to back off for a while?
MR. RUBIN: I certainly wouldn't comment on the internal government
deliberations.
QUESTION: Do you have any information when it's going to be announced
that the next waiver for Chapter III on Helms-Burton?
MR. RUBIN: I believe the timing is the middle of next week. But what
the decision would be --
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: Next month.
(Laughter.)
We'll get you a date.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)
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