U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #65, 98-05-27
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
957
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Wednesday, May 27, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS
1 US Concern About Developments in Tajikistan
1 Recent Arrests of Pro-Democracy Leaders in Nigeria
1 US Bulgarian Economic Bilateral Working Group
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
1-2 Speaker Gingrich's Trip to the Region
2-3 Setting Up of Structures in Muslim Quarter of Jerusalem
PAKISTAN
3,12 Pakistani Delegation Visit to US
3-4 Diplomatic Discussions with Pakistani Government re Nuclear
Testing
5 Prospects for Security Guarantees to Pakistan
5,6-7,8 Pakistani Assurances re Nuclear Testing
7-8 Economic Effect on Pakistan From Possible Sanctions
INDIA
4,7-8 Economic Costs of Sanctions to India for Nuclear Testing
5,7 World Bank Action on Loan for India
5-6 Actions Necessary by India to Reverse Sanctions
8 US Ambassador to India in Washington
8 Negotiation of No First Use Agreement with Pakistan
SERBIA
9,11 Dr. Rugova of Kosovo in Washington/Meetings
VENEZUELA
9-10 Purpose for the Secretary's Travel to Caracas for the OAS
General Assembly
INDONESIA
10 Congressional Proposal re Soeharto Assets
14-15 US Assessment of New Cabinet/Prospects for New Elections
EL SALVADOR
10-11 US Documents re Killing of American Church Women in l980
LUXEMBOURG
11-12 Secretary's Travel to NAC/Meetings
TURKEY
12 Arrest of Suspects in Killing of Human Rights Leader Birdal
RUSSIA
12-13 Assessment of State of Russian Economy
IRAQ
13-14 Iraq's Weapons File/Richard Butler's Efforts
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #65
WEDNESDAY, MAY 27, 1998, 1:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. Let me
start on the subject of Tajikistan. The United States Government is
concerned about developments in Tajikistan affecting the peace process,
including recent fighting and the lack of progress towards ensuring
security for the international community in Dushanbe, failure of the
government to move ahead with creation of a coalition government; and
adoption by the parliament on May 23 of a law on political parties which
contains unacceptable provisions that violate both the spirit and the
letter of the UN-mediated peace accords.
We continue to believe there is no alternative to the timely and complete
implementation of the peace accords. We call upon the President of
Tajikistan to use his veto power to return the new law to the parliament.
We further call upon the government to proceed with naming of opposition
members to their share of government positions, as agreed upon under the
accords. A full statement will be posted after the briefing.
We will also have a statement on Nigeria and on the US-Bulgarian economic
bilateral working group.
With those beginnings, Barry Schweid.
QUESTION: There's Pakistan and there's the Middle East; let's try the
Middle East first. The back-biting, the accusations continue both here and
in the Middle East. I wondered if I could pick up on a corollary point. Is
there no criticism - in fact, I think you had a phrase for Gingrich's
diplomatic efforts. Is there any question here that the Speaker would go
out to the Middle East, talk to Netanyahu? I know you criticized reports of
what he said, but try to bring Netanyahu and Arafat together. Is that
acceptable to the Administration?
MR. RUBIN: Well, he is a member of Congress; and as I said, we support
congressional travel as a general rule. With regard to his visit, as I said
yesterday, it went reasonably well. I don't think it particularly advanced
the peace process; but it went reasonably well.
QUESTION: Would you still say that today? Have you gotten any report on
the Arafat meeting?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I would still say that today.
QUESTION: Hasn't accomplished very much?
MR. RUBIN: Advanced the peace process - the peace process will be
advanced if we can, through the methods that we've been working, get
agreement on the US ideas that are necessary to move to permanent status
talks. That will advance the peace process.
QUESTION: It appears that, I believe it's Arad, who has announced that
he's coming here next week. Is there --
MR. RUBIN: I do understand that he's going to be here. I wouldn't see
that as a direct discussion primarily on the peace process. I would also be
surprised if it didn't come up. He tends to be someone who works on other
issues of concern to us and the Israeli Government. But I suspect that will
be a part of the continuing contact that we have with the Israeli
Government in trying to get agreement to the American ideas that we think
would best advance the peace process.
QUESTION: Do you have any observations on the recent events in East
Jerusalem with these temporary structures and the subsequent --
MR. RUBIN: These kinds of unilateral and provocative steps undermine an
environment necessary for any Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. We
believe that with respect to setting up structures in Jerusalem's Muslim
quarter, those who took this step are consciously trying to prevent genuine
reconciliation and to inflame an already intense situation.
We're also very concerned by the way Palestinians were treated. Treating
Palestinians in this fashion should never had occurred; handling this kind
of situation in this matter is not acceptable. We understand that Mr.
Kahilani has apologized to the Palestinians, and we commend him for doing
so. We've also been informed that the Israeli Government is dismantling the
structures that were established.
QUESTION: Will you have any remark about that?
MR. RUBIN: Sorry?
QUESTION: You don't have anything to say about their dismantling the
structures - just that they're doing it?
MR. RUBIN: We understand that they are dismantling the structures; and I
certainly commended Minister Kahilani for apologizing on the question on
the way the Palestinians were treated.
QUESTION: Is the Department pleased that the Israeli Government has
intervened and is dismantling the structures, or are you just noting it
happened?
MR. RUBIN: I'm noting it happened, and certainly we're pleased that it
happened. Again, the question of what goes on in that part of the world and
that particular piece of real estate is extremely sensitive, and everyone
should do all they can to try to make sure that those who are consciously
trying to prevent reconciliation between the Palestinians and the Israelis -
those who are trying to inflame the situation and make the situation
worse by creating opportunities for violence should not proceed in that
basis. We don't regard that behavior as anything other than against peace
and against the interests of everybody.
QUESTION: Jamie, what treatment of the Palestinians - what particular
things is it that you're objecting to?
MR. RUBIN: There were a lot of scuffles and certain people were knocked
down, legislators. So generally speaking we thought that this thing got out
of hand.
QUESTION: Is it the Israelis' fault that it got out of hand?
MR. RUBIN: The Israelis apologized, so I think that speaks for itself.
QUESTION: Pakistan?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Do you know is the delegation from Pakistan still coming, and
who they might be meeting?
MR. RUBIN: A delegation headed by Senator Akram Zaki, Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee in Pakistan, is expected to arrive in the
United States May 29 and spend one week in New York and Washington. As I
understand it, the delegation will be seeking meetings with senior US
officials, as well as members of Congress, but I don't believe those
meetings have been spelled out.
With regard to the reports that Pakistan has completed preparations for a
nuclear test, which I have a feeling is going to be your follow-up question,
let me say this - we cannot publicly confirm the content of alleged
intelligence reports. However, there have been frequent public statements
by Pakistan that they are making the preparations necessary to be able to
test, if they were to decide to test. Pakistani officials have also made
clear publicly, as recently as today, and privately to us and others that
they have not yet decided to carry out a test.
We've always known that Pakistan was in a position to test if it chose to
do so; the question is, will it choose to do so? What we are doing is
strongly urging the Pakistani leadership not to test. Such an action would
jeopardize, not enhance, their security, the security of the people in
South Asia and the security of the world.
QUESTION: Can I ask you again - we've tried this a number of times - but
what incentives might be offered for Pakistan not to test?
MR. RUBIN: We are in intensive discussions with the Pakistani Government
in trying to explain to them the serious negative consequences of testing.
I think for those who have followed what happened to India as a result of
their test, it's very clear that the international community's condemnation
of India's defiance on this subject has cost India dearly. Loans including
$450 million for electrical power distribution; $130 million for hydro-
electric generators; and $275 million for road construction; and $10
million for promotion of private sector development have all been postponed
- a total of $865 million. This is going to sting.
The Indian electric power sector needs to expand very rapidly if the
country's economy is to grow. Without direct support from the World Bank
and with the financial uncertainly created by postponement of these loans,
expansion will be slowed significantly.
The point of this and the point of the fact that sanctions are being
imposed as we speak -- $41 million of munitions licenses were stopped, the
OPIC, that is the Overseas Private Investment and the Ex-Im, the Export-
Import Bank have suspended new commitments. The potential coverage for OPIC
was over $10 million, and Ex-Im guarantees were about a half a million
dollars, with another possibility of over $3.5 billion of loans. In other
words, the sanctions that are being imposed on India are stinging to the
extent of billions and billions and billions of dollars of lost opportunity
for the Indian people.
I think part of our discussion with the Pakistani Government is based on
that, which is informing them of what is happening to India so they
understand what the automatic sanctions that are in American law could do
to them.
On the positive side, we are obviously engaged in a serious discussion with
them about their security in the aftermath of this decision by India to
test, and how our relationship could be enhanced; on how existing
difficulties could perhaps be overcome; and what a future might look like
in the absence of a test by Pakistan. But the specifics of those general
categories are something we think is best left for our discussions with the
Pakistanis directly, prior to discussing them publicly.
QUESTION: Is there anybody weighing up with the United States that you
would single out as being particularly helpful or energetic about trying to
dissuade Pakistan?
MR. RUBIN: As I indicated last week, I think Secretary Albright was
pleased to see that the Chinese Government was adopting a position very
similar to ours; and that despite the suggestion that somehow there would
be some extended nuclear umbrella over Pakistan, which we had not heard
much about, appears not to have been the case. What China was doing -- and
indicated in correspondence with the Secretary -- was making clear their
view that a test by Pakistan would be a negative development and would,
like we have said, yield increasing uncertainty and instability on
the peninsula. So we are pleased that the Chinese Government has taken
a very responsible position in this area. There are other countries, I
think, who by demonstrating the strength of their reaction to India's test,
are also by indirection helping, we hope, Pakistan to make the right
decision -- namely Japan and other countries who have supported tough
measures against India.
QUESTION: You mentioned ways in which Pakistani security could be
enhanced. Might that include security guarantees by the United States to
Pakistan?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I did also, at the end of that remark, make clear that
other than saying the general categories that we would think it would be
unwise in a delicate moment like this when we have the prospect of a
nuclear arms competition on the Indian Subcontinent in South Asia, to make
public things we are discussing privately if that will make it harder for
our private discussion to succeed. At this point, other than saying that
we think we can help make Pakistan's security greater if they don't
test than they do test, we'd prefer not to get into any specifics.
QUESTION: Just two questions - you say that the Clinton Administration
has received private assurances from Pakistan that they're not preparing to
test. Can you give any detail to that conversation?
MR. RUBIN: What I was trying to signal to you as best I could is that the
public statements and the private statements have been the same. Which
particular conversations have been had, and I suspect that include in
country by our ambassador, and as well as discussions that people here may
have had -- not that they will not test, but that they have not yet made a
decision to test, a political decision.
QUESTION: And the second question - there were sort of conflicting
reports on the World Bank action yesterday, if you could just clarify. Did
the Clinton Administration fail to convince the World Bank to dismiss the
loans completely, or were you just seeking a suspension of the loans -
suspension consideration?
MR. RUBIN: My understanding is that some of the reports have been
misleading. The US achieved its objective at the World Bank, which was to
delay indefinitely consideration of the loans. But again, the exact action
of the World Bank, I'd prefer them to describe rather than us; other than
to say that our objective was indefinite postponement, and that's what has
happened.
QUESTION: On your statement of the Pakistanis have assured you publicly
and privately that they have not yet made a decision to test. Have they
also said that they will not make that decision until after this delegation
comes?
MR. RUBIN: No, I'm not aware of that. Again, I think with each passing
day, we've passed a day when they haven't had a test. We are very much
taking the question of Pakistani testing one day at a time.
QUESTION: What would the government of India have to do to make itself
whole again?
MR. RUBIN: Well, clearly the ball is in India's court; and if they want
to get themselves out of the hole they've dug for themselves, they could
start by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without conditions, join
negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and undertake not to
weaponize or deploy ballistic missiles. Those certainly would be steps that
would begin to put India back on the road to good standing in the
international community when it comes to weapons proliferation practices.
QUESTION: Those would be first steps, but not sufficient to have all the
sanctions removed?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, for sanctions to be removed, there is no
provision for removal of sanctions in the legislation. If one wanted to do
that, one would have to pass another law.
QUESTION: When you say New Delhi would have to undertake not to weaponize,
would signing the CTBT be sufficient to do that, or would they have to do
something more affirmatively?
MR. RUBIN: Weaponized ballistic missiles could be many types of weaponry -
- it's not necessarily just nuclear weapons - and the CTBT refers only to
nuclear weapons. So these are three separate undertakings we're looking
for. One, sign the Comprehensive Test Ban, join the rest of the world - the
over 100 countries that have signed it. Number two, agree and pursue
seriously negotiations to cut off all the fissile material in the world
that could be used to make nuclear weapons; and number three, not deploy
ballistic missiles and weaponize them.
QUESTION: But presumably, a statement by the government wouldn't be
sufficient; they'd have to sign some kind of an agreement.
MR. RUBIN: Well, there is no such agreement currently in place - a non-
weaponization of ballistic missiles agreement. However, there are
agreements that, like the Missile Technology Control Regime, that govern
missiles. We would certainly not have any trouble constructing a way to
give effect to a commitment not to weaponize or deploy ballistic missiles.
The problem is the commitment, not the structure.
QUESTION: And if they did all three of these things, it wouldn't
necessarily mean that the Congress could be persuaded to lift the
sanctions?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm not saying what the result of those things would be,
except to say that they would return them from the direction that they're
now in, which is outside the mainstream, outside the norm of the international
community against proliferation. Those are three steps that could begin to
reverse the process. How far it would reverse their current status, I
wouldn't even hesitate to say because we've had no indications that
they're now prepared to take those steps.
QUESTION: Could you say when the most recent assurance was given by
responsible Pakistani officials?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get that for the record.
QUESTION: Or you may know this off the top of your head - did you get any
assurances after the flurry of reports, principally by CNN, I believe,
yesterday that they're about to test. And intelligence has decided - you
quoted alleged intelligence, by the way, which might be well taken - that
Pakistan was about to - did you check back with them on the theory that CNN
drives American diplomacy sometimes by its appeal, by it being broadcast
around the world?
MR. RUBIN: Well, certainly, with that preamble, I can answer the question,
no, we certainly don't get our foreign policy driven by --
QUESTION: Well, it's broadcast around the world, and that would set alarm
bells off.
QUESTION: Can I set the record straight?
MR. RUBIN: Certainly, we would be happy to have --
QUESTION: We did not report that they were about to test. CNN reported
that they had finished preparations to do so, to possibly test.
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - that report occurred roughly 24 hours ago.
Today I was told that we have received private assurances. I would suspect
that since we are operating on a day-by-day basis and we're only taking
this one day at a time, that we will be, on a daily basis, looking for
signals of anything changed.
With regard to any specific, authoritative representation by the Pakistani
Government, I am not in a position to report that. But we'll try to get
that for the record.
QUESTION: Jamie, apropos of your remarks about the loans to India and the
cost to them, one World Bank official told me several days ago, before
yesterday's action, that India not getting the loans that were pending
would be, and he quoted, "an inconvenience to them" - would not be
crippling. Without asking you to comment on that, what's the State
Department's assessment of what Pakistan not getting loans would be? What
would be the economic impact on Pakistan?
MR. RUBIN: I'm going to have to comment on that. I do not believe the
fact that the international community has condemned India, the fact that
the World Bank and the IMF are now in the position that they're in, the
fact that all the activities that I described - billions of dollars worth
of lost opportunity for India from American sanctions - is an inconvenience.
I think it will sting; it will sting for a long time to come. India
made a profound miscalculation about the effect of sanctions, and
with each day, they're going to be realizing what the effects are.
So I do not think it's an inconvenience; I think it's a long-term, profound
lost opportunity for India to join the international community as a member
in good standing; to have an economic integration with the rest of the
world through Overseas Private Investment Council guarantees, through
insurance, through billions of dollars of projects that they very much
wanted to pursue. So with that preamble, let me say that I suspect that the
effect on Pakistan would be even greater, given the state of its economy.
QUESTION: Jamie, just to follow up to what you said when you responded to
Barry's question; I'm just a little unclear about it. You said that you're
taking the Pakistani testing one day at a time, or day by day. So would
today be a no-test day? Would you say today you've gotten private
assurances --
MR. RUBIN: Well, it's 1:00 a.m. in the morning in Pakistan. I'm not aware
they have tested.
QUESTION: So would you say today, based on your private assurances from
yesterday and looking at today, and even though it's 1:00 a.m. in the
morning, things are looking like it's been a no-test kind of reading?
MR. RUBIN: It does look that way, yes.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Jamie, let me ask, the US Ambassador to India was recalled. Is
he back to India? And how long he was --
MR. RUBIN: He's here. I was just in a meeting with Ambassador Celeste.
When the Administration decides to send him back, I'm sure he'll be willing
to go, and I'm sure he'll have things to say when he gets back there. But
for now he's in the Department.
QUESTION: Also, as far as the State Department is concerned, do you
suggest President Clinton to go ahead with his visit to India and Pakistan
and South Asia, despite all these problems, even if Pakistan tests or
not?
MR. RUBIN: What we're recommending at this point, and the President's
spokesmen have indicated this as well, is that that visit is under
review.
QUESTION: India today apparently made a public offer to negotiate a no-
first-use agreement with Pakistan and I wondered how that struck you?
MR. RUBIN: We do believe that the Prime Minister's proposal indicates a
sensitivity to the issue of reducing tensions between India and its
neighbors, and we favor steps that will accomplish that important
objective. However, we should bear in mind that India's testing of nuclear
weapons has itself made a major contribution to raising tensions in the
region. What would be best would be to focus less on this no-first-use
issue, and focus more on the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban without
conditions, serious negotiations to fissile material cut-off, and a
decision not to weaponize or deploy ballistic missiles. Those would be the
kinds of steps that would genuinely reduce tensions.
QUESTION: Jamie, I'm not as familiar with the fissile treaty as others
might be.
MR. RUBIN: Their proposed negotiations for a treaty that would involve --
prior to now, international arms control treaties have dealt with launchers,
missile systems, bombers and START III, if it's negotiated, would deal with
the warheads themselves in terms of counting and using that as a unit of
account.
The next level would be to try to bring under control and cut off the
supplies of the fissile material that makes it possible to make a nuclear
weapon -- the key component that many people know how to construct a weapon
if they could get their hands on fissile material. So what we would try to
do in such a treaty is cut off the production of that material and try to
limit it so that people would not have a handle on it.
QUESTION: Production?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: I understand the Secretary may be meeting with Mr. Rugova of
Kosovo today; is that true?
MR. RUBIN: No, the Secretary is at an internal meeting at the White House,
and then is going straight to the airport for Luxembourg and did not have a
meeting with Mr. Rugova today. I believe he's here tomorrow and Friday.
QUESTION: Could I ask you about her trip to Venezuela?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. I posted that yesterday; I think I announced it.
Yes.
QUESTION: Until a few days ago, Mac McLarty was supposed to head the US
delegation; now, all of a sudden, the Secretary's decided to go. Was there
anything that prompted her to make this last minute decision?
MR. RUBIN: As far as I know, the schedule for the Secretary during this
six-to-seven day-period was always in flux, and this was always an option.
There were some other stops she was considering taking in Europe that she
didn't take. Therefore, she felt it was very important to go to this
meeting and consult with her colleagues from this hemisphere, and that was
the basis of the decision.
That's not to say that there aren't issues that are going to come up there
in Caracas, but she will address those at the time. I would say it was a
combination of factors, as most of the planning for trips is.
QUESTION: I understand she may meet with the Panamanian Foreign Minister.
Do you know whether a decision is close with respect to the multinational
counter-narcotics center?
MR. RUBIN: The MCC - I believe what's going on is we are all trying to
figure out how to bring this thing across the finish line and see whether
some of the problems that have existed in the negotiations can be resolved.
But I don't believe we're there yet.
QUESTION: Congressmen Berman and Senator Kerry have proposed that the
Administration try to recapture at least some of the Soeharto wealth as
possible - likening it to what the United States did in the case of Marcos.
I wonder how you react to that.
MR. RUBIN: Well, we have received no formal request from the Indonesian
side for that; and that would be what would be necessary to trigger the
relevant laws. But we are studying the letter we received along those lines
from Senator Kerry.
QUESTION: Might there be something that the Administration could do on
its own, as opposed to whatever --
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, as I understand the legal situation, it has to be
triggered by a request from the government or relevant authorities there.
With respect to acting without that request, we are studying the letter
from Senator Kerry and Congressman Berman and others who have talked about
that.
QUESTION: So you think there might be some value in that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, we're studying it.
QUESTION: Jamie, lawyers for the family members of the four American
church women who were killed in El Salvador in 1980 have been after
Secretary Albright to authorize the release of documents the United States
may have about those crimes and possible cover-up. I understand there was a
second request to her yesterday. Do you have any --
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of that request, but I can say as a general
matter that Secretary Albright and Secretary Christopher before her have
pushed very hard, and an enormous number of documents have been released
during the course of these discussions. So in principle, she would want to
be as supportive as possible. But at this point, we don't have any specific
request to respond to.
QUESTION: The new element in this, you probably know, is recent
statements from the four guardsmen who are in prison in El Salvador for
having committed those murders, who are talking about superior orders that
they reportedly received for this, and also that they were told to keep
quiet about it. Given that these were US citizens that were killed, does
the United States think that the Salvadoran prosecuting authorities should
seek testimony from these guardsmen?
MR. RUBIN: Without getting specific about how they would conduct an
investigation, I think its clear that we believe that these matters should
be fully investigated by Salvadoran authorities. At the time when this
information first was made public, I think I made that very clear. With
regard to any further steps and any help we can be, we'd need a request,
and then we'll process it. As a general principle, I think both Secretary
Albright and Secretary Christopher have wanted to do all they can,
considering that the highest responsibility of the Secretary of State is
the protection of American citizens abroad.
QUESTION: And finally, do you have any comment on whether the Director
General of the National Guard at the time, would be made available to
testify about this? And also, any information on how he happened to get
asylum or a visa to enter the United States as a resident?
MR. RUBIN: You're going to have to check with the INS about their visa
policies; but again, we would want the Salvadoran authorities to leave no
stone unturned in investigating this effort. There have been a lot of
investigations, and I think I've reported to many of you and the State
Department has put out a lot of documents about what we know and what we
don't know about what happened. As a general rule, there is always a
greater assumption that we know more than we know; and as recent events
have demonstrated, sometimes we don't know. What we can do is try to be as
helpful as we can, and we'll continue to do that.
QUESTION: On Kosovo and the visit by Mr. Rugova, can you give us more
details on the agenda of the meetings he will have and what the US is
trying to accomplish by these meetings?
MR. RUBIN: We invited Dr. Rugova, leader of the Kosovar Albanians, along
with his delegation. The visit will be an opportunity to exchange views on
the situation there. It's not his first meeting with senior Administration
officials; he met previously with both Secretary Albright and Secretary
Christopher.
Obviously, what the key agenda item is, is how can the United States be
helpful in trying to prompt progress in the discussions between the Kosovar
Albanians and Serbian President Milosevic. There has been a procedural
delay in the planned discussions this week, precisely because Rugova will
be in Washington for the remainder of the week, but we do expect them to
announce further discussions.
Again, there have been continued reports of fighting in several locations
in Kosovo. The Embassy reports increased presence of both special police
and regular police in Kosovo, and travel restrictions in the region have
also increased. We're continuing to investigate reports of violence, and
what this violence underscores is the importance of making these negotiations
work.
QUESTION: Can you tell us who will meet --
MR. RUBIN: I don't think all the decisions have been made and who he will
meet, but I'm sure he will meet at high levels here at the State Department,
at least.
QUESTION: When the Secretary is in Luxembourg, does she have any
scheduled meeting with the Turkish and Greek foreign ministers?
MR. RUBIN: Well, both Turkey and Greece are members of the North Atlantic
Council and are close allies of the United States. My experience has been
when Secretary Albright is at one of those meetings, she, in one way or
another, meets with all the members of the North Atlantic Council. It is
also my understanding that there's a strong possibility of some separate
bilateral meetings outside of the actual NAC session.
QUESTION: Also, Turkish security forces captured the attackers of the
Turkish human rights activists, Akin Birdal. When the attacks occurred, you
had a very strong statement on the subject. Do you have anything about
it?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, we were pleased to learn that on May 22, six suspects
were arrested, including the two alleged gunmen for the May 12 assassination
attempt against Turkish human rights leader Birdal. We understand that the
detainees claim to be members of ultra-nationalist gangs. The investigation
of this attack is still ongoing, and we urge the Turkish authorities to
quickly bring all involved parties to justice.
The United States Government strongly condemns the assassination attempt
against Mr. Birdal, one of the foremost human rights advocates in Turkey.
He dedicated himself to improving Turkey's human rights situation, and the
US strongly the vital role of non-governmental actors in democratic
societies and in Turkey, in particular.
QUESTION: Just to go back to the Pakistani delegation - is this going to
be a delegation made up entirely of parliamentarians?
MR. RUBIN: The leader of the delegation, as we understand it, is the
chairman of their foreign relations committee. I am not ruling out that
there will be other contacts with the Pakistani Government to deal with our
expressed desire to convince them not to test. I would say that this is not
the primary channel in which those discussions occur.
QUESTION: Okay, but this delegation is not a government delegation, per
se.
MR. RUBIN: As I understand it, it's led by the chairman of their
parliamentary committee; and therefore, is not a representative, directly,
of the sitting government.
QUESTION: And one last one on a different subject. Do you have any
comment on the state of the Russian economy today?
MR. RUBIN: First let me say that we do believe that President Yeltsin has
a strong economic team that he's chosen, and they are fully capable of
leading Russia in the direction that will help its economy be brought into
as much success as possible. It's also true that Russian markets have come
under pressure in recent days, due to concerns about financial stability
there.
The Russian Government is taking steps to deal with the situation. The
central bank raised interest rates sharply and reconfirmed its commitment
to ruble stability. In addition, the President approved a package of fiscal
measures designed to reduce the budget deficit.
The IMF is currently in discussions with the Russian Government on terms
for the next year of Russia's existing IMF program, which could also
trigger disbursal of a $670 million tranche from the existing loan, and we
hope to conclude its assessment in the next few days. US officials
obviously are working directly with the IMF, and the discussions that are
now going on there are an indicator of the productive relationship between
Russia and the IMF that has built up over recent years.
QUESTION: At this point, can you say whether the Administration backs
disbursal of the $670 million?
MR. RUBIN: No, I could not. At this point, what I can say is that the IMF
is discussing the details of that with the Russian Government, and it will
be up to them to make a judgment whether the conditions merit that.
QUESTION: And getting into some detailed economics, do you think this is
a result of the Asian financial malaise? And do you think the Russians can
resist it?
MR. RUBIN: It's certainly possible that some of this is linked to the
Asian financial crisis, and at the same time, it's also evidence of how
integrated Russia has become into global financial markets - something that
was decidedly untrue just a short number of years ago.
QUESTION: Question on Iraq - Richard Butler is going to the Security
Council next week with new information that could speed up the process of
closing Iraq's weapons files. Does that indicate any shift in US thinking
on the best way to do that?
MR. RUBIN: No, on the contrary. We've been saying for some time that the
best way to solve the crisis Iraq has created with the international
community is for them to move away from a posture where they lie, they
obstruct, they delay, they deny, they do whatever they can do to not
provide the information the UN needs to do its job.
If Iraq were to change it posture from disputing every record the UN shows
up with, from not providing the information necessary to prove how much
chemical weapons material, how much biological weapons material was
produced, this situation would change dramatically. Let's bear in mind
inspections are not a necessary prerequisite for sanctions to be lifted.
What is a necessary prerequisite for sanctions to be lifted is cooperation.
The most simple example I can give you is there are huge discrepancies
between the amount of material that UNSCOM knows Iraq has imported to
produce, say, media in which biological weapons - and that's not an insult -
media in which biological weapons can grow, and there are huge amounts of
material that are unaccounted for.
So we know huge amounts were imported. Iraq has only confirmed the fact
that a small portion of that has been destroyed. Let me give you an example
of that. We don't believe, in the absence of written documentation, that
Iraqi officials would go about destroying chemical or biological weaponry.
If you were an Iraqi mid-level official, I don't think you'd want to do
anything on such a sensitive area unless you were sure that your superiors
had ordered you to do so. So in the absence of proving that they've
destroyed this material, given Iraq's record, UNSCOM is quite right to say
that this remains unclear.
So what we need to see from Iraq is not a game of hide and seek, not a game
of, okay, finally we'll let you come visit this place, but a cooperative
process where they actually walk UNSCOM through what they did; what they
did with the material; what happened to the equipment that's missing, and
prove to UNSCOM that there are no more biological weapons components,
chemical weapons components in Iraq. That's what's been missing. That's
what I would call a positive attitude, instead of not taking a negative
attitude.
All we've had from the recent events is a willingness on Iraq's part to not
deny access to sites. But we've seen no change in their posture of
providing information necessary for UNSCOM to answer the questions. Until
we do so, sanctions can't be lifted.
QUESTION: Well, why is Butler now being given the go-ahead to release
previously classified information, then, to Iraq?
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't assume that Ambassador Butler makes those decisions
based on anything but his best judgment. He has the confidence of the
Secretary and the President, like Ambassador Ekeus before him. We believe
both of these gentlemen have been fully capable of determining what they
know, what they don't know and why they don't know it. So what I'm
suggesting to you is that if Ambassador Butler puts down a plan for Iraqi
cooperation that is positive cooperation, not no longer failing to
cooperate by allowing access, that would be good news if they were to do
that.
But there's no evidence to suggest they're about to do that. We'd be
thrilled.
QUESTION: At the time that Indonesia changed presidents, you said that a
very important indicator of Indonesia's future and whether or not the US
would be supportive of loans to it in the future would be the new Cabinet.
I'm not sure I ever hear you tell us what you think of the new Cabinet. You
said that Yeltsin has a strong economic team; does President Habibie have a
strong economic team, in your opinion?
MR. RUBIN: We do think the new Cabinet is a pretty good operation, and
has strong economic advisors. People are marked more for their competence
than their family ties. Therefore, we are pleased with the make-up of the
Indonesian Cabinet in economic terms.
Again, I would emphasize that our objectives in Indonesia are financial
stability, economic growth, political reform and human rights. With respect
to how the IMF and the international financial institutions will respond to
particular requests, we will make a judgment about what seems most likely
to advance these objectives. We look forward to progress towards the
political and economic conditions that will permit an effective program of
support for Indonesia's economic recovery.
Recent developments are positive steps. The basic make-up of the Cabinet,
in economic terms, is a positive step.
QUESTION: And he has said he'll have elections, but hasn't said when.
Should he say when?
MR. RUBIN: We believe the Indonesian politicians, the Indonesian
leadership, in consultation with all elements of Indonesian society, have
to come up with an Indonesian solution to their political and economic
crisis that occurred in recent weeks and months. And we, the United States,
don't need to set down specific programs for when elections should occur
and what the exact make up should be. Let's bear in mind Indonesia is a
country that has never had opposition political parties before. A free and
fair election would require a set of rules and regulations and laws that
would permit opposition parties to compete freely and fairly. So it's
not something that obviously can be done overnight.
But beyond stating that analytical point, we believe it's up to the
Indonesian people in consultation with their leadership and their political
leaders to make a decision as to when and where and how elections should be
put forward.
QUESTION: But are you happy with the new leader? And also, if you are -
(inaudible) -- the IMF loans which were approved to Indonesia for the new
government?
MR. RUBIN: I think I just answered that question. With respect to the IMF
loans, our view is that we want to support the people of Indonesia, and we
will make a judgment about what seems likely to advance our objectives of
economic stability and the rights of the Indonesian people, in deciding how
to act in the IMF.
Let me point out that they've just returned there; the discussions are just
beginning. We do look forward to progress towards the comprehensive
political and economic reform that President Habibie referred to. And we
look forward to the political and economic conditions that will permit us
to pursue an effective program of support for Indonesia's economic
recovery.
QUESTION: Do you support him at this time - whether he will hold
elections or not?
MR. RUBIN: We think he's taken some positive steps in terms of the
Cabinet, in terms of calling for comprehensive reform, but we are still in
a wait-and-see-mode.
QUESTION: You spoke yesterday about the Secretary's strong protest in the
barley case with the EU, and I wondered if the Administration had decided
on a remedy?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any new information for you on that. We can
check; I don't think we've made that decision yet.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:50 P.M.)
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