U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #53, 98-04-30
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
551
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Thursday, April 30, 1998
Briefer: James B. Foley
ANNOUNCEMENT
1 --Background Briefing on Release of Department's Patterns
of Global Terrorism
SERBIA
1,2-3 Assessment of the Contact Group Meeting in Rome
1,4-5 --Freeze on Funds Held Abroad by the FRY and Serbian
Governments
1,4 --Further Actions by May 9 Should Belgrade Remain in
Non-Compliance
1 --Condemnation of Violence in Kosovo
1 --International Involvement To Facilitate Talks
1-2 --Stabilization Package/OSCE Missions/Confidence Building
Measures
2-3 Russian President Yeltsin's Comments re: Kosovo and
Pressure on Serbia
3 Serbian Reaction to Contact Group Meeting
5-6 Economic Effect on FRY/Impact on Montenegro
6 Security and Stability of Surrounding States in Region
8 Evans and Novak Column re: Options
RUSSIA
6 Prime Minister Kiriyenko Appointment of Economic Team
INDONESIA
6 Reports of Widespread Demonstrations
CHINA
7 Reported US-Provided Space Cooperation Agreement
CAMBODIA
7 UN Consideration of Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge
7 --China's Position on Establishment of Tribunal
7-8 --Venue for Tribunal
CUBA
8 Reported USIS-Cuban Institute of Film Presentation
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
8 Update on Process/Meetings in London
SUDAN
8 US Humanitarian Assistance
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFF-CAMERA DAILY PRESS BRIEFING (CORRECTED VERSION)
DPB #53
THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 1998, 1:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. FOLEY: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements to make
except
to remind you that we are going to have a background briefing this
afternoon on the Patterns of Global Terrorism Report at 3:00 p.m. It will
begin, certainly, after the President's press conference has completed, but
tentatively scheduled for 3:00 p.m.
QUESTION: Do you have an assessment of the Contact Group meeting?
MR. FOLEY: Yes. The Contact Group meeting yesterday in Rome had a full
day of discussions that went into the evening. We are satisfied with the
results of that meeting; the Contact Group agreed to an immediate freeze on
the funds held abroad by the FRY and Serbian Governments and the contact
group also agreed to take further actions by May 9th if Belgrade remains in
non-compliance on the critical dialogue between the FRY and the Kosovar
Albanians. I can go through some of the main points, if you wish, that
the Contact Group agreed.
First, all members of the Contact Group are firmly opposed to the
independence for Kosovo and to a continuation of the unacceptable status
quo. Second, the Contact Group condemned the increase in violence in recent
days in Kosovo, in particular the excessive use of force by the FRY army.
The Contact Group noted that the crucial requirements of the London and
Bonn Contact Group meetings had not been met and, as I said, it therefore
instituted a freeze on FRY and Serbian Government assets abroad.
I think, very importantly, the Contact Group agreed that appropriate
international involvement was essential to establish confidence between the
parties and to facilitate talks. The Contact Group recommended and urged
Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanian leadership to adopt a framework for
dialogue based on a number of principles that are necessary to make
dialogue succeed; rejection of violence for achieving political goals; no
preconditions and mutual respect. They also put forward a stabilization
package that must include, as a minimum, first cessation of repression by
the authorities in Belgrade, also a strong condemnation of terrorism by the
Kosovo Albanian leadership; second, reopening of the OSCE missions
in the FRY, including in Kosovo; and finally, concrete inter-communal
confidence building measures, including implementation of the education
agreement according to the agreed time table. The Contact Group reiterated
that it attaches the highest priority to the immediate launching of the
Gonzalez mission.
Finally, I'm sure you're aware, that the Contact Group noted that if the
leadership in Belgrade agrees to the framework for dialogue; if Belgrade
agrees, and indeed implements, the stabilization measures that I mentioned;
if the Gonzalez mission is launched; and if substantive talks begin, that
the Contact Group will promote "a clear and achievable path towards
Belgrade's full integration into the international community, including
participation in the OSCE."
So, as I said, we believe it was a constructive meeting and that the
Contact Group was able to make concrete decisions that place the focus now
principally on President Milosevic in Belgrade. He now has a clear pathway
in two directions; one is to continue the repression, to refuse unconditional
dialogue and to see the Serb economy, which is already in horrendous shape,
get significantly worse and the international isolation of his country
deepened, which obviously is a prospect which we hope he does not
embrace because it certainly is against the interests of his people.
But the Contact Group at the same time opened another perspective,
which is one of eventual reintegration of Serbia and the FRY into the
international community within the context of a dialogue, an unconditional
dialogue, with Kosovar Albanians that will allow not only for the
realization of the legitimate political aspirations of the Kosovar
Albanians within the FRY but also, we would argue, would be of significant
interest to Milosevic personally and to the people of the FRY, including
the Serb people of the FRY, insofar as the stabilization of that situation
can arrest the downward spiral and allow the Serbian people the prospect
finally, almost ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, to begin to
enjoy the fruits of the democratic changes that have been sweeping
Europe to the exclusion of parts of the former Yugoslavia over the
last decade.
QUESTION: What would be Russian President Yeltsin's comments on Kosovo
today?
MR. FOLEY: What did he say? No, I didn't.
QUESTION: Well, it was a call to resist pressure. There's not been
international pressure on Serbia over Kosovo, and I was wondering if you
had a reading on whether Russia was increasingly at variance with your
position over Kosovo.
MR. FOLEY: Well, I think there has been a disagreement over tactics
between Russia and other members of the Contact Group, notably the United
States over the last month and a half since the crisis broke out. We saw
Russia disassociate itself from some of the punitive measures decided, I
believe in London on March 9th. So I would argue in the first instance that
this is not new and we do have a difference of view. We believe that we
went the extra mile in acknowledging that it was important to offer a
positive perspective to the leadership in Belgrade; that if they take
the steps that are necessary that the Contact Group, including Russia,
has called upon Belgrade to take in the way of ending the repression and
beginning a real dialogue -- that if they take those steps there is a
perspective for improved relations and improved cooperation and integration
in the international community.
So we accepted that thesis, but we believe that it is equally important
that the leadership in Belgrade must understand that their situation will
get worse if they don't take those necessary and important steps called for
by the international community. So we have a difference of view there. I
wouldn't exaggerate it because the fact of the matter is that the Russian
Federation in the Contact Group meeting, Minister Ivanov, played an
otherwise constructive role. I believe the atmospherics were good.
Ambassador Gelbard felt that it was a good meeting, not only in terms
of results but in terms of the spirit of cohesion that prevailed
in that meeting. And I think what is most important is the fact that Russia
did adhere to the basic prescriptions that the Contact Group endorsed.
Russia only disassociated itself from the two punitive measures that were
agreed by the other Contract Group members.
But insofar as we're talking about the framework for dialogue, the
stabilization package, the call for unconditional dialogue, an end to the
repression, the pullback of special police units, disengagement of the
Yugoslav army from internal repression, we believe there was a unanimity of
views in the Contact Group.
QUESTION: Have you seen the initial reaction from Belgrade?
MR. FOLEY: I have not.
QUESTION: Well, they describe the Contact Group's actions as criminal
activity, apparently not auguring very well.
MR. FOLEY: Well, I don't think we would be surprised by their initial
reaction, but Belgrade now has a number of days until May 9th to digest
this meeting of the Contact Group. Inasmuch as Belgrade may have hoped that
that meeting would have produced a result at the lowest common denominator;
would have produced a result that did not entail punitive measures; would
have produced a result that might have shown daylight between members of
the Contact Group, I can understand that those hopes, not having been
fulfilled, that there might be a reaction of disappointment, if not
bitterness, that is reflected in the hyperbolic nature of those comments.
But the fact of the matter is because the meeting was successful, the focus
is no longer on the Contact Group. The Contact Group has acted and the ball
is solely in Mr. Milosevic's court, and we trust that on sober reflection
he will consider that he has now two stark choices and it's up to him to
choose. One choice leads to the unknown, to an unknown which is replete
with negative possibilities for himself and for his people and for the
region, and the other one is a very positive perspective. Milosevic
has shown himself as someone who has, in the past, been part of the
problems in the Balkans and also someone who is able to make himself part
of solutions to problems in the Balkans. So we think that, as I said, on
sober reflection he will have an opportunity to see that, indeed, there are
opportunities for him and his people in following the advice of the
international community.
QUESTION: The Contact Group accord that you mentioned, you mentioned four
very specific "if's", if this happens. Was there any specific provision if
none of these happens? What if Belgrade goes ahead with the current
policy?
MR. FOLEY: Yes, indeed. The Contact Group decided - let me find the
appropriate quote here. This was minus Russia, of course, but we think it's
significant nevertheless, that if Belgrade takes the steps in paragraph six
of the Contact Group statement to bring about negotiations, we will
immediately reverse the decision on the freezing of assets. "We have also,"
said the Contact Group, "decided that if dialogue is blocked because
of Belgrade's noncompliance, we will by the 9th of May take actions to stop
new investment in Serbia." I think that's about as explicit as they could
possibly be.
QUESTION: A meeting on May 9th and, if so, at what level?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware that there is a Contact Group meeting as such on
May 9th. I believe that all the foreign ministers who are members of the
Contact Group will be in London for the pre-G8 summit meeting of finance
and foreign ministers.
QUESTION: Can you help us to understand to what extent, if any, the
freeze on assets is more than a symbolic move? What assets are there that
were frozen?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not going to be in a position to give you facts and
figures and to flesh out the Contact Group's statement. They have made a
decision yesterday and it's now going to be up to capitals to take a look
at their inventories of assets and take the measures that are required. So
we don't have that information now. I think it is indisputable though that
the FRY and Serbian governments do maintain significant accounts abroad. It
is difficult to state with precision how much money will be affected by
the funds freeze, but we will press for implementation of this measure
to be as far-reaching and consequential as possible.
Most importantly, the funds freeze restricts the ability of the FRY and
Serbian governments to move money freely through international financial
markets, restricting Belgrade's access to the global economy and, obviously,
the investment ban will be even more significant if, if it comes to that,
by May 9th Belgrade has not moved in a positive direction.
QUESTION: Can I just follow up?
MR. FOLEY: Sure.
QUESTION: You couldn't speak to assets in other countries. What about the
United States? Does the FRY or the Serb government have assets in US
banks?
MR. FOLEY: Well, as I said, I'm not in a position to get into facts and
figures today, and I don't know if I will be able to talk about that
publicly later in the week. But the decision has just been made and,
obviously, our experts are going to be looking at that. I don't have those
for you today.
QUESTION: But a yes or no though, on that. Do they have any assets in the
United States?
MR. FOLEY: I believe they do.
QUESTION: Jim, weren't they frozen? Didn't the US freeze their assets a
while ago?
MR. FOLEY: The US government has already taken action in this regard. I'm
not sure if it is as far-reaching and comprehensive and definitive as was
decided by us and our partners yesterday but, obviously, we're looking at
the widest possible impact and how it will be applied in other countries,
and I would say as well in countries beyond the members of the Contact
Group. So we will also be seeking to build support for a wider application
of this sanction.
QUESTION: Isn't the ban only in Serbia and not against Montenegro?
MR. FOLEY: That's my understanding.
QUESTION: In general, what do you think the economic effect on Yugoslavia
will be, because some people say it's not going to be very significant?
MR. FOLEY: May I just go back to Ron's question? I'd like to take that
question and get back to you on it because the language of the Contact
Group's statement is that the Contact Group had decided to take action and
put into effect a freeze on the funds held abroad by the FRY and Serbian
governments. I need to check that. Certainly, in so far as the prospective
investment ban is concerned, the operative word here is Serbia.
QUESTION: If I could just repeat my question. What, in general, do you
think the effect will be on the Yugoslav economy, as some people think it
won't make an awful lot of difference?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I think, as I indicated, that the prospective investment
ban will probably have the most profound effect because we understand, and
I can't get into the details - in part because I don't have them with me
here at the podium, but nevertheless we understand, though, that there are
some significant prospective investments out there that would be affected
by this ban if it does come into effect. We think, though, as a general
matter, that these measures, both the asset freeze that was decided
yesterday and the investment ban that may eventually come into effect
in about ten days, have a significant chilling effect on the Serb
economy. It is a message to not only international investors and entrepreneurs,
but indeed to investors and entrepreneurs inside Serbia, that the prospects
for a good return on their money are dimming and almost nil under current
circumstances.
And as we have said here on previous occasions, as bad as the Serbian
economy is today, it can get a lot worse. In fact I think we've not begun
to see the ultimate impact of the decision reached I believe in London in
March on the ban on western support for privatization in Serbia, because
we've known for a fact that previous privatizations have served, in effect,
as kind of a "cash cow" for Milosevic, which has permitted him to pay off
some of his debts to the leading pillars of his regime and that is
drying up significantly. So, he is going to face, if not by May 9 when
we've requested or demanded that decisions be taken, but eventually he's
going to reach a crunch point. And having successfully presided over the
amputation of the former Yugoslavia, I think on two occasions already if
you look back to the start of the Balkan war and to the events in the
Krajina; having successfully presided over the demolishing of his economy,
he's setting himself up for further successes of this nature unless he
reverses course.
But again, the decisions in Rome yesterday are not strictly of a punitive
nature. We have gone the extra mile to trace out the perspective of a
different future for Mr. Milosevic and for his people if he's willing to do
what we believe is in his interest and in his people's interest, which is
to settle the problem politically in Kosovo.
QUESTION: Earlier in the week you mentioned reinforcement of elements of
cooperation between NATO and Albania. Did the Contact Group come out with
something on that and is there a sense of how Russia feels about it?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware that the Contact Group specifically addressed
the issue of the surrounding countries yesterday in their meeting in Rome.
Ambassador Gelbard has not returned and so I don't have a full readout of
the meeting, but certainly the security and stability of the surrounding
states in the region remains of paramount concern to us and indeed, this is
a subject that was addressed in London in the initial meeting of the
Contact Group on the Kosovo crisis on March 9 and so it is something
that is of concern to us and that we have under review.
QUESTION: Kiriyenko has appointed his economic team, and I was wondering
if you had any view on whether it's good news for the reforms?
MR. FOLEY: I think we're going to be reluctant to try to comment on
specific individuals in the government except to wish all of them well,
insofar as this is a pro-reform team that Prime Minister Kiriyenko has
assembled under President Yeltsin's leadership. We wish it well and we hope
that it will continue along the path of economic reform and we see no
reason to suspect otherwise. So, we wish President Kiriyenko and his new
government well and we look forward to close cooperation with that
government.
QUESTION: There seem to have been fairly widespread demonstrations today
against the Soeharto Government in Indonesia. Do you have any information
on that; some of them were met with police?
MR. FOLEY: I've not seen those reports. As you are aware, on previous
occasions when this question has arisen in this briefing format, we have
indicated a couple of things; first, that we recognize that the security
authorities in Indonesia have a responsibility to preserve order But we've
also reminded them that they have an equal responsibility to do so within
the framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights and respect
for the safety for civilians and respect for the right of peaceable
assembly; and we continue the urge to government in that direction.
QUESTION: May I ask a question about China?
MR. FOLEY: Let me just say that I'm unlikely to say very much about
countries which the Secretary of State is in the process of visiting.
QUESTION: Would you submit comment on the press report here from the The
Washington Post, yesterday, that reported the United States has offered to
sign an agreement on space cooperation with China. Do you have any comment
on that?
MR. FOLEY: I believe you're referring to another newspaper in this city.
The fact is, as you are aware, we don't comment on alleged classified
documents that were referenced in the article in question. I can tell you,
however, that the US has not provided China with a draft space cooperation
agreement, so the article is wrong.
Moreover, the Washington Times, which is the newspaper involved, was
informed of this fact the other day. The important point is that, as we
made clear back in March when commenting on another story on a similar
subject, that there never was and there still is not any US plan or
proposal to offer China access to missile technology. Missile non-
proliferation is a long standing high priority for this administration's
global non-proliferation policy. It is one of the key issues we discuss
with China. The US has a strong interest in promoting restraint in missile-
related exports in accordance with the MTCR guidelines. So, in this regard,
we have been considering ways to encourage China to strengthen its
controlled missile-related exports. This includes consideration of
scientific space cooperation. But again, no one is proposing any offers of
direct or indirect access to missile technology.
QUESTION: Can you confirm a report in the New York Times today that the
United States is asking the United Nations to set up a three-man tribunal
to try Cambodian Khmer Rouge leaders?
MR. FOLEY: Yes. The crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge were among the
most horrifying of this century with up to two million deaths over a four-
year period. For this reason, the US Government believes we must do
everything possible to bring the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders who
exercised the most senior leadership positions during the 1975-79 period to
justice. Based on the current military situation in Cambodia with respect
to the Khmer Rouge, we have discussed with many governments a variety of
options should senior Khmer Rouge leaders become accessible to the
international community, and we have concluded that creation of an
international criminal tribunal is the most appropriate of those options.
We have shared with UN Security Council members in New York a draft
resolution to establish a separate tribunal for Cambodia which would try a
small number of senior Khmer Rouge leaders for their actions during the
1975-79 period. We certainly hope that the Council will be able to act
swiftly on this proposal.
QUESTION: Do you have that China already is saying that it's not in favor
of this?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we're in the process of dialogue with China on this
issue; I think we remain hopeful about Chinese cooperation.
QUESTION: Where would this tribunal sit?
MR. FOLEY: I believe, and I'd like to get back to you if I'm wrong, that
it would be in The Hague.
QUESTION: On Cuba - Last night in Havana the film "Amistad" was shown in
a presentation co-sponsored by the US - (inaudible) - and the Cuban
Institute of Film. This is a first in many, many years in Cuba. Is this
part of a program to do things with the Cuban Government - these kind of
promotional films?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware of the facts of the case. I'd be happy to look
into it for you though.
QUESTION: Do you have any comment about Chairman Arafat's acceptance of
the US plan and Prime Minister Netanyahu's apparent resistance to it,
public resistance to it?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we've not commented publicly on either party's specific
views about our proposals in view of the fact that we're negotiating those
proposals privately, and I think you won't be surprised if I'm not willing
to do so. I'm certainly not going to be drawn out on this subject in
advance of the very important meetings to take place in London on
Monday.
QUESTION: Do you have anything in response to the Evans and Novak column
today, which was rather unkind to the Secretary?
MR. FOLEY: Yes. It's flat out wrong.
QUESTION: What part of it is wrong?
MR. FOLEY: Well, first of all, it's wrong concerning the policy in
question. There has been no change in US policy on the question.
QUESTION: Would that be the Christmas -
MR. FOLEY: I'm not going to address the specifics of the story, but there
has been no change in American policy, and that as far as we're concerned,
everything remains on the table. We've not ruled any options out, but we
don't speak publicly and have not about that issue. But the story is
wrong.
QUESTION: I asked you a couple days ago about aid, humanitarian aid to
Sudan?
MR. FOLEY: Yes, I think if you give me a couple minutes I can get you
something on that. Other questions? Thank you.
(The briefing ended at 1:40 P.M.)
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