U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #51, 98-04-27
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
639
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Monday, April 27, 1998
Briefer: James B. Foley
ANNOUNCEMENTS
1 Today's Background Briefing by a Senior Department Official
Regarding the Situation in Kosovo
SWITZERLAND
1 Contact Between Under Sec. Eizenstat and the Swiss on the
Issue of Nazi gold
SERBIA
1-2 US Policy Regarding Foreign Intervention in Kosovo; US
Reaction to Vote by the Republic of Serbia Against
Foreign Intervention in Kosovo
3 Update on the Serbian Arms Embargo
RUSSIA
2 Status of START II in the Wake of PM Kiriyenko's Nomination
by the Russian Duma
10 SIBERIA: No US Reaction to Current Election Situation,
Alexander Lebed
GERMANY
3-4 US Comment on the Election Results in the State of
Saxony-Anhalt
IRAQ
4 US Position Regarding Iraqi Compliance with UNSCOM
4-5 Support for Sanctions Against Iraq within the UN Security
Council
5 TEM's Assessment of Iraqi Compliance with the UNSCOM
Mission
5 US Policy Regarding the Furthering of Sanctions Against
Iraq
5-6 Update on the Oil for Food Program
6-7 Russian Position Regarding Sanctions Imposed on Iraq
CUBA
7 US Policy Regarding Cuba's Return to the Organization of
American States
7 Discussion of Human Rights Between the Canadian PM
Chretien's and Castro
7-8 Impact of US Embargo to Cuba
8 US Reaction to Castro's Remarks Concerning the Imposed
Economic Embargo
8-9 Status of Upcoming OAS Vote Regarding the Return of Cuba to
the OAS
MEXICO
9 US Reaction to the Pastors of Peace being Attacked in
Chiapas
CYPRUS
9 Update on the Situation in Cyprus; Amb. Miller's and
Amb. Holbrooke's Travel to the Region
TURKEY
9-10 Readout on the Bilateral Meetings Between Amb. Miller and
the Turkish Dep. FM
10 US Designation of the PKK as a Terrorist Organization
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #51
MONDAY, APRIL 27, 1998, 1:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. FOLEY: Welcome to the State Department. I don't have any announcements
except to underline -- I think we already indicated out of the press office
-- that we're going to have a senior administration official briefing on
background this afternoon about the situation in the former Yugoslavia,
with a particular look towards the Contact Group meeting in Rome on Kosovo
scheduled for this Wednesday. So with that, George, let me open the
floor.
QUESTION: Are there talks going on in the building today involving Under
Secretary Eizenstat and the Swiss on the issue of Nazi gold?
MR. FOLEY: I don't know whether Under Secretary Eizenstat himself is
involved. I'm not sure of his whereabouts today; I can check that for you
and get that to you after the briefing - that should be easy to verify. But
what I can say is that Under Secretary Eizenstat first convened the parties
to the class action suit at their request last December in Zurich and he
has brought them together several times since then. He is going to
continue to remain actively involved in facilitating direct talks
between the parties as long as the parties desire and as long as the
opportunity remains for progress towards a just and fair resolution.
QUESTION: Can you say if the talks have opened here today?
MR. FOLEY: I want to get that for you after the briefing. I believe there
are talks taking place today, yes.
QUESTION: There are a few people in Switzerland who believe there's going
to be a statement on this issue from this building at 4pm.
MR. FOLEY: Well, they haven't been down to the press office this morning
and indicated that to us, but I'd be glad to get that for you.
QUESTION: On Kosovo. The Republic of Serbia has voted, I think but all
but 3% of the voters say they don't want any foreign intervention in
Kosovo. On the other hand, the Albanian Kosovars are saying that they're
coming across the border and they're going to
continue their military actions and I would ask, is this really not for
Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav leadership to meet these armed incursions
across the Albanian border?
MR. FOLEY: Well, first of all, I think what surprised us about the vote
in Serbia last week was that actually 3% of recorded voters voted against
the government's position, I think given our known views about the nature
of democracy or the lack of democracy in Serbia, it's no surprise that the
vote produced the result that it did. We continue to believe, as a member
of the Contact Group, that what the Contact Group called for in its first
meeting in London and subsequent meeting in Bonn -- calling for direct
negotiations, unconditional negotiations, between the FRY leadership and
under President Milosevic's sponsorship and the Kosovar Albanians -- is
essential.
The border problem right now that we have begun to see - reports of
incidents along the Albanian and Yugoslav border in Kosovo - are really
symptomatic and, indeed, a consequence of the failure of Milosevic to take
meaningful action towards achieving a viable solution to the crisis. As you
will recall, the Contact Group called additionally, as well as for direct
and unconditional negotiations, called for a pull-back of the special
police, called for international mediation, called for international
presence for monitoring, for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In
almost every one of these areas we've seen nothing but obstruction on the
part of Milosevic.
So I'm not going to steal the thunder of our briefer this afternoon, who is
going to talk a little bit more directly about the situation in Kosovo and
about the prospects for the upcoming Contact Group meeting in Rome. But I
can say about the border incidents that we've seen referred to by the
Yugoslav army that the US does recognize the sovereign right of nations to
protect their borders. But there are additional reports of a significant
military build-up in the interior of Kosovo, and we believe these reports
are troubling given the recent incidents of disproportionate use of force
by the government. We have raised this concern with senior officials
in Belgrade. Again, the United States reiterates the UN and the Contact
Group's call for the immediate withdrawal of special police units from the
Kosovo region and for Belgrade authorities and the Kosovar Albanians to
engage in an unconditional dialogue. It is clear that the status quo in
Kosovo is not sustainable and that the level of mistrust and the wide gap
between the two parties make it impossible for these parties to have
productive talks without some kind of international assistance, which is
additionally what the Contact Group was calling for.
QUESTION: So the United States policy would be for all sides - all armed
sides to
stand down and disengage?
MR. FOLEY: Absolutely. We have called for both the standing down, the
withdrawal of the special police units and the non-intervention of the
Yugoslav army on the one hand, and we've also called on the Kosovar
Albanians themselves to eschew violence. So far we've only seen one
response, from the Kosovar Albanians who have agreed to enter into a
dialogue with Belgrade.
QUESTION: I have a question about Russia and the situation in parliament
there. How much concern is there about the threatened retaliation by the
Russian Duma against President Yeltsin basically backing them against a
wall on confirming his Prime Minister? Are you worried about the possibility
that they would slow down, for example, ratification of START II?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I would - I'm not familiar with recent reporting of
statements by Duma members in the wake of the confirmation of Mr. Kiriyenko
as Prime Minister. As you know, on Friday, we welcomed his approval by the
Duma. I believe Vice President Gore also spoke with the new Prime Minister
and looked forward to continuing the commission that's been doing good work
over these years. So we're rather optimistic about the prospects, at least
to continue close cooperation between the United States and Russia on a
range of issues.
President Yeltsin, as well as his new Prime Minister, have reiterated their
support for continuing to pursue economic reforms at home and the basis
thrust of Russian foreign policy, cooperation with the United States and
other western nations abroad. So we don't see any change in Russian
Government conditions, per se.
Your question has more to do with the Duma in that, insofar as the START II
ratification is concerned, we've seen even the chairman, or the Speaker of
the Duma before the Kiriyenko nomination was approved coming out in favor
of early ratification of the treaty. We think it's in the interest of both
the United States and Russia, and the Russian Government itself is
committed to pursuing ratification. If the speaker of the Duma himself is
endorsing it and urging an early vote in favor, I think there are reasons
to be optimistic. But we will have to see how the situation plays out. I
think the next step is Prime Minister Kiriyenko has to name a new
government; I believe that's expected this week, so it's premature to
comment on what the legislative calendar may be in the weeks ahead.
QUESTION: Back on Kosovo - have you seen the report out of Europe that
the EU has drawn up a list of new military items which will be embargoed or
sanctioned in the case of Serbia?
MR. FOLEY: I have not seen reports of a new list. As you know, the
Security Council approved, what I understand to be a blanket arms embargo;
and so if this involves some sort of clarification of further implementation
or elucidation of items to be covered in such an embargo, then that's
probably a positive step.
QUESTION: What about police equipment?
MR. FOLEY: I have not seen that report.
QUESTION: Also, on another subject. Have you seen the results of the
voting in the Saxony-Anhalt in Germany, with a trend toward a growth of
strength by the extreme right?
MR. FOLEY: Yes. From this podium we don't make it a practice of
commenting in detail about elections that take place, especially in allied
nations. We believe Germany is an extraordinarily solid democracy and has
been so for half a century; we have full confidence in Germany's democratic
system. We, of course, will be watching developments closely. There are
going to be national elections later this year, but we certainly don't see
the results in that state of Saxony-Anhalt as a harbinger or as any kind of
a national bellwether.
QUESTION: Iraq on the UN today. As you know, the Security Council is
hearing from Mr. Butler on sanctions. Can you give us, just in case
anything's changed since we last asked you, which isn't long ago, I realize,
what is the latest US position on whether or not it is ready to declare
Iraq in substantial compliance on the nuclear part of the work of
UNSCOM?
MR. FOLEY: Well, let me just say, first of all, that UNSCOM Chairman
Butler will brief the Security Council today. We look forward to hearing
what he has to say. I believe the IAEA will also brief it's six month
report to the Security Council today, as well. I would rather not comment,
at this point, in order to prejudge the outcome of these briefings, as well
as the follow on discussions that will occur after those briefing.
But I can refer you to what Spokesman Rubin said on the subject last week,
which was that we would be pleased to recognize progress where it occurs,
and there apparently has been some progress - I would emphasize some -- in
the area of understanding some of what Iraq had done in the nuclear area.
Bbut if we're talking about transitioning to a different form of monitoring,
which is what it would involve down the road in all of these areas
where UNSCOM and the IAEA have responsibility, the transition would
be to long-term monitoring and we would be prepared to consider that if
Iraq is able to answer some of the as-yet unanswered questions in the
nuclear file, in the nuclear area, and also continue to demonstrate good
faith in its cooperation with the UN, generally. But I wouldn't want to
highlight what position we are specifically going to take in New York.
QUESTION: Do you note any erosion of support for sanctions against
Iraq?
MR. FOLEY: No.
QUESTION: Within the Security Council?
MR. FOLEY: No, none whatsoever. We note that Iraq is attempting to build
a drumbeat of noise, if you will, in order to try to garner support for
their position that sanctions ought to be lifted. But we don't note any
weakening of the international consensus, and certainly within the Security
Council, that the lifting of sanctions is predicated on the verifiable
completion of the disarmament process. I think the UNSCOM report that is
being discussed today indicates that there really has been no progress --
little, if any, progress over the last six months towards identifying,
verifying and destroying Iraq's missile and chemical and biological
weapons capability since last October. Obviously, there was a significant
hiatus during this six-month period caused by Iraq's attempt to divide the
Security Council and prevent the inspections from taking place. So it's not
surprising that there hasn't been that kind of progress.
What we have had is an initial site visit under the new Memorandum of
Understanding negotiated by the Secretary General to the so-called
presidential sites. But one visit does not make a successful completion of
UNSCOM's mandate. On the contrary, the Iraqi's have been emphasizing the
question of procedures; the fact that they allowed one visit when what is
at stake is the question of whether Iraq has disarmed and has provided all
the answers that UNSCOM is seeking about what it has done historically with
its biological, nuclear, chemical weapons and missiles and what's been
destroyed and what hasn't been destroyed; and we've seen no progress on
that front.
On the contrary, I would also point out that, as you know, there was a
group of - the so-called TEM, the Technical Evaluation Mission, was
convened in Vienna in March at Iraqi instigation in order to assess Iraqi
compliance with the UNSCOM mission. That TEM, which included experts from
all over the world -- including, I believe, Russia and China -- found that
Iraq remained woefully short in its obligations on the biological issue. So
we see, of course, from our point of view, no reason to even begin to
consider the question of lifting of sanctions. But I have not seen
any of evidence that other members of the Security Council have noted
any need to reconsider sanctions in view of what, I think, everyone agrees
has been inadequate performance on Iraq's part.
QUESTION: Jim, given the inadequate performance, would the United States
prefer to see heightened sanctions against Iraq?
MR. FOLEY: I think it's clear that Iraq is fully dissatisfied with the
level of sanctions such as they exist. Clearly, what Iraq seeks to do by
all means - by propaganda, by evasion, by noncompliance - is to attempt to
get out from under the sanctions such as they exist. I think it's clear
that the sanctions have succeeded in their basic mission since the end of
the Gulf War in terms of containing Iraq, preventing Iraq from rebuilding
its capabilities in the military field with which it can threaten
its neighbors, with which it can further develop weapons of mass destruction.
I think any sort of neutral observer would have to conclude that Iraq's
failure to comply with the disarmament demands placed upon it at the end of
the Gulf War is indicative, indeed, of a desire to maintain its capabilities
in this area; and they are willing to apparently continue to endure
sanctions without doing what's necessary to see them relieved.
So I think that currently it's not a question of ratcheting up the
sanctions at this point. I think we are still seeing a work in progress. We
were satisfied that the inspectors were able to go visit the presidential
sites for the first time. But as I said, that was a single visit. The
agreement that Iraq signed with Secretary General Annan called for, among
other things, unrestricted access, which I believe in UNSCOM's view means
that UNSCOM will have the ability to go back, including non-notified or
surprise inspections to those presidential sights and, indeed, to sites
around Iraq. Yes.
QUESTION: On Iraq. Do you have any update on the expanded Oil For Food
Program? Do you know where that stands?
MR. FOLEY: I don't have an update specifically on the implementation of
that resolution.
I can tell you that last week, I think it was last Monday in London, there
was a meeting of international organizations of several countries designed
to look at how the international community can act to direct assistance -
and when I say assistance, I mean the proceeds of the increased oil sales
that are envisaged in the coming months in Iraq -- but to use those
proceeds in a way that gets really to the neediest people in Iraq. I think
that meeting in London focused specifically on children, I believe,
under the age of five. They discussed a number of items, including a
nationwide immunization program.
So we think that this is essential work; and I would note that the Iraqi
Government, unfortunately, declined to participate in that meeting. That,
perhaps, is not a good omen for possible future Iraqi cooperation with this
oil-for-food increase that was decided by the Security Council in recent
months. And the sad fact is that it is, I think, crystal clear that Saddam
Hussein and his regime really do not see it in their interests to remove
the humanitarian problems that are facing their people because they find
this to be their best argument in the propaganda battle: to try to
have sanctions lifted without having complied with the need to disarm
in the areas of weapons of mass destruction.
It's an open question as to whether the best plans that the international
community may come up with to help Iraqi children, to help the elderly and
pregnant women in Iraq, to help with hospitals and schools and infrastructure,
whether indeed there will be the cooperation that will be necessary from
the Iraqi regime in order to provide this assistance to the Iraqi
people.
QUESTION: Still on Iraq. It's clear that the US doesn't - you've made the
position clear that the US doesn't want to ratchet up any kind of more
sanctions; however, you're not happy with the way things are going. But,
once again, it looks like the Russians are suggesting that they want to
reward Saddam Hussein for opening up his presidential palaces. Is the US
disappointed that, once again, Russia is advocating leniency in this?
MR. FOLEY: In answer to, I think, the first question I got, I stated, I
think emphatically, that we don't see anyone on the Security Council
arguing for lifting of sanctions now. I think everyone understands that the
consideration of lifting sanctions, must follow the issuance of a clean
bill of health by UNSCOM, that namely the disarmament process has been
completed; and we've seen no progress on the disarmament front in the
last six months, so that's not on the table. There had been reports
that some nations looking at the IAEA recent report have seen progress on
the nuclear file, and that that progress ought to be acknowledged. I stated
to Jim Anderson a few minutes ago our view that there has been some
progress, and we would be willing to acknowledge such progress if Iraq is
able to answer the remaining questions, having to do mostly with the
concealment mechanism involving their nuclear weapons programs in the past,
and if Iraq continues to cooperate with the UN inspectors in the coming
months.
QUESTION: Are you disappointed that the Russians are once again jumping
to the gun and wanting to put things ahead of the end game?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I think your question had to do with whether nations on
the Security Council are urging the lifting of sanctions; that's, to my
knowledge, not the case.
QUESTION: There's growing support inside of the Organization of American
States by calling on the next Assembly General of the OES about to
reinstate Cuba as active member. My question is, is the United States ready
to build up support to reject that vote exactly as they did in 1962 when
Cuba was suspended as an active member?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we look forward to Cuba's return to the Organization of
American States; that is, a Cuba which has undertaken a credible and far-
reaching transition to democracy and we hope that day comes sooner than
later.
QUESTION: Are you disappointed by the fact that the Prime Minister of
Canada, in his speech in Cuba, he a little bit mentioned the fact of human
rights - he was supposed to talk with Castro about human rights, and
according to what you were expecting, and he only did a little mention of
it?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I think it's premature to react to Prime Minister
Chretien's visit to Cuba, which has only begun. We'll have to see what
happens in the course of his visit and we will certainly be in touch with
our Canadian friends after the visit to discuss what results, if any, have
obtained, particularly on the human rights front, in Cuba.
But I think we've made clear all along that we are skeptical that
government-to-government engagement with Cuba can yield beneficial results
on the human rights front until Cuba has actually undertaken a systemic,
democratic change. However, given Canada's very strong human rights stance
throughout the world, we would certainly expect that Prime Minister
Chretien, if not in his opening comments but in the course of his visit,
will press for progress towards democracy and human rights, and that that
will remain a major focus of his trip.
As we have noted in the past, however, for our part we have seen no
evidence that the constructive engagement approach used by Canada and other
nations has resulted in the type of democratic change or respect for human
rights that is our shared goal. We may have differences in tactics from
time to time with friends around the world. But I think there's no
difference of view in what we would like to see as a result, which is a
real genuine transition to democracy in Cuba.
QUESTION: But at the same time, 36 years of embargo hasn't made change in
Cuba.
MR. FOLEY: I don't think that's the first time I've heard that argument
from this
podium.
QUESTION: It's not an argument; it's a fact.
MR. FOLEY: And would you care to describe to me the results of engagement
with Castro in terms of changes in Castro's behavior; complete, utter lack
of any indication of an interest in catching up with the rest of the world
and the tide of history over the last 10 years towards democratic
governments and respect for human rights. We see no evidence whatsoever. On
the contrary, I think one could argue that the US embargo was in some sense
undermined, if you will, during the long period of the Cold War when
Castro was receiving heavy subsidies from the Soviet bloc. That's
no longer the case. We believe that the embargo actually is having
an impact today.
QUESTION: Did you see - did you see Castro's welcoming remarks? He urged
the Canadian -
MR. FOLEY: I was told about them.
QUESTION: You don't have any - anything prepared?
MR. FOLEY: Well, did you have a particular reference?
QUESTION: Well, he recommends the convening of an international war
crimes tribunal for those responsible for imposing an economic embargo
against Cuba for the past 36 years.
MR. FOLEY: Well, I have not seen those comments specifically. They are
absurd; I think it's an instance of Castro-enteritis, if you will, which
we've seen on other occasions. Clearly, the plight of the Cuban people,
their economic backwardness is wholly the result of the economic system in
place for the last four decades. Cuba is in the same category as other
communist states, but it's in its own category in having failed to make a
transition to a market-based economy. That clearly is the root cause of
economic problems in Cuba. Yes.
QUESTION: Yes, I have a follow-up on the OAS and Cuba. You said the
United States would look forward to the return of Cuba - implicit that
there were changes in Cuba. However, the next OAS assembly is going to be
in less than two months. Are you having talks with other countries in the
OAS - what is going to happen if this vote comes up now? If they are not
making a condition that there will be changes in Cuba - but they vote
the proposal?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I think our view was implied in what I said, and all
that I've been saying over the last 10 minutes, which is that we see no
evidence that Cuba has joined the ranks of the all the other nations of the
hemisphere in terms of transitioning to democracy, respect for human rights,
a market-based economy. Therefore, our view is that they ought to continue
to be the odd man out of the OES since they are clearly the odd man out in
terms of the fundamental political and economic trends in the hemisphere.
QUESTION: My question - I'm sorry - my question is whether this is
already being discussed with Latin American countries after the summit and
before the - the OAS assembly?
MR. FOLEY: I think if it had been a significant issue in the sense that
we were engaged, either on our part or on the receiving end of diplomatic
initiatives, that I would be aware of it. I am certainly not. Yes.
QUESTION: To Mexico. The group of Pastors for Peace were attacked
yesterday. Do you have any reaction to that or any comment?
MR. FOLEY: Well, our Embassy in Mexico City is attempting to confirm that
a bus carrying members of the US-based group Pastors for Peace was attacked,
as you say, April 25 in Chiapas province by persons who were throwing
rocks. Apparently, no one was hurt according to a spokesman for the group.
The group was in Chiapas delivering aid to refugees of the conflict in that
province. We understand that the group intends to continue its mission.
The safety of American citizens traveling in Mexico is, of course,
a major concern to the United States Government and a topic of continuing
dialogue between ourselves and the Mexican Government. Yes, Patrick.
QUESTION: Do you see any signs of any progress on the Cyprus issue prior
to Dick Holbrooke's visit there?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I think that's asking a lot that there would be progress
between now and his arrival in Cyprus on May 1. Rather, we're focusing on
his visit; on Ambassador Miller's visit. Ambassador Miller goes to Cyprus
on May 29, and Ambassador Holbrooke follows on May 1. As we have said
before our activities are intended to --
QUESTION: April 29?
MR. FOLEY: Yes - what did I say?
QUESTION: May 29...
MR. FOLEY: Yes. He's a remarkable man, but I don't want to mis-state
his
arrival date; it is May 1. But his activities, along with Ambassador Miller,
are intended to
support the UN's effort to find a solution to the Cyprus dispute based, as
you know, on a
bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Yes.
QUESTION: Last week, Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister, Ambassador Haktanir,
and a large Turkish delegation had a meeting in this building -Thursday and
Friday. Do you have any read-out about the meetings? And also, do you reach
any tentative agreement about Cyprus or the energy line and Iraqi
subjects?
MR. FOLEY: Well, we're not in the practice of coming out and talking
explicitly about all the subjects that were discussed in our bilateral
relations, especially with a close ally such as Turkey. We have an
excellent dialogue and we are going to be continuing high-level contacts
with Turkey over the coming months. I can't report the specifics of that
meeting though.
In terms of Cyprus, I think it would behoove me to say very little on the
subject now. We wish Ambassador Miller and Ambassador Holbrooke well this
week. We will see if we are in a position to report anything in the wake of
their visit.
QUESTION: Ambassador Haktanir has also told that he brought some new
document and new proofs which involvement of the PKK terrorist activity in
Syria and Greece. Do you have any information on this subject?
MR. FOLEY: Well, I can repeat what I said, which is I'm not going to talk
about what was discussed privately. The PKK has been designated by the
United States as a terrorist organization. Our position on the PKK is well
known. Yes.
QUESTION: Yes, Jim, Alexander Lebed is leading his runner-up into a run-
off in, I think it's Krasnoyarsk province in Siberia. Does the State
Department have any comment about his success in this election? Or for that
matter in the electoral process?
MR. FOLEY: No. Thank you.
(The briefing concluded 2:10 p.m.)
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