U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #37, 98-03-26
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
934
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Thursday, March 26, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
LAOS
1 Statement Released on Freedom of Worship in Laos
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
1 Special Representative Gelbard's Travel/Meetings
1 Situation in Kosovo/Actions of Police
1-2 Russian Position on Imposition of Arms Embargo
2-3 UN Security Council Resolution re Arms Embargo
3 President Milosevic's Compliance with Contact Group Demands
3-4 Status of Pending Arms Deal Between Russia and the FRY
4 Comparisons with US Train and Equip in Bosnia
4 Congressional Delegation Recommendations/Milosevic as War
Criminal
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
4-6 Israeli Offer for Troop Withdrawal from Lebanon
5 Secretary Albright To Meet with Israeli Defense Minister
6 Ambassador Ross' Travel to the Region
6-9 Israeli Proposal re Withdrawal from the West Bank
9 European Role in the Peace Process
GREECE
9-11 Foreign Minister's Visit to US
TURKEY
10 Reported PKK Training Camps In Greece
CYPRUS
10-11 S-300 Missiles
11 Proposal for "No Fly Zone" for Cyprus
IRAQ
11 Inspection of President Site Scheduled for Today
IRAN
11-13 US Policy Toward Iran
12 Development of "Radio Free Iran"
MEXICO
13-14 Anti-Narcotics Effort and Military Corruption
COLOMBIA
14-15 Possible Kidnapping of Americans
LATIVA
15 Former Lativan-SS Troops Participate in March in Riga
ARMENIA
15 Reported Russian Sale of S-300 Missiles to Armenia
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #37
THURSDAY, MARCH 26, 1998, 12:40 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Welcome to the State Department briefing. It's good to see
that at least some of you who traveled with the Secretary managed to make
it here today - at least some of you did.
We have a statement on Laos, on the freedom of worship issue, that will be
posted after the briefing. Which of the two AP reporters should get the
first question is up to them.
QUESTION: Well, can I pick up on a little something left over from
yesterday? There was some question whether Gelbard would be able to go on
to Belgrade. Do you have any further information?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. I spoke to Ambassador Gelbard about an hour ago. He was,
at the last minute, provided flight clearance. He met with Mr. Milutinovic
in Belgrade. He also met with Ibrahim Rugova in Pristina and a group of
student leaders there. He is emphasizing the importance of dialogue and
that on the Serb side, that they comply with the four conditions the
Contact Group laid out; that they understand that the message coming out of
Bonn was a message that pressure is going to continue on Serbia-Montenegro
unless and until they get the message and begin to focus on dialogue rather
than crackdowns as a means of resolving this problem.
The situation in Kosovo, as far as Ambassador Gelbard was concerned, is
calm. However, we do believe that the special police are digging in; that
there is no indication that they're leaving; and that their activities are
therefore ominous. What we're facing if they don't get the message the
Contact Group tried to send to them is a situation where the violence will
increase and where the Contact Group and the international community will
proceed to even harsher measures if the Serbian authorities don't get
the message.
QUESTION: Is it your understanding that the Russian agreement to the arms
embargo will block this alleged Russian arms deal with Belgrade, which has
been written about?
MR. RUBIN: Well, Secretary Albright did receive assurances from Foreign
Minister Primakov, as indicated by the Contact Group statement. Foreign
Minister Primakov told the Secretary that they are going to go forward and
implement the decisions to impose an arms embargo. A deadline of March 31
was set - an objective, rather - to pass the resolution. The discussions
are now ongoing in New York, and our diplomats there report that the
discussions are taking place constructively. We have every reason to
think that an arms embargo will be put in place in time. And if not,
that would be troubling.
But assuming that it does go ahead, normally an arms embargo would prohibit
the transfer of military equipment from the time the arms embargo went into
effect. There was some suggestion that perhaps this arms embargo should be
of a limited time frame. That was rejected by the Contact Group; so it is
going to be an unconditional, unlimited arms embargo that will only be
lifted when Belgrade complies with the requirements of the Contact Group.
Every arms embargo resolution I've ever seen -- and I haven't actually
looked at this text - would, from the time of enactment, prohibit
the transfer of weaponry.
As far as what we do and don't know about what may be going on, all I can
say is that we are aware of the possibility of military to military
cooperation between Russia and Belgrade. That is a matter that would, in
our view, if it involved military equipment, be prohibited by an arms
embargo resolution. That's precisely the reason why this resolution will be
important.
QUESTION: Was this particular deal or issue discussed in Bonn with the
Russians by you?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm not in a position to describe every aspect of the
discussions between the two ministers; other than to say that we have no
reason to believe that Russia doesn't understand that an arms embargo is an
arms embargo -- and that means that there will be no transfers of military
equipment if that embargo is enacted.
QUESTION: If this is so clear what are the discussions in New York
about?
MR. RUBIN: Well, as I've indicated to many of you on many occasions, when
you write the sentence "arms embargo" in your stories, then it's over. You
said they will impose an arms embargo. But when the diplomats who have to
actually conduct the work, prepare a resolution -- and for those of you who
have worked in New York or read the elaborate texts that are resolutions
-- they are very carefully drafted documents that require a lot of careful
preparation prior to enacting a resolution that would impose such a severe
sanction.
So they are now working on the text of a resolution and that takes a number
of days; and it is a perfectly normal procedure for that work to take some
time so that when and if it's passed and imposed and can't be lifted until
Serbia complies, that all the i's are dotted and the t's are crossed before
the resolution is passed, not afterwards.
QUESTION: This would include watching border crossing points and
monitoring at airports, say, to make sure --
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, I'm not going to go into all the details of
what's in such a resolution and whether there would be that kind of
enforcement. Normally the way in which these resolutions get enforced are
the commitments by the governments that would not want to be in violation
of a Security Council resolution who will halt such transfers. No embargo,
in my memory, has ever been perfect, and there is always the possibility of
leakage.
Whether this would involve elaborate border monitoring for the embargo's
purposes is not my understanding at this time. I don't believe that was the
case even during the war in Yugoslavia that there were border monitoring
posts for the arms embargo. There was a monitoring procedure for the
economic sanctions, which is a much more complicated exercise. This embargo
will work if the governments in the region and around the world follow the
demands of the Security Council; and by and large, such embargoes
can work if they're passed by the Security Council.
QUESTION: Jamie, you said it's unlimited, open-ended, whatever; then, of
course, you also said it'll stay in place until Milosevic complies. How
many of the various demands must he comply with or is it all that non-
scientific at this point?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think the clear conditions that were laid out in the
London document were four. They were that Serbia-Montenegro, Belgrade would
withdraw the special police units that were involved in the crackdown; that
they would ensure that access was provided to international organizations -
humanitarian organizations - as well as diplomats from the Contact Group to
go in there and monitor the situation. They included - and this was spelled
out in great detail in the Bonn communiqué - a public commitment
by President Milosevic to begin a process of dialogue, unconditionally,
with the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community; and finally, a
general cooperation with the efforts of the Contact Group.
So this is not a simple check the box, check the box, check the box. We
will have a process whereby the three chairmen - the past chairman, the
current chairman and the future chairman - of the OSCE will be monitoring
this. Generally speaking, if Belgrade were to pursue these points, we think
we'd know it when we saw it.
QUESTION: Can you confirm that there is actually a pending arms deal
between Moscow and Belgrade?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I have many times said to you that we understand and
have indications that there is a consideration of military cooperation. As
far as a pending arms deal, I'm not in a position to get to that level of
detail; other than to say that we do believe the possibility exists for
cooperation of that kind between Russia and Serbia-Montenegro, and that
would be prohibited by this kind of an arms embargo.
In December 1997, Russia and the FRY did sign a military technical
cooperation agreement. To the best of our knowledge, that agreement has not
been implemented. It is pending before the Serbian parliament.
So clearly, there is a potential for a relationship that could include
military cooperation of the kind that we would want to not see happen if
this arms embargo is passed. As far as any particular news accounts of
particular arms deals with particular types of weaponry, I wouldn't be in a
position to confirm that.
QUESTION: What about other countries?
QUESTION: If the Russians were to say to you, well, you're arming the
Bosnians; why shouldn't we arm the Serbs, what would be your response?
MR. RUBIN: Well, first of all, there's a big difference; and the
difference here is that the war in Bosnia, in our view, one of the causes
of the war in Bosnia was the fact that the Serbs vastly outnumbered a
virtually non-existent Bosnian army that was slaughtered by the Serbian
forces in Bosnia. One of our objectives, as set forth in the Dayton accords,
is to establish a balance between the forces of the Bosnians and the Serbs
and the Federation forces so that there is underlying stability so that
when - and I emphasize the word "when" - the international force
departs, that a military imbalance is not the reason why war resumes.
In this case, it's quite clear that the Serbian authorities have modern,
heavy armament that they are bringing to bear in Kosovo. We think a signal
to them of our abhorrence of using modern military equipment to crack down
on virtually unarmed civilians who are trying to express their legitimate
political rights - and a way to express our abhorrence is to make sure that
they are limited in the amount of such equipment that they can get.
QUESTION: Are you aware of any other countries - like NATO countries,
like Greece, perhaps - arming or continuing to arm Yugoslavia?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any further information on that.
QUESTION: On Kosovo, a congressional delegation - or a delegation led by
three members of Congress - returned to this country yesterday. They were
unable to go to Kosovo. Among other things, in their recommendations, they
asked for the United States to push for the indictment of Milosevic before
the War Crimes Tribunal. Does the United States take any view about his
recent actions? Do those make him more eligible for indictment than
previously?
MR. RUBIN: I think last week or the week before, we had an extended
discussion of this issue in this briefing room about our views of the
importance of the International Tribunal investigating what's gone on there,
and leaving it to the Tribunal to make the judgment as to who is responsible
in a legal sense.
I certainly indicated at the time that politically, President Milosevic is
the president of the country; and if it were determined that there were war
crimes, obviously, there is a level of political responsibility. To what
extent that responsibility would be legal and subject of indictments is up
to the War Crimes Tribunal.
QUESTION: Can we go on to another subject? The Israeli Defense Minister
is coming, so it may be appropriate to ask the same question I tried last
week, to make sure I know the US policy. How does the US feel about
Israel's offer, under certain conditions, to pull its troops out of
Southern Lebanon?
MR. RUBIN: We have long said that the - as a general principle, we
support the idea of direct negotiations between the two countries to make
progress wherever progress is possible. We have long believed in the
importance of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
which must include - in order to be comprehensive - agreements between
Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and Syria.
We did vote for UN Security Council Resolution 425, and continue to support
that resolution, which called for the immediate, unconditional withdrawal
of Israeli forces. That is still our view. At the same time, we believe
that negotiations between Israel and Lebanon would provide a way for Israel
and Lebanon to resolve all the issues that divide them, and to advance
Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity. So that is our view.
QUESTION: But in the real world, Lebanon hasn't got a chance in you-know-
what to negotiate with Israel without Syria's approval; and the Israeli-
Syrian track is not being used right now. So in the real world, do you
think it's feasible or possible for Israel to carry - can you take yes for
an answer? I mean, you want Israel to pull back, and they say they want to.
But how are they going to arrange this if it depends on Syria? Do you see a
practical way to do this?
MR. RUBIN: Well, as I said, we support Resolution 425, which calls for
the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of all Israeli forces. So that is
our view.
QUESTION: -- nothing else.
MR. RUBIN: That is what Resolution 425 says.
QUESTION: Oh, okay.
MR. RUBIN: In the real world, do we think that this can happen without
some discussion? Probably not. And it's up to the parties in the region to
decide that it's worth implementing a Security Council resolution, and to
try to pursue that process. But as a matter of principle, we have voted for
a resolution which calls for the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of
Israeli forces.
QUESTION: And will he be seeing Secretary Albright?
MR. RUBIN: He will be tomorrow, yes.
QUESTION: Okay.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - Prime Minister of Lebanon, Prime Minister Hariri,
is reported to have ruled out accepting any sort of peace agreement
associated with a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon. Can
you comment on that?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen that report. As I indicated, we would believe
that the best way to advance a comprehensive peace process is for there to
be direct negotiations between all the parties - that includes Israel and
Syria, Israel and Lebanon. Clearly, in order to achieve the kind of peace
that would allow Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity and
security of both countries to be established successfully over the long
term would require such discussions.
So we would encourage that. The peace process has been moribund for too
long. A year has gone by. It is in dire straits. Ambassador Ross is now in
the region, trying to see whether he can convince the leaders of both
parties to make some hard decisions, without which we face the real
prospect of disillusionment, of an inability ever to restore the peace
process if time continues to be lost. There are only a given - I believe 14
months remaining before the established deadline under the Oslo accord for
the completion of final status talks. Time is running out for those who
care about peace in the Middle East. So all the parties - the Israelis,
the Palestinians, the Lebanese, the Syrians - should stop trying to find
reasons why things can't happen and look for reasons why things can
happen.
QUESTION: I just want to be clear. You're saying that the Administration
thinks the way to go now is a comprehensive way. You would not think it's
wise for the Israelis to try to pick off Lebanon, so to speak, as they did
with the Palestinians and with the Jordanians, and have a separate deal
with them - separate without bringing the Syrians in.
MR. RUBIN: I didn't say that. What I'm trying to communicate, however
cryptically, is that we believe that for peace to be sustained over a long
period of time, it has to be comprehensive; therefore, it needs to include
all the parties.
We have always said we support the idea of direct negotiations, and we
encourage progress on any track where it is possible. To the extent that
becomes more difficult because of problems on the other tracks, we
recognize that. But it is our view that wherever progress can be made,
discussions should be held and progress should be made.
QUESTION: Jamie, has the Israeli Prime Minister come up with anything
which the United States Government understands to be a new proposal on
withdrawal from the West Bank?
MR. RUBIN: You know, I'm always amused to read articles which have
everything called "a new proposal." It's our view that there is basically
one agenda, and it is the agenda agreed to by the Israelis and the
Palestinians in New York. It is an agenda that includes the question of
further redeployment; it is an agenda that includes the question of a time-
out, security steps by the Palestinians and a path to final status.
We have been trying very, very hard to see whether, through extensive
diplomatic spadework and protracted behind-the-scenes discussions that have
become increasingly hard to justify, that to get a bridge between the views
of the Palestinians and the views of the Israelis on what is necessary to
meet each of their objectives in those four areas. We have not been
successful; 1998 has not been a good year.
We are in the process of finalizing some refinements to our ideas -- that
is what Ambassador Ross is doing -- but I can assure you they are minor
refinements. Our basic view is that we have to find a way to bridge the gap
between the two sides' views of what constitutes a credible redeployment
and what constitutes a serious and sustained effort on security and how to
put that all together with the peace process. And we are looking at a
parallel process involving a further redeployment over a several-month
period combined with a security package. That's what we're working on.
We've been hearing for many months different variations on different
details within the framework of those four pieces and we are discussing
that. But as far as I can tell, we are not closer to being able to bridge
the gap.
QUESTION: There are reports out of Israel that the prime minister is now
talking about quality rather than quantity which, as I understand it, means
that some of the land would be contiguous, so the isolated Palestinian
pockets would be connected. Is that your understanding of what's being
talked about from Israel; and is that acceptable?
MR. RUBIN: I am not going to get into a daily update just because
something appears in the newspapers about what is being discussed behind
the scenes.
For those of you who have followed this process, you have heard us say that
in order to achieve a successful further redeployment, it's got to talk
about quantity, quality, timing and security, and that all of those fit
together. The better the quality, perhaps less the quantity. The better the
security procedures, the quicker it can be implemented. We have long said
that those are interrelated. I am not saying that anything has changed. We
have always said that quality and quantity and timing and security are an
interrelated package because in each case, more on one or less on one
will influence the views of the others.
Our role here is not to declare for one side or the other what is right.
Our role is to help them bridge the gaps. They are unable to bridge those
gaps themselves. They often talk about their ability to discuss this
themselves. We have seen nothing come of that, and so we are trying to
figure out a way to bridge the gap. That's what we're trying to do, and
obviously all of the factors that go into a further redeployment would be
important.
QUESTION: One aspect of quality might be, would it not, that the lands be
contiguous?
MR. RUBIN: Absolutely.
QUESTION: You say having a mediator tell Israel how many more percentage -
how much more of a larger percentage of the West Bank it should give up is
a refinement, or would you consider that a proposal or a plan or even
pressure?
MR. RUBIN: We have not told the Israeli Government -- and I think you
know this, Barry -- what is required or not required for their security.
What we have done in these negotiations is try to give them our best
estimate, based on us having direct contact with the Palestinians that they
apparently do not have, as to what would be necessary to break the
impasse.
As far as what our refinements would consist of, they are called refinements
because they are not changes of a magnitude that would justify calling them
something more significant than that. A refinement is not a massive change,
it's not a big change. A refinement is, perhaps, adjusting the timing or
other details like that, adjusting the interrelationship between those four
issues.
QUESTION: What about the amount of land?
MR. RUBIN: I am not going to get into a discussion of what we're doing
behind the scenes.
QUESTION: You just gave us two examples; what about a third example? How
about an adjustment, look - we can't have this discussion if we're going to
rule out, which you can if you like, percentages that Israel is willing to
give up and percentages that Dennis Ross is trying to apply to them. But if
the Prime Minister of Israel says a 1 percent difference is a big deal, and
you're pushing a 4 percent difference, how can you minimize that by calling
it a refinement?
MR. RUBIN: You're using numbers that we have not used, so I'm not in a
position to answer your question.
QUESTION: Well, then you have to approach it some other way, without
using numbers. Then leave out the numbers. Telling Israel how much land -
how much more land it should give up than the Prime Minister has told the
President it is prepared to give up, would you consider that simply a
refinement?
MR. RUBIN: No one has told Israel what to give up.
QUESTION: No one has told Israel what it ought to give up if it wants to
make nice to the Palestinians?
MR. RUBIN: Told them? No.
QUESTION: Have you suggested to Israel --
MR. RUBIN: No, and we've never -- I don't believe in all the discussions
I've ever been in, the Secretary of State has ever used the phrase, "make
nice to the Palestinians."
QUESTION: Well, I'm talking about Ross, not so much the Secretary of
State.
MR. RUBIN: What we are trying to do here - or Ambassador Ross - those are
words that I couldn't imagine coming out of his mouth. These are very
serious diplomats. We're working very, very hard to try to bridge the gaps
that the two parties have been unable to bridge themselves. When we have
ideas, those are ideas based on our best judgment of what can be done to
bridge the gaps.
We don't tell each party what to do. We don't tell each party to make nice
with the other party. We do provide ideas for what we think are the
plausible, realistic ways in which the gaps can be bridged.
QUESTION: Are your ideas expressed in percentage terms?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going - certainly they have been, yes. Our ideas have
included percentages.
QUESTION: And they still do?
MR. RUBIN: Absolutely.
QUESTION: And if the Prime Minister of Israel says 1 percent is
substantive and important - and, in fact, he says it's important to
Israel's security - what is your response? What is the US' response to that
- that's his opinion?
MR. RUBIN: We're not going to get in a process of negotiating this in the
briefing room.
QUESTION: Jamie, is the State Department uneasy about the way Israel has
begun consulting in a parallel way with the French on the peace process --
even to the point of stopping off in Paris before they come to Washington?
MR. RUBIN: Wow, boy am I tempted.
(Laughter.)
The Secretary is very comfortable with the role the Europeans have played
in the peace process in recent weeks, and we certainly hope that the trip
of Foreign Minister Cook - the intentions behind his trip - would make a
difference in the efforts that the leaders will make to answer the hard
questions and make the hard decisions.
We don't have any sense that there is any other country in the world that
can play the role the United States can play in trying to bridge these
gaps. On the other hand, we recognize that we haven't succeeded yet in so
doing. But I think it was clear in recent weeks that it is only the United
States that has the confidence of the two parties sufficient to try to make
progress, to put ideas forward that can bridge the gaps.
QUESTION: Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos, was in Washington, as you know,
this week. In various public speeches he made clear that the Greek national
interests and American interests were diametrically opposed. Let me just
mention a few issues. On Israeli-Turkish cooperation, the United States is
very happy about it; Pangalos said he was against it. (Inaudible) oil
pipeline is something the US has been supporting since '95; Pangalos was
against it. Turkey's EU membership, the US is supporting consistently;
Mr. Pangalos could not repeat enough how Turkey should not belong
to Europe. The S-300 missiles, the US repeatedly told Greece not to place
them on the island; Mr. Pangalos is for it. And on flight moratoriums
proposed by the United States, again this was not an idea preferred by Mr.
Pangalos.
So the list goes on and on. The question is, how happy is the United States
with Greek foreign policy under the leadership of Mr. Pangalos?
MR. RUBIN: The Secretary of State had a very good meeting with Foreign
Minister Pangalos.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: The international issue of Time magazine, published a report
about the PKK safe haven and training camps nearby Athens in Greece. Do you
have any comment on it?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. The United States has formally designated the PKK a
foreign terrorist organization, and we oppose activities, such as
fundraising, which supports this terrorist group. We are aware that legal
structures in some countries in Europe do not treat this sort of activity
with the stringency of US law. The United States cooperates closely with
Greece in combating both domestic and international terrorism. The nature
of PKK activity in Greece, including the presence of a political office in
Athens, has often been a subject for discussion between our two governments.
All reports of terrorist activity are taken seriously and assessed by the
competent US agencies.
QUESTION: In all due respect, do you disagree that in all the issues I
have raised --
MR. RUBIN: I don't know how to respond to a speech given in the briefing
room. If you have question, I'd be delighted to answer.
QUESTION: Let me repeat the question again.
MR. RUBIN: That was a speech; that wasn't a question.
QUESTION: Greek and US national interests, as Mr. Pangalos made very
clear, are opposed in long list of issues. So I asked how comfortable is
the United States Government with the current Greek foreign policy? It was
not a speech, it was a direct question with details.
MR. RUBIN: We had a good meeting with Foreign Minister Pangalos. As far
as the US position on the S-300 missiles on Cyprus is concerned, our view
has not changed. Although we do not question Cyprus' right to make
decisions about its defense, we believe the S-300 missile deal increases
the danger of conflict on the island and is a serious obstacle to our
efforts to reach a settlement of the Cyprus dispute. We continue to urge
the Government of Cyprus to cancel the deal.
We have also urged Turkey to address the S-300 issue through diplomatic
means and to refrain from threats to take the missiles out militarily. With
regard to the idea of a no-fly zone that Foreign Minister Pangalos raised
in his meetings with Secretary Albright and Under Secretary Pickering, we
certainly would welcome the establishment of a permanent moratorium of all
combat aircraft over-flights over Cyprus by Greece and Turkey as a serious
effort to reduce tensions and build confidence. We do not agree, however,
that a no-fly enforcement regime that could potentially pit one NATO
ally against the other, is the best way to accomplish this objective.
QUESTION: In a different area, do you have any comment on the inspection
of presidential sites getting underway?
MR. RUBIN: We understand that this morning, Baghdad time, UNSCOM began
inspecting a presidential site located in Baghdad. Apparently, the
inspection is proceeding quietly and without incident.
Obviously, very shortly Chairman Butler will be in a position to report on
this inspection process; but what's important to us is that the Iraqis
provide the cooperation that this new regime needs, and so far it appears
to be going quite well. Some of the fears of those that the diplomats would
interfere in the process have not borne out. They have made clear that they
are there to observe, not to inspect; and the initial reports are that
the mechanism is working.
Whether the Iraqis provide the information necessary -- the baseline
information, the written information, the overall cooperation -- that will
yield a more favorable report by Chairman Butler, is obviously very much in
doubt. But as far as them permitting the inspections in these new sites,
they appear to have gone well, which, in our view, vindicates the idea that
working diplomatically and backing that diplomacy by force was the way to
get new access for UNSCOM to places in Iraq it never had before. And so far,
so good.
QUESTION: There was a piece in the Times this morning which made some
interesting observations, one of which was that there may be some Iranian
pull-back vis-à-vis terrorism. There's also a reconsideration of
Radio Free Iran here. And also, on the negative side, I suppose, the
Iranian weapons programs are continuing as before.
MR. RUBIN: With regard to the US policy towards Iran, we do seek to
encourage change in Iranian policies and actions, and we have noted in the
past positive changes in rhetoric. We have responded to President Khatemi's
call for civilizational -- that is, people-to-people --dialogue. We've seen
people-to-people exchanges, which have included academics and athletes,
have gone well and we expect more such exchanges to occur. American
visitors have been treated with warmth and courtesy by ordinary Iranians
and officials alike.
As we have also said, however, those events are valuable; but what would be
more valuable, and what would be the best way to solve the policy issues
that divide us, would be for there to be a direct dialogue between the
United States and Iran. It has been too long since such a dialogue has
happened. We would raise issues of concern of ours in such a dialogue; we
would expect them to do the same. And we believe that through direct
dialogue we can overcome these problems.
With respect to Iranian actions, let me say this -- we're not going to be
able to provide a snapshot. The concerns we've had have developed over time,
and we will need time to make considered, prudent judgments about whether
changes have occurred. But we have said that we are facilitating people-to-
people exchanges by working with private American organizations who wish to
host Iranian visitors or send groups to Iran. In that context, we
review on a case-by-case basis and as expeditiously as possible, Iranian
visa applications. Recently, for example, we have also given permission for
the Iranian UN permanent representative to travel outside New York City to
deliver a speech to a private American group in Los Angeles. We have also
allowed President Khatemi's women's affairs advisor to travel from Iran to
address a private think tank.
We do favor increased Farsi language radio broadcasts by the US Government,
and are working closely with Congress on how best to accomplish that goal.
So we're going to continue to work on that.
With respect to the oil issue that was mentioned, I think we've said many
times from this podium that there has been a reduction in the oil that may
have been leaking through the Iraqi embargo in that region. While we can't
be sure exactly why that is, we are certainly encouraged that it has
happened. So that is our view on that.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) permission given to an Iranian diplomat to leave
the New York City metropolitan area?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to check that, but it's certainly not common.
QUESTION: Something you just said and then another question - you said
you favor increased Farsi language broadcasts. Is that something different
from Radio Free Iran?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, we're going to work with Congress on how best to
accomplish the intended goals of a program like Radio Free Iran, which is
to bring news to the people in the region. But we want to do it in the best
possible way, and we've been working closely with Congress on what's the
best way to do that.
QUESTION: Also, the article George refers to says that the Secretary is
the strongest and perhaps one of the loneliest voices urging no re-thinking
in this policy, I believe the term "gratuitous insult" was used in that
story in reference --
MR. RUBIN: I read the article.
QUESTION: Can you comment on that?
MR. RUBIN: That part of it struck me as more fictional that fact. The
Secretary of State is obviously the official in this government who's
responsible for formulating and implementing our policy on Iran. None of
the steps that I just indicated to you that have taken place, and none of
the steps that we would hope could take place would be happening unless
that was directed by the Secretary of State.
Secretary Albright, when apprised of this particular quote, giggled and
said, you know, if everywhere in the world I were to listen to what people
thought my views were, I wouldn't remember what my views are.
QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Rubin.
MR. RUBIN: Is it on this subject?
QUESTION: Another subject.
MR. RUBIN: Oh, George, go ahead.
QUESTION: There are a couple of paragraphs on terrorism and on the
Iranian weapons program. Do you have anything on either of those?
MR. RUBIN: Again, here all I can say is that there are obviously areas of
concern to us and in order to judge whether there has been a change there,
it will take time; because the concerns that we have, and have had,
developed over time. So we want to wait until we're in a position to make
prudent judgments, well-considered judgments on matters this important.
QUESTION: Mexico.
MR. RUBIN: You can just refer to the article, instead of summarizing
it.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Okay. Let's refer to Ken Golden's article in The New York Times,
which basically says the Mexican military is more involved with the
trafficking than they've admitted, and says that traffickers and high
military officials are meeting regularly. Has this report come to State;
and does State concur with this particular --
MR. RUBIN: Again, I think you know that I won't comment on any specific
report.
But on the substance of the issue of Mexican drug corruption and their law
enforcement and military, we have said, and let me repeat, there is no
doubt that all Mexican law enforcement institutions are under attack from
drug traffickers, and we are working with Mexico to confront this threat as
vigorously as possible. We're not going to speculate about the extent of
drug penetration of the Mexican military or any other Mexican institution,
except to note that the Mexican Attorney General has himself stated
publicly that entrenched criminal elements are a major problem for
Mexico's police forces. So this is not news.
We don't agree that our efforts have been futile; they have not been
futile. President Zedillo has indicated that he is committed to tackling
corruption and rule of law issues head on. He announced a new nationwide
program against crime and corruption, and this is going to be a long term
challenge. The Mexican military itself is investigating on its own and
arresting and prosecuting those involved with drug traffickers. Five
general officers are now under arrest and in jail as a result of this
effort.
Our assessment is that the Mexican military is carrying out its anti-drug
mission in a responsible manner. We need to bear in mind that the expanded
use of the Mexican military in counter-narcotics operations was conceived
by the Zedillo Administration as a temporary measure. It's impossible to
imagine that the Mexican military, like other Mexican institutions, will
not be challenged to some extent by drug corruption. I can't comment on any
intelligence document, but I can say that the particular allegations have
been carefully considered by all relevant US agencies. The charges
of this particular gentleman, who, as I understand it, is a self-confessed
narco-trafficker, are self-serving, contain significant gaps and are
therefore, in many respects, suspect.
We believe the Mexican military is vigorously investigating prosecuting and
punishing corruption. Therefore, the overall government view, having
reviewed all available data, has concluded that it does not support these
specific accusations by Mr. Rebollo. Speculation is always possible, and
many scenarios can be constructed from the same set of facts. But the
considered judgment of the US officials and the United States Government as
opposed to the purported judgment of a few people is the one that I
suggested.
QUESTION: Do you have anything on a story that came over the wires late
this morning of some Americans being taken hostage in Colombia - four bird
watchers?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. The US Embassy in Bogota is seeking confirmation that
four visiting Americans are being held by guerrillas who staged a violent
roadblock in Colombia over the weekend. We are in the process of notifying
next of kin about the situation and therefore cannot identify the
Americans.
The Americans who were visiting Colombia to bird-watch were in a rental car
in a long line of traffic impeded by a roadblock some 75 miles from Bogota.
The barricade, which began around 2:00 p.m., was not lifted until about
10:00 p.m. after the Colombian army intervened. The Americans' rental car
was discovered near the scene of the clash. Our Embassy in Bogota is
maintaining close contact with Colombian authorities who are pursuing this
matter through their contacts with the guerrillas, known as the FARC.
Our Embassy is also in the process of notifying next of kin.
This group has taken US hostages in the past and, as I will provide to you
afterwards, we have some significant travel warnings in effect for Colombia,
and we may be considering upgrading that warning in light of this
event.
QUESTION: Do you know if there have been any requests for ransom, or if
there's been any contact?
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't be able to give you any more information than I
just did but we can try to check on that for you.
QUESTION: I have a question on the Baltics. This morning in Moscow,
German Chancellor Schmidt and French President Jacques Chirac condemned the
march of former Latvian SS troops in Riga on March 16. As you know, this
march was joined by Latvian officials, and these former SS troopers are
responsible for the killings of thousands of Jews during the Second World
War. As far as I know there has not been any official reaction yet from the
US to this manifestation and to the position of Latvian official
authorities. How would you reconcile this position with the aspirations of
Latvia to join NATO and European Union?
MR. RUBIN: That is a good question. We will get you a considered and
carefully formulated answer if you speak to Mr. Foley after the briefing.
QUESTION: Mr. Rubin, Russian S-300 missiles sale to Armenia, which they
based also a violation of the several arms agreement. Do you have any
concern about this sale?
MR. RUBIN: We always have concern about arms sales, in particular. I
would have to get you an answer for the record as to what we know about
this reported sale. But in general practice, this is not a part of the
world that would benefit from more arms.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)
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