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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #34, 98-03-16

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


876

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Monday, March 16, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

ANNOUNCEMENTS
1		Sec. Albright to address U.S. policy toward Africa: March
		  19, at George Mason Univ.
1,8		Sec. Albright to travel to Bonn for March 25 Contact Group
		  meeting
1		Amb. Gelbard to leave tomorrow to travel to Kosovo and
		  Pristina

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 2,3 Security situation is tense; restraint welcome 2 Need for leaders to make hard decisions 2 U.S. is evaluating how to move the process forward; no U.S. decisions have been made yet 3 Comment on EU president's trip to region 3 King Hussein's visit next week not a prerequisite for any U.S. step 4 Ariel Sharon's comments on assassinating Hamas leader not helpful 4 Terrorist acts must be condemned in strongest possible terms 4 No current plans set for Amb. Ross to travel to region

IRAQ 4 Idea for U.S.-Iraqi dialogue unwise 5 Illicit gasoil sales have diminished

IRAN 5 No specific request for earthquake assistance

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 5-6 Reports of additional police action over weekend in Kosovo 6 Kosovar-Albanians have legitimate grievances 6-7 Belgrade's half-measure and empty gestures 'woefully inadequate' 6 Belgrade's negotiating offer was deliberately unacceptable 6 U.S. does not support independence for Kosovo 6,8 Deputy Secretary Talbott is traveling in the region 7,8 Assessment of 10-day deadline by Contact Group 7 Milosevic must reverse course, "get with the program" 7,9 Possible FRY assets freeze will be discussed 8 Meeting of ministers of countries surrounding Kosovo cannot be ruled out 8 Only confirmed meeting is for Contact Group in Bonn 9 Sec. Albright discussed Kosovo with Russian FM Primakov today 9 International community united in opposing Serbia's actions 9 UN to consider comprehensive arms embargo on FRY this week 9-10 Meaning of term, "enhanced status"

KOREAS 10 Four-Party talks are underway; U.S. views on troop withdrawals unchanged 11 No date yet to resume missile talks 11 U.S., South Korea believe U.S. troops should be stationed there

CHINA 11 No dates for President Clinton's trip 11-12 U.S. will not sponsor resolution at UN Human Rights Commission 12 U.S. continues to consider China's human rights record unsatisfactory 12-13 Chinese assurance to stop nuclear cooperation with Iran a major development

RUSSIA 13-14 U.S. constantly monitors procedures for use of nuclear forces


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #34

MONDAY, MARCH 16, 1998, 12:40 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Greetings: Pretty close to another on-time performance here at the State Department.

I have three announcements: First of all, Secretary Albright will deliver an address on US policy toward Africa on Thursday, March 19th, at 11:00 a.m., at George Mason University campus in Fairfax, Virginia. This event is co-hosted by the African-American Institute and George Mason University. We'll be giving you later today some further press arrangements for that speech on Thursday.

Secondly, Secretary Albright will be in Bonn on March 25th, to chair a meeting of the Contact Group of foreign ministers to discuss the subject of the violence in Kosovo and to follow up on the meeting that was held in London. We want to thank the German Government for agreeing to let Secretary Albright host that meeting in Germany. We accommodated ourselves to the need to move the meeting to Germany so that all the ministers could be there, and we have reasonable expectations that they all will be there.

Thirdly, Ambassador Gelbard will be leaving for the region again tomorrow. He will be traveling to Kosovo, to Pristina; and the rest of his schedule is still being determined.

QUESTION: Jamie, I notice your phrasing - you said she'll be there. Will she be coming from Washington?

(Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - it is normal to try to have other meetings on subjects of concern to the Secretary and the President in conjunction with overseas travel. At this time, the only purpose of the trip, and the primary purpose of the announcement today, is to discuss the subject of Kosovo with the foreign ministers in Bonn. If, between now and the 25th, we have other meetings we organize, we'll be sharing those with you as soon as we can.

QUESTION: Well, as things are shaping up now, will she be going there from another place in Europe, or from another region of the world, possibly?

MR. RUBIN: At this point, the only travel that I am aware of that has been confirmed that the Secretary intends to take is a trip to Bonn. But I am not going to rule out meetings associated with that visit to Bonn.

QUESTION: We'll probably get back to Kosovo, but while I think of it, please, if I may, which is part of the basis of the question: What sense of urgency does the Secretary feel for the US to lay out its formula - or pick your own word - its expectations, its wishes, its whatever, for an Arab- Israeli settlement, a Palestinian-Israeli settlement?

Cook's in the area. The British, who have always maintained sort of a special interest in the area, in light of their colonial past, are insisting that it's time to move. I'm a little confused, because on the one hand, she's appealing to the leaders to take the hard decisions. There's no evidence they have. On the other hand, you seem to be revving up for some bold declaration. So could you address that a little bit?

MR. RUBIN: I don't want you to be concerned that we're revving up for a bold declaration. Let me say this - with regard to the security situation on the ground, clearly we're concerned about the security situation. It is tense right now. We call on all parties to exercise the utmost restraint. That means not only in terms of the actions their security forces or others take on the ground, but also in terms of the rhetoric that's used.

We do welcome some of the restraint shown in recent days by both sides to curb the potential spread of violence. But the current tension and the tenseness of the situation there is a direct result, in our view, of the failure to make progress on the peace process. And in our view, the only way to make progress in the peace process is for the leaders themselves to make the decisions -- the hard decisions that have been so sorely lacking up to date. As the Secretary has said before, 1997 was not a good year for the peace process and 1998 isn't shaping as much of a better year either.

So we are examining intensely what we think would be the best course of action. We're evaluating how best to move the process forward in light of the ideas that Secretary Albright and the President presented to the leaders in recent months. Certainly Secretary Albright is quite aware of the need to move, but the first point that I think needs to be made is that it's the leaders who need to move. We've presented ideas. We've presented ways to close the gaps, and so far that hasn't yielded the kind of hard decisions that need to be made. It is time to move on the peace process. She is very concerned about this problem, and has focused intensely on it in recent days.

As far as what we will do next, no decisions have been made at this time. When decisions are made, we will let you know -- other than to say that we are concerned, the situation is tense on the ground. Clearly the atmosphere has been poisoned over the last 18 months by the lack of progress. Let me strike that back -- I guess it's more like 14 months since Hebron. That is a problem that we are confronting, wrestling with, and when we have some new tack to pursue we will share that with you.

QUESTION: I'm tempted to - but I won't. I'm tempted to ask you wasn't there more violence when you were going full-blast with you peace process? Hasn't there been a decline in violence since the so-called peace process ground to a halt?

MR. RUBIN: I don't think it will surprise you, Barry, that our view is that the peace process is better than no peace process.

QUESTION: Yeah, but I don't think you can measure violence as having increased since the end of negotiations.

MR. RUBIN: And the tenseness --

QUESTION: It's declined.

MR. RUBIN: If you want, I'll try to answer your question if you'll let me have the floor to do so.

QUESTION: Sure.

MR. RUBIN: The tenseness and the degree of widespread violence, we believe, is a function of the collapse of the peace process. That doesn't mean that there weren't terrorist incidents that we have condemned in the strongest possible terms while the peace process goes on. But isolated, although deadly, terrorist incidents are different than a general decline in the willingness of Arabs and Israelis, Palestinians and Israelis, to work with each other and bring forward the fruits of peace that the people of the region so desperately need.

QUESTION: Do you think Robin Cook's plans to go to Har Homa will help settle things down?

MR. RUBIN: Well, it doesn't look that way. It's up to Robin Cook, the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, to make his own schedule. But to the extent that it becomes controversial and overshadows other important meetings that he is going to have and other events that are going on, again, it's a reflection of the general deterioration in the process that we're so concerned about. But it's up to him to make those decisions.

QUESTION: Is King Hussein's visit here this week critical or important in determining what steps will be taken next?

MR. RUBIN: I don't see that as a necessary prerequisite for any particular step that we're taking. Certainly when the King is here, there will be an opportunity for the Administration to consult with him closely on his views of what's necessary to take the next step, as well as to consult closely on the subject of Iraq that's obviously of concern to Jordan. So he has been a critical player in the Middle East peace process. He has done a great deal to bring reason and rationality to the region, and we will be talking with him about that.

QUESTION: Still on King Hussein's visit, maybe you could comment --

MR. RUBIN: This is the double team here. Go ahead.

QUESTION: I can wait until later.

MR. RUBIN: No, I'm just --

QUESTION: I thought it was thematic. On the subject of his concern about Iraq, what does the US think about his suggestion that there should be a dialogue with Iraq - the United States dialogue with Iraq?

MR. RUBIN: We do not believe it would be wise to have a dialogue with Iraq. We don't have much to say to Iraq, until they do what the international community has demanded for so long. This isn't a question where there's a confused message that needs to be clarified with direct discussions. Those resolutions have been around a long time. Iraq knows full well what they contain and what is required from those resolutions. And so, in our view, the need to clarify American policy through a dialogue is completely unnecessary. What's necessary is (that) Iraq to get with the program; to start complying with the resolutions that it has flouted for so long.

QUESTION: Just to go back to the subject of needless provocations: What do you think of Ariel Sharon's comments that Israel would assassinate the Hamas leader in Jordan, despite their bungling of it the first time around?

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say this - we welcome the fact that an issue that had caused tension between Israel and Jordan, with regard to the incident in Jordan, has been resolved between them. We think that was a step forward in trying to reduce tensions and promote progress in the area.

We do not, as you know, support the methods that Ariel Sharon mentioned, and therefore don't think this is a particularly helpful comment. On the other hand, we've made clear in the past that it's up to Israel to judge what steps it needs to take to fight terrorism. And it's clear that there are determined terrorists out there who have taken the opportunity to try to destroy the Middle East peace process by killing innocent men, women and children and splattering their blood on the streets of Israel in their hopes of killing the peace process. And those types of efforts have to be condemned in the strongest possible terms. We have no illusions about the difficulties of fighting such terrorism. But in our view, this particular method is not one that we pursue, and therefore we'd be hard-pressed to endorse such a statement.

QUESTION: Can you say whether the Administration believes Mr. Mishaal, I believe is his name, is an international terrorist who is responsible for these attacks in Israel?

MR. RUBIN: I'll have to take that question.

QUESTION: Still on the Middle East: Any plans for Dennis Ross to travel?

MR. RUBIN: There have been no travel plans at this time that I am in a position to announce or that have been set.

QUESTION: On Iraq, can you confirm that the illicit oil shipments by Iraq down the coast of Iran have indeed been shut off by Iran?

MR. RUBIN: We have noted a diminution of the amount of gasoil smuggling by Iraq. If this trend continues, it would be a good sign. We welcome all efforts by the international community, including Iran, to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq. Such efforts are supportive of the international community's work, including our own, to achieve Iraq's full compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions.

So we've seen a diminution of this type of smuggling. We are not yet in a position to judge the exact reasons why it's been reduced, but we do welcome its reduction. To the extent that countries in the region are getting tougher and enforcing sanctions, that's a good thing.

QUESTION: Do you have any idea of the scale of the reduction? I mean, there were reports that the Iraqi regime was getting as much as much as $600,000 a day from these illegal shipments.

MR. RUBIN: I've seen those numbers go up and down. I don't have a specific US Government number for you. Let me make two points: Number one, we believe that the sanctions regime on Iraq is the tightest sanctions regime in history and that it has worked extremely well in cutting off, choking off, funds for the Government of Iraq. There is no question about that. At the same time, one of the small leaks in that was through this mechanism, and we have seen a diminution. I wouldn't believe every report you read, but I'll try to get you some better data on what we think has happened in recent weeks, but we do think it's been reduced.

QUESTION: One more: There was an earthquake, I believe, yesterday in Iran. Has the US been asked for any humanitarian aid? Do we intend to help?

MR. RUBIN: Well, in the past, around the world, when there have been humanitarian disasters of that nature, we have been helpful. I am not aware of a specific request from the Iranian government at this time.

QUESTION: Could we swing back to Kosovo, which I diverted us from, please? There a lots of questions.

MR. RUBIN: OK.

QUESTION: There is a little more restiveness today after some days of calm, if you want to address that. I'm terribly interested in what this meeting in Germany might do on top of the things you decided in London -- your program to the UN Security Council, your own unilateral - US unilateral moves. Could you get into that?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. We have received reports of additional police action this weekend, though on a smaller scale than the initial widespread violence two weeks ago. We are investigating these reports and we'll give you more information as soon as possible. At the same time, the police did not interfere with a number of peaceful demonstrations over the weekend; but the police did prevent a group of Kosovar-Albanian women from marching to the Drenica region today.

As far as the negotiating track is concerned, we believe that Kosovar- Albanians have legitimate grievances, and we continue to believe that only meaningful dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina can address them. So far, Belgrade has not offered anything that we regard as meaningful. The half measures and empty gestures Milosevic's government has put forward in the wake of recent bloodshed are woefully inadequate. In our view, Belgrade deliberately couched its offer in terms obviously unacceptable to the Kosovar-Albanians. This was not a serious negotiating offer. We urge Belgrade to make a wholehearted effort to address the concerns of the Kosovar-Albanians. We have said in the past that we support an enhanced status for Kosovo in the context of the former Yugoslavia, but this must be achieved through peaceful means.

It's not surprising to us that some of the Serbian political parties are concerned about Albanian independence. We do not believe that the Albanian - I'm sorry, Kosovar-Albanian independence - that there ought to be independence there. But we think they need the additional self-administration and way to pursue their legitimate political rights that has been the cause of this tension and violence.

QUESTION: Would the status quo ante be good enough, what Milosevic did in Kosovo about a decade ago? If that were reversed, would that basically meet US policy -

MR. RUBIN: Well, our standard, again, is that the Kosovar-Albanians have an ability to see their legitimate political rights fulfilled. Certainly, one way to do that is to go back to the status that existed prior to President Milosevic -- then Slobodan Milosevic's -- efforts in the late '80s. At this point, what we are prepared to say is that we do not believe there should be independence for this region. At the same time, we do believe that there should be more self-administration. To the extent there can be an enhanced status for Kosovo in the context of the former Yugoslavia, we think that will address the problem.

But those are issues that they need to decide through negotiations, and that's why it is so troubling to us that rather than proposing well- prepared, unconditional negotiations, the government in Belgrade is putting forward ideas and propaganda releases designed to undermine that goal.

QUESTION: One last thing: Can you fit the Deputy Secretary's trip into this?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. He is, I believe, on his way to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia today. I can get you the rest of his schedule, but it definitely involves countries in and around the areas that we consider most at risk if this violence were to spread. He is going to be meeting with them to build their confidence of our interest in the problem and to talk to them about ways in which we can take steps now to deter the conflict from getting out of control.

Let's go here and then back to George and then we'll come back.

QUESTION: Jamie, the10-day deadline that was set, unless I'm mistaken, we're on the verge of that deadline expiring. Is there any sign -

MR. RUBIN: I believe today is Monday and the deadline was set seven days ago, yes.

QUESTION: Well, we've got a few days to go then.

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: Any sign that the Belgrade Serbs are planning to comply with that deadline; and what will be the price if they don't?

MR. RUBIN: We have made clear that we do not believe that the government in Serbia, that Slobodan Milosevic's government is doing what it needs to do in order to show that it wants to resolve this peacefully and meet the legitimate concerns of the international community. We have made clear if he does not change course, if he doesn't start looking for ways to solve this at the negotiating table rather than on the killing fields, then we are going to have to step up the pressure economically. The first item of business of the Contact Group ministers will be to address the freeze on assets that was discussed in their last statement; and that will obviously be one item and there may be additional items for discussion. But as of now, there is no sign that he is reversing course; on the contrary, he is putting forward proposals that appear designed to fail and that are woefully inadequate. So if he doesn't get with the program and reverse course, the Contact Group will be talking about how to stiffen these measures.

With regard to the freeze, there are questions about how it can be best implemented; that will continue to be discussed. We are discussing them already, but we will intensify that discussion when that10-day deadline expires on Thursday if things haven't changed. There are three foreign ministers who will be in the region in the coming days - Foreign Minister Vedrine, Foreign Minster Kinkel and Foreign Minister Primakov - and hopefully Slobodan Milosevic will understand that the international community is united in getting tough on Serbia if it does not ease up on the Kosovar-Albanians.

QUESTION: The additional measures, are they all economic?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not in a position to describe those at this point, but I would steer you away from any suggestion that they are of a magnitude beyond that. We have said that all options are on the table and we are not ruling any out.

QUESTION: The London conference gave Milosevic 10 days to withdraw special police units.

MR. RUBIN: And begin a dialogue, I believe, was in the three-part plan. We'll get you the statement, but that was one of the demands, yes.

QUESTION: Have you seen any movement on the special police unit -

MR. RUBIN: I'm not in a position to confirm anything. As far as we can tell, as I said, there were some activities over the weekend. But with regard to the three points the Contact Group spelled out, we have not seen the kind of movement that would indicate that he is reversing course.

QUESTION: A couple of things on the meeting next week and on the topics you just discussed: You mentioned that all the foreign ministers visits to Belgrade. Is Secretary Albright considering such a visit?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of that.

QUESTION: And you also mentioned Deputy Secretary Talbott's mission to countries surrounding the trouble spot.

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: There was talk at the Contact Group meeting of having some sort of a ministerial-level meeting of those nations. Is that under consideration as something to occur together with, parallel to, immediately after?

MR. RUBIN: Again, I wouldn't rule out any meetings with regard to this subject. I am trying to give you real-time information about what decisions we have made. I can't talk about decisions that haven't yet been made. I wouldn't rule out such a meeting. Certainly Secretary Albright and Ambassador Gelbard believe that it would be important to bring those countries into the discussions, and that is why the meeting that Deputy Secretary Talbott is having with leaders in the region is important. Them meeting with each other is important, and them reaching out to other countries in the region. But beyond saying that I can't rule it out, all I can tell you is that the only meeting that is now scheduled that I can confirm for you are the Contact Group meeting in Bonn at this time.

QUESTION: In regard to the Contact Group meeting, you said you expected the foreign ministers to be in attendance.

MR. RUBIN: All of them, right.

QUESTION: So that would include Mr. Primakov?

MR. RUBIN: Well, right. Again, I can't specifically speak for other foreign ministers, but the term of art "expect" is a well-chosen one, and we would expect there to be full attendance by foreign ministers. But that doesn't rule out last-minute scheduling changes or other reasons why ministers can't end up actually attending.

QUESTION: Have Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Primakov consulted since the Contact Group - since their consultation at the Contact Group meeting and in advance of Mr. Primakov's visit to Belgrade?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, Secretary Albright spoke to Foreign Minister Primakov this morning. He is expected to go to the region, I believe, tomorrow. She went through with him the reasons why she believes it is so important to deliver the toughest possible message to President Milosevic that he can't think that there are differences between the countries on the basic point which is that the blame for this crisis and this violence rests squarely on the shoulders of the leadership in Belgrade; and that if they don't change course, the result will be even further alienation from the international community, less integration into the international economy, less integration into the European economy.

And to get back to one of Barry's questions, one of the items on the Security Council's agenda this week is a comprehensive arms embargo that is being considered by the Security Council. That, again, is a way of signaling that we're moving from a process of integration that was occurring in the aftermath of success at Dayton to a process of isolation for the government in Belgrade, unless it changes course. She made those basic points to Foreign Minister Primakov, and her reaction was that she felt that - at least from what he said to her - that he was going to deliver the kind of reinforcing message that we had hoped for.

QUESTION: Jamie, to follow on the possible freeze, do you have an assessment of what kind of impact - economic impact -- that would have? Is there a dollar amount? Are there any specifics?

MR. RUBIN: No, I do not have that for you; that's something that we're considering right now. But I can say this - if you can't use your bank accounts, you certainly can't begin to have normal economic commerce with countries around the world, and that is a step that will clearly signal the greater isolation of Serbia economically and the fact that even though the economic sanctions that were on the embargo that was on after the war - during the war in Bosnia, that Serbia is heading rapidly for that kind of economic isolation. But as far as a dollar figure is concerned, I don't have one for you.

But I can say this - it would make it extremely difficult for any of the Serbian companies to have normal economic commerce if they knew that their assets were going to be frozen if they opened bank accounts.

QUESTION: Can I follow up on what you were discussing with Barry before? When you used the phrase "enhanced status," is that a synonym for autonomy, or are you deliberately not using the phrase "autonomy?"

MR. RUBIN: We have said that an enhanced status would help achieve the legitimate political rights of the Kosovar-Albanians. In response to Barry's question, I said, going back to the autonomous status that Kosovo had would be one way to achieve that. But there are many ways to skin this kind of problem. All we're saying is that we want to see an enhanced status for the Kosovar-Albanians, their legitimate political rights being pursued. It's not up to us to decide what is the only solution, but it is up to us to describe the direction that it needs to go; and it needs to go away from repression, away from violence, away from police action, and toward the pursuit of legitimate political and ethnic rights within the former Yugoslavia. We've made clear that we do not support independence.

QUESTION: Switching to a new subject, do you have anything to say on four- party talks in Geneva, which just started today?

MR. RUBIN: Those talks are underway. It would be difficult, considering the fact that the talks are underway, for us to get into much specificity. With regard to the public discussion of the withdrawal of American troops, we have said that all parties to the talks can raise any issue they wish within the context of the agreed agenda, which is establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and issues concerning tension reduction there.

There is no change of our view on the question of troop withdrawals. We hope to move the process forward through these discussions, but our expectations are not high for breakthroughs in what will be a slow and painstaking effort. That's why the "marathon runners" that have worked on this kind of issue for the US Government before know they're in for a long, long haul.

QUESTION: Follow-up?

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: The following question -- according to the wire services, the opening apparently mired in procedural dispute. Can you elaborate what happened?

MR. RUBIN: No, I can't get into greater specificity. I was prepared to comment on the general point on the withdrawal of US troops and make clear that's obviously a non-starter. It can be discussed. Anything can be discussed but it's a non-starter.

QUESTION: Let me ask you about President Clinton's trip to China.

MR. RUBIN: Was there more on Korea I heard? I'll come back to you.

QUESTION: The March 13 Berlin talks, there are a couple of reports on -

MR. RUBIN: Sorry?

QUESTION: March 13th Berlin talks.

MR. RUBIN: Berlin talks?

QUESTION: Bilateral talks. There are a couple reports US and North Korea have agreed to resume missile talks.

MR. RUBIN: We have not yet agreed to a date to resume these talks.

QUESTION: But anything on the missile talks?

MR. RUBIN: I said we have not yet agreed on a date for the missile talks.

QUESTION: Also on the troop withdrawal question, Jamie. If there was - I know it's wildly hypothetical, but if there was a peace agreement, would there been a need to - would it then be a time for the United States to consider its troop posture in South Korea?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to, by answering a hypothetical question, create a whole series of speculation on what our views are. It's too hypothetical to get into at this point. We have troops there because we think we need them there. The South Koreans think we need them there. The Korean Peninsula is a very dangerous place and it's a long, long away from being not a dangerous place.

QUESTION: On the Korea missile talks, you've not yet agreed on a date for them? Is that what you said?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, we have not yet agreed to a date for the missile talks to resume.

QUESTION: The two sides have agreed to resume -

MR. RUBIN: I didn't say that. The information I have been given is that we have not yet agreed to a date to resume these talks.

QUESTION: Do you have any kind of read-out on the Berlin talks?

MR. RUBIN: No.

QUESTION: May I ask you about President Clinton's trip to China? Is there any date already? And then the second question is, can you confirm that the United States will not sponsor a resolution condemning China's human rights record?

MR. RUBIN: I don't believe that normally the State Department spokesman announces dates for the President of the Unites States' trip; and since this spokesman wants to continue to "spoke," he will not start doing that.

With regard to your second question -

QUESTION: Go for it, Jamie.

(Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: With regard to the second question, the United States has decided not to sponsor a resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva this year. We took this decision because of the steps China has taken and the anticipation of further progress.

Among the steps taken are, number one, China's decision to sign the international covenant on civil and political rights, which codifies - and this is extremely important - the principle of the universal declaration on human rights. We believe this step, when ratified, will be a major advance in China's recognition and acceptance of the universality of human rights.

China also agreed to sign the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights last year. Thirdly, there has been a release of a number of prominent political prisoners whose cases we have highlighted to the Chinese Government, and we are obviously hoping for more such releases. Fourthly, China has invited the UN arbitrary detention working group, which visited Chinese prisons, and its agreement in principle to an exchange of US and Chinese prison officials. Fifthly, China has agreed to create a US- China NGO -- non-governmental organization -- forum for discussion of human rights issues.

So with regard to the covenant on civil and political rights, this is a particularly important development since it will create a multilateral process for scrutiny of China's human rights record. Let me emphasize our decision not to go forward with a resolution does not mean that we accept that China's human rights record is satisfactory. We do not think it is satisfactory. We will continue to speak out publicly about that record, including at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. We will advocate this position forcefully through our diplomatic channels as well. We hope that progress achieved to date and China's decision on the covenant will open the way for further steps on human rights.

So we have asked for certain things. We believe they are moving forward to bring China more into the fold on human rights principles, and we clearly have seen progress in this area. On that basis, we have decided not to go forward with sponsoring such a resolution, and that's that.

QUESTION: Can you respond to some of the points - there was a Washington Post editorial this weekend, you may recall, which criticized the Administration in general on China policy and, in specific, on nonproliferation saying that the China's have made some promises to the US on the basis of which the US has made some concessions, and then it was found that they hadn't kept their promises.

MR. RUBIN: Critics will criticize; they have to earn a living. We here believe that we are doing the right thing for the United States of America on China policy. There is a very simple calculus, and that is that the Chinese have made certain assurances with regard to stopping and reversing a long-time trend of nuclear cooperation with certain countries. In particular, they have agreed to stop their nuclear cooperation with Iran. This is a major development in non-proliferation. We are moving from a situation where the Chinese Government in the past had provided certain assistance to the government of Iran in the general nuclear area, not directly related to nuclear weapons design or other such direct matters. But now they are moving from a presumption of cooperation in this field to a presumption of denial. That is called non-proliferation.

With respect to the case that came up last week, we believe this case, contrary to the critics' attempt to use it as a signal of a problem, is rather a signal of how the system works. There was no agreement to provide this chemical to Iran by China. When we first understood there was a discussion about it, we raised it with the Chinese and they investigated the matter and told us there had never been such an agreement. We have no reason to believe there was such an agreement and, when queried, the Chinese assured us it would not go forward.

In addition to a number of other contacts we have had with the Chinese, we believe that they are following through on their pledge not to cooperate with Iran on its nuclear program, and this is a major step forward. There will be maximalists; there will be people who always say that more can be done. But those tend to be people who don't work in the actual government circles, and they tend to be people who think that if one just snaps one's fingers the world changes. This is a sea change in Chinese non- proliferation behavior over the last several years. They have moved from a major proliferator to a supporter of all the major treaties designed to stop proliferation and, in practice, we have seen significant and substantial changes.

Solved that one, yeah.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: Jamie, have you gotten into this subject of the declining Russian nuclear forces that have been brought up by the folks this weekend?

MR. RUBIN: I have not.

QUESTION: Can I ask if the Department has a reaction to David Hoffman's articles; and, specifically, the two points of the launch-on-warning status. Is it truly that way with the Russians? Secondly, should we all back off and give more time by removing warheads or something?

MR. RUBIN: We don't normally comment on specific named articles, but on the subjects you mentioned we believe that despite officially having a no- first-use policy until the early '80s and the early '90s, the Soviet Union and now Russia have always maintained a launch-on-warning capability. The new public stance simply reflects this reality.

With regard to the risk of accidental launch by Russia, although we believe that Russian nuclear forces remain under secure command and control, the United States continues to review all credible proposals to assure continued confidence regarding the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons. In other words, this is an area where there is no amount of scrutiny, no amount of work which is too much because the risks of such an accident or unauthorized launch are so great that there are hundreds, if not thousands, of people in our government who are constantly reviewing this problem and trying to be sure that we have left no stone unturned in our effort to work with the Russians to minimize this risk.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:20 P.M.)


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