U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #171, 97-12-01
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
543
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Monday, December 1, 1997
Briefer: James P. Rubin
DEPARTMENT
1 Members of Louis Farrakhan's Staff Meeting with State
Department Representatives
1-2,3 Department's Position on Proposed Trip by Louis Farrakhan
2-3 Travel Restrictions/Passport Validation Required for
Certain Countries
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
3-5 Israeli Government's Decision re Further Redeployment
4 US Role in the Peace Talks
NORWAY
5 Reported "Link" between Norway's Signing of Land Mine
Treaty and US Withdrawing Arms and Equipment from Norway
SOUTH KOREA
6 Financial Difficulties and International Obligations
6 IMF Discussions
RUSSIA
6-7 American Citizen Detained for Suspicion of Espionage
BOSNIA
7-8 Role of International Presence/American Forces in Bosnia
IRAQ
8-9 Oil-For-Food Program
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #171
MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1997 12:55 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department noon briefing, or
rather the nearly 1 o'clock briefing. After a long weekend, it took a
little time to get ourselves organized.
Let's start with George Gedda.
QUESTION: I understand some of Minister Farrakhan's people were here in
the building this morning. Do you know what that was about?
MR. RUBIN: I believe there was a brief contact made this morning, and a
proposal was made to have discussions later this afternoon, in which the
State Department would be happy to provide American citizens, in this case
people working for Mr. Farrakhan, information about our travel restrictions
regarding countries; specifically, in this case, Iraq, Libya, and others.
But I would remind you that we make available information about restrictions
on travel to certain countries by US citizens, but it is up to individual
travelers to make their own decisions, taking into account all relevant
information.
QUESTION: Is that why Mr. Farrakhan visited the State Department
today?
MR. RUBIN: No, I was referring to a question about some people who
apparently work for him.
QUESTION: How did the meeting, the initial meeting, come about?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know all the circumstances, but I believe there was a
discussion yesterday -- a rather public discussion -- in which the briefing
was offered, so it would follow that a briefing could ensue. It hasn't
happened yet. If it does happen, we'll be happy to report that to
you.
QUESTION: You're encouraging him - or discouraging his trip?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we are making clear our position. And we can state
categorically that US citizens are prohibited from using a US passport
without validation for travel to Iraq and Libya. And we would be prepared
to make clear the reasons for those decisions and the reasons for that
policy in any discussions with representatives from his office.
QUESTION: But he can get it stamped and do it?
MR. RUBIN: Sorry?
QUESTION: He can get his passport stamped by the State Department and
make this trip?
MR. RUBIN: Well, there are four categories of exceptions. They include
journalists, American Red Cross, humanitarian considerations and national
interest considerations. In recent years, the Department has received some
80 to 100 requests for validation for Iraq annually. These have been
granted or denied according to the individual circumstance. The number of
validations specifically given, I can't provide to you.
QUESTION: Will you - will Minister Farrakhan get this validation? Are you
going to --
MR. RUBIN: That's a hypothetical question. He hasn't asked for it.
QUESTION: He hasn't asked for it.
MR. RUBIN: Again, as I think you know, a discussion ensues. There are
categories, and then there are rationales. And since no discussion has
ensued, it would be hard to make a comment on what the result would be of
any discussion.
QUESTION: You mentioned Iraq and Libya. There are other countries, as
well; right?
MR. RUBIN: Correct. Correct. I can go through the entire list for you, if
you'd like, but there are a number of them, yes. They include North Korea;
they include Cuba; they include Vietnam, Iran, Lebanon.
Now, not all of these are the same. They each have separate restrictions.
If you'd like me to go through a paragraph or two on each of the countries,
I'd be happy to do that. Is that not necessary? Okay.
QUESTION: Lebanon, though --
MR. RUBIN: We have taken away, as you know, the specific restriction, but
the Department of Transportation has restrictions on ticketing and on air
cargo originating in Lebanon, as well as on landing rights in the US by
Middle East airlines. You can contact the Department of Transportation for
additional information, if you'd like that.
QUESTION: Then you would be prepared to discuss with Minister Farrakhan,
one of these exemptions?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, I don't know that -- this is all very much in the
realm of the hypothetical. I'm trying to respond to your hypothetical
question. All that I can tell you for sure is that we are prepared to brief
representatives of his office on the rationale for our passport restriction
policy. Beyond that, it's pure speculation.
QUESTION: If Mr. Farrakhan does decide to go to Iraq, how will he be
allowed to go to Iraq? Will he be then listed as a terrorist agent, or
what?
MR. RUBIN: That becomes what we call a privacy matter, and I would have
to refer you to other agencies.
Let me be clear - Ambassador Richardson said this yesterday - obviously, we
don't think this is a particularly helpful exercise. But as far as what
decisions we would make or wouldn't make in a case that is completely
hypothetical, I can't comment.
QUESTION: Jamie, on another subject, has the State Department had any
glimpses of the proposal that the Israeli Government is preparing on the
second phase withdrawal?
MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright has been in extensive consultation,
intensive consultation with Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu in
recent days and weeks. She obviously met with the two of them in London -
Prime Minister Netanyahu in London, and Chairman Arafat in Bern, Switzerland.
She's had extensive phone contact with them since then; and I expect the
telephone contact to continue.
Our view on this announcement is as follows. We have always said that the
interim agreement should be implemented, and this includes the further
redeployments. In that context, we view the Israeli Government's decision
in principle to move forward with the further redeployment as a step in the
right direction. As we have said, we expect that the further redeployment
will be significant and credible.
We are engaged with both sides in intensive consultations on the four-part
agenda, which you are all quite familiar with. We will hopefully be able to
say more about next steps during the course of this week.
In short, we are discussing this matter with both the Israeli Government,
and the whole four-part agenda with the Palestinian Authority, and we will
continue to do so. It's a matter of some interest. As you know, the
Secretary has made clear that she believes there ought to be a greater
sense of urgency on the part of the parties to move the peace process
forward. This announcement is a step in the right direction, but now we're
going to have to look at the substance and see how far it goes.
QUESTION: From what you've seen of it so far, does it meet the significant
and credible test?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to get into a public discussion of something
that's under intensive consultation with the parties; that's not helpful to
diplomacy.
I can say that we want it to be meaningful; we want it to be credible; we
want it to be significant. We'll have to make that judgment based on - as
we continue to discuss it. And if and when it becomes necessary to make our
view public, we'll do that. But it's not the right time for that now.
QUESTION: On the same subject, the US has been, for some time now,
operating as a mediator between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Are
there circumstances under which the US might decide to become a direct
participant in the peace talks?
MR. RUBIN: Well, these are words that are obviously laden with great
significance over time. Having observed personally Secretary Albright's
work with Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu, and with Foreign
Minister Levy and Abu Mazen from the Palestinian Authority, I can assure
you that we play an active role; and that it isn't simply a matter of
setting up the room and arranging for them to shake hands -- that she gets
into specific discussion with them about our ideas, when necessary, and I
suspect will be prepared to continue to do so.
So if a mediator is someone who doesn't present ideas, but merely tries to
mediate between the two parties, then we are already more than a mediator,
because we have presented our own ideas. As far as whether one can go to
another stage where the US presents a proposal and then asks the others to
react to it, that is not a stage we're at now, and therefore, I could only
say that the question is premature.
QUESTION: But are there circumstances under which that could become --
MR. RUBIN: Well, right now, we believe that there has been a step taken
in the right direction by the Israeli Government; and that is, to come up
with the idea of a further redeployment, as indicated by the Oslo Accord
and the Hebron agreement. So therefore, we are moving intensively down this
current path. And if this current path doesn't yield fruit, then we'll be
prepared to talk about other paths, if any.
QUESTION: Jamie, you said interim agreement you wanted to carry out. That
interim agreement included three withdrawals. The Israelis are only talking
about one.
MR. RUBIN: Again, let me say that there is a little confusion on this,
and I'm not going to try to further confuse it by explaining it completely.
But what we have told the Palestinians, at the conclusion of the Hebron
talks, is we have provided assurances that the process of further
redeployments -- of which there were originally scheduled to be three --
should be completed no later than mid-1998. That is an assurance that we
have provided the Palestinians.
As far as what the timing and the scope of any further redeployment would
be - as you know, there was one announced in March that never was
implemented - that is something that is under active discussion by
Secretary Albright and Ambassador Ross and others. So exactly how this
would all come together, I'm not in a position to speculate for you right
now; except to say that we stand by our assurances that the process of
further redeployment should be completed no later than mid-1998.
QUESTION: Could I follow that up by saying that there was in the interim
agreements -- in the Oslo II agreement, I should say -- a provision that
the withdrawals would be to specified military locations. Now, that has
been interpreted by an Israeli source that saw your letter to Arafat, which
has never been published, as meaning cantonments, not general withdrawal to
large sections of the West Bank.
MR. RUBIN: Let me answer your question this way. If I was not prepared to
answer a question about whether 6 percent to 8 percent was significant or
credible, I'm certainly not going to start interpreting those documents in
the way you've suggested. It's just not useful at a time when we are
engaged in intensive discussion.
We obviously want to meet the requirements of Oslo. Different sides have
different interpretations of different parts of it. We're not going to get
into a situation where we judge the legal interpretation of every word.
What we are going to do is press very hard behind the scenes, and when
necessary, publicly, to make clear the importance of the peace process, the
importance of moving. And right now the focus of our work is on how to
put those four pieces together: the security component, which is the
sine qua non of the peace process; the time-out that is necessary for any
final or permanent status negotiation to succeed; and this further
redeployment, which is indicated by the previous agreements - I've
forgotten the fourth - and obviously, an arrangement for the final
permanent status.
So that's what we're focused on at this time. Considering the sensitivity
of the issue, we're not going to be making specific comments on every
specific legal interpretation of every word.
QUESTION: I have a question about Northern Europe. Is it correct that the
United States will pull out its prepositioned arms and military equipment
from Norway, if Norway signs the ban - the anti-personnel land mine treaty?
We understand that talks have been going on.
MR. RUBIN: That there's a link between signing the treaty and equipment?
I mean, I haven't heard that, but I will try to get you an answer for the
record.
QUESTION: Well, the representative for the State Department has said to
the Norwegian authorities that the land mines are --
MR. RUBIN: I'm not ruling it out; I'm just saying I haven't heard that,
and I will get you an answer for the record.
QUESTION: Do you have anything on meeting -- North Korean delegation, Kim
Gye Gwan and Charles Kartman met last Wednesday in the State Department?
MR. RUBIN: I believe we made a comment about that last week - that it was
part of the bilateral discussions that we've had in the past. But I think
most of the attention in this area is now focused on Geneva and how to get
positions laid down in that meeting that will bear fruit in what we expect
to be a very long, but very important, negotiation on the four-party
talks on the Korean Peninsula.
QUESTION: Are you anticipating South Korea having trouble living up to
its financial obligations for the nuclear reactors under KEDO, given the
bail out and the financial instability?
MR. RUBIN: Well, on that specifically, we understand discussions are
underway between the IMF and the Republic of Korea. Obviously, they - the
Republic of Korea or the IMF - would have to speak directly to those
negotiations. But certainly the idea of engaging this exercise is to bring
the maximum stability as possible to South Korea, which would include its
ability to continue on a subject as important as nuclear proliferation on
the Korean Peninsula.
I have not heard any specific concern raised that this is in jeopardy. I
think everyone recognizes the importance of that agreement. It was a
milestone agreement that froze the North Korean nuclear program in its
tracks, and was a boon to stability and nonproliferation in the region.
QUESTION: Two questions - is it your understanding - can IMF money be
used to pay for the reactor? And also, it's a little more widespread than
just South Korea; it also involves Japan, which is another key financier
here.
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: Is the US prepared to up its contribution to make up for them?
Are you expecting to still make these contributions, given the state of
their economies?
MR. RUBIN: I think I'll get you a listing of the exact cost and who's
paid what for this program in the past. But I think if you look at it,
you'll see it's rather small in comparison to the numbers we're talking
about here that have important implications. I have not heard any fears
expressed the way you expressed them.
I think we have to bear in mind that Korea and Japan and other countries
are - we have important allied relationships with, and we have numerous
reasons to want to do what we can to assist in stability in that region -
not just this issue. But I have not heard any specific fear that this is
putting that in jeopardy. I will check for you and see whether that was a
concern.
As far as exactly how we would be contributing our part to any arrangement
like this, I'd have to refer you to the Department of the Treasury.
QUESTION: Give us what you have, if anything, on the arrest of the
American in Russia on charges of espionage.
MR. RUBIN: Richard Bliss, an American employee of Qualcomm, a US
telecommunications company has been detained by Russian authorities in
Rostov since November 25. He has not been formally charged with any crime.
According to the Russian Government, he is being investigated on suspicion
of espionage.
Mr. Bliss was gathering data using a global positioning system device for
the development of a cellular telephone network. Richard Bliss and Qualcomm
have asserted that they had all the proper documentation for the operation
of this equipment in Russia. An embassy officer visited Bliss today for
over two hours, and reported that he was being well treated - or at least
that Mr. Bliss reported that he was being well treated. He has an attorney
who has paid him frequent visits.
We don't comment on alleged intelligence matters. We were not given
permission to visit him by the Russian Government until today, and we have
protested this delay.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: Could I also ask a Bosnia question?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: What's the status of the Administration's thinking process?
When is the President going to decide to announce that he's come out in
favor of a US military role after June? And what's the timetable? I mean,
is it going to be after the NAC meeting?
MR. RUBIN: I think, certainly, the President's decision-making and the
timing of the President's decision-making is a question I would recommend
you address to the White House Press Secretary, Mike McCurry, who I'm sure
will ably rebut it.
QUESTION: Well, can I ask you, though, presumably the State Department is
involved in the decision-making process. Is there a timetable? Is there a
sense of how there's a series of steps that need to be taken, or --
MR. RUBIN: We are engaged in intensive consultations internally and with
our allies and with Congress, and have been for some time, on the question
of what international presence ought to be in Bosnia after the spring of
next year, and whether if any American forces should be part of that. We
have been consulting on that intensively, because we do believe that a
decision is necessary at the appropriate time.
As far as when that appropriate time would be and the process by which that
decision is made, I would again refer you to my colleague Mr. McCurry.
QUESTION: I ask because Secretary Cohen was quoted over the weekend as
saying that he wanted to hold out for some guarantees of specific
contributions by European nations -- the specific roles that they would
take on, and so on. I'm just wondering whether there's -- whether the US is
now in the position of asking for some assurances and some promises from
its European allies, before it would announce its decision.
MR. RUBIN: I can say this, that part and parcel to our policy in Bosnia
has been a recognition that the European governments should bear an
important part of the burden, and that that burden should be significant.
We are in constant discussions with them over different aspects of how to
propose an acceptable division of labor, and that has been going on for
some weeks now and months, and I expect it to continue to go on.
But again, if you're making a specific link that, if this happens, then
that's going to happen, and the President's going to announce Z, I again
would have to refer you to the White House.
QUESTION: On the question of the Iraqi oil-for-food deal, do you have any
ballpark figure for how much, if at all, the US would be prepared to see
Iraqi oil exports increased?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me again do what I can to try to put this issue in
context, because this is easily misunderstood. There are two issues. On the
one hand, there is the sanctions regime that is in place, that was put in
place after the Gulf War. It's the toughest, most comprehensive sanctions
in history. It has always had an exception for humanitarian goods. Under
that sanctions regime, from the beginning, Iraq was permitted to buy food
and medicine.
Because Saddam Hussein refused to do so in sufficient quantities and his
people were suffering, in 1995, the United States put forward a resolution
in the Security Council -- Resolution 986 was put forward in April 1995.
But Iraq refused to implement that resolution for over a year and a half.
Since that time, however, over two million tons of food and related
commodities have reached Iraq for distribution to the Iraqi people.
And it is our understanding, from UN agencies that the oil-for-food program,
which is the other piece of this puzzle - again, on the one hand, sanctions,
and on the other hand, the oil-for-food program. The oil-for-food program
is not about sanctions relief.
There is no way Iraq can come away from the tight sanctions that have been
put forward by the Security Council until it complies with UN resolutions,
including weapons of mass destruction. But because we are concerned about
the Iraqi people, and Saddam Hussein's government apparently is not, we
have regularly sought to find ways to provide food and medicine for the
Iraqi people.
We understand the Secretary General will shortly present recommendations to
the Security Council on extension of this oil-for-food program. We look
forward to his report, and will be prepared to act immediately to improve
the delivery of food and medicine to the Iraqi people. If the Secretary
General believes that additional revenue should be devoted to this purpose,
we and the Council will give that urgent and positive consideration, as
well.
Again, because we believe that Saddam Hussein has used his people as a pawn
in his attempt to convince the world to lift sanctions, we have tried to
make clear that we care about the Iraqi people. We have sought to remove
that humanitarian card and, in turn, have provided, at our initiation, over
two million tons of food and medicine for the Iraqi people. We are now
prepared to, as I said, give any new proposal with additional amounts, or
other aspects to improve the program, urgent and positive consideration
in the Security Council.
QUESTION: But do you have any figure in mind of how much it might
be?
MR. RUBIN: I do not believe the Secretary General has put one forward.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:25 P.M.)
|
