U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #167, 97-11-21

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From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

STATEMENTS
1		OECD Agreement to Prohibit Bribery of Foreign Officials in
		  International Business Transactions

IRAQ
1-2		Composition of UNSCOM Inspection Teams/Number of Americans
2-3		Joint Iraqi-Russian Communique re: Improving UNSCOM
		  Operations
3-4,5		US View of Effective UNSCOM Operations/Need for
		  Unconditional Cooperation by Iraq
4-5		Status of Humanitarian Assistance/Oil-for-Food Program
6-9		Prospect of Full Compliance by Iraq with UNSC Resolutions

TURKEY/TURKMENISTAN
9		Turkey's Purchase of Natural Gas from Turkmenistan

NORTH KOREA
9-10		Four Party Preparatory Talks/Bilateral Meetings

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
10-11		Secretary's Meetings with Prime Minister Netanyahu and
		  Chairman Arafat/Next Steps

GLOBAL AFFAIRS
12-13		Departure of Under Secretary Tim Wirth
12-13		US Delegation for Kyoto Conference

MEXICO
14		Allegation of Zedillo Family Connections to Drug Traffickers

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFF-CAMERA DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #167

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1997, 1:00 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. FOLEY: Hello. I will welcome myself back to the daily briefing. We're not on camera today, so I can show my ringed hand.

QUESTION: How was your wedding?

MR. FOLEY: How was my what?

QUESTION: Your wedding.

MR. FOLEY: I have no guidance for you on that, Sid.

(Laughter.)

I have no announcements. I'm going to post a statement on the agreement that was reached at the OECD to prohibit bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions. So you can pick that up in the Press Office after the briefing.

And Lee, that's in my name, okay?

QUESTION: Iraq is on people's minds still, I guess, and ours. Is there any change in the American contingent in the inspection teams - the number of Americans?

MR. FOLEY: I don't have the make-up, Barry, of the officials, the UNSCOM officials who went in today. I understand there are Americans among them. I'm not aware of any changes in the composition.

Indeed, the Iraqi announcement of acceptance of the return of the team - I think it was their ambassador in New York referred to the team's return with its usual make-up to resume its usual work. But I have no information to indicate anything otherwise.

QUESTION: Well, the Iraqis themselves are speaking in Baghdad of there being fewer Americans on the team. And I think it's being described as someone or other as normal rotation.

MR. FOLEY: I have no information on it.

QUESTION: All right, well, then, look, maybe you know the policy. Maybe the policy is relevant. Has the US agreed to have a look at the proportion or the ratio of Americans on the team - consider some other mix as part of this agreement?

MR. FOLEY: Well, our position all along has been that this is not a matter for US decision or for any nation's decision - least of all, Iraq. This is a matter for UNSCOM, under its chairman, Richard Butler, to determine in line with the needs of his mission. In other words, what are his requirements in order for UNSCOM to do its work effectively and rapidly, based on the expertise that he needs and the expertise that's available. That's the only criterion as far as we're concerned; and that's his judgment to make.

QUESTION: All right, well, that seems to take Iraq and agreement with Iraq out of the picture. Has the United States agreed with UNSCOM officials or worked out something with UNSCOM officials that there would be fewer Americans on inspection teams?

MR. FOLEY: I'm certainly aware of no such agreement whatsoever. I can only characterize it that way because I have no information to the contrary. I certainly would be surprised if there were any decisions of that nature taken.

Again, this is Chairman Butler's decision. In our view, his mission needs to be effective; it needs to be more effective. His decisions, we believe, will be based in light of that sole consideration - how to make the inspections effective, and how to get to the bottom of Iraq's program of weapons of mass destruction development.

QUESTION: Yeah, sure, but your helpful Russian partner has said he would try to improve - was his word - improve UNSCOM operations. I suppose in his mind, in Iraq's mind, maybe in French minds, be improved if there's a lesser, a lower American presence. It would be less abrasive, perhaps, to the man in Baghdad. But you're not aware of any finessing or any re- jiggering of this to stroke Saddam Hussein?

MR. FOLEY: Absolutely not. As you know, today the UNSCOM commissioners are meeting in New York. Then later today, it's envisaged that, I believe, there will be some informal meeting of the Security Council. I think Chairman Butler may be reporting in that forum. So if the Chairman has any recommendations, we'll know about them at that point.

But certainly, I'd like to make clear - and I'm not the first to do so; more senior officials before me, including the Secretary today and Mr. Berger yesterday and the President have made clear that there have been no hidden deals, no compromises engaging or involving the United States. Our view is that the UN Security Council resolutions have standards that Iraq must meet. And those are the same now as they were before Iraq precipitated the crisis three weeks ago.

QUESTION: Referenced in the joint communiqué - the Iraqi-Russian communiqué - yesterday to improving UNSCOM's operations. Do you know what they specifically meant by that? Why did they put that in there?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I've seen speculation, just as you've seen, in the press. I think some of these ideas have been mentioned in the public marketplace over the last days. So I don't think we'll be surprised by them. But it's likely that the United States has a different view of what it takes to make UNSCOM's work more effective -- different from, say, for example, Iraq's view of what it takes to make UNSCOM's work more effective.

The Iraqi view, until now, has been to block and to attempt to cripple UNSCOM's work, and at the same time to claim loudly the need for relief from sanctions. Our view, of course, is very simple - that sanctions relief is predicated upon UNSCOM doing its job freely, fairly, rapidly, if possible, but effectively and without any hindrance whatsoever.

QUESTION: Yeah, but Jim, if the Russian Foreign Minister sees - perceives, whatever his reasons are, a reason to improve, as he puts it, the operations, that means he wants to change something. Now, you just said you have - whatever - the US view is of how to be effective clearly could differ from Iraq's. Does your view differ from the Russians?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I can tell you what our view is.

QUESTION: Yeah, but I mean, have you got a problem? They're on the Security Council; they're one-fifth of the permanent membership, and the French will probably trot along with them when it comes down to that, although they haven't been very verbal. So what's - do you have a problem with two of your friends?

MR. FOLEY: Well, Barry, first of all, let me tell you - define for you what it is - what it means for us to enable UNSCOM to do its work more effectively. First, it must be able to do its job without strings, conditions, harassments, blockages or restrictions. We've seen a lot of those in the past. Secondly, that it's able to conduct full, effective and speedy inspection activities on the ground and in the air, and here, very importantly, enjoy access to any site, person or document.

Now, Iraq has never met the standard of full and unconditional cooperation with UNSCOM. And doing that, in our view, is what would make UNSCOM more effective.

QUESTION: But you said site; you didn't say weapon site, you said site. That would encompass so-called presidential sites, or would it?

MR. FOLEY: Full and unfettered access to any sites UNSCOM deems necessary, absolutely.

QUESTION: Jim, this letter that Under Secretary Pickering mentioned yesterday to the Security Council, I presume is from Primakov. Does it say - -

MR. FOLEY: I think the letter he was referring to - because I was with you at that press conference - I think he was referring to the Iraqi ambassador's communication with the --

QUESTION: Oh the - does the Iraqi ambassador's letter to the Security Council contain any surprises? Is it exactly as stated in --

MR. FOLEY: I've not seen the letter. I'm not aware - I think I probably would have heard this morning if that letter contained stipulations or conditions that we would find unacceptable. But I'd have to take the question, really, to be safe, Jim.

QUESTION: And on the business of improving or changing the future oil-for- food deal, for example, it may not have been in any letter, it may not have been approved by the P-5 foreign ministers. But if there is a perception on the part of the Iraqis that they were given a wink and a nod by Primakov that conditions would be changed, wouldn't that be a problem in the future?

MR. FOLEY: Wouldn't what be a problem in the future?

QUESTION: Wouldn't their perception --

MR. FOLEY: Are you talking about the oil-for-food or - you started your question with that?

QUESTION: Yes, any segment of the deal - oil-for-food or improving the inspections or whatever. If there's a perception on the part of the Iraqis, given suggestion by Primakov that things could be improved from their point of view, would that not be a problem in the future - if that's what they believe, rightly or wrongly?

MR. FOLEY: Well, in Geneva, the Russian Minister made clear that the Russian conversations with the Iraqis were bilateral conversations that did not engage anyone but themselves.

I believe Mr. Berger yesterday noted comments by Tariq Aziz to the same effect; that the Iraqis are not under illusions that there have been any commitments made on the part of anyone except, perhaps, a Russian willingness to continue - and again, this would not be new because we've seen this over the years - to continue to be an articulator of some Iraqi views and concerns, concerning the nature of the inspections regime.

If that were to happen, it wouldn't be the first time that it happened. But there have been no commitments.

Now, returning to your point, though, about the humanitarian nature as being part of a deal. First, I think I've made clear there's been no deal whatsoever. Iraq has welcomed the return of the inspectors unconditionally, as far as we're concerned. But this has been an issue in the press - the question of humanitarian relief - and, indeed, it's been a concern of the United States Government for a good number of years, throughout the duration of the sanctions regime.

I would hasten to add, though, that in our view it has not been a concern of Saddam Hussein and his regime. Certainly the plight of the Iraqi people is a notion that he has brandished from time to time, in an effort to escape from the sanctions. And we've always been willing to look at the question of how the program in effect now that provides for humanitarian relief through some authorized sale of oil can be improved if necessary. We're constantly willing to take a look at that to make sure that food and medicine are going to the Iraqi people who need them.

But I would challenge the notion that this is something that (a) Saddam Hussein cares about; and (b) he would regard as integral to the proceedings of the last several days.

QUESTION: Well, to put it in a more positive light on the oil-for-food humanitarian aid, would the United States like to see the amount of oil sales and subsequent food deliveries increased?

MR. FOLEY: I think it's something that we're willing to take a look at. We want to be sure that Iraqi people - men, women and children - are not unduly suffering to the extent that we can help alleviate that if it is a problem.

We regard the Iraqi regime's arguments in this regard as specious, because the fact of the matter is that they have been dragged, more or less kicking and screaming, towards the implementation of the oil-for-food program; have put up roadblocks at various points; have failed to avail themselves of the facilities under the agreement. So we find their arguments disingenuous on this score.

On the other hand, it's an issue that we keep under review, and we're willing, as I said, constantly, to re-examine.

QUESTION: Is this crisis over, or has it been diminished? Or would you care to give us your reading? I mean, the inspectors are in. This is one of the criteria for - this is what started this; they were expelled. So now that they're back in, what's the status?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I thank you for the question. They're back in, and now the question is, what happens next? Are they able to - the $64,000 question is, are they able to do their job?

I would point out to you that Iraq's pledge to cooperate fully with UNSCOM yesterday would be a novel achievement if implemented, because returning to the status quo which existed before October 29 would return us to a state of semi-compliance because Iraq was not fully cooperating, even before the latest crisis. And UNSCOM, I think, has made that perfectly clear in its reports over the last days and weeks.

Iraq has blocked access frequently to places, to documents to equipment and to arms. So we're looking for improved performance and enhanced compliance with the UNSCOM inspectors and their mission.

QUESTION: What is the criterion for understanding when the crisis is over? And also when the build-up can be reduced, or built down.

MR. FOLEY: Well, I'd have to refer questions about military deployments to the Pentagon, in terms of the operational aspect and in terms of their duration, ultimately, to the White House and to the President. I can't really comment on those.

But I think the view has been clear from all senior US officials, I think, including the President today, that we are in a wait-and-see mode and we are maintaining our vigilance. My understanding is that our posture in the region remains unchanged and is not about to change, either.

We are pleased with the Iraqi announcement of a willingness to accept the return of the inspectors. We are pleased that the inspectors, some of them, now have returned to Iraq. But the real question will come when they begin to resume their work. We will have to see how the Iraqi authorities meet the commitments that they have made.

Q The question is whether you will be satisfied the crisis is over when they resume work at the level that they were working previously, which was not adequate; or whether you insist on full access to everything as the criteria.

MR. FOLEY: Certainly we insist on full access, full cooperation with UNSCOM and unimpeded access and unqualified cooperation with UNSCOM's work.

Now, as I stated, the status quo ante was not perfect - far from it - from our point of view. But let's be realistic - what precipitated the crisis is the fact that Saddam Hussein is sick of the sanctions regime, and he wants to opt out or to free himself from the sanctions regime. To the extent that the return to the status quo ante is a return to a situation where there's continuing blockage and lack of cooperation, then that will continue to further postpone the day when the Security Council can consider the question of sanctions relief.

So in other words, in our view, it ought to be in the interest of a wise and humane government in Iraq, and in the interest of its people, to cooperate fully and rapidly with UNSCOM, and to do better than they've done before the latest crisis.

QUESTION: Does the converse hold true that the extent to which he now cooperates and goes beyond previous levels of non-cooperation is the extent to which he can have the prospect of sanctions being lifted?

MR. FOLEY: If I understood your question correctly, that if there's a lack of cooperation, it further postpones the day of consideration of sanctions relief, absolutely.

QUESTION: But I'm referring to it the other way around. I mean, to the extent to which he now cooperates and gives additional access, does each additional step on his part bring the end of sanctions closer?

MR. FOLEY: Well, you're talking about taking a snapshot of something that, in our view, is more of a movie not a snapshot. The end of the movie has to be a declaration or certification by UNSCOM that Iraq's programs of weapons of mass destruction have been dismantled, all the elements have been dismantled, and that UNSCOM gives Iraq a clean bill of health in that regard.

QUESTION: Is it the policy of the United States Government, now, this week, that military forces will remain beefed up in the Gulf, remain on alert; that that particular stick will remain in place until compliance is seen and there's some track record of compliance by Saddam with regard to the inspectors?

MR. FOLEY: Well, Roy asked a similar question, and I really couldn't expand on it because, of course, first of all, it would be - it's a Pentagon matter and, ultimately, a Presidential decision.

But my understanding is that there has been no change, and there's no anticipated change in the near future of our posture in the region.

QUESTION: So say if there's a predication on compliance in weapons inspection.

MR. FOLEY: I really wouldn't want to characterize it.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. FOLEY: Obviously, those forces have been sent there in response to the crisis. And we are in a wait-and-see mode right now.

QUESTION: Why was the United States willing to stand by for several years while the Iraqis were not complying fully? I mean, you're saying for the past years they haven't complied, but it hasn't caused a crisis. And are you now saying the threat of military action applies to Iraq if it only goes as far as the status quo ante; that is, it continues to block inspections? Is there the threat now of military action by the United States?

MR. FOLEY: I don't think it would be prudent for me to get into the particulars of your question. It's an interesting question, but I think it's - certainly I have no guidance on the subject, and it would be imprudent to try to answer it. But the fact is that UNSCOM has done a lot of work in Iraq over the years. It's uncovered a lot of nefarious activities, proscribed activities, activities that Iraq was continuing to attempt to hide or continuing to pursue. And UNSCOM has found reason to believe that there's a lot left in various areas of weapons of mass destruction that they have yet to find out about and yet to eliminate.

So certainly their work has been impeded, but it has not been unsuccessful; they have made progress. But in the course of making progress, they found more areas of concern. So I just would not be in a position to comment specifically on your question.

QUESTION: Well, I'm just - would the Administration be satisfied to go back to the way it ways? With the sort of partial --

MR. FOLEY: We want to see full compliance on the part of Iraq, and that's what Iraq has stated yesterday; that they will let them back in - the UNSCOM inspectors - they will let them do their work unconditionally, unimpeded, and we're waiting to see that.

I wouldn't want to comment further, because it's really pure speculation. Interesting, but speculative.

QUESTION: On a sort of similar subject, dealing with Northern Iraq, has the United States reconstituted its presence in Northern Iraq?

MR. FOLEY: You'd have to ask the Pentagon if there's been any change in our posture.

QUESTION: -- not necessarily military presence.

MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware of any particular new developments concerning Northern Iraq.

QUESTION: -- Iraqi Congress and those sort of associated with --

MR. FOLEY: Oh, I see what you mean.

QUESTION: There was a story yesterday that - an agency had a story that had with the help of Turkey, had gotten those people back in.

MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware of any such - I didn't see the story. I'm not aware of the information, either.

QUESTION: It was in The New York Times, but --

QUESTION: Back on the question of Iraqi compliance, I'm just not clear what, if any, incentives Saddam really has for cooperation. I mean, is there a reward for cooperation? Or must he do seven other things besides give full access?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I think in terms of incentives, you'd have to put yourself in his shoes and try to determine what it is he's aiming for.

I think the evidence thus far is that he's really sought to have his cake and eat it, too; in other words, to maintain to some degree his program of weapons of mass destruction, and also to obtain relief from sanctions. And our policy - the policy of the Security Council, and I think all the members are united - is that he must comply with the resolutions and make that choice - to choose to forswear once and for all, and to allow the dismantling of his programs of weapons of mass destruction; and on that basis, have the opportunity to have a new relationship with the international community.

That's a clear choice. We presented him with that choice. Obviously, he would like to slip out of that choice. So you ask what's the incentive for him. We want Saddam Hussein and his regime to understand that insofar as they believe it's in their interest to emerge from sanctions, to enjoy sanctions relief and a return to the international community, the price is forswearing their weapons of mass destruction once and for all.

QUESTION: But is that alone enough? Or are there other resolutions that have to also be brought in that have to be fulfilled - the way he treats his minorities. There's a whole series of other resolutions.

MR. FOLEY: Are you asking whether Saddam Hussein sees this that way?

QUESTION: No, I'm asking whether we see it this way. Must he fulfill a lot of other things besides dismantling the weapons of mass destruction?

MR. FOLEY: It's the view of the United States that all relevant UN Security Council resolutions apply, as we look towards our relationship with Saddam Hussein and his regime over the long run.

QUESTION: Does that include restorations and freeing Kuwaiti prisoners?

MR. FOLEY: There are a number of resolutions that deal with prisoners of war and reparations, yes. I could get a list for you.

QUESTION: Do you have any opposition to Turkmenistan natural gas transfer over Iran with the pipeline to Turkey?

MR. FOLEY: Could you repeat the question, please?

QUESTION: The Turkmenistan natural gas transfer from over the Iran to Turkey - do you have any opposition to this subject?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I'd have to refer to our standing position. It's a complicated issue. I think at the time when a pipeline was announced - or a Turkish intention, I think, in the summertime to purchase Turkmen gas, that we indicated that we were pleased with the Turkish decision because there had been, apparently, I think, a prospect under consideration at some point of a Turkish purchase of Iranian gas. In that context, we said - I'd have to refer back to a position that I enunciated back many months ago. But I think we expressed some understanding at that time.

So I don't believe our position on that has changed -- the Turkish purchase of Turkmen gas.

QUESTION: Have you any updates on four-party talks happening in New York today?

MR. FOLEY: I don't have any news. They've been, as far as I understand, they've been meeting since about 10:00 a.m. this morning.

I did ask the question about an hour or so ago, whether anyone knew what the temperature was in New York and how things were going. I think the reply was, 46 degrees or something like that. But in terms of what's going on in the negotiating room, I don't have that. We --

QUESTION: -- broke for lunch, or if they are going to continue on in the afternoon?

MR. FOLEY: I don't know. I would be very envious if they actually broke for lunch, but I don't have that information.

QUESTION: Did you talk to a State Department person?

QUESTION: I'm sorry, do you have anything to say on the bilateral dimension of this talk?

MR. FOLEY: Between which nations?

QUESTION: The US-South Korea, US-China supposed to have happened yesterday.

MR. FOLEY: We had bilateral meetings, yes, with those nations yesterday. But I don't have a read-out about them. I think they were prospective, looking towards today's meeting.

I'm not trying to be coy. I truly don't have a read-out of where they are. We were hopeful - cautiously hopeful, obviously, given the record, that there might be a prospect of a successful meeting. We'll know hopefully sometime this afternoon. I think we'll be in a position to announce the results, if there are any, in the hours to come.

We had anticipated that maybe in the early or mid-afternoon we might have an announcement. But I don't know where we are right now.

QUESTION: What are the next steps in the Middle East peace process, as far as the United States is concerned?

MR. FOLEY: Well, the last steps I can tell you about because, since my return, I've informed myself about them. But that's not, obviously, news to you.

Someone is beeping. Is that you, Barry?

However, in other words, the Secretary's meetings in Europe with Prime Minister Netanyahu and with Chairman Arafat. And I'm not aware that further scheduled meetings at that level are anticipated. You'll probably ask me about Ambassador Ross. I asked the question yesterday - he has no imminent travel plans. He's been working the phones.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. FOLEY: On the phone?

QUESTION: No, he was trying to get a car.

(Laughter.)

MR. FOLEY: Did he make any breakthroughs on that?

QUESTION: I didn't ask him.

MR. FOLEY: In any case, the interim committees are meeting in the region. We think they're doing well. Obviously, when they met here a number of weeks ago, some of the gaps were narrowed.

But the fact of the matter is, though, that we are impatient -- the United States - with the lack of progress on the tough issues. I'm not talking about the interim issues, but the four-part agenda that the Secretary has laid out, and that she discussed with Chairman Arafat and with Prime Minister Netanyahu. So she had useful discussions, then.

Again, we've had the intervening crisis in Iraq, which has obviously concentrated minds. But Ambassador Ross is working the issue, and I have nothing really new to report on it today.

QUESTION: Nothing? I mean, no tactical or strategic moves in the peace process?

MR. FOLEY: No, I have no news. We are impatient. We want to see progress, and we're hoping that the leaders in the region will demonstrate the commitment to treating each side as partners, and to taking each other's needs into account and to taking both steps to meet each other halfway.

I think the Secretary has laid out some interesting - some useful ideas to help bridge the gaps and to help us move towards accelerated permanent status negotiations. So we're waiting for an appropriate response to the appeals that she's launched to the sides.

QUESTION: It was the Israeli idea in the first place. What's the problem? What do you have lack of progress in - their willingness to move into these big issues, or what they are saying on those big issues?

MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware, Barry. It would be wrong for me to try to venture on an area where I don't have information. I'm not aware that we've actually launched discussions on the permanent status issues.

QUESTION: I'm not even asking that.

MR. FOLEY: I think not. I think the question is creating the atmosphere that the Secretary has been endeavoring to do since her trip to the region.

QUESTION: What about the time-out category?

MR. FOLEY: It's the time-out, the issue of further redeployments. It's the imperative of intensified security cooperation between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. It's those three issues that are the predicates, really, for our success in launching permanent status issues.

QUESTION: The proceedings are slow, right?

MR. FOLEY: Yes, on the first three, right.

QUESTION: Yesterday, there's a political campaign that's nearing its end in Republika Srpska. One of the charges made by a person close to Plavsic, who is our special friend there, is that Radovan Karadzic tried to buy an atomic weapon, a nuclear weapon during - I don't know, a couple of years ago -- spent money and got something which was not that weapon. Is this just election rhetoric, or did - have they informed the United States of this action?

MR. FOLEY: It's the first I've heard of it, Roy. Truly, this has not come to my attention nor to my colleagues' attention in the room. I'm not aware of it.

QUESTION: Tim Wirth has been offered a job by Ted Turner. Do you have any word on a replacement in the Kyoto conference that's coming up in the next few weeks?

MR. FOLEY: No, I don't. You saw the Secretary has noted with regret Tim Wirth's departure, or expected, or imminent departure. He's done a really sterling job as Under Secretary, and has created and defined the job he's in, and he's going to be sorely missed. But the Secretary believes that if there's one job that he's going to where he's going to continue to help work for a safer, more cooperative world, it's the job he's going to - working for Ted Turner and helping to implement his mission in support of the United Nations' activities.

Obviously, this has just been announced, and a search will be underway for other candidates for the position, for the Secretary to consider. She's been, obviously, very busy with her regional travels, with the Iraqi crisis. She's now in Vancouver for the APEC meetings. So it's impossible to say when she'll be in a position to make an announcement.

But obviously, any replacement will have to build on the strong leadership, cohesiveness and record of success of Under Secretary Wirth that he has provided to the global affairs agenda.

In terms of Kyoto, the State Department and the White House are still working on the delegation list, so I have nothing to announce.

QUESTION: Jim, don't you all - aren't you all a little puzzled, don't you find it a little bit disingenuous that Mr. Wirth couldn't have waited just a couple of weeks? Mr. Wirth, who's so committed to the global environment, the environment and so forth, could have waited just a couple of weeks to take this job and gone ahead to Kyoto and not quit and sort of crippled your efforts there at Kyoto?

MR. FOLEY: I'm afraid there's a misunderstanding, and I ought to clarify it. He hasn't quit; he's announced that he's going to be leaving the State Department at the end of the year.

QUESTION: He's not going to Kyoto.

MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware of the composition of our delegation to Kyoto. I don't think it's been finalized. But he is in the job. I can tell you I was in a staff meeting this morning where he spoke. He's active on all the issues in his portfolio, and will be for the next six weeks, until the end of his mandate.

QUESTION: If you don't have the answer, can you take the question as to whether he will go to Kyoto?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I don't have the answer. As I told you, the White House - well, I can take the question, but I may not have the answer until the White House and the Department have finalized the delegation list. We don't have it yet.

QUESTION: Well, he was originally supposed to go, head the delegation to Kyoto.

MR. FOLEY: I'm not sure if he was the one leading it or not. But I'll take the question, but I just don't know if I can get an answer for you quickly because we haven't made that decision yet.

QUESTION: I have a follow-up. I think this decision by Mr. Tim Wirth created some negative impression among the participants of the Kyoto conference that the United States might not be too serious about this issue - the global warming issue. Is this the US understanding, that this is a setback for the US to participate in this important conference?

MR. FOLEY: No, not at all. Our position hasn't changed - the one that was announced by the President some weeks ago. No change at all, and it should not be interpreted as such. It's obviously a brilliant and a unique opportunity that awaits Under Secretary Wirth, which he will take up at the beginning of next year.

Although I've noted for Sid's interest that our delegation has not been named yet, the fact is that the Kyoto Conference is of great importance to the United States; the President has made that clear. He will have a top- notch team going there. Under Secretary Wirth will be working on the issue from now until the end of the year. So there should not be any interpretation of that sort. This was obviously a powerful opportunity for Under Secretary Wirth, and he's grateful for the offer from Mr. Turner and the Secretary of State has applauded that. But I wouldn't read anything other than a personal choice into his decision.

QUESTION: Can you take one on Mexico?

MR. FOLEY: You want me to take a question before you've asked it?

QUESTION: No, don't take the question, just would you accept this inquiry?

MR. FOLEY: I'll be glad to take it.

QUESTION: Yesterday Ms. Reno responded that she had heard, was aware of allegations by the former drug czar, Gutierrez Rebollo, that was the general, that the Amecuez, I think is the correct pronunciation, family, the meth kingpins in Mexico, were connected to the Zedillo family. I would ask you, does the State Department have any concern about this being possibly a true allegation?

MR. FOLEY: It's the first I've heard of it, so I couldn't possibly comment on it, Bill.

Any other questions?

Thank you.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:45 P.M.)

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