U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #164, 97-11-13
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
998
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Thursday, November 13, 1997
Briefer: James P. Rubin
IRAQ
1-2,6,7 UNSCOM inspectors; update on situation; Security Council
action
2-4,6 Hussein's action; US view; potential for military action;
options Secretary's trip; withdrawal of inspectors;
assurances
4-7 Diplomatic efforts by other countries; Hussein's actions
during "time lag"; weapons of mass destruction; targets;
Amcits in Iraq
10 Iraqi Food Stocks
13-14 US repayment of dues; resolution; allies' support of US;
Lott's proposal
PAKISTAN
7-9,15 Embassy security; possible backlash/retaliation re Kansi
verdict; consular information/dissemination; embassy
measures; diplomatic security re companies' safety;
Secretary's visit; Sharif/Clinton phone call; business
interests in region
NORTH KOREA
9-10,16-17 Four-party talks schedule; level of renewed interest in
peace talks; preliminary, working level meetings, etc.;
locations, dates
TURKEY
10 Turkish religious party leader meeting with Grossman in
London
CHINA
10-11 Dissidents released; Ambassador Sasser comments
ISRAEL
11-12,14 Secretary/Netanyahu/Arafat meetings; Secretary's goals;
Clinton/Netanyahu meeting schedule; Arafat declaration
for a Palestinian state; Netanyahu's response
14 Resolution against Israel re settlements; Status of US vote
RUSSIA
12 Chechen President's unofficial visit; meeting with
Sestanovich; agenda
COLOMBIA
12 Approval of extradition bill without retroactivity;
certification process
MISCELLANEOUS
13 Secretaries Albright and Rubin meeting with Gingrich;
issues discussed
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #164
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1997, 12:50 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. I have no
announcements. I'm here to take your questions.
QUESTION: You've probably seen the announcement that all of the UNSCOM
inspectors are due out of the country, of all nationalities, by Friday. I
just wondered, do you have any thoughts on that?
MR. RUBIN: First of all, the President made clear this morning that this
announcement is unacceptable. It is clearly unacceptable and is a further
challenge to the international community. Our view now is that the Security
Council sent the right message in passing its resolution overwhelmingly;
and that message was to Saddam Hussein: comply now and let the UN get back
to do its important work in uncovering and determining that there are
no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. That task is extremely important
to the United States.
Secretary Albright will be consulting closely with our allies and other
members of the Security Council on how to respond to Iraq's latest
challenge to the international community. I understand that she has spoken
to Ambassador Richardson, who will be seeking further action in the
Security Council today. That action will have a very simple purpose; it
will be to demonstrate to Saddam Hussein that this attempt to divide the
world has failed, and that he will have only painted himself further in the
corner. There's only one way out; and that way out is to comply with
the United Nations, allow the inspectors to do their job.
So the action we'll be seeking in New York will demonstrate anew that he
has painted himself into the corner; that he's only further isolated by
trying to divide the world. I think we saw the UN Special Commission
Chairman Butler make clear that this an attempt to divide UNSCOM. That is
unacceptable to the United Nations. Secretary Albright spoke with Secretary
General Kofi Annan just a few minutes ago, and he made clear to her that
this attempt will not be permitted to divide Americans from others on the
UN inspection teams, and that the world stands united in demanding
that Saddam Hussein reverse course.
QUESTION: Is Ambassador Richardson's job complicated by the vote in the
Congress last night on payment of arrears to the UN?
MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright, I know, has believed for some time that it
is extremely important for us to pay our debt to the United Nations, and
that paying that debt is the best way to ensure that we get the support
that we need from countries around the world in important national security
matters. So if Congress adjourns without providing the billion dollars - I
guess, $900 million -- that we owe the United Nations, and without
sending the clear signal that they will pass it and that that money
is coming, Secretary Albright believes it will be harder and harder
to get support from the United Nations for this important national security
matter. So this is extremely troubling, and it will make it more difficult
for us to do the nation's business if we can't send a message to New York
that we will pay back the money we owe.
QUESTION: In the view of the United States, what steps should the
Security Council now take against Iraq?
MR. RUBIN: Well, as I said, we're going to be seeking action in the
Council to demonstrate that he has only painted himself further into the
corner. There's only one way out, and that is to comply with the United
Nations.
That's the kind of step we're looking at now, is a demonstration anew that
an attempt to - let's put it this way. Tariq Aziz has been in New York
trying to explain how the Americans dominate the UN Special Commission, and
their view that the Americans dominate the Special Commission is what has
generated this threat to throw out the inspectors. If the UN Security
Council responds, rejecting completely and utterly that attempt to split
off the Americans, it will become increasingly clear to Iraq that its
argument has failed; it has not won any friends. In fact, all it has done
is unite the world against Saddam Hussein.
QUESTION: Jamie -
QUESTION: Hold on. Could I just follow up, please? So you're looking for
a Security Council statement of condemnation?
MR. RUBIN: Something of that kind, yes.
QUESTION: Jamie --
QUESTION: We just have a report that the --
MR. RUBIN: Excuse me. Let me go over there first.
QUESTION: I'm sorry.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Just to follow up on this, Mr. Butler also said in his
statement that by pulling out the inspectors, this further reduces the
United Nations to be able to "see what's really going on over there." Are
you worried - is the United States worried that Saddam has a lot of rope to
maneuver, move around some more equipment? And the second part of my
question is, would you say that the gap has been narrowed to take military
action against him?
MR. RUBIN: On your first question, I think we talked about this at length
yesterday. There's no question that with each passing day, it is harder and
harder for UNSCOM, the UN Special Commission, to do its job. And if the UN
Special Commission can't do it's job, there is the possibility that Saddam
Hussein will begin to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction. But that
doesn't change the fact that we are all in a position, we hope, to be able
to keep the pressure on Saddam Hussein and make sure that he realizes
that delaying the work of UNSCOM is like throwing away the key to unlocking
sanctions.
So, yes, we're concerned that the UN Special Commission can't do its job,
but the ones who should be most concerned about it are the Iraqi regime,
because they are going to at some point make it extremely difficult for
UNSCOM, the UN Special Commission, to know that they have even a baseline
from which to monitor what's going on in Iraq. So at some point - and when
that point is will be determined by Ambassador Butler - but at some point,
they will cross a threshold that will require UNSCOM to start all over
again in establishing a baseline.
QUESTION: And the second question, about the gap narrowing?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to - I have no new comment for you on military
action. All I can tell you is that we have not ruled any options out.
QUESTION: Is there any thought being given to delaying her trip?
MR. RUBIN: The Secretary's bags are packed. The jet is, I suspect, being
fueled right now, and we are leaving this evening.
QUESTION: I'm just not sure you're addressing the latest development,
which is that the United Nations is pulling out all of the inspectors
except for a skeleton crew.
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: Doesn't this just give Saddam what he wants right now?
MR. RUBIN: On the contrary, I think what will happen is that he will see
today in New York that the international community has rejected his
argument that Americans should be separated out from other countries'
officials in the United Nations, and that Secretary General Kofi Annan,
UNSCOM Chairman Ambassador Butler, and the entire world reject this attempt
to divide the international community and to divide members of the UN. All
he will have done, when this is all said and done, is further paint himself
into a corner, from which there is only one exit, and that exit is
compliance with the United Nations and letting the UN continue to do its
job.
QUESTION: Jamie, when Tariq Aziz was making the statement earlier that
the inspectors -- the American inspectors should leave, he gave them a
specific time frame, which was six hours from his announcement. When
Ambassador Butler said that the entire team was going to leave, he said
they would leave tomorrow on an airplane. So we're going to pass this
deadline imposed by the Iraqis. Is the United States seeking some assurance
from the Iraqis that they will not take any action against the American
members of the team?
MR. RUBIN: As I understand the situation, Ambassador Butler has made the
decision that demonstrates that Saddam Hussein has failed. That decision is
to not allow Americans to be separated and treated differently than others
on the international effort to monitor his weapons of mass destruction.
So he has said he wants them all to go out together. He has indicated that
his intention is to put them all on an aircraft that will leave tomorrow,
and that that will make little difference to the Iraqis, in terms of what
they said that they wanted - which was the Americans out today - and he's
waiting for a response. So we are leaving this matter to Ambassador Butler
to negotiate with the Iraqis. But I hope it will be clear to all that we
will regard any attempt to interfere with Americans or single them out
or act in any way against them as unacceptable.
QUESTION: Not to repeat history, because we'll all be condemned if we do,
but before the Gulf war the Russians seemed to have a great need to go to
the Gulf and have one more conversation with the Iraqis. In the Secretary's
various conversations with Primakov and others, are you - is there any
reason for the US to expect that some other countries will make an
additional diplomatic effort which, in effect, will give Saddam more time?
Whatever you want to attribute the purpose, is anybody about to go
off on a trip and tell the US, hey, wait a minute; let me have another
talk with the guy?
MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright spoke with Foreign Minister Primakov
yesterday. They discussed the matter, and she made clear to him that we
have now acted in unity and we need to maintain as much unity as we can
achieve, and that she wanted to stay in touch with him in the coming days
and how to do whatever additional steps we needed to take to convince
Saddam Hussein to change his mind.
During that conversation, I'm not aware that Foreign Minister Primakov
indicated an intention to travel the way you suggested. But again, I
wouldn't rule out officials from other countries trying to use their
diplomatic wiles on the Iraqi Government to convince him that he seriously
miscalculated. He thought he saw a wedge developing. He thought he could
single out Americans from others, and he's failed. Even countries that
tended to support his case, or at least express some sympathy for his case
in New York are now united as one against the position that he's taking.
QUESTION: What is the US view of what does he do with his time that he
keeps getting? You spoke a week ago of having walked the last diplomatic
mile. The resolution got approved in pretty short order. But it seems that
there's still a lag in taking those other measures. What is he doing with
the time? Is he moving stuff around? Is he hiding biological ingredients?
Is he rallying the Arab world to hate the United States? Is he getting any
dividend out of this delay - if you want to call it a delay; there
may not be the word.
MR. RUBIN: I think the answer to that question is that only Saddam
Hussein has the key to unlocking sanctions. If he keeps throwing it away,
by preventing the UN from doing its work, the sanctions can't be lifted.
So there is concern that at some point, a failure to allow inspections will
yield a moment in which much of the baseline work that has been built up
over these last six years could evaporate, and UNSCOM might have to start
all over again in several aspects of its work. But I would ask you to bear
in mind that we will - UNSCOM has announced its intention to continue U-2
flights. There are other remote cameras that Ambassador Butler talked about
today that will operate. So although the situation deteriorates in
terms of the weapons of mass destruction, just because you can't inspect
doesn't mean you don't have any handle on what he's doing.
As far as our next steps are concerned, all I can say is, stay tuned.
QUESTION: If you'll just let me a quick follow - when you say the
situation deteriorates as far as weapons of mass destruction, indeed
because he's moving them around?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I'm not going to tell you what we know or think that he
may or may not be doing. It's really up to UNSCOM to report that kind of
thing publicly. But we are concerned that this time could be used for that
purpose.
QUESTION: Do you have anything to say about his gathering of children and
their families, adults, civilians in possible strategic places? What does
that say to you? Is that going to deter you from certain targets, should
that become necessary?
MR. RUBIN: I am not in a position to get into targeting questions.
QUESTION: Given the grave potential danger of this weapons of mass
destruction program in Iraq, is it really not more important that the
inspections continue; that they continue with Americans on board? I mean,
shouldn't the priority be that the inspections go ahead, rather than simply
making sure that Americans are part of the team?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, President Clinton has made clear the high value we place
on the work that UNSCOM and the UN has done. He's pointed out several times
that they have destroyed more weapons of mass destruction in the years
following the Gulf war than were destroyed during the Gulf war.
So I think we are very clear in our minds on the value of the UN Special
Commission. But what we've learned over the years is that if you give
Saddam Hussein an inch, he will take a mile. Today it will be American
inspectors; tomorrow it will be British inspectors; the day after that it
will be inspectors from another country. Pretty soon, you won't have any of
the individuals you think are necessary to do the job.
So the point is that when it comes to determining who does the work for the
United Nations, if you let Saddam Hussein dictate the terms, you are going
to then begin a process by which he dictates where they can go, when they
can go, how quickly they can expect. These are issues that have been played
out over and over again over the last six years. The lesson we've learned
is that the only thing he understands is firmness; the only thing he
understands is a united Security Council supporting the UN Special
Commission. That's why the focus of our initial efforts have been on
demonstrating the unity of the Council.
QUESTION: Jamie, I know you say all options are open. The Russians think
one option is closed, which is military action. In her discussions with
Primakov, can you say whether the Russians have come up with another
imaginative means short of warfare to make Saddam change his mind? And
would you be happy to see Mr. Primakov, on his own, make efforts to talk to
Saddam Hussein, in the context of being a Security Council veto-holder?
MR. RUBIN: On the first question, again without breaking the confidence
of diplomatic discussions, I don't believe that there was an extensive
discussion about next steps. I believe it was more a discussion where the
Secretary was asking the Russian Foreign Minister what his ideas are on how
to resolve the problem. I don't think she came back thinking that there
were any ideas there that were of the kind that were likely to break the
impasse any time soon.
As far as the second question is concerned, he didn't raise the subject; he
didn't propose it. So I will have to fall back on the spokesman's safety
net of, "that's a hypothetical question."
QUESTION: You haven't done that. You've never done that.
MR. RUBIN: Well, then the first --
QUESTION: We used to get it three times a day.
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: Well, then, the first time this spokesman has fallen back on
that safety net called the hypothetical question.
QUESTION: At what point would the US and the UN began to lose patience
that the diplomatic efforts have failed and Saddam has not gotten the
message? And the fact that all of the inspectors are leaving Iraq tomorrow -
does that make it, then, out of harm's way? Would that make it also
easier?
MR. RUBIN: Again, as far as military questions are concerned, all I can
say is that we haven't ruled any options out. As far as how long we will
wait, again, it's not in our interest to dictate publicly what our
timelines are. All I can tell you for sure is that we will not wait
indefinitely.
QUESTION: Privately, are there timelines?
MR. RUBIN: If there were, and I just told you that there were, then I
would be starting the process of finding out the timelines.
QUESTION: Jamie, there are Westerners there. There may be some Americans
in Iraq. Would you advise them to leave the country now?
MR. RUBIN: I have no information suggesting a consular warning of that
kind. I think we have made clear, if Iraq had attacked the U-2 aircraft,
that would have been a big mistake with consequences. So we understand
there is an additional U-2 flight planned. So that view would pertain to
the future flight, that pertained to the last flight. I don't believe we
made that statement surrounding that flight - if any of that made
sense to you.
QUESTION: Still on Iraq? Or can we go to Pakistan, maybe?
MR. RUBIN: Go ahead.
QUESTION: I wanted to ask you about the travel warning, and pardon me if
I'm going to have you rehash a little bit about what the paper says. What
does it mean to security, if you could just explain how the embassy is
going to be beefed up, and just what other alert systems you've put in
place about the travel warning for Pakistan. And then I wanted to ask you
if the United States is concerned that with the Kansi verdict down, and
he's in his sentencing phase now, and Ramzi Yousef's guilty finding,
are you concerned that if they're sentenced to death or some other kind of
life sentence that this could cause some kind of backlash or retaliation,
as we saw with the four Americans that were killed?
MR. RUBIN: Let me start by saying on the evening of November 10, a public
announcement on the conviction of Amir Kansi was disseminated worldwide.
This announcement followed an earlier one issued for Pakistan - a warning
on June 25, following Kansi's capture - reminding Americans in Pakistan to
remain vigilant, to keep in touch with our Embassy in Islamabad or our
consulates in Karachi, Peshawar or Lahore for updated security alerts.
We also issued a public announcement October 1, urging extreme caution
by Americans in Pakistan.
On November 12, following the murders of the four Americans, we issued a
new travel warning, recommending Americans defer non-essential travel to
Pakistan. The warden network was also activated following yesterday's
incident to alert Americans in Pakistan to take extra security precautions
at this time.
All of these announcements - the travel warning and our consular information
sheet - are given very wide dissemination, through the media, the consular
home page on the Internet, the consular affairs automated fax service, and
through 24-hour telephone recordings. They are also posted in the Press
Office. I think the point here is that Karachi, Pakistan, is not a safe
place. Two and a half years, two consulate employees were killed in similar
incidents. And we've been making clear ever since, in a series of warnings,
that this is not a safe place for Americans to be. The warnings all have
separate and different calibrations of that judgment, but that's the bottom
line.
As far as what steps we are taking worldwide, I think the - just to point
out, the Department's 1996 information sheet identified Karachi as an area
of instability. In addition, we issued a specific warning based on the
Kansi conviction on the evening of November 10. We scaled back our
consulate presence from 50 to 20, following that attack two and a half
years ago.
As far as what worldwide warnings we've put out in response to this
possible verdict, the verdict hasn't happened yet, to my knowledge, and we
will try to get you some further information on what steps we intend to
take and have taken outside of Pakistan.
QUESTION: But are you worried that if you have some kind of - if the
verdicts are very strong, if they're sentenced to death or life in prison
that we're going to have another retaliation against Americans?
MR. RUBIN: We're concerned about Americans around the world for many
different reasons. We put out a warning as a result of the initial verdict.
So yes, we're concerned that verdict and possible sentencing could have an
impact on Americans. That's why we're alerting Americans to these
dangers.
QUESTION: Jamie, the embassy is apparently telling Americans in Karachi
to stay indoors. How long would those sort of measures be anticipated to
remain?
MR. RUBIN: That will be a tactical judgment that's up to the people on
the ground. I have no information as to how long. I will try to get that
for you.
QUESTION: Is there any thought being given to scaling down the non-
essential presence?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard of that at this time.
QUESTION: And lastly, in the general advisory to Americans abroad, what -
how would you define, or what's really meant when you say that they ought
to pay attention to their personal security? What steps would you recommend
to Americans?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think the simple answer, to give an anecdote, I think
that Americans around the world - we've all traveled - those of us who have
traveled know that there are things that you can say and things that you
can do that immediately identify you as American. You have to be aware of
where you're doing and saying such things. And then the precautions that
any of us take walking in dangerous places anywhere in the world, one would
be well advised to take.
QUESTION: Is there going to be any effort by diplomatic security to
somehow deal more with companies over the next week or two who have people
overseas? I know diplomatic security does some training for companies for
the safety of their employees. Do you know if any of this added security
will go on?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard of that. I will try to get DS, Diplomatic
Security Service, to get me an answer to the question of whether this is
changing their current practices.
QUESTION: On a new subject?
QUESTION: More on Pakistan.
MR. RUBIN: Great.
QUESTION: What specific - sorry. Is it my turn?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: What specific security measures will be taken for Pakistan for
the Secretary's visit there?
MR. RUBIN: We don't talk about her security precautions from the
podium.
QUESTION: Do we get out a read-out on the phone call that Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif had with President Clinton this morning? Did he confirm that
they had knowledge of who might have been involved in the attack?
MR. RUBIN: I believe that we've provided some information about the
determination of the Pakistani Government in that discussion -- to leave no
stone unturned in investigating the incident. As far as any leads and any
of that, it would be inappropriate for me to comment.
New subject. Yes.
QUESTION: Korea?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: This is kind of a follow-up to yesterday's discussion, but the
North Koreans are now saying, apparently, that they are ready to begin full
four-party talks in Geneva next month, at the ministerial level. And they
are saying that preparatory talks will begin on November 21. Can you
confirm?
MR. RUBIN: We did have a working level meeting among all four parties in
New York on November 10. Subsequent to that meeting we have made progress
toward convening a preparatory meeting and the first plenary session of the
peace talks. Discussions are ongoing, however, and we have nothing to
announce today.
For those of you who follow the North Korean negotiating process, I have
told you before that our negotiators are marathoners. I think our
negotiators are increasingly optimistic that we are on the verge of being
able to develop that first meeting and to have the first discussion; but
it's not over till it's over. They are not packing their bags to go to
Geneva at this point. What they are doing is working on details to do all
they can to see whether we can actually achieve that agreement, get these
peace talks started, and work on ways to ease tensions on the Korean
Peninsula.
QUESTION: A follow-up, please, if I might. Have the North Koreans said
they are willing to begin these talks before December 18, the South Korean
elections?
MR. RUBIN: I am - again, I think the Secretary said yesterday that she
hopes that we would be able to have a plenary meeting next month. I'm
saying today that we're increasingly optimistic that we could have such a
meeting next month. That month is December.
QUESTION: This is on Secretary Grossman's meeting, yesterday, I asked a
question about the London meeting with the Turkish religious party leader.
Do you have anything today? You took the question.
MR. RUBIN: I would have certainly expected our crack Press Office to have
provided you with the answer yesterday, since you asked it yesterday. But I
guess we didn't, so we'll get it for you later this afternoon.
QUESTION: Our correspondent told us the Iraqi Government has 16 days only
- only 16 days' food stock. Are you aware of this?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to be in a position to assess the food stock,
the military preparedness, the military capabilities of the Iraqi
army.
QUESTION: Jamie, Ambassador Sasser was interpreted as saying - his
comments this morning were interpreted as being optimistic that some
Chinese dissidents might be released. Is that the case?
MR. RUBIN: We have long urged the Chinese government to release all
prisoners held for peaceful expression of their beliefs. During the Chinese
President's visit, President Clinton and Secretary Albright raised our
general concerns and specific concerns over human rights and specific
cases. We are hopeful; we are always hopeful. But I have no predictions to
offer on possible releases.
QUESTION: How do you explain his optimism? He clearly was a little more
forward-leaning than you are being now.
MR. RUBIN: Well, Ambassador Sasser referred to his characterization of US-
China relations in ways that were perhaps a little more over-exuberant than
the Secretary would regard them. We think we had very business-like
meetings. We think we made some progress across the board, but we think we
have a long way to go on matters like trade proliferation, human rights. So
that's our view.
QUESTION: If I could move to her meeting with Netanyahu and Arafat.
MR. RUBIN: Sure.
QUESTION: Could you give us at least an idea - I mean, is the agenda the
same agenda, or will she also try to figure out when Netanyahu and Clinton
can meet here? In other words, is that meeting in part dependent on her
meeting? That's a sort of fair way of asking that.
MR. RUBIN: The short answer is, no. The President's - the White House has
informed us that they intend to have a meeting with Prime Minister
Netanyahu. The question is not whether there will be a meeting, it's when.
They've had some scheduling difficulties. Secretary Albright's meeting with
Prime Minister Netanyahu has been in the works for some time. It is
unrelated to the question of when the schedulers get the Prime Minister and
the President jointly scheduled, which is often not an easy task.
So there is no connection between that. We do not take the view that such a
meeting requires any particular steps. There will be a meeting; it's just a
question of scheduling.
QUESTION: And then, in terms of what she would like to get done - I mean
obviously you had negotiators at a lower level here, and there were certain
things that they couldn't do that had to be bounced up. And I presume
that's the agenda for the conversation; is that right?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. The Secretary is looking forward to her meeting with
Prime Minister Netanyahu tomorrow, and Chairman Arafat the day after. As
political leaders of their countries, they are in a position to make the
hard political decisions that will be necessary if we are to break the
impasse and allow the two parties to get to a point where accelerated
permanent status negotiations can take place under conditions of a time-out
that Secretary Albright has talked about; namely, conditions where
unilateral steps are not taking place that undermine the chances of such
accelerated permanent status talks occurring, or if they have occurred,
such talks succeeding.
There are two other items on the agenda -- the political agenda, if you
will -- and that is the continuing need for a vigilant, 100 percent and
permanent effort by the Palestinian Authority to fight terror and ensure
that they are doing all they can on the security front. And finally, there
is the last issue on the agenda, which is the further redeployment of
Israeli forces pursuant to the Oslo Accords. We would like to see that
further redeployment go forward. We've made that clear in the past, and we
would be discussing that with Prime Minister Netanyahu at the political
level, where these issues are most likely to see progress.
QUESTION: It will be those issues rather than the interim issues, you
think, or will there also be --
MR. RUBIN: I think the focus of the discussions will be on that four-part
agenda.
QUESTION: One further one. I understand the Chechen President is here
tomorrow. Do you ehave anything on who is meeting and what the agenda will
be?
MR. RUBIN: The Chechen President will be making an unofficial visit to
the United States, November 10 through 15. Ambassador-At-Large and Special
Advisor to the Secretary of State, Steven Sestanovich, plans to meet with
him in the State Department. The United States continues to have concerns
about the case of two Americans, Fred Cuny and Andrew Shumack, who
disappeared during the Chechen conflict, as well as about individuals who
have been abducted more recently.
We also intend to discuss with the Chechen President the operations of the
OSCE mission in Groznyy. We believe that the OSCE mission should receive
the full support of the Chechen authorities, as it works with all sides in
the reconciliation process.
Let me remind you that the United States respects the territorial integrity
of the Russian Federation. Since August 1996, Russian and Chechen
authorities have been negotiating Chechnya's status, and have agreed to
resolve the issue within five years. We continue to encourage the parties
to reach a mutually acceptable solution through peaceful means.
QUESTION: You might not have an answer to this, but if you could take the
question, please. The Colombian lower house approved the extradition
measure, without retroactivity. Do you have a comment on that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, it's not a good sign. We reiterate our view that
Colombia should pass the strongest possible extradition bill with the least
number of restrictions, and should include a provision for retroactivity.
To live up to its international obligations, the Colombian congress should
permit extradition of narco-traffickers currently in jail in Colombia, to
stand trials in countries where their crimes have been committed.
Extradition with retroactivity is an essential tool to combat the trans-
national nature of the Colombian criminal enterprises. As it currently
stands, the bill passed out of the house first committee yesterday, and
presumably the full house --
QUESTION: The lower house.
MR. RUBIN: The full lower house, requires further work to eliminate
restrictions to extradition, and to achieve the strongest possible
implementation.
QUESTION: Still on Colombia. What will happen during the upcoming
certification process if Colombia does not approve - if Colombia's congress
does not approve such extradition with retroactivity?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let's not put the cart before the horse. This bill is
still working its way through their parliamentary system. Obviously, we
think this is an important tool - retroactivity for extradition.
QUESTION: Can we get back to the problems in the US Congress for a
second? The Secretary and Secretary Rubin spent something like two hours
last night in Mr. Gingrich's office. Did they accomplish anything? And what
is going to happen now that the Secretary is out of the country and
Congress is coming to a conclusion?
MR. RUBIN: Well, Secretary Albright and Secretary Rubin, I think, made a
powerful case that our national interests were at stake here. That is, in
the case of Secretary Albright, that we're going to be going to the United
Nations and may need stronger and stronger support from member states of
the United Nations and the United Nations itself in holding firm against
Saddam Hussein. To drop this kind of a decision on the UN just at the
moment it was expecting to see this $900 million spent will make it
harder and harder for us to do the nation's business.
We're in a situation where working with the United Nations and working with
other member states is extremely important to us, and extremely important
in our confrontation with Saddam Hussein. So to deny funding to the UN at
this time is extremely counterproductive, and would damage our ability to
confront the Iraqi dictator.
Secretary Rubin made a different case about the multinational development
banks, and I will leave him to make that. But I will simply say that we're
not too many days away from the Vancouver summit. We would expect the issue
of the economies in East Asia and Southeast Asia to be part of the
discussion. This would be damaging to the United States' national interest
if at that very time we were having those discussions, the Congress pulled
the rug out from under the President.
QUESTION: You said earlier that some kind of a signal - I thought you
indicated some kind of a signal that they will pay the dues might be enough
- they might be appropriated later. I think right now there is $100 million
in the Congress, Justice and State bill for the UN. Would that be enough --
MR. RUBIN: That is not enough. The United States has said on behalf -
after an extraordinary amount of work, on a bipartisan basis between
Senator Helms and Senator Biden and the Secretary and other members of the
Administration and members of the House, have developed a reform package
and a plan to pay off our money to the United Nations. That wasn't
supported by a lot of members of the United Nations, who thought these
kinds of conditions were unacceptable.
For those of you who were with the Secretary in New York, in meeting after
meeting she made clear to them that we needed to get them to accept these
conditions, and that we would get the money. She didn't promise the money,
because the Administration can't promise that the Congress will put it
forward; but all the signs were positive. For Congress to adjourn now and
send the message to New York that we don't care about the United Nations,
at the very time the President is seeking support from the United
Nations in our and the world's confrontation with Saddam Hussein,
would be damaging to our national security.
So we need more than a signal. We need legislation that will make that
possible.
QUESTION: Jamie, a couple of quickies on that. Without attacking or
questioning the logic of what you're saying, I mean, if you carry it out,
you're in effect saying - and do you mean to - that the allies might not
stand with the US on Iraq because the US is slow in paying what it owes the
UN? And secondly, Trent Lott said yesterday that the resolution was
weaseled down, watered down to accommodate the allies. He for one is for
strong action. Could you address --
MR. RUBIN: I think there's a general view among Americans that the more
international support we get for our determined fight against Saddam
Hussein, the better. Again, our fight to get him to allow the UN inspectors
to go back and do their job. The more support we get, the better.
I can't tell you what country will vote what on what issue; that would be
speculative. I can tell you that Secretary Albright has been in enough
meetings with other members of the UN and officials of the UN as Secretary
of State, and also as Ambassador to the UN, to know that the United States'
leverage is undercut by strong signals that we are not going to pay our
bills.
QUESTION: And Lott's suggestion that - really proposing a more forceful
approach. He's suggesting you're being dragged back by the allies.
MR. RUBIN: We have made clear that we've ruled no options out. I think
all of us - Senator Lott, other senators have indicated that the desire is
certainly to have as strong international support as possible. That doesn't
mean you go for the lowest common denominator. But in the building of
international pressure against Saddam Hussein, there's a diplomatic
process. That is what we are trying to do.
QUESTION: Could I ask a question on the Netanyahu-Arafat meetings? At the
United Nations today, there's an issue of a resolution against Israel for
settlements. Is the United States expected to vote against that? And will
that come up in the discussions in London and Geneva? Also this afternoon,
Arafat has announced that by 1999 he will declare a Palestinian state. Is
that likely to become a real bar, because Netanyahu has said that he
would withdraw from the peace process if he did this.
MR. RUBIN: On the first question, I don't know the specific resolution
you're referring to. I'll get that for the record. I can tell you that the
United States often votes against anti-Israel resolutions in the UN, and so
that wouldn't be a new situation. As far as the second question is
concerned, certainly our view on this subject has not changed.
QUESTION: Can I follow that? Earlier, I think I heard you correctly, and
I want to see if I did. You mentioned, in the talks upcoming with Netanyahu
and Arafat, that they represented the political leadership of their
countries.
MR. RUBIN: That was a slip of the tongue, and I appreciate your pointing
it out. Chairman Arafat is the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, and
nothing in our position has changed. I guess you noticed that when I said
that our position hadn't changed; right, Charlie? I appreciate the
correction there.
QUESTION: Can I mop up on Korea a little bit, to just see if we and --
MR. RUBIN: Let's go right over here, and we'll finish that.
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. RUBIN: And we'll finish with Korea.
QUESTION: And just -- and "mopping up" also might be a good phrase for
Pakistan. Just for the average person out there who got a little bit lost
on your comments on Pakistan travel, what should the average person hear
from the State Department today about traveling to Pakistan?
MR. RUBIN: That Karachi, as we've said for two and a half years, is an
unstable place. We have issued a new travel warning, following the murders,
recommending Americans - I think I said this - defer non-essential travel
to Pakistan. That means, don't go unless you really have to.
QUESTION: Is the Albright trip essential? I don't mean that in any - I
mean, you know, we're thinking of not just the Secretary, there's a large
contingent going, a lot of people, sort of remembering, not drawing any
comparisons --
MR. RUBIN: We'll only go if we think it's necessary.
QUESTION: But I mean, there's business to do there that's essential?
MR. RUBIN: Correct. I think the United States has important interests in
India and Pakistan. This is an important part of the world. We have
important nonproliferation issues to deal with. Those are issues that
require high-level attention, and so we regard her trip as something that
ought to go forward.
Now, again, these warnings are put forward to those who don't have the
ability to have large security contingents. So the judgment that the
Secretary makes is different than a judgment an average American makes who
doesn't come with a security package that you've all seen, who have
traveled with the Secretary. So therefore, the judgments wouldn't be the
same that the Secretary makes as to how essential the trip needs to be for
her to go, as it would be for an average American without a security
package.
QUESTION: Let me try one, possibly, last try on Korea.
MR. RUBIN: You sure you don't want to do more on Pakistan?
QUESTION: I really want to - well --
MR. RUBIN: Go ahead.
QUESTION: I'm going to try to close the window on Korea. In any way, have
the North Koreans signaled the United States a new interest or a renewed
interest in getting these peace talks going?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: I mean, they're not coming here; you're not saying that.
MR. RUBIN: I said that we have another meeting to prepare for a possible
meeting next month; that we're increasingly optimistic that we will be able
to put together that plenary session next month, but it's not done yet. And
those who work on this issue and those of you who have heard State
Department spokesmen prematurely announce meetings know that we're always
going to be cautious until we've nailed down all the details.
QUESTION: Can you say where that preliminary meeting is going to be
held?
MR. RUBIN: In New York.
QUESTION: And the real meeting you would hope would be held in New York,
as well?
MR. RUBIN: In Geneva.
QUESTION: November 21.
MR. RUBIN: I believe that's what I told you before. I can go back and
check it for you.
QUESTION: No, no.
QUESTION: November 21 is the preliminary meeting, in hopes that it will
get going?
MR. RUBIN: As you know, we had a working level meeting among all four
parties in New York on November 10. Subsequent to that meeting, we have
made progress toward convening a preparatory meeting. What day the next
meeting is, I will get you for the record -- the time, the location and
what press arrangements there are.
QUESTION: But there will be this preparatory meeting to talk about the
plenary meeting in December?
MR. RUBIN: That's my understanding. I will get you a date and a
time.
QUESTION: Working-level meeting continuing until this weekend?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get you the details. There's always a lot of
contacts, but I'll get you the detail on the next meeting.
QUESTION: Thank you very much.
(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)
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