Visit the Greek-American Folklore Society (GAFS) Homepage Read the Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits (24 July 1923) Read the Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits (24 July 1923)
HR-Net - Hellenic Resources Network Compact version
Today's Suggestion
Read The "Macedonian Question" (by Maria Nystazopoulou-Pelekidou)
HomeAbout HR-NetNewsWeb SitesDocumentsOnline HelpUsage InformationContact us
Wednesday, 18 December 2024
 
News
  Latest News (All)
     From Greece
     From Cyprus
     From Europe
     From Balkans
     From Turkey
     From USA
  Announcements
  World Press
  News Archives
Web Sites
  Hosted
  Mirrored
  Interesting Nodes
Documents
  Special Topics
  Treaties, Conventions
  Constitutions
  U.S. Agencies
  Cyprus Problem
  Other
Services
  Personal NewsPaper
  Greek Fonts
  Tools
  F.A.Q.
 

U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #139, 97-09-22

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Monday, September 22, 1997

Briefer: James B. Foley

AFRICA
1-3		Rwanda: Details of Amb. Scheffer's trip/activities to
		  Central Africa, the Balkans, and  the Hague; Rwandan
		  tribunal effectiveness
3		Zaire: UN investigative team in Eastern Zaire; solution;
		  suspension of US aid

KOREA 3-4 North: Four-party talks breakdown; schedule of future talks; items discussed 4-6 flexibility of agenda; US view; proposed agenda in Geneva; categories; date of talks 6-8 food aid linkage; trilateral meetings planned; gesture to bring US and North Koreans back to negotiating table; reassessment of US policy; reassessment team to North Korea; date of departure; schedule of future working-level meetings 8 Kartman-Kim agreement reached Sept. 10,11; Chang case; Kim Jong II to take father's title; US view; effect on four-party talks 9 North and South Korea bilateral talks; aid package to the North

MIDDLE EAST 9 West Bank: recent closures of villages by Israelis; widespread arrests 9-11 Libya: Arab League communiqu ; pilgrimage flights unchecked by UN; exceptions; US expression of dismay; US options; US-Arab League diverging interests 12-13 Arafat's alleged ill health; fainting 11 Explanation of Hilliard's trip 11-14 Israel: caretakers at Ras al Amud; US compromise deal; student occupation; alleged US endorsement of maintaining status quo; Arafat's approval of agreement 14 Iraq: appeal to UN for return of planes from Iran

CYPRUS 14-15 Secretary's meeting with Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot Foreign Ministers; date; plans for a trilateral meeting; State Department's view

BOSNIA 15 Gelbard's attendance at service for victims of crash; identity of victims; Gelbard's return to US

JAPAN 16 Reports of North Korea deployment of missiles reaching Tokyo; deployment around Pyongyang DOD's review of anti-ballistic missile defenses; Tokyo's supposed request for US help in light of North Korean deployment

RUSSIA 16-17 Lebed's report on loss of nuclear weapons


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFF CAMERA BRIEFING

DPB #139

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1997 12:45 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. FOLEY: Good afternoon. As you know, the locus of our State Department daily briefing will be shifting to New York tomorrow. Our department spokesman, Jamie Rubin, is of course with the Secretary now in New York, and will be making himself available to cover the range of issues - foreign policy issues and also, of course, to report on the Secretary's many activities in New York.

Today, of course, the Secretary is assisting the President on his activities and his meetings and bilateral meetings in New York. So I'm going to take questions today from this podium on the range of issues of interest to you, but hereafter -- at least for this week and probably into the following week -- the locus of briefings will be, obviously, in New York.

I don't have any announcements, so I'll go right to your questions. George.

QUESTION: Could you tell us what David Scheffer is doing in Rwanda? And was that trip announced, or not?

MR. FOLEY: Well, it certainly was not a secret trip.

QUESTION: No, I'm not saying it was.

MR. FOLEY: I don't know that it was announced from the podium. But it was an extensive trip.

QUESTION: But did Steven Lee Myers just happen to be spending the weekend in Kigali? I notice he has a story from Rwanda about Ambassador Scheffer's activities. I'm just curious if the State Department had anything to do with that.

MR. FOLEY: Well, we can talk after the briefing, if you'd like, about any press details regarding this trip, if you'd like.

QUESTION: All right.

MR. FOLEY: But if you're interested, I can comment on his visit, which was a significant one. As you know, Ambassador Scheffer is the first incumbent in this newly-created and important position that was indeed created at the initiative of Secretary Albright to give meaning and substance to her long-standing commitment to pursue the issue of international war crimes, which is more and more a matter of international concern.

So Ambassador Scheffer embarked on this two-week trip to Central Africa, the Balkans and The Hague in order to introduce himself in his new capacity to officials of the two international criminal tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and also to relevant government and NGO officials, and to examine war crimes issues in these regions.

He reviewed the work of the Rwanda tribunal in Arusha and in Kigali. He concluded that it is back on track, following the highly critical UN Inspector General's report of earlier this year. However, he believes there is room for much continued improvement.

While in Burundi, Ambassador Scheffer explored with government officials how to take the next steps on their proposal for an international criminal tribunal to examine the massacres of 1993 and other atrocities in that country. Burundi officials should now have a clear understanding of what may be required.

In Kinshasa, Ambassador Scheffer met with the UN investigative team and explored in-depth the snags in the deployment of the team into the field. He made progress in clarifying what the problems are so the government and UN officials could explore next steps.

In Bosnia, he met with government, UNOHR, SFOR and NGO officials to discuss a range of war crimes issues. In Croatia, he met with Foreign Minister Granic, Serb authorities in Eastern Slavonia, and then he finished up his two-week tour in The Hague, where he met with the ICTY Chief Prosecutor Arbour, and he delivered a major address in the Peace Palace.

QUESTION: You said the Rwanda tribunal is back on track?

MR. FOLEY: Well, following the UN Inspector General's highly critical report, some changes and improvements were made on the ground. I spoke with Ambassador Scheffer this morning. Clearly, there is room for further improvements. He noted that some of the major senior figures who are alleged to have been involved in atrocities are in detention and awaiting trial. Some trials, apparently, have begun but are currently suspended. So he urged the tribunal authorities there to keep up with the improvements that they have managed to accomplish over the last months.

QUESTION: What are the improvements, specifically?

MR. FOLEY: I'd have to get that for you. I believe that there were serious internal difficulties. I'd have to refer you, really, to the UN Inspector General's report, which I haven't seen myself. But I understand that there were questions involving the management on the financial side. There are problems involving simple logistic capabilities and resources. And I think there were questions surrounding the overall direction and leadership of the effort, which, my understanding is, has improved, and he was able to verify that to his satisfaction.

But the process of getting on with the trials has been slow-moving, and I think that continues to be a problem, although Ambassador Scheffer is somewhat optimistic that on the trial front, that they may begin to accelerate their work.

QUESTION: What are the problems standing in the way of the UN investigative team for Eastern Zaire?

MR. FOLEY: It's a very simple problem. The government in Kinshasa has been obstructive to this date in meeting its commitments to allow the team to go forward and to do its work. It's very simple.

QUESTION: And does he have a simple solution?

MR. FOLEY: Well, as I believe Mr. Rubin reported on Friday, our ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador Richardson, has had a couple of telephone conversations with President Kabila last week. My understanding is that the impasse continues, following their last conversation.

If I can quote the protocol that was signed by the Congolese Government and the UN in July, it stipulates some very specific undertakings on the part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. And I quote, "the DROC commits itself specifically to guarantee free access to anyplace within the national territory of the DROC that the mission would like to visit, and guarantees free access to all sources of information within the national territory."

Quite clearly, the government has been thus far unable or unwilling to meet the terms of that very clear-cut commitment.

QUESTION: And in the meantime, any US aid to Zaire is suspended; is that right?

MR. FOLEY: Well, our assistance to the new Congolese Government is contingent upon, and is directly linked to, among other things, the government's willingness to abide by its commitments regarding the investigation of alleged war crimes on its territory. And that certainly has not changed.

Yes.

QUESTION: Another subject?

MR. FOLEY: Anything more on Africa or on war crimes?

QUESTION: The four-party preparatory talks ended on Friday without achieving an agenda. Can you give us an idea of what the problems were between the parties; and if there's another set of talks scheduled in the future?

MR. FOLEY: Well, the answer to your second question is no; although we agreed that discussions on the initiative could continue through working level channels in New York. But if the question is, is the United States prepared to show up for another round of preparatory talks absent a real evidence on the part of North Korea that it's willing to come to New York to negotiate seriously, then I think we're not likely to be scheduling any such talks in the immediate future.

We remain committed to the principle of the talks, and especially to the very important goals we hope to achieve through the talks, leading to a stabilization and hopefully a permanent peaceful settlement on the Korean Peninsula. But our negotiators, while committed to the talks and willing to go the extra mile to make them succeed, are not going to waste their time. So we will await indications on the part of North Korea that they are indeed willing to come and reach agreements.

Now, as to the specifics, what happened in New York last week - it's pretty simple. The DPRK insisted on a direct linkage between food assistance and negotiations. Secondly, they also remained inflexible in the effort to achieve a mutually agreeable agenda. They demanded, as you know from previous rounds, a specific and concrete agenda for the plenary talks, while the other three sides had agreed during the last round that a more general agenda - allowing each participant to raise any relevant issue - was more practical. The DPRK agenda items - including discussion of the withdrawal of US troops - would, in our view, prejudge the results of the plenary talks before the negotiations began.

We made a good faith effort in New York over several days. The United States probed for flexibility and found none. We engaged in two days of extensive discussions in an effort to seek common ground. But as I indicated, the North Korean side made no attempt to seek common ground with the other parties. It was clear that they came to New York unable to make progress.

QUESTION: Do you have a sense, then, that there is any flexibility at all in the position? I mean, coming into these talks, these same items were held over from the previous round. At least it's my understanding the North Koreans were demanding that the withdrawal of US troops be on the agenda and for a very specific agenda. Why did the US and the other participants think that this particular round might provide them with a breakthrough, when the first one didn't?

MR. FOLEY: Maybe it will take the next round to determine that. But on the issue of flexibility, I think the important factor is for the North Koreans to understand that on our side, there is no flexibility on these two major points of contention.

On the issue of food aid, the question is not whether or not the United States is willing to provide food aid and respond to the urgent humanitarian crisis that has been unfolding in North Korea. Our record on that is clear. But we refuse linkage -- and they know this -- between the four-party talks and the provision of food aid, which is a humanitarian issue for us. Again, our record has been one that we can be proud of, in terms of reflecting the American people's commitment to helping other people around the world in time of crisis and in time of need.

As for the agenda item problem, we're not saying that these issues of concern to the North Koreans cannot be addressed in the four-party talks. They will be free to raise their concerns and their issues, and that's what the negotiation is all about. What we will not do, though - and on this, again, the question is the North Korean side understanding the firmness of our position - but what we will not do is place the specific items as specific agenda items. Rather, under a general rubric, we believe that all sides will be free to raise whatever issues of concern they wish to.

But to place those as discrete agenda items would, in our view, tend to prejudge the outcome of the negotiations. The negotiations are for negotiating, and we want to preserve the integrity of the negotiating process.

Sid.

QUESTION: What sort of sign are you looking for from the North Koreans that they are ready to be flexible?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I couldn't predict what sign would be helpful and convincing. I think what will be helpful and convincing is when they come back to New York and sit down and agree to move to the plenary talks in Geneva.

I understand your question, what, as we're sitting in Washington and as they are sitting in Pyongyang, we will need in order to agree to send our negotiators back to New York. I couldn't say. But diplomatic channels are open; we will continue to meet at the working level in New York. If we see a sign of a change of heart on their side, then we will be very willing to go back to New York and to complete the preparatory round.

QUESTION: They've got to do more than just agree to another round of high-level talks?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I'd hesitate to speak on behalf of our Korea experts and to prejudge our negotiating position. But I would be surprised if we agreed to go back to New York absent a firm indication on the North Korean party's side that they are willing to come to agreement at a next round to permit the four-party plenary talks to begin six weeks hence in Geneva.

Yes, in the back.

QUESTION: I know this may have been said from this podium before, but could you just say again how specific is the US willing to be on this agenda for the talks in Geneva?

MR. FOLEY: Well, it has been stated, I think, a number of times from the podium that we and the other two parties to the talks, the Chinese and the South Koreans, are in agreement that it should be a general agenda without enumerating specific components thereof.

QUESTION: Are there any categories that you can say that you are willing to discuss?

MR. FOLEY: Again, each side in the plenary talks, under a general agenda item, would be able to raise any issue that it wished to raise.

QUESTION: You're saying that the talks are going to begin in six weeks?

MR. FOLEY: Well, the agreement reached at the last round of the preparatory talks was that once the preparatory phase was completed - and we failed to complete it last week - but once it was completed, that the plenary talks would begin six weeks from that date in Geneva. They agreed on a number of sort of modalities surrounding the talks - logistics issues and things of that nature.

Yes. I'm sorry, Jim, yeah.

QUESTION: On the food linkage problem, I may be missing something here, but I would think it would be to the advantage of the North Koreans not to link food aid and political considerations. In other words, they get the food aid on its merits, without any encumbering linkage. Do you have any insight as to why they insist on a linkage, apparently against their own interests?

MR. FOLEY: I couldn't put it better myself, Jim. It is a curious position they've taken because, at the same time, they've indicated, I think, openly that they oppose the notion of food aid being used as a political weapon or a vehicle of leverage over the negotiations themselves. To make that point and yet, on the other hand, to insist on food aid, themselves, directly linked to progress in the four-party talks is a contradiction. You're absolutely right.

QUESTION: And you don't understand what their --

MR. FOLEY: No.

QUESTION: Do you have any trilateral meetings planned, as you did last week?

MR. FOLEY: Well, we met trilaterally because the negotiators were all present in New York at that level. Of course, they've all gone home on their respective sides.

Our delegations in New York can continue to meet - that channel remains open. Whether they would meet in a three-way manner, I couldn't tell you.

Yes.

QUESTION: You had mentioned that you're waiting for the North Koreans to make some type of gesture before you go back to the table. Today the North Koreans said that they're expecting the United States to make some type of gesture before this progress can move on. With that, it obviously appears we're at a stalemate. Is there any chance of reassessing? Are you looking to reassessing this policy? And if not, how long do you plan on going on before reassessment of the policy takes place?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I wouldn't want to get ahead of ourselves, but I'm certainly not aware of any reassessment taking place on our part. I think I was fairly clear on that, in answer to a similar question a few minutes ago.

What we maintain in these talks is not really very demanding or onerous. Again, on the issue of food aid, we have always been there when the World Food Program for example, has launched an appeal to us to provide food aid. Our record is clear. Again, we look forward in Geneva, if and when we get there, to discussing the broad range of issues of concern to all parties, including North Korea.

So I think the question has to be directed to them. If they are serious about moving forward in the relationship, about moving forward towards peace on the Korean Peninsula, and towards making the four-party talks happen, then they're going to have to realize that we are firm in our positions and that we want to sit down and negotiate. They are going to have to make a decision as to whether they're willing to participate in that process and to carry it forward.

We think that it is in their interest to make this process succeed. We think they believe that it's in their interest to make the process succeed. Therefore, we are not pessimistic that we will get to successful completion of the preparatory talks and get to Geneva for the plenary talks.

So I think that we're talking here about negotiating tactics. Certainly, that's the assumption that we would like to hold -- that these are negotiating tactics and that the North Koreans will realize that it's important to move beyond this stage and to get to Geneva.

QUESTION: UESTION: Jim, do the Americans have the team -- the food assessment team still going to North Korea?

MR. FOLEY: That's my understanding, certainly.

QUESTION: UESTION: When do they leave?

MR. FOLEY: I don't have that.

QUESTION: UESTION: Could you take that?

MR. FOLEY: Yeah, sure.

Patrick.

QUESTION: UESTION: Is there a working-level meeting scheduled in the near future, between your side and the North Koreans?

MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware that we have one that's coming up in the next days, but that channel remains open. I wouldn't be surprised if our delegations do meet in the near future, but I don't have any specific announcement.

More on Korea.

QUESTION: UESTION: Yes, North Korea.

MR. FOLEY: Yes.

QUESTION: UESTION: Jim, it is said the US Government and North Korea reached some agreement in Peking, September 10 and 11, between Mr. Kartman and Mr. Kim Gye Gwan. And also - it's actually five items - and also it is said that the US and North Korea have agreed not to send Ambassador Chang to South Korea. Do you have any comment about that agreement?

MR. FOLEY: I have no comment on details of either the Chang case or our private diplomatic conversations on that subject. We will handle the Chang case as we have other cases of this nature, in accordance with domestic and international law. Persons in the United States are normally free to travel, if they wish to do so, subject to the normal requirements of US law.

Yes.

QUESTION: UESTION: Apparently, Kim Chong Il is going to take his father's title in the next months. So what is the US Government view on that, his assumption of his father's title? Do you basically welcome the assumption?

MR. FOLEY: It's our understanding that a provincial party conference in South Pyongyang province was held on Sunday. The conference discussed and approved a recommendation that Kim Chong Il become General Secretary of the Korean Workers Party. We believe that this is the first public step in the final phase of the political succession that would end with Mr. Kim becoming general secretary of the party.

The completion of this process would be a largely symbolic step, since we believe that Mr. Kim has exercised ultimate authority in the DPRK since his father's death.

QUESTION: UESTION: Do you think his assumption would be, you know - good effect to the four-party talks, or see any connection of that?

MR. FOLEY: I couldn't say. It's always very difficult to analyze internal developments in North Korea, given the opacity of the system. But we hope, as I said a few minutes go, that the authorities in North Korea will affirm their interests and the interests that we jointly share with all parties in the preparatory talks to make them succeed and to move to Geneva.

Bill.

QUESTION: UESTION: Pardon me if this was already asked, Jim, but in the talks Thursday and Friday, did the North and the South have any kind of formal or informal bilateral talks? And second, did the South offer some kind of an aid package to the North?

MR. FOLEY: Not to my knowledge. We met trilaterally, of course, with the North and South Koreans at one point - I believe it was on Thursday. But in answer to your specific question, not to my knowledge.

Howard.

QUESTION: I'd like to do a different subject. There have been closures of villages in the West Bank by the Israelis, widespread arrests. Do you have any information or comment about that?

MR. FOLEY: Well, we note that the Israelis continue efforts at finding those responsible for the recent spate of suicide bombings. We are not fully aware of the details of what took place, apparently, near Nablus. The arrests over the weekend were in Zone B, in which Israel maintains ultimate security control. But I don't have a lot for you on that because the details, I think, are still emerging.

QUESTION: The Middle East?

MR. FOLEY: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: The Arab League is seemingly trying to soften the embargo on Libya, allowing flights over the 21 states of the league for special occasion. Do you have any comment on that?

MR. FOLEY: Well, we are deeply disturbed by what appears to be the Arab League's call for actions which would violate the sanctions. The Arab League communiqu urged Arab states to "take steps to ease the toughness" of sanctions against Libya. It appears to advocate actions which would violate UN Security Council sanctions against Libya.

Clearly, the Libyan regime continues to defy the will of the international community by refusing to comply with UN Security Council resolutions imposed because of Libya's responsibility in the bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772.

The bottom line is that the perpetrators of these acts must be brought to justice, as is called for in the relevant Security Council resolutions. The sanctions provide for legitimate, humanitarian flights to Libya. Libya has fully adequate means to meet its needs. Medical flights and flights carrying those making the Haj are routinely approved. There is no need for changes for this program, and certainly no excuse for violating its provisions.

We must not lose sight of the real issue, which is Libya's involvement in terrorism; specifically its failure to deliver for trial those responsible for 279 deaths in the Pan Am 103 bombing.

Yes.

QUESTION: Last spring they allowed or did not allow but flights took place for pilgrimage and the United Nations didn't really act on it. Do you think this set up a situation where Libya is going to test the water even more?

MR. FOLEY: Well, again, there are provisions within the sanctions law for allowing certain humanitarian flights to address humanitarian needs in Libya. And as you indicated, flights carrying those making the Haj have occurred and they have been approved. I'm not aware of the specific incident you mention. I think that it does predate my arrival here. But I think the Arab League action is perhaps one that needs to continue to be analyzed. As you should note, I stressed the word "appear".

If what the Arab League was referring to was the issue of pre-approved flights by the United Nations and allowed for actions that were within the framework of the sanctions and that were approved by the UN, that would be a different matter. If it indicated a willingness on anyone's part to subvert those sanctions and the mechanisms that enforce them, then we would be, I think, more than disturbed, as I said. We would be truly dismayed.

QUESTION: UESTION: What are you going to do to reverse it?

MR. FOLEY: To reverse what, Sid?

QUESTION: UESTION: This action. I mean, how are you going to express your dismay?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I've just done so from the podium. I've also indicated that the operative consequences of the Arab League declaration are unclear. They have just made the communiqu declaration. We'll be watching to see what people do.

QUESTION: UESTION: What array of options are you considering if they go ahead? I mean, as I understand it, they are going to allow Qadhafi landing rights, and any other officials of the government on official business, in their nations. That's part of what they said. They said they should not be encumbered by these sanctions. Are you going to shoot them down? Are you going to put sanctions on the countries that allow him? Are you going to go to the UN Security Council?

MR. FOLEY: Well, Sid, you know, it's hypothetical, so it's perilous to predict what might happen, what we might do, and it's probably unwise to tip our hand. But we're not there yet. This was just a communiqu declaration. As I indicated, we intend to hold all members of the United Nations to support the resolutions and the sanctions that are mandated under them. Clearly, if there were violations of the kind that you mention, it would be a matter for the immediate attention of the Security Council. I wouldn't say anything beyond that, though.

QUESTION: UESTION: Are you worried that there are, again, diverging interests between the Arab League states and the US? That their support for someone who is a strong opponent to the peace process begins to peel them away from the US, in terms of having a common interest?

MR. FOLEY: I'm not sure. I think you'd have to ask your colleagues in the region to talk to some of the countries that were represented there. It's possible that they were merely indicating some sense of sympathy for the people of Libya. As I said, we believe that the humanitarian needs of the Libyan people can be met through existing mechanisms. If that's all it was, then we probably won't hear much more about the issue, but we'll have to see.

I would note, also, I believe the Arab League's communiqu referenced the Secretary's recent visit to the Middle East in positive terms. So I wouldn't say that this is a sign of any divergence from our overall perspective. Clearly, the Secretary minced no words, has not, before, during and after her trip, about the crisis of confidence that exists in the region. It is serious, and that's why it is so imperative to begin to build steps that restore confidence in the prospects for negotiations and for peace. No doubt about it.

Yes, in the back.

QUESTION: UESTION: Yes.

MR. FOLEY: Are we still on - I'm sorry, are you still on the Middle East?

QUESTION: Almost. It's Cyprus and Greece-Turkey.

MR. FOLEY: Well, that's a matter of debate.

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR. FOLEY: We'll get to you, though.

QUESTION: Have you looked at all any further into the visit of Congressman Hilliard into Libya? Have you been in touch with him? Do you know why he went?

MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware that we've been in further touch with him. I'd simply refer you to his office for an explanation as to why he made that visit. I have no information or comment on it.

Howard.

QUESTION: How are the caretakers doing at Ras Al Amoud? Are they taking good care of the property?

MR. FOLEY: I don't have that information for you, Howard. I'll take that as an innocent question.

QUESTION: Israeli opposition leaders are complaining that --

MR. FOLEY: I'm sorry Israeli --

QUESTION: Opposition figures.

MR. FOLEY: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: Some parliamentarians are complaining that the Netanyahu Government either hoodwinked the US in this compromise deal, or that the US sort of knowingly, eyes open went along with it. They are quite critical. They say that - they maintain that it's a bad deal. Do you have any comment on that?

MR. FOLEY: Well, we have candid and productive relations with the government of Israel. Our government received explicit assurances from the Israeli Government concerning the disposition of that case. You're familiar with them, because Mr. Rubin, himself, was rather explicit about them on Friday - namely that the families who left the house will not be permitted to return; that there will be no construction in the neighborhood; and that therefore - and here's the critical point - the nature of the neighborhood will not change now or over time.

So we trust those assurances.

QUESTION: I think one of the areas that --

MR. FOLEY: But obviously, it's something to watch over time.

QUESTION: One of the areas the critics are seizing on, I guess, since then, is the assertion that they're not domiciled there -- that the students are not actually living there. They complain that they are staying there overnight and therefore, what's the difference? They don't see a distinction.

MR. FOLEY: Well, certainly the Prime Minister faced a tough issue last week. I think Mr. Rubin covered the ground rather extensively, and I'm not going to attempt to go over that same ground again today.

We received specific and explicit assurances, and we trust that those commitments will be implemented now and over time. So we'll have to wait and see.

QUESTION: Just getting back to the Arab League meeting. Apparently Yasser Arafat fell ill during the meeting. I'm wondering if you made any inquiries about his health - the seriousness of this.

MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware that we made any inquiries. I saw something indicating that he may have fainted at the occasion. Perhaps the level of debate was -

(Laughter)

I hesitate to characterize, but the temperature may have been at high levels.

QUESTION: So you're not concerned?

MR. FOLEY: No, we're not.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: Back on the neighborhood, the Ras - I'm having a hard time understanding your position. You say that the nature of the neighborhood has not changed, when in fact it has because an apartment house full of Palestinians is now an apartment house full of Yeshiva students. What I don't understand is why you all are endorsing this deal as maintaining the status quo - something that the Secretary repeatedly asked for - when in fact, it doesn't maintain the status quo; it reverses the status quo and allows Moskowitz's and the Israeli Government's sort of ham-handed compromise to stand.

MR. FOLEY: Well, I don't think, first of all, that we've endorsed anything. We received assurances concerning the nature of the disposition of the problem and of the building and of the people who had gone and moved in there and who have now moved out. We've been told they will not move back in there, and have now moved out. We have been told they will not move back in, that there will be no construction, and that the status quo will stand, and that nothing will happen that will change that.

Now, you can get into a whole labyrinth of questions involving the law that governs property there. We have said that, for us, it is indeed not so much a question of law that is paramount at this critical time, given the overall situation in the Middle East, but one of what contributes to recreating the climate of trust and confidence that we need to move forward if there's to be hope of political progress leading to peace.

So we can parse and analyze the specifics, as you are inviting me to do, but I'm not going to do it. I think that we are going to watch what happens there, and if the status quo remains and does not change, I think then we'll be able to continue our efforts to create the kind of climate that we need to get negotiations going again.

QUESTION: UESTION: You mean the new status quo now, with the Yeshiva students? I mean, the status quo was, there were three Palestinian families living there.

MR. FOLEY: I'm not going to get into that, because there are issues involving property and sale and things of that nature, and I'm just not going to get into them. We're concerned that the event of people, families moving in, has been reversed. I'm just not prepared to say anything more about it at this stage.

Yes.

QUESTION: UESTION: Just one thing more. Did you run this compromise by Arafat prior to it being made public? Is this something he signaled to you that he could live with?

MR. FOLEY: Not to my knowledge.

QUESTION: UESTION: Not to your knowledge.

QUESTION: UESTION: But you're not real - (inaudible)?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I'm just saying, not to my knowledge, Sid.

QUESTION: UESTION: Right.

QUESTION: UESTION: Another subject?

MR. FOLEY: Yes.

QUESTION: UESTION: One last question on the Middle East.

MR. FOLEY: Howard, then we'll go into the back.

QUESTION: UESTION: Iraq is apparently appealing to the UN to get its planes back from Iran. Do you have any comment on that -- the planes that were flown there during the --

MR. FOLEY: No comment.

Yes.

QUESTION: UESTION: Yes. Secretary Albright, according to schedule, will meet Greek, Turkish and Cyprus foreign ministers on Wednesday. Before that, I know the American side has a desire to prepare some kind of Madrid-like meeting with the Greek, Turkish and US foreign ministers all together. Did you get any assurance or positive sign from the Turkish or Greek side, Greek foreign minister, on this meeting?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I'm not sure that your assumptions are correct. We've handled this question at least a couple of times over the last week or so, and have stated that there were no plans for a trilateral meeting. I'm not aware that that has changed. The Secretary is meeting with her counterparts, as you indicated, this week; but again, I'm not aware of plans afoot for a trilateral meeting.

If we believe that such a meeting could be productive, along the lines of what was achieved in Madrid, I suppose we would be looking at it. But I'm not aware that the Secretary's schedule has changed in that regard.

QUESTION: UESTION: Can I follow up, though?

MR. FOLEY: Yes.

QUESTION: UESTION: By your own, I suppose, admission, the reason such a trilateral meeting is not planned is because there is no conviction in the State Department that it would be of any use?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I wouldn't want to credit the thesis more than it merits at this point, and to read more into this. When we've had trilateral meetings, they've been exceptional events. It's not every day that we hold trilateral meetings. We're engaged in, obviously, concerted diplomacy with all the parties in the Eastern Mediterranean. We're trying to make progress everywhere we can and on all occasions.

But to my knowledge, the Secretary's schedule has not changed in that regard.

QUESTION: When is the Clerides-Denktash meeting?

MR. FOLEY: I believe it's on Friday.

QUESTION: Friday?

MR. FOLEY: Yeah.

QUESTION: So that's firm now?

MR. FOLEY: I believe so, yes.

QUESTION: Just a quick one on Bosnia. Over the weekend, Ambassador Gelbard was to attend that service on Saturday. There was some talk on Friday that when he returned, he might be accompanying the bodies of the five Americans who were killed in the helicopter crash. Do you know if he was able to do that? And have they been identified?

MR. FOLEY: I think that's been, sadly, a very slow process. My information is that the remains of Mr. Marvin Padgett are being flown home to his family in Tampa, Florida, but that work continues on identifying the remains of the other victims.

There will be a memorial service in Washington at a future date, after the remaining victims have been identified.

QUESTION: Did he go over and back?

MR. FOLEY: I think he's coming back today.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. FOLEY: Bill.

QUESTION: One more, Jim, this is Korea with a link to Japan.

MR. FOLEY: We're going back to Asia, Bill?

QUESTION: We're going to Asia, all right. I think this is more important for Japan. But do you have a reaction to the report that Reuters has issued from Tokyo that a US military satellite detected North Korean deployment of Nodong I ballistic missiles, capable of reaching Tokyo? These are apparently about 700, 800 mile missiles. And there's another report that says that there are ten launchers have been deployed, seen on the surface for these missiles, somewhere around Pyongyang.

MR. FOLEY: Well, as you know, we do not comment on alleged intelligence reports. North Korea's missile proliferation activities are of great concern to the United States, and have been addressed at the US-North Korean missile talks.

Our Deputy Assistant Secretary, Mr. Einhorn, the other day was speaking to the Korea Society, and he did note that North Korea is in the advanced stage of developing the Nodong missile, with a 1,000-plus kilometer range. We believe they are in the early stages of developing longer-range missiles.

But again, as to the specific report, I just can't comment on it.

QUESTION: With regard to Japan, a Defense Department expert last week said that there was very intense review going on in Japan regarding anti-ballistic missile defenses for Japan, especially, I think, Tokyo. Has the US got anything on the shelf that we're offering? Or have we been asked by the Japanese for some help in this regard?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I believe that the issue of missile defense is one that is on the agenda in our relations with Japan. It's an important issue. But I don't have anything I can report to you today on the state of play in that regard.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: On Russia --

MR. FOLEY: Just one more, Sid. Yes.

QUESTION: Can you comment on this report from Russia that according to an ex-aide of President Yeltsin is saying that portable nuclear weapons might be lost. This is something Alexander Lebed had said before. The United States said, I think, there was no confirmation that there was this random loss of nuclear weapons. Do you have anything on that?

MR. FOLEY: I have nothing new to say in that regard. I could get to you what we said at the time when the Lebed report surfaced. But it remains the case that we have no confirmation.

Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)


U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article
Back to Top
Copyright © 1995-2023 HR-Net (Hellenic Resources Network). An HRI Project.
All Rights Reserved.

HTML by the HR-Net Group / Hellenic Resources Institute, Inc.
std2html v1.01a run on Monday, 22 September 1997 - 23:57:02 UTC