U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #115, 97-08-12
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1002
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Tuesday, August 12, 1997
Briefer: James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS
1 Available on Cambodia and Lithuania
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
1 Amb Ross Rpt to the Secretary on New Mechanisms on
Obtaining Security Cooperation / Readout on Mtgs / Travel
Plans
1-2 Steps Taken to Encourage Security Cooperation
2-3 Description of New Procedural Mechanisms / US Role /
Participants
3 Secretary's Trip to Region
4-6 MEPFA Expires / Suspension of PLO Office in Washington /
Continuing Contacts
5,6 US Assistance to Palestinians / Certification
6-7 Settlement of Klinghoffer Lawsuit / Italian Cooperation
RUSSIA / SYRIA
3-4 Rpt of Russian Offer to Update Syrian Military Hardware
MEXICO
7 Gov Weld Activities at State Dept / Secy Contacts with Sen
Helms
8 Political Scandals and Narco-Traffickers / Military
Involvement / Juarez Cartel Arrests / Indications of
Becoming Narco-Democracy
IRAN
9-10 UN Amb Kamal Kharrazi Named Foreign Minister / Areas of US
Concern in Relationship
IRAQ
10 Allegations of Blocking Food, Medicine Acquisitions
SERBIA / BOSNIA / CROATIA
10-12 US Position on Opposition Participation in Serbia Election /
Milosevic Response
12 Greek Extends of Line of Credit
12-13,14-15 Amb Holbrooke, Amb Gelbard Recent & Future Trips / US Options
13-14 Link Between NATO Enlargement & Maintaining Troops in Bosnia
Amb Holbrooke's Rpt to Secretary
CAMBODIA
15-16 ASEAN to Remain Engaged / King Sihanouk's Rptd Abdication /
US Position
BOLIVIA
16 Request for Extradition of Col. Luiz Arce Gomez
KOREA
16 WFP Reports on Drought / US Food Aid
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #115
TUESDAY, AUGUST 12, 1997 12:35 P.M
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. We have two statements today that will be posted --
one on Cambodia, and one on Lithuania.
Let's go straight to questions. Barry Schweid.
QUESTION: Dennis and the Middle East. What's this little change now on
when he might be done? And also, there was some easing of the economic
restrictions, and he was quoted as saying they should be - it's counterproductive
to have restrictions unless they deal with security. Could you enlighten us,
what kind of restrictions have to do with security and which don't?
MR. RUBIN: Let me take your first question. Dennis Ross, Ambassador Ross,
reported in to the Secretary a few hours ago and indicated that he was
encouraged that there were a series of meetings that have taken place in
the last 24 hours that involved new mechanisms for obtaining the kind of
security cooperation that we believe is necessary to fight terrorism and
ensure the minimum security required for the peace process to be able
to resume in full.
He regarded the meetings as concrete, focused, and very practical. That is
not to say that we've reached any new threshold. It is to say that we now
have some mechanisms, and the Secretary is more encouraged today than
yesterday. Now the focus is on results, results, results. That will be the
test of whether this new mechanism and these meetings will prove fruitful.
As far as his travel plans are concerned, my understanding is, he will stay
overnight and have some meetings tomorrow, and then fly back to the United
States.
With regard to closure and the steps that the Israelis have taken to try to
encourage, in their view, better cooperation on security, we have taken the
view that there are some measures that are related to security that are
understandable. When a country has gone through the trauma of a terrorist
bombing like the one that Israel went through on July the 30th, there are
others that seem more punitive to us and, therefore, are counterproductive.
An example of that would be the funds that have been withheld, the VAT, the
taxes that the Palestinian Authority thinks it is supposed to get,
and we think that doesn't promote better security cooperation. So
we've made that clear.
As you know, in conversations with the Secretary that have been followed up
with Ambassador Ross, Prime Minister Netanyahu has said that, as the
security cooperation improves, the steps that they have taken will be
eased. So we're hopeful that if the results start coming in from this new
mechanism - and again, what they are focusing on there is not only who is
responsible for the July 30th bombing, but also what steps they can take to
ensure that it doesn't happen again. In short, we're hopeful that if the
meetings cause concrete results to occur that some of the problems
the Palestinians have had with these steps will ease up. But we've
regarded them as counterproductive, and we still do regard them as
counterproductive.
QUESTION: What's a mechanism? The Secretary was very clear in her speech
what she wanted done. She wanted the infrastructure torn down. She wanted
people put in prison without revolving doors. What's a mechanism? Is that
another committee?
MR. RUBIN: Well, it's not a committee; it's a procedural device. When
you've had a breakdown in cooperation and you've had no meetings and you've
had no real provision of information, you try to find a way to rebuild the
cooperation between the people. Basically, what this boils down to is
Palestinians and Israelis communicating with each other the information
that each of them has. It means Palestinians convincing Israelis that they
are taking all the reasonable steps they can take.
So this is procedural, but usually before we have breakthroughs in the
Middle East or anywhere, you have to have a procedural device to get people
talking, to transmit information. So this is not a breakthrough, but it is
encouraging that a mechanism has been found, and now we're going to look
for results, results, results.
Yes, Steve.
QUESTION: Jamie, this procedural mechanism, if we can join the two, is
that an American official? And if so, at what level?
MR. RUBIN: We have, in the past, been involved in trying to assist in
this process. It's very difficult, in the area of security, to get too
detailed from the podium about what that specific mechanism is. All I can
say is that the professionals -- the people who know what needs to be done
to find out who is responsible, the people who know what needs to be done
to deter and, hopefully, prevent an action like that from recurring --
have been meeting in what Ambassador Ross regarded as a very practical,
very concrete and very serious way.
But again, these are meetings, and the test will come when the meetings
yield results -- when they meet again and they check the box for four
things that happened in the first meeting, and they move to the next four
in the next meeting. So that's what we're going to have to wait for.
Yes.
QUESTION: Taking that further, the mechanism is direct Palestinian-
Israeli communication?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: There hasn't been?
MR. RUBIN: Again, it's very difficult to get into detail on the specifics
of who is doing the meeting. In order to achieve results, there has to be
an agreement on what the goals are and how they will be judged, what the
problems are and how they will be fixed. That requires experts, and that's
what's been going on.
Yes.
QUESTION: Jamie, will the type of American presence that has been there
for these meetings, excluding Dennis, be present as part of this future
mechanism?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think we quite see it that way. Again, it's very
difficult because for a variety of reasons -- the sensitivity of who meets,
when they meet, what they're talking about -- is something you don't want
the enemies of peace to know about and know who's doing what and when. But
what I'm trying to signal - however successfully or unsuccessfully - is
that Ambassador Ross and the Secretary believe that procedurally, things
are much better today than they were yesterday. There are now procedures,
mechanisms - not dramatically new mechanisms with dramatically new
committees or anything like that - but the kind of meetings and the kind of
discussions that, if the goodwill is there, is the way to get to this
progress.
QUESTION: Jamie?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Since these are a lot of green signs, maybe you could say signs
of progress, is the Secretary even more encouraged that her trip will
indeed happen at the end of the month? Has a date --
MR. RUBIN: We do not have a date. When we have a date, I can assure you
it will be the first thing I report on when I get the question on the
Middle East. So we don't have a date.
To the extent that the discussions over the last 24 hours that we hope to
continue today, yield results, the trip becomes highly likely. For now,
we're more encouraged today than yesterday.
Yes.
QUESTION: There's a report that Russia has offered to upgrade Syrian
military hardware. Russia was, of course, the supplier. Have you seen it?
And is that a destabilizing factor?
MR. RUBIN: I have not seen that specific report. I don't know which
particular weapons it refers to.
QUESTION: Tanks. T-55 tanks.
MR. RUBIN: There have been reports in the past of such Russian sales. We
generally take the view that our cooperation with Russia on conventional
arms sales is designed to see that destabilizing sales don't go forward. I
would have to ask the experts to get a specific answer for you on whether
we think this report is real, whether it's a signal that there's more to
come, and what the effect on the regional balance would be before
we could make a declaration like that. However, Syria is a state
on the terrorist list and we don't particularly see any reason why it
should get more weapons.
Yes.
QUESTION: On MEPFA - the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act expires
today. Can you tell us how will this affect your contact with the PLO,
especially their office here in Washington?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. The suspension of the PLO office here is required by law,
given the lapse of the legislation. We regard compliance with our law, and
we take it very seriously. We've made our views known to the PLO representative.
A letter was sent to him by our Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic
Security, Eric Boswell, explaining what would be required. Essentially,
it suspends operations of the office. We think that's a problem. We
consulted with Congress before they left to try to get an extension. We
weren't successful, and we'll work with Congress in the future.
In the meantime, as is evident from what's going on in the Middle East, we
will continue to have contacts with the Palestinian Authority in pursuit of
the peace process. We do not provide financial assistance to the PLO or
direct budget support to the Palestinian Authority. The bulk of our
assistance is for projects which directly benefit the Palestinian people,
and which advance good governance in general. So we will continue our
efforts to try to show the people in the Palestinian Authority the benefits
of peace, and we will continue our diplomatic efforts in the region. But as
far as the office is concerned, it's in suspension. It will be in
suspension --
QUESTION: Do you have any contacts with them?
MR. RUBIN: We believe that we can have diplomatic contact with representatives
of the Palestinian Authority.
QUESTION: Can you tell us if it's the office that ceases to function?
MR. RUBIN: It goes into suspension.
QUESTION: Closes the door, right. But I mean, that's the only --
MR. RUBIN: For example, the letterhead has to change and the way in which
the phone is answered has to change.
QUESTION: But they can keep it open?
MR. RUBIN: I suspect they'll still be going to work, but not at the PLO
office.
QUESTION: Will it be the same, Jamie?
MR. RUBIN: And they'll probably be going to work at the same address.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Do you have a dollar figure on how much aid is affected by
this? We asked last week.
MR. RUBIN: Yeah. Again, I will try to get that for you. The aid people
resist mightily dollar figures, for fear of misuse and misunderstanding by
Congress as a result of failure by people like me to explain it clearly.
But I will try to get you an answer. Again, the bulk of our assistance -
the hundreds of millions of dollars that we've provided in the last couple
of years and will continue to provide - is not going to - is something we
want to be able to continue because it doesn't go through the Palestinian
Authority. It goes through private voluntary organizations. But I will try
to get you a specific number.
Mr. Foley, can we work on that today - getting a specific number?
QUESTION: Jamie, he's just taking the name off the door. It sounds like
you're sort of winking. First, you began by telling us how you're a firm
believer in the law of the land. And you end up with a smile on your face
about just taking the title off the door and the same folks go there and do
business.
(Laughter.)
If they do that - I'm not sure they're going to do that; they may have to
use their own telephone. But if they do that, how does that - is that in
the spirit of the congressional act? Would the U.S. approve of that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we try to --
QUESTION: What if they just call themselves, you know, the Peace Process
Institution? Would it be all right with you if they keep in business?
MR. RUBIN: Barry, what we try to do here in the briefing room is provide
a little bit of brevity and a little bit of levity so that we can get
through the day. But as far as us taking this law seriously, we take it
seriously.
There are people all over the world who have fought and died to be able to
call themselves a representative of an organization. The fact that they are
suspended from calling themselves the PLO Washington office, I suspect,
means a lot to them; and it's a very significant act.
Any attempt to bring a little levity to the briefing room will be modified
in the future by the possibility of sending the wrong signal.
QUESTION: Well, you understand the origin of it?
MR. RUBIN: Yeah.
QUESTION: So we don't have to go over that. It's because the PLO is
considered a terrorist organization, under U.S. law. The waiver has been
lifted now. And if you think, as you said in this, that we thought Congress
should have extended it, why didn't the President certify? Was he unable to
- if he wasn't able to certify, then the office can't stay open. And if he
was able to certify, why didn't he do it?
MR. RUBIN: We tried to work on an extension. We were unsuccessful in that
regard. Because we were unsuccessful in being able to convince Congress to
extend the law and avoid its lapse, we did not address the issue of a
certification. A certification is based on a number of judgments. They're
judgments that are made over time. We don't make them lightly, and we don't
make them unless we are faced with the decision. So if the law is extended
and we want to employ its tools, then we will face the question of
a certification; we'll approach it very seriously and we'll, of course,
report to you the results of any judgment we make.
Yes.
QUESTION: Just a clarification?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Aid is suspended for now, though?
MR. RUBIN: The assistance we provide to the people through private
voluntary organizations and AID is not suspended.
QUESTION: But anything to the PA is?
MR. RUBIN: Which, as I understand it, there is no specific program in
operation right now that is suspended. There were some ideas, there were
some holds on specific programs. Those programs would now not be able to go
forward, yes.
Sorry, go ahead.
QUESTION: In the interest of removing levity from this topic, do you have
anything to say about the PLO settlement on the Klinghoffer murder?
MR. RUBIN: The U.S. Government is pleased that the civil litigation has
apparently been settled to the satisfaction of all parties. We have not
been involved in this litigation, and have no information about the terms
of the reported settlement. But we're pleased that it's been settled.
As you know, we in the past have sought to bring to justice the terrorists
involved in this case. The government of Italy has exercised jurisdiction
over the defendants. The trials took place in Genoa in 1986. In July 1986,
Abu Abbas and two others tried in absentia were sentenced to life
imprisonment. So we are continuing to want to see justice done. But as far
as the civil part of this, we're pleased that they were able to come to an
agreement.
New topic?
QUESTION: Yeah, a little levity --
MR. RUBIN: Apparently not.
QUESTION: A little levity in the room - moving to William Weld and his
constant campaign, ongoing for this ambassadorship to Mexico. It's been -
sources on the Hill say he's in town, immersing himself in Spanish lessons
at the State Department. Have you - do you know how those Spanish lessons
are going?
MR. RUBIN: Well, as I understand it, Governor Weld - who we hope some day
will become Ambassador Weld - has a pretty good working knowledge of
Spanish. So he is at the Foreign Service Institute, I believe it's today -
isn't that correct? And he is going through the normal drill on getting
himself briefed on the relevant issues, including, I suspect, some brushers-
up on his Spanish.
But again, our position has been clear and it is the Secretary's view that
Governor Weld is a man who could very successfully do the job as ambassador
to Mexico; who understands the issues; who was a federal prosecutor; who is
a political figure - that would give some significance to our relationship.
We believe that he ought to have a hearing and we're hopeful that he will
be able to get one when Congress resumes.
QUESTION: Has the Secretary spoken with Senator Helms about this
anymore?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, I'm not going to get into the practice of
reporting on every conversation with Senator Helms or the substance of it.
I can say this - she has made clear publicly and privately to Senator Helms
that she believes that Governor Weld deserves a hearing, is a suitable
candidate for the job and would make an excellent ambassador to Mexico.
She's made that clear both publicly and privately.
QUESTION: Can I do a Mexico question?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: The increasing violence in Mexico related to the narco-
trafficking and also the political scandals involving military people in
Mexico has been used by some analysts calling Mexico on its way to
Colombiazation. Is the State Department feeling that way? If not, do you
really trust the Mexican military involvement in the narco-traffick
fight?
MR. RUBIN: I would try to make sure that you got a full briefing from our
experts on this issue, because it's a very complex one. But what I can say
from here is that President Clinton, in certifying Mexico, made a judgment.
The judgment was that President Zedillo was our partner in this fight; that
he understood the importance of fighting the narco-traffickers, of stopping
the war on drugs and that he was committed to fully cooperating with
us in that fight. That does not mean we don't have significant concerns
about the ways in which the past cooperation has occurred, the corruption
in certain institutions in Mexico, the problems they've had with their
previous drug czar and a lot of other problems.
So we've worked on that very carefully with the Mexican Government. But our
general judgment is that the president - the political leader, the elected
president - is committed to fighting the war on drugs with us, to fully
cooperating.
Yes.
QUESTION: It was some kind of cooperation with the Mexican Government in
the arrest that was announced by the Justice Department, in terms of the
Juarez cartel? That was reported, too.
MR. RUBIN: As far as our involvement in that, I have no specific comment
other to say we were pleased it took place.
Yes, Steve.
QUESTION: One more on Mexico?
MR. RUBIN: Okay.
QUESTION: Mexico? I think Ward Anderson, in the same article alluded to
in the previous questions, yesterday says there are signs, negative
indicators and a whole litany of negative indicators that Mexico is sliding
toward the path of Colombia and becoming a narco-democracy. There is also
the issue of their incursion of the Mexican cartels into the East Coast
market; that's a new thing. Jamie, isn't this a tremendous national
security problem?
MR. RUBIN: We consider drugs a tremendous national security problem. We
are working very hard to try to make sure that our cooperation with Mexico
improves. We do not see it on the same scale as Colombia, which we have not
certified.
Yes, Steve.
QUESTION: On Iran, if I may.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Mr. Khatami named a new cabinet today, including a new foreign
minister who was the UN ambassador -- Mr. Kharrazi, I think it is -- and an
intelligence chief. Do you have an initial reaction? I realize the mantra
has been "results, results, results," on Iran, as well, and fair enough.
But, I mean --
MR. RUBIN: I've been looking for synonyms for "results, results,
results."
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Do you have an initial reaction to this cabinet, particularly
these key positions? And did the Secretary know Mr. Kharrazi at the UN? And
does she have a view of him?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, that's a good question, and the answer is, she did know
him, as one tends to know the other ambassadors. We didn't have a dialogue
with him, pursuant to our policy, which says that we would only have an
authorized dialogue in the event that the Iranian side was prepared to
discuss the three issues that you are aware of -- namely, their opposition
to the Middle East peace process, their support for international
terrorism and their effort to pursue a nuclear weapons program. We
have not seen that kind of offer yet.
As far as a specific reaction, we don't have one at this time. We will,
obviously, take a look at the people and see what we can conclude from
that. Unfortunately, so far, we haven't seen any indications when it comes
to the three areas that we're concerned about, that there has been
fundamental change. But as the President has said, we regard the election
as an interesting development. We're watching it very carefully, and we're
watching very carefully to see whether there are modifications in any of
those three areas that would make a difference.
QUESTION: Follow-up.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Are you saying that modification in any one of those three
areas might provide the pretext or context with Iran, or an opening?
MR. RUBIN: Again, our position has been - and I'm not trying to signal
anything new; I'm just trying to point out how carefully we're watching it,
because Iran is a country we ought to be watching very carefully. If there
is a willingness on the part of the Iranian side to have an authorized
dialogue in which those three issues -- all three issues -- are on the
table, we have long said we'd be prepared to have such a dialogue. Those
are the issues that put Iran in a category that has led us to engage in
rather dramatic economic sanctions and rather determined efforts to get
support for those sanctions around the world.
Yes.
QUESTION: Moving next door, Iraq says --
MR. RUBIN: On Iran, anyone else?
Okay, go ahead.
QUESTION: Iraq says the U.S. is blocking the acquisition of a number of
ambulances from France under the oil-for-food deal.
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: Comment?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Having worked in New York with Secretary Albright during
the negotiation of the various resolutions that permit oil for food and
medicine, my understanding of this is colored by the constant attempts of
the Iraqi Government to find reasons why they are being discriminated
against, even as the international community tries its best to give them an
opportunity not to shoot themselves in the foot and to help their
people.
We do not believe that this specific request necessarily meets the standard
of food or medicine. They often try, through the sanctions committee, to
interpret food and medicine in such a way as to assist their economy. To
the extent that we take a look at these specific requests and conclude that
they are not humanitarian needs, they are, rather, attempts to get around
the economic embargo by calling something something else, we would
obviously try to block it.
Carol.
QUESTION: And that's what you think about this case?
MR. RUBIN: As I understand it, when you put a hold on something, it
doesn't mean you've determined that it can't go, you've asked for more
details, and I believe that's where it is.
QUESTION: I'd like to go back to an issue that we talked about yesterday
and I sort of left unclear as to where the U.S. stood, and that's the
Serbian elections.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Does the United States believe the opposition should participate
in these elections?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. I'm glad you asked that question, because I went back to
try to clarify what our position is, and I hope that this clarification
assists you. We recognize that the decision whether or not to participate
in the upcoming Serbian presidential and parliamentary elections, under
grossly unfair electoral conditions, is a difficult one. It wouldn't be
right for the United States to advise Serbian opposition parties on an
election boycott. That is a choice that the individual political parties
must make themselves.
In general, however, the United States favors the broadest participation in
the political process. Boycotts are not particularly effective tools for
bringing about political change. It is clear, however, that electoral
conditions in Serbia at this time are neither fully free nor fair. The
opposition parties are denied equal access to the media, particularly radio
and television. Serbian authorities have gerrymandered the electoral
districts to further favor the ruling Socialist Party, and the government
has consistently refused to fulfill the terms of the Gonzalez report by
engaging the opposition in a dialogue on electoral conditions.
The Serbian Government's refusal to permit monitoring of the elections
suggests that Belgrade has something to hide, and we believe the OSCE
should be given unrestricted access. If Belgrade is serious about building
a legitimate democratic system, it will extend an open invitation to the
OSCE to allow observers and conduct an assessment.
Now, what all that means is that we are not encouraging a boycott. We
recognize that it's a difficult decision for the parties themselves to make,
those involved. What we can do is work directly to try to make the
conditions as free and fair as possible. Ambassador Gelbard and Ambassador
Holbrooke engaged in a lengthy discussion of this with President Milosevic,
making clear that, over the long term, the support that the international
community has for him will be determined by the democratic conditions in
Serbia, and that he needs to allow monitors in, and he needs to give
these opposition candidates a fair shot at the media.
So we are not advocating a boycott. We believe in participation, in general,
but we recognize that this is a tough call because of the extent of the
subversion of the democratic process there.
QUESTION: Would it be accurate to say that Gelbard urged the opposition
to participate? Are you assuming a more neutral stance? You're not
encouraging a boycott; you understand it's a difficult decision. But are
you actively encouraging them to participate or are you more neutral?
MR. RUBIN: It's a good question, and let me try again. The view of the
United States is that we cannot go too far in telling a particular party to
participate in an election when we know how unfair it looks from this
point. We know it's a tough call, so we are not telling them that their
failure to participate will somehow affect our view of them. We're not
pulling out all the stops. On the other hand, as a matter of general
principle, we don't believe that boycotts are the way to go. So what
we're doing is encouraging a legitimate democratic process, trying
to tell the people who have to make the decision that we understand
how difficult it is and we'll have to see.
QUESTION: Did you get any response from Milosevic on the question of
elections? Did he give you any promises that he would do better?
MR. RUBIN: As I understand it, he indicated that some monitors could come
in from some countries. But we're not sanguine about the result of that,
either.
Yeah, Mark, same subject? Same subject?
QUESTION: Yeah, was his response generally negative to the entreaties
made by Holbrooke and Gelbard?
MR. RUBIN: I asked them about this this morning - exactly that way. I
think that he recognizes that his failure to live up to the Gonzalez report
and failure to allow a free democratic process is a problem for him. But it
doesn't appear that he's going to make fundamental changes.
QUESTION: Greece today extended $100 million line of credit to Yugoslavia
- the Republic of Yugoslavia. Do you have any comment on that?
MR. RUBIN: There is a different sanctions regime today. I have not seen
that specific report, but as a matter of principle, we know that countries
involved have engaged in significant trade with Belgrade. What our position
has been is that there are no sanctions in place that prevent that kind of
investment, but the outer wall of sanctions that we are insisting be
maintained - that is with respect to international financial institutions,
with respect to participation in international organizations - is going to
stay in place until we see far better cooperation on Dayton and with
respect to minorities in Serbia.
But it's up to the Greek Government to make decisions like that. We'd
obviously hope that any cooperation with the government in Belgrade would
include strong entreaties to see that Dayton is complied with.
Yes, Steve.
QUESTION: On the same topic, if I could, two questions about our
erstwhile and intermittent ambassador, Mr. Holbrooke.
MR. RUBIN: Okay.
QUESTION: First --
MR. RUBIN: He is upstairs, having lunch with Secretary Albright right
now.
QUESTION: First, is it wrong to interpret his trip to the region as a way
of telling Milosevic, this is the last diplomatic opportunity you have to
comply before we do something else? And then secondly, do you agree with
Holbrooke's opinion expressed on your favorite program, McNeil/Lehrer, that
the topic of NATO troops in Bosnia - SFOR troops remaining in Bosnia - and
the topic of NATO expansion is inextricably linked?
MR. RUBIN: Mr. McNeil is no longer with the program.
(Laughter.)
The characterization of Ambassador Holbrooke and Ambassador Gelbard's trip
as a last diplomatic effort before some other step, I can assure you, is
not true. Ambassador Gelbard is planning to go back to the region on
Sunday. He will be meeting in Bosnia with all the relevant leaders. He will
be discussing follow-through on the steps that were taken last week,
including the currency coupon, which Mr. Krajisnik indicated he could now
live with, with some adjustments, which might permit that to go forward;
including the work that Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic had done on
improving commerce back and forth between Croatia and Bosnia; and including
refugee return. So Ambassador Gelbard is going back to do diplomatic work,
so to the first question, I guess the simple answer would be no.
The second question, inextricably linked -- we recognize that the Bosnia
troop decision is one that Capitol Hill senators and congressmen are very
interested in, because they should be. It involves American soldiers
putting themselves at risk. We also recognize, as we did when we made the
initial decision to go into Bosnia, that one of the reasons why it was in
the national interest of the United States to do so was because of the
possible impact a failure to do so would have on the NATO alliance. We made
that very clear, the President did in his speech to the nation discussing
the original deployment, and I think it has been part and parcel of all of
his public and our public statements since that time. So we recognize the
linkage, that NATO's future and Bosnia's future is linked to that
extent.
As far as whether - the argument usually goes, if Bosnia doesn't go well,
or if the NATO allies are concerned that we leave before they do, that NATO
enlargement will somehow not happen or ratification will be more difficult.
That is an argument we don't accept. We are obviously going to work very
hard to see that Bosnia is a success, and we're going to make the case --
beginning very soon when we start the ratification debate and our lobbying
effort, or our public education effort, in full swing, very shortly --
that NATO enlargement is in the interest of the United States, above and
beyond the Bosnia problem. But we recognize that in the minds of many key
senators, it's inextricably linked, and therefore we will have - it will
not be easier because of Bosnia.
QUESTION: Can I just rephrase the argument because the argument usually
is, if you're going to let Southern Europe become destabilized by leaving
the Bosnians to their own devices, it undermines the logic for NATO
expansion, which is supposed to provide political stability on the northern
flank. That was your choice of countries.
MR. RUBIN: That is one argument. I mean, I think the other one was just,
if Bosnia goes bad, it's going to be no time to enlarge an alliance, which
is the first one. We're hopeful that won't happen. We've been working very
hard to prevent that from happening.
Again, we hope that at the end of the day, after a vigorous public
education campaign and a vigorous effort by the President and his national
security advisors, led by Secretary Albright, that we will convince
Congress that NATO enlargement is the right thing to do. That doesn't mean
we don't recognize the complicating factor that it will come to a head at
much the same time as the deployment of American troops as part of SFOR
will come to a close.
Yes.
QUESTION: On Cambodia.
MR. RUBIN: Okay.
QUESTION: One more on - back on Serbia.
MR. RUBIN: Okay.
QUESTION: Upstairs at their lunch, will the Secretary be getting from
Ambassador Holbrooke his recommendations on additional forms of pressure to
bring to bear on the Bosnian Serbs and on Milosevic that she would then
recommend to the President?
MR. RUBIN: I have no doubt that Ambassador Holbrooke will make available
to the Secretary his views on what should be done. I also have no doubt
that when the Secretary believes that there are additional steps that ought
to be taken, she will discuss that with Mr. Berger and Secretary Cohen and
the President, if necessary. But I'm not aware we're at sort of a
denouement of that kind.
Yes.
QUESTION: Real quick on Bosnia, and following up along something that
Steve had touched on -- before Ambassador Gelbard left with Mr. Holbrooke
for the region, a senior official, in a briefing said that the United
States has ways to make Mr. Milosevic's life - as well as Mr. Krajisnik's
life - uncomfortable; and that Ambassador Gelbard would possibly be
expressing this when he went to the region over the past trip. What do you
think that this person - what does uncomfortable mean? I mean, the ways to
make these individuals' lives uncomfortable? For the stupid person
that I am, what could that be referring to?
MR. RUBIN: Let me first say, you are not a stupid person.
QUESTION: I mean, but if I wanted to understand it in plainer terms.
MR. RUBIN: I don't know what senior official could possibly have used the
words uncomfortable, but what Ambassador Gelbard and Ambassador Holbrooke
did have in their bag of tricks was a package of carrots and sticks -
making clear to President Milosevic that if things did not improve for him,
that we had options and that we had demonstrated - at least in the case of
Croatia, most recently - an ability to work very closely with our European
allies to prevent steps from occurring that President Tudjman wanted
in the area of international financial assistance.
So we have options, in terms of economic sanctions, broadly defined. I
think those were made very clear to President Milosevic, but I'm not in a
position to be more specific than that.
QUESTION: So you can't - you're not going to outline any more --
MR. RUBIN: Not more specific than that.
Cambodia?
QUESTION: Yeah, any reaction to the whole raft of events going on, I
guess? But Hun Sen being - and Ung Huot visiting King Sihanouk, who is now
threatening to abdicate or may or may not be. Also, an arrest warrant
issued for his son. Kind of an odd juxtaposition of events, I guess. What
is the state of play, as you understand it?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me start by saying the United States welcomes and
strongly endorses ASEAN's decision, announced at the meeting yesterday, to
remain engaged in seeking to restore political stability to Cambodia. We
share ASEAN's goal of restoring the principles of the Paris Peace Accords,
and we believe that ASEAN is uniquely placed to sustain contact with
Cambodia's principle political actors in pursuit of those goals.
As far as the abdication question is concerned, we have seen reports
indicating that the king is prepared to abdicate. This isn't the first time
we've seen such reports. According to the constitution, his successor would
be chosen by a special nine-member council. We would prefer not to take a
position on what would clearly be a significant personal and political
decision for the king. We would note that he is a very popular figure among
Cambodians, and does have significant political influence. No doubt, a
decision to abdicate would obviously have major political implications.
So we understand the significance of such an act, but we're not going to
try to tell King Sihanouk what is the right thing to do in this case.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Sorry, but why not? I mean, he's an important figure, he's the
guarantor of Cambodian sovereignty. We have lots of problems with Hun Sen.
Why shouldn't we express a view on whether this is a timely decision on his
part - to abdicate or not - and whether, in fact, he should abdicate or
not? Why not; isn't that part of our job?
MR. RUBIN: It's the view of the experts on this subject that this is not
the first time that such a possibility has been raised, and that to the
extent we have a view, it needn't be expressed publicly.
QUESTION: Our view is just - I'm sorry, but that's different from saying
that we are not going to express a view. If you're going to express a view
privately, that's fine.
MR. RUBIN: I would be very surprised if we didn't express a view if we
thought it was going to make a difference.
QUESTION: So the experts think this is a smoke screen? You've said
several times he's done this before - threatened this before.
MR. RUBIN: Those words were not chosen randomly.
QUESTION: One more?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, one more.
QUESTION: You might not have an answer to this, but if you could take the
question --
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Has the United States received a request from Bolivia for the
extradition of Colonel Luis Arce Gomez, who's serving a 30-year sentence in
Florida on drug trafficking charges?
MR. RUBIN: I do not have an answer. Let's take that and get you an
answer.
Any other subjects?
QUESTION: Just one more. The World Food Program reported this past
weekend that North Korean crops were scorching in the fields from the
drought, and that food subsidies would necessarily have to continue until
perhaps October of next year. My question is, is the U.S. Government
prepared to see North Korea through this famine?
MR. RUBIN: The short answer is that America has long held the humanitarian
view that when people are starving - especially children - we have a
responsibility as Americans to do something about it. We have an excellent
record when it comes responding to appeals. We haven't received one. If we
get one, we'll take a good, hard look at it, yes.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MR. RUBIN: Thanks.
(The briefing concluded at 1:20 P.M.)
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