U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #112, 97-08-07
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
933
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Thursday, Aug. 7, 1997
Briefer: James P. Rubin
ANNOUNCEMENTS / STATEMENTS
1-2 Introduction of A/S Jamie Rubin by Secretary Albright
PEACE PROCESS
2-3 Arafat and Netanyahu Statements and Secretary's Speech
of 8/6
3-4 Security Concerns and Dennis Ross' trip to the area
4-5 US view of Arafat's position on terrorism
5-6 Permanent status talks
6 MEPFA expiration and contacts with PLO
12-13 US view on lifting of restrictions on Palestinians
13-14 Monitoring group meeting and situation in the south
INDIA
7 China's Sale of missiles to Pakistan
7-8 Arms to militants in Kashmir
12 Travel to region by Secretary
NORTH KOREA
8-9 Four party talks in NY
8 Joint military exercises
CYPRUS
9-10 Turkey/Cypriot Agreement
10 Holbrooke
CAMBODIA
10-11 Appointment of First Prime Minister by Hun Sen
11 Humanitarian Aid
11-12 US view of official position of Hun Sen
BOSNIA
14 Holbrooke/Gelbard meetings
CHINA
15 Special Coordinator for Tibet and China's reaction
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #112
THURSDAY, AUGUST 7, 1997 12:32 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Good afternoon, everybody. Standing here this
afternoon with Jamie Rubin is a little like standing next to a deer on the
first day of hunting season.
(Laughter.)
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: But I am assured that he is very well prepared for
his new duties. Day after day, experts like Mike McCurry and Nick Burns
have drilled him on such important phrases that he has to use that are very
enlightening, such as "our views are well-known" - (laughter) -"we call on
both sides to exercise restraint," and "I'll get back to
you on that."
Let me make this point absolutely clear - there is no moral equivalency
between evasion and deception, between not saying something and saying
something is that is not or that is not that is. If that isn't clear,
please ask my spokesman.
(Laughter.)
Now, I want you all to be very nice to Jamie. He is a very long time
advisor and friend. I'm sure that if he is required to be evasive on an
issue as important to all of us on diplomacy, he will evade that issue head
on. After, all he is the one who taught me how to speak like a diplomat -
in English and Spanish.
(Laughter.)
I have said before that Jamie and I have achieved a sort of Vulcan mind-
meld on key issues. I would say it again, but this is also the 50th
anniversary year of Roswell, and I'm afraid that people might take me
literally on that.
Let me be absolutely serious and say to you that I think those of you that
know me and know what my approach is to foreign policy, that I believe that
conveying our views publicly to all of you and to the American public is a
key responsibility that we have and I have as Secretary of State. We have,
some of us, talked about the role of the press in not just the conveying of
information, but in helpful criticism of the information, and our role in
making sure that, as we enter this new era, that the public is well
informed.
It is for that reason that I asked truly someone who has become one of my
very closest advisors to spend a great deal of time with you. I could use
Jamie all the time, upstairs in my small office. But I believe that the job
that has to be done here of making sure that our policies are well-
understood and well-explained requires that I ask somebody that I have the
greatest confidence in to come and spend a lot of time with you.
So it is my great pleasure to introduce, for his first appearance, the new
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, James P. Rubin.
MR. RUBIN: Thank you.
QUESTION: Fresh meat.
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: Let me start just be thanking Secretary Albright for those
very kind words. I know that sometime in the next year or two, I will make
a mistake and you may be sorry, but I hope you get over it.
(Laughter.)
But seriously, it's a great honor to be here and I want to thank you for
the words that you did say. I know how important this is to you and that we
get this right, and so I'll work very hard at it. I won't ask you to stay
for more than a minute, just to say that we all want to thank Nick Burns
for the work that he did here from the podium and the work that he did with
all of you. As many of you know, Nick was fond of baseball analogies.
And in honor of Nick's work here, we've decided to retire baseball
analogies from the podium. So you've heard your last baseball analogy.
Instead, we're going to try to use the American tradition of cinema. So let
me hope, after the Secretary leaves and we start our first question, that
this will be in the words of Rick Blaine, the beginning of a very beautiful
friendship. Thank you. Thank you for introducing me.
I don't have any announcements. I'm not going to introduce anybody. I'm
just ready for your questions. Barry.
QUESTION: Jamie, this won't be a softball -
(Laughter.)
A couple of quotes - properly balanced - one by Arafat, one by Netanyahu.
So I want to put you on notice that you're going to hear two sides here. I
wonder if the State Department would react to Arafat telling leaders of
Fatah to prepare for battle. Might as well give you both at the same time -
they were so brief - Netanyahu accusing the Palestinian Authority of
behaving "like a regime of facilitating terror, like Iran or Iraq or
Libya." Could you comment, and particularly in light of the Secretary's
speech yesterday and at least the inference that the leaders - these two,
for instance - are interested in peace?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, let me first take the Arafat statement. In her speech
yesterday, Secretary Albright talked a lot about the importance of
partnership and building partnership if we're going to build peace. We do
not regard the statements that Chairman Arafat made in this regard as
helpful. In fact, to the extent they're construed or interpreted as meaning
battle with Israel, we regard them as counter-productive and we think they
should not be made.
Let's remember Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority have committed
themselves to a peaceful settlement of their differences with Israel.
Therefore, they should refrain from saying the kinds of statements that
cast doubt on the peace that they have committed themselves to.
As far as your second question is concerned, it is hard to fathom how one
could compare Chairman Arafat to Colonel Qadhafi. Chairman Arafat was on
the White House lawn with the President. He signed a peace agreement with
the Israelis. We regard him as a partner in our effort to find peace in the
Middle East. Colonel Qadhafi is an international outlaw.
Carol.
QUESTION: The Secretary yesterday said that she would be prepared to go
to the Middle East, provided that there was progress on security issues.
How are you going to measure that progress? And given the fact that there's
talk that this trip could take place the end of the month, is three weeks
really long enough? I mean, even if they were to cease the rhetoric, which
they haven't; even if Arafat were to crack down today even more strongly
on terrorists, is three weeks enough to make a judgment about intentions
in this regard so that she can make this trip?
MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright said in her speech yesterday that, provided
some progress was made on security issues, she was prepared to travel to
the Middle East by the end of the month. That does leave us roughly three
weeks. Her decision to go was based on a combination of factors that she
laid out very clearly in the speech - that we had reached a time when there
was a crisis of confidence in the peace process. She believes that if we
can make the minimum progress necessary on security issues to make
the environment plausible and make it possible to make progress on the
interim agreement issues, on discussions on how to accelerate permanent
status negotiations - namely how to get the peace process back on track -
that she wants to go there and she is prepared to go there.
As far as what will happen between now and then, all I can tell you is that
Dennis Ross, Ambassador Dennis Ross, is going to be arriving in the Middle
East this weekend. He'll be meeting almost exclusively with Palestinian and
Israeli leaders - Chairman Arafat, Prime Minister Netanyahu - and he will
be focused exclusively on how to provide the security cooperation, get it
back to a point where a minimum level of confidence has been restored, and
that will permit the Secretary to go.
But I can't make a firm judgment now, until Ambassador Ross has taken his
trip, of what we will specifically need to make a trip worthwhile. But she
is prepared to go. It's been something that she's thought a lot about.
She's struggled with when the right time to go would be. She has long said
that she would go when it was ripe. And provided there is some progress on
security, it will be ripe to go by the end of the month.
QUESTION: Well, you set a pretty low standard. Could you imagine that she
would not go, given what she has said and the fact that you have set a
minimum level of progress?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I can't imagine the future. What I can imagine is that
when Dennis Ross, Ambassador Ross, returns and hopefully succeeds in
achieving some minimum cooperation, some progress on the issue of security,
he will report to her and she'll make a judgment at that time. We'll know
it when we see it.
Andrea.
QUESTION: Following up on Carol, would we be wrong to conclude that the
situation isn't ripe because there is the progress; the situation is ripe
because of the crisis in confidence - that her involvement now is really
required or indicated because things have reached such a bad pass?
MR. RUBIN: You would be right to conclude that one of the factors that
made Secretary Albright decide that she should be prepared to go to the
Middle East in a few weeks is the crisis of confidence that's developed in
the Middle East, yes.
QUESTION: You - sorry, George - the Secretary has spoken a lot with Mr.
Arafat over the phone and all of the parties involved. And over the past
several days, officials at the State Department have said that the sense
they're getting from the Chairman is that he's committed to peace and
committed to beefing up his security efforts and cracking down on
terrorists. But after his comments --that Barry highlighted-- and he said
he wouldn't bow to the Israelis in any kind of way and he's preparing for
battle, is the United States still convinced that he's ready to put
forth 100 percent effort to fighting the terrorists and cracking down,
as he said?
MR. RUBIN: Yesterday both President Clinton and Secretary Albright made
clear what we expect from the Palestinian Authority - what we would see as
100 percent progress. Those items are laid down very carefully in her
speech. They include arresting the right people; they include making sure
the infrastructure is broken down; they include making sure there's not a
revolving door for terrorists or possible terrorists who are arrested. So
we laid out quite clearly what we expect from the Palestinian Authority,
from Chairman Arafat. We will be able to declare 100 percent effort when
those items are implemented consistently over time, with a determination to
fight terror in the same way that the Israeli people want to see terror
fought.
Let's remember that terrorists are the enemies of peace; that terrorists
are the enemies of Chairman Arafat, they're the enemies of the Israeli
people and they're the enemies of the Palestinian people. So we want 100
percent effort in that fight. When it's consistent and when it's taken
place, we'll know it.
QUESTION: You commit to his commitment. I mean, is it absolute? What's
the - are you --
MR. RUBIN: As I said, the only way to judge these things in foreign
policy, whether it's the Middle East or Bosnia - and you'll hear this a lot
from this podium - is by actions. We will be convinced of his commitment
when the actions are taken.
Steve.
QUESTION: Jamie, there were some interpretations of the speech yesterday
suggesting that, especially her call for an acceleration of final status
talks, put her more in line with the Israeli position than the United
States had been. I'm wondering if that was the intent of her call for the
acceleration of the final status talks; and if not, specifically, how that
call differs from the one that Netanyahu made some months back.
MR. RUBIN: No, that was not the intent. The Secretary has thought a lot
about what the best approach to the Middle East ought to be in the
negotiations. During the course of Ambassador Ross' numerous trips to the
region, she's been in daily contact with him. We've obviously thought a lot
about what would be the best way to get the peace process back on track.
Earlier this year, Prime Minister Netanyahu talked about moving directly
to the final status, the permanent status negotiations. That is not
what we're talking about.
What we are talking about, what the Secretary is talking about, is marrying
an accelerated permanent status negotiation with implementation of the
interim agreement that has been previously negotiated. So we are trying to
marry the two. We're not trying to leave behind the requirement for steps
to be taken in areas like the seaport, the airport, the safe passage and
further redeployment.
QUESTION: Have you heard from the Palestinians on this?
MR. RUBIN: Again, we don't make it a practice of giving you a daily
update of what each of the parties say to us privately. What I can say is
that for some time now, we have had a number of ideas that we believe will
be useful if the parties intend to restore peace. Those ideas have included
how to get from here to the end point earlier than 1999, mid-1999, as
currently set forth in the agreement. So they're not going to be surprised
by what the Secretary will say if she goes at the end of the month.
They're aware of aspects of our ideas. But as far as their specific
reaction is concerned, we'll have to leave that to them.
QUESTION: On your previous answer, it was always implicit in Netanyahu's
earlier suggestion that the current situation - the current negotiations
would continue. But it would also be combined with going directly to the
direct status. However, I don't think you answer Steve's question. First,
how does it - how would it differ? And second, part of that question, in
his plan, there was a terminal target date for the end of those talks.
Six months, I think, is what he was talking about. Is there to be a
deadline or a terminal date in the American acceleration?
MR. RUBIN: I spoke to Ambassador Ross this morning about the differences
between Prime Minister Netanyahu's plan and the ideas that we have and the
specific reference to accelerating permanent status. He made clear to me
that we are not implying that the parties should forego implementation of
other aspects of the agreements they've already reached. That differs from
the ideas that Prime Minister Netanyahu was talking about earlier
in the year. As far as our timeframe is concerned, all I can tell you is
that the permanent status negotiations began last year very briefly in May,
I believe. They were designed to end in mid-1999. That's roughly two years
from now. Two years is too long to hold out as a hope for the people to see,
to have the understanding that there is an end point to this process.
So we're talking about a significantly shorter timeframe, but I'm not going
to be able to say specifically.
QUESTION: Talking about end points, also there is a commentary this
morning that the Secretary did not address the issue of Palestinian
statehood in her speech. That was a failure on her part. I'd like your
comment on that.
MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't think that it will come as a surprise to you
that we, as a matter of practice, have taken the position that for the
United States to try to impose a solution on the parties is not the best
way to go. To establish our positions publicly or privately at this stage
on what we think the permanent status issues should be, we do not think is
the proper role for the United States at this time. What we think is the
proper role for the United States is is to help find a path by which the
peace process can be restored and the crisis of confidence can be
eased.
QUESTION: Can we try a little bit for another area? I know there's
probably no end to Middle East questions.
MR. RUBIN: Any more on the Middle East? We'll do one more on the Middle
East. Over there.
QUESTION: Yes, the Middle East Facilitation Act lapses on the 12th. Since
the Congress is not in session, there's no hope it's going to be renewed.
How will this affect your contacts with the PLO? According to the law, Mr.
Ross cannot even meet Arafat in the area when he's there next week. Is it
against the law to meet with him? And how are you going to solve this
problem?
MR. RUBIN: We obviously would have liked to have seen the Middle East
Peace Facilitation Act extended. We will continue to work on that with the
Congress. But we will be able - and Ambassador Ross and Secretary Albright
will be able - to continue to conduct diplomacy with Chairman Arafat and
other members of the Palestinian Authority. It does not prohibit that in
any way.
What it does do is possibly cause the suspension of the Palestinian office
here, which is a completely different point.
Next subject. One more in the back. Lee Katz.
QUESTION: Jamie, I thought you might want to take at your inaugural
briefing an opportunity to give us a definitive answer on whether the
Secretary of State will visit Syria during her upcoming Middle East trip.
Will she take the chance to try and revive those frozen talks, as
well?
MR. RUBIN: Although it is my inaugural briefing, I will not take the
chance to answer that question. When we are ready to lay out our agenda,
including the stops and the time, we will do so.
QUESTION: Jamie, new accusations on an old subject.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: India's junior Foreign Minister is saying today that China -
you've heard this before, of course - China is providing Pakistan with
missiles, trying to help Pakistan develop a missile factory. It's a subject
- I know we're not talking about the U.S. directly involved -- but it's a
subject the State Department customarily monitors - China's behavior.
Anything to that report that the U.S. is aware of, by chance?
MR. RUBIN: What I can say on that, Barry, is that we are deeply concerned
and have been deeply disturbed by many reports we have seen about the
possible transfer of M-11 missiles to Pakistan. We've been studying those
reports very, very carefully, as a matter of an interagency process. We
have not determined that such missiles have been transferred. If we do
believe the standard of evidence has been met that we have set, which is
quite high for a matter like this, we will act according to our laws, but
we have not done so.
QUESTION: What about the factory work that --
MR. RUBIN: Again, this falls into the category of trying to describe from
this podium those issues that are best understood in intelligence channels
and so it's a very difficult thing to do. I can say this, that we are
deeply disturbed by reports that China may have engaged in cooperation in
the area of missile production that would, if true, trigger our laws. But I
have nothing for you about a determination in that regard.
Yes, Carol.
QUESTION: On North Korea --
QUESTION: I have another question.
MR. RUBIN: Same subject?
QUESTION: It has to do with India.
MR. RUBIN: Okay.
QUESTION: There was also an accusation by the Prime Minister of India
that from across the border arms are coming in to the terrorists in
Kashmir. And the same spirit in which the Foreign Secretary spoke about
terrorism in Israel, would you apply the same standard to terrorism in
India?
MR. RUBIN: Let me answer that question this way - as you know, we want to
see a peaceful resolution of the dispute there. We are prepared to be of
assistance, if we think we can be. We've been encouraged by recent steps in
that area, both by the Indian Government and the Pakistani Government.
Obviously, any step that would improve the chances of progress in
reconciliation, we'd be in favor of.
QUESTION: The North Koreans are criticizing the U.S. and South Koreans
for going forward with war games at the same time that you're trying to
have peace talks in New York. The South Koreans apparently are criticizing
the North for pushing for a peace agreement with the United States, a
separate peace agreement. I wonder if you could comment on both of those
and also give us any assessment that you can about the nature of the talks
in New York.
MR. RUBIN: As far as the talks in New York are concerned, they're
progressing quite smartly. The discussions have included the venue, the
level of representation, the agenda and details on how the talks would
proceed. At yesterday's meeting, they worked their way through these
topics. They have made some progress on items such as a date and a venue
for the next meeting, but no final decisions have been made. I think
they're getting back to capitals on that.
So we still have some hurdles, as we will surely have as this process
continues and negotiating with North Korea is not easy task, as many of you
know. We are working very carefully on the agenda and trying to determine
whether we can get agreement on that.
As far as the context for the talks, which essentially relates to your two
questions, we are going to continue doing what we think we need to do as
part of our relationship with South Korea. We do not regard actions we take
with regard to South Korea as threatening. On the contrary, we have a
defense alliance, not an offense alliance with South Korea.
Yes, in the back, please.
QUESTION: Another subject - Turkey and the Turkish --
QUESTION: On North Korea--
MR. RUBIN: On Korea, yeah, go ahead, Andrea.
QUESTION: I know that we have a defense pact with South Korea.
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: But is this the right time to be planning joint military
exercises, just when these four-party talks are beginning for the first
time?
MR. RUBIN: I would refer you to the Pentagon to talk about the nature of
the planning, how far along it is, and when it's going to happen.
QUESTION: But in terms of the diplomacy, doesn't it impact on -
MR. RUBIN: We are comfortable that we have done all we can, in preparing
for these talks, to create a climate in which success can occur. If people
want to find excuses for not making progress, they can, but the climate is
fine.
Yes. Sorry, in the back there, please.
QUESTION: Yes. I didn't catch, what are the hurdles that remain, and are
they going to work them out this week?
MR. RUBIN: We're hopeful that they will work out the hurdles on the four-
party talks, including the issue of the agenda -- what are the substantive
topics, how will they be framed, confidence-building measures, the question
of how to replace the armistice agreement, and other matters that,
obviously, other parties might want to bring up. That's what we're talking
about.
Yes, Carole.
QUESTION: I'm just wondering when you said if people want to find excuses
to not make progress they can, are you saying the North Koreans are looking
for excuses not to -
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen the specific report you're referring to. I'm
merely saying that we believe we have set the context properly for progress
in the four-party talks. So what we've done is try to come up with a plan
for a follow-on negotiation, for a place to have that negotiation, and an
agenda of what to discuss. We do not believe, in the context of our
military alliance with South Korea ,and in the context of the North Korean
nuclear agreement that is going forward and other discussions we have
bilaterally with the North Koreans, that we've done anything to interfere
with the context for progress. But if someone or some party wants to see it
that way, we wouldn't understand it, because we've gone about trying to
create the right climate.
Yes, let's go over there.
QUESTION: Have we any new information about the location of the four-
party peace talks?
MR. RUBIN: Sorry?
QUESTION: A Korean official said that the four-party peace talks will be
held in Geneva. Do you confirm the information?
MR. RUBIN: I've seen that report. I think I could comfortably say that
those of you who want to cover it should not make hotel reservations in New
York.
QUESTION: According to reports, Turkey and the Turkish-occupied area of
the Republic of Cyprus agreed today on partial integration, just five days
before the continuation of the talks in Switzerland, sponsored by the UN
and supported by the U.S. Government. I'm wondering, how do you respond to
this Turkish action?
MR. RUBIN: We're aware of the joint statement issued by Mr. Denktash and
the Foreign Minister of Turkey. We strongly support the UN in its efforts
to secure a settlement of the Cyprus dispute. We do not think this
announcement was helpful, and we don't want to see any steps taken which
undermine the UN negotiation process or which move toward the permanent
partition of the island.
QUESTION: Cambodia?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Does the United -
MR. RUBIN: Same issue. We'll do one more on Turkey and Cyprus, Greece,
and then we'll move on.
QUESTION: On Cyprus. Yesterday, when she was asked the U.S. plan for
Cyprus, Secretary Albright gave one name, Richard Holbrooke.
MR. RUBIN: It's a good name.
QUESTION: It's a wonderful name. But, as you know, recently, Mr.
Holbrooke is pulled back again into the Bosnia issue. In the view of the
Department, do Department officials think nothing will happen anytime soon
anyway, so Mr. Holbrooke can get busy with Bosnia again?
MR. RUBIN: Mr. Holbrooke is a very able diplomat. Ambassador Holbrooke is
fully capable of walking and chewing gum at the same time. He can juggle
many balls and when he is done with his mission, which would probably be as
early as this weekend, I am sure he'll have plenty of time to focus on the
Cyprus issue.
QUESTION: Does the United States recognize the new first prime minister
of Cambodia?
MR. RUBIN: We have seen statements by King Sihanouk acquiescing in the
selection of Ung Huot. The King has made a number of statements in this
regard. His latest statements authorize the national assembly president and
acting head of state to appoint formally Foreign Minister Ung Huot as first
prime minister.
As we have said consistently, we consider that the process by which Ung
Huot was named as first prime minister was not democratic. The vote in the
assembly took place in the absence of many deputies and other parliamentarians.
In addition, we understand there was a constitutional question raised by
the fact that the vice president of the assembly was not there.
In short, neither the action nor the King's reported statement changes our
assessment that the process by which he was appointed was not democratic.
Although we are pleased, at the same time, that he has called for adherence
to the Paris Accords and for free and fair elections in 1988, we want to
see this actually happen.
We are prepared to meet with him. We do not want to be in a position where
we only talk to Hun Sen, but we do not believe that he was chosen
democratically. We note that Hun Sen has given a commitment to our special
envoy and to ASEAN that FUNCINPEC could present a new candidate for first
prime minister if it so chooses. So we are working closely with ASEAN and
other friends of Cambodia to be sure that, if they make another choice,
that that choice would be accepted by Hun Sen.
In other words, we don't regard this process as democratic, we don't accept
this choice. We believe there is an opportunity for a democratic choice to
be made, and that is what we are going to be working toward.
QUESTION: How would that happen? How soon could FUNCINPEC act?
MR. RUBIN: Well, obviously, they have a problem with their people in
different parts of the world, so we will be talking to them to see whether
we can be of assistance. But we are trying to be sure that ASEAN takes the
lead and that we are able to help ASEAN help FUNCINPEC make a choice that
is democratic.
QUESTION: Where are we in terms of restoration of aid to Cambodia? I mean,
that's got to be - the 30 days is obviously nearing expiration. The
Secretary indicated that ASEAN - or at least Nick did - that it was likely
some form of aid, humanitarian aid, would be renewed. Do you have anything
to add on that?
MR. RUBIN: We're obviously playing with that as we speak because the one
month review ends, I believe, this weekend. I wouldn't expect any
significant changes in how we've approached it -- and that it that we will
not provide funds to go through the government of Cambodia and we want to
make sure that any aid we do provide goes through non-governmental
organizations and is designed to help the people of Cambodia, the people
who have suffered so under this regime and suffered far more greatly
under the genocide of Pol Pot's regime.
So we are not going to take steps that harm the people, but we are not
going to provide funds through the government of Cambodia.
QUESTION: Do you know how much the humanitarian aid component is
yet?
MR. RUBIN: I will have to check that for you and I'll get back to you on
that.
QUESTION: One more on Cambodia?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: You say that he was not democratically elected. This government
meets with a lot of foreign leaders who are not democratically elected and
recognizes them as legitimate representatives of sovereign nations. The
question is, do you recognize him as the legitimate representative of a
sovereign nation and will you deal with him as such?
MR. RUBIN: We, as I indicated in my statement, are prepared to meet with
him. We'll not refuse to deal with him. We will do so as necessary. We
don't want to be in a position of only dealing with Hun Sen. But we will
also continue to deal with other FUNCINPEC leaders, both inside and outside
Cambodia.
As far as recognition is concerned, that is a decision for FUNCINPEC to
make. Under the agreements that have been worked out, the leader of
FUNCINPEC is a decision for them to make. They have not made a decision
that we recognize and we note that Ranariddh has shown flexibility in the
past on the issue of his future role and we believe that he should be
allowed to return to participate freely.
So we will meet with him and we believe there are other ways to designate a
leader of FUNCINPEC that would be democratic that we could support and
recognize.
QUESTION: When you meet with him, will you be dealing with him as the
recognized prime minister of Cambodia?
MR. RUBIN: We'll be meeting with him in order to do business with the
government of Cambodia. I've said four times now that we do not believe
that the way in which he was chosen was democratic and we don't accept
that.
QUESTION: If you could go back to India, yesterday President Clinton -
MR. RUBIN: Third question on India.
QUESTION: - made kind of a puzzling statement. He said that the U.S.
presence in South Asia should be "heavily felt." What was he talking about?
Is he talking about a physical presence of a military kind, because it has
led to some speculation in the region.
MR. RUBIN: Perhaps he was talking about the fact that Secretary Albright
has said that she hopes to go to the region this year.
Yes.
QUESTION: Can we go back to the Middle East, please?
MR. RUBIN: Okay.
QUESTION: The Israelis have so far resisted the quiet diplomacy pressure,
American pressure, to lift the measures on the Palestinian people, the
collective punishment measures. Are you doing more? I mean, they also
refused Jordan's request during Crown Prince Hassan's visit to Israel to
lift these measures. Are you doing more to alleviate the hardship of the
civilians?
MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright has spoken to Prime Minister Netanyahu
about this very, very recently - yesterday, in fact - and they have talked
about ways in which the closure and the effect of that closure could be
eased. Prime Minister Netanyahu, as you know, takes the position that he
doesn't want to do that until the Palestinian Authority has taken steps to
cooperate on fighting terrorism.
We have said - and I will repeat today - that some of the measures involved
here, we think, are not wise and they are counter-productive -- and that
includes steps that affect the population but are not necessarily tied to
fighting terrorism. So we are going to work with the Israeli government in
trying to make clear why we think it is unwise to punish the Palestinian
people and to de-legitimize the Palestinian Authority, and we will continue
to do that.
QUESTION: Bosnia?
MR. RUBIN: Bosnia.
QUESTION: Could we go back -
MR. RUBIN: I think we've exhausted the Middle East for one day. One more
question. Yes?
QUESTION: Did Prime Minister Netanyahu -
MR. RUBIN: Excuse me, I didn't hear you, please.
QUESTION: Did the Prime Minister Netanyahu promise the Secretary to ease
the closure or to take any measures to ease the situation?
MR. RUBIN: They talked about ways in which steps the Palestinian
Authority would take would be followed by easing of the closure. I can't
speak for Prime Minister Netanyahu and I urge you to consult your
colleagues in Israel who might have had a chance to talk to him.
QUESTION: On Lebanon - a quick question?
MR. RUBIN: Okay.
QUESTION: The situation in the south is getting very difficult for the
last couple of days. Do you have anything new about the new Israeli attacks
and do you have anything about the monitoring group meeting?
MR. RUBIN: We obviously want to offer our condolences to the families of
the Italian and Irish members of the UNIFIL forces who died on Wednesday. I
bring that up in this context. People who serve in the United Nations are
often under-appreciated. They risk their lives in trying to pursue the
cause of peace, and that was a tragic accident.
As far as the monitoring group is concerned, there has been an inability of
all the delegations to travel to the meeting site. Therefore, the scheduled
meeting today has been postponed. But we are urging all the parties to
exercise maximum restraint in order to diffuse the situation on the ground,
and we're in contact with members of the monitoring group to see what we
can do to get that meeting convened.
Yes, Judd.
QUESTION: Holbrooke reportedly had to delay his trip to Banja Luka, throwing into
question when he would go to Belgrade. Is he still going to Belgrade, and
can you tell us what the itinerary shapes up as, at this point? And what
kind of assessment can you give us on -
MR. RUBIN: Well, I did just get off the phone before we came down here
with what I think could be fairly called a tag-team diplomacy. Both
Ambassador Gelbard and Ambassador Holbrooke are working very well together.
They are diplomatic heavyweights, and I think they've already made some
significant progress with President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic.
You've probably seen the statement. The point of the statement is that
there are concrete commitments with concrete timetables for following up on
those commitments, including a very clear statement by President Tudjman
to do his utmost to get indicted war criminals to The Hague.
So that was a good day they had yesterday. They are now in Sarajevo. They
had a power breakfast with General Shalikashvili and General Wes Clark in
Tuzla, and they discussed all the issues related to implementation, and
talked about ways to ensure that the civilian and the military side are
working closely together. They did have to delay their trip to Banja Luka.
They intend to go tomorrow morning. I have not heard any talk of delaying
the trip to Belgrade.
Frankly, the unique value Ambassador Holbrooke probably brings is in the
relationship that he struck with President Milosevic, which has enabled him
to get probably as much as anyone has ever gotten out of Milosevic. That is
why we thought it would be so important, and the Secretary specifically
wanted Ambassador Holbrooke to be in Belgrade, so that they could do some
tag-team diplomacy and maybe get a small diplomatic victory out of
it.
QUESTION: On Tudjman, I assume you would be wanting to add that actions
speak louder than commitments.
MR. RUBIN: Well, thank you for offering me that opportunity. I think
you're going to hear that a lot from this podium, so I'll try to find new
and interesting ways to say it. In this case, in Bosnia, in Croatia, words
are cheap, and deeds are the coin of the realm.
QUESTION: How does Tudjman's commitment regarding the war criminals
differ from what he promised in Dayton a year and a half ago?
MR. RUBIN: The words are probably not that different, but what's
different is, we've seen some steps recently, including some Croatian
assistance in getting indicted war criminals to The Hague. We believe that
as a result of our discussions with President Tudjman and his foreign
minister, that we have reason to believe that this commitment may have more
meaning than it has had in the past. But again, in Croatia, words are cheap
and actions are the coin of the realm. We'll just have to see.
I'll take one more question. Yes.
QUESTION: The Secretary has announced that she's going to appoint a
special envoy to Tibet. The Chinese have recently retaliated by saying that
it's interference in their internal affairs. Has here been any conversation
between the two governments on that issue? Is there going to be any Chinese
input on who the special envoy is? And is this going to throw a long shadow
on the summit meeting scheduled for October?
MR. RUBIN: The Secretary has not appointed or said she would appoint a
special envoy for Tibet. She has said she would try to construct a special
coordinator for Tibet, which is very different. We have made clear that we
would not want to have any personnel decision of that kind cast any doubt
on our policy that Tibet is part of China. What we do want to have that
person do, when they are selected and in place, is be able to work on
the issues that we care about, which is making sure that the unique
cultural freedom for the people in Tibet is promoted. To the extent that a
special coordinator could improve that, she's prepared to do it. The
Chinese are aware of this policy and aware of the fact that we're
considering this. When we have more to say about it, we will. Thank
you.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:15 P.M.)
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