U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #70, 97-05-08
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
1806
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Thursday, May 8, 1997
Briefer: Nicholas Burns
ANNOUNCEMENTS
1-2 Introduction of Foreign Service National Award Recipients
2 Foreign Service Day on Friday, May 9
2 Foreign Policy Town Mtg. in Memphis on Thurs., May 15
2 Statement on Behalf of Monitoring Group
24-25 Secretary Albright's Travel to Denver
ZAIRE
3-4,-6-7 President Mobutu/Kabila and Rebel Alliance/Prospects for
Second Mtg.
3-5 Ambassador Richardson in Paris/Return to U.S.
3,8 Refugees
4-5 Fighting/Involvement of Surrounding Countries
5-11 Peaceful Transition/Elections
5 Role of South African Government
5-6 President Mobutu's Financial Assets
6 Reports of Departure of Gov't. Officials
6 Ambassador Simpson Mtgs. w/Senior Zaire Officials
GREECE
11-12 U.S. Support for Discussions between Greece and Turkey
12 Carey Cavanaugh in Region
CYPRUS
11-12 U.S. Visit of Cypriot FM on June 6
NORTH KOREA
12,16-18,19-21 U.S. Food Assistance --Not Tied to Four-Party Peace Talks/
World Food Program
13 Arrival of First Food Shipment
13-16 Missile Proliferation Talks-U.S. Proposal for Alternative
Dates
19-20 Cooperation on MIAs/The Agreed Framework
JAPAN
13 Trilateral Mtg.-U.S., ROK, Japan
20-21 --Cases of Missing Japanese Allegedly Kidnapped
PAKISTAN
21-22,31 Detention of Mr. Ayyaz Baluch
RUSSIA
22-24 Discussions on NATO-Russia Relationship
CHINA
25-29 Senior Tebetan Monk Sentenced to Prison/Panchen Lama /
Religious Freedom/HR
TURKEY
29 Press Reports on U.S. Terrorism Report/Terrorism
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
29 Dennis Ross' Discussions in Region
COLOMBIA
30 Congress' Postponement of Action on Extradition/Status of
Mr. Perafan
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #70
THURSDAY, MAY 8, 1997 1: 18 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. BURNS: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Today is a special day
at the State Department. Every year we honor the Foreign Service Nationals
who are the people who are, in many ways, responsible for the success of
our embassies and consulates abroad. Those who have served in our
embassies and consulates understand that we couldn't survive without
Foreign Service Nationals.
So today I'd like to introduce to you the people who have all been honored
by being invited to come to Washington, D.C. They have been voted by the
Department to be the outstanding Foreign Service Nationals in 1996.
I'd like to start with the Foreign Service National of the Year, Maria
Josefa Bastos Dos Santos, from Angola. The citation for her award reads,
for your dedication, sound judgment and personal courage in tenaciously
promoting American commercial interests in Angola, helping American firms
generate substantial new revenues, creating thousands of American jobs,
saving the United States Government large sums of money by ensuring that
our programs are run smoothly, and strengthening bilateral relations with
our second largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa. Congratulations.
I'd also like to recognize the runners-up for Foreign Service National of
the Year. I'd like to begin with Mr. Enrique Alarcon from Bolivia. In
recognition of his superb and dedicated service as a valued colleague of
the U.S. Mission in Bolivia, and especially for his consistently stellar
performance during numerous high level visits under extreme and often
arduous circumstances, congratulations, Mr. Alarcon.
Next is Mr. Hee Kwang Kim from our Embassy in Seoul. Mr. Kim, in
recognition of outstanding achievement in financial management throughout
27 years of service to the United States Government, and in particular for
significant contributions to the implementation of the International
Cooperative Administrative Support Services Program, congratulations.
Next is Miss Irina Vozianova from Kiev, in Ukraine. Since the opening of
Embassy Kiev in 1992, Irina Vozianova has served as a key link between the
United States Embassy and Ukrainian officials at all levels. She has
consistently been a source of accurate and timely information on political
developments in Ukraine. This knowledge, combined with her intuitive
understanding of diplomacy and her remarkable interpretive skills, have
made her indispensable to the Ambassador, Bill Miller, and they've had a
direct bearing on the success of Ukrainian-American relations.
Congratulations.
We have two more gentlemen that we'd like to honor today. Mohamed Aouar of
Algeria, from our American Embassy in Algiers. To Mr. Aouar, in
recognition of uncommon dedication to duty in a very dangerous environment,
extraordinary professionalism, unfailing good humor, and grace under
pressure in managing the local security guard force at our Embassy in
Algiers; congratulations, sir.
Finally, Mr. Venkitaraman Suresh from the American Embassy in New Delhi, in
India. In recognition of his outstanding management of the Mission housing
program, his conservation of financial resources amounting to millions of
dollars, and his exemplary performance in both the housing and travel
offices at New Delhi, he is the runner-up for Foreign Service National of
the Year, but is the nominee for the Bureau of South Asian Affairs.
Congratulations to you.
I just want to say a word of thanks for all of us here in the United States
to all of you who have done so much to distinguish yourselves and your
countries, and have done so much to help the United States over many, many
years. Congratulations, and I think all of the journalists will join me in
a round of applause for you.
(Applause.)
You don't have to sit through the entire briefing if you don't want to.
It's not part of being an award recipient. But you are most welcome.
Tomorrow is Foreign Service Day. Annually we honor the Foreign Service
Officers, current and retired, in special events here in Washington. All
of the events are open to the press corps.
I think that John Dinger issued a press release a couple of days ago with
the schedule of events. If you want to attend any of the events, they begin
at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow morning with presentations in the Dean Acheson
Auditorium, a speech by Under Secretary Tim Wirth, seminars in the
afternoon, concluding in the afternoon with seminars on the Balkans, on
diplomacy in the Information Age, on Department resources for the 21st
Century, the future of NATO, and on the importance of public diplomacy.
You are all welcome to attend.
We have a Foreign Policy Town Meeting scheduled for Memphis, Tennessee, on
Thursday, May 15th. This is co-sponsored by the Fogelman Executive Center
at the University of Memphis. That is May 15th. Ambassador Jeff Davidow,
our Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs will deliver remarks on
the President's trip to Mexico and Central America, and the Caribbean. He
will be joined by Ambassador Al Larson, our Assistant Secretary for
Economic Affairs, and by Maria Ionata of the Policy Planning Staff, who
will discuss environmental affairs.
Finally, we have a statement today that we are issuing on behalf of the
Monitoring Group regarding complaints filed to the Monitoring Group of
incidents that occurred on May 5th, and these complaints were filed by
Israel and by Lebanon. I would refer you to that if you have any
questions. Barry.
QUESTION: Zaire, if you would, please. Is Mobutu coming back, do you
suppose? Does the U.S. have any late word on any possible negotiations
over transition?
MR. BURNS: We don't know if President Mobutu will be returning to
Kinshasa after his visit to Gabon. We know he has met there with President
Bongo and other leaders from nearby African states.
This is a decision that he alone can make.
You know that Ambassador Richardson was in Paris today briefing the French
Government on the results of his diplomatic mission.
Ambassador Richardson is now returning to the United States.
The United States' objectives, as we watch this transition taking place,
are to first of all, end the fighting, achieve a cease-fire; second, to
ensure respect for human rights, the human rights of the citizens of Zaire;
and third, to try to promote, along with South Africa and the United
Nations and others, a peaceful transition.
There is no question that that transition is underway with the continued
march towards Kinshasa of the rebel alliance. That alliance military
victory seems likely in the coming days. But the future of Zaire is at
risk. Ambassador Richardson spoke to this today in Paris. The citizens of
Zaire, the international community and the United States are going to judge
the alliance and Mr. Kabila on the way they comport themselves in this
endgame.
As you know, we have had many concerns about the treatment of refugees in
and around Kisangani. We have made those clear to Mr. Kabila, and we have
now received assurances from him that those refugees will be well treated
and that they will be allowed to leave through the assistance of the United
Nations.
But the test here is to make sure that the actions, as well as the words of
the rebel alliance, meet a basic international standard.
We would submit a standard that the Zairian people would also want to have
for their own government. That test is, will the rebel alliance proceed in
a democratic fashion? We hope it will, and that is where your attentions
are directed. Will it respect the human rights of the citizens of the
country? And will the rebel alliance work cooperatively with President
Mobutu and with others in Kinshasa to avoid a bloodbath, to avoid
bloodshed, and to make sure that the end, the victory of this military
alliance, which is undoubtedly going to happen, that that takes place in a
peaceful way.
QUESTION: Do you have any word on whether Mobutu or the people he left
behind are now willing to take U.S. advice and enter negotiations for their
-- obviously, for their demise with the advancing rebels?
MR. BURNS: We do not know, Barry, what President Mobutu intends to do now
that the Libreville meetings have concluded.
His spokesman says that he'll be returning to Kinshasa tomorrow.
We don't know if that will take place or not. We'll have to wait and see,
along with the rest of you, how that happens.
We do hope that President Mobutu and Mr. Kabila might be able to meet. As
you know, the South Africans and the UN are talking about a possible
meeting next week. Before that happens, we hope that their seconds, their
advisers, could be in close touch so that the fighting might cease - and
there is terrible fighting today, 150 kilometers from the capital - and
that the transition that is clearly underway can proceed in a non-violent
way so that the citizens of Kinshasa are not subjected to war on their
streets.
QUESTION: Two questions - despite all the efforts, Richardson's efforts
and what not, you still have not - correct me if I'm wrong, it sounds like
you still have not gotten a reliable commitment from Kabila that there will
not be a bloodbath in Kinshasa; is that correct?
MR. BURNS: Well, I would just say that I think Ambassador Richardson's
trip was very successful because he helped along - obviously, under the
leadership of the South Africans and the UN - to put together the meeting
they had. There is now the promise of a second meeting. I refer you to
Mr. Kabila's public comments.
He said that he'd be willing, as you remember, to have a period of time to
allow for a transition.
Now, unfortunately, I don't know who started the fighting first in Kenge,
but there has been fighting, and very severe fighting and many hundreds of
people have died. Who is at fault; who started the fighting? We can't
say. We just know that both sides - the government and the rebels - ought
to be responsible for putting together a cease-fire.
QUESTION: That wasn't the question, though. Let me try it again. Do you
feel you have a commitment from Kabila to do what you want him to do, which
is to say not have a bloodbath when his forces come into Kinshasa? Do you
have that commitment?
MR. BURNS: I think we understand from our conversations with Mr. Kabila
that he'd very much like to avoid that. He, however, says also that he is
determined to take the capital. Our view is that he and others need to be
mindful of their own actions, which are a test of their credibility. There
is no reason for bloodshed in Kinshasa. There ought to be a way to develop
a peaceful transition in the coming days.
Now, we are encouraged by the statements by the South Africans and the UN
today that there might be a meeting next week. Obviously, Mr. Kabila, as
well as President Mobutu ought to put their efforts into peaceful meetings,
dialogue, rather than storming a capital city with many hundreds of
thousands, if not millions, of innocent people in it.
QUESTION: So the answer is no, there is no commitment.
MR. BURNS: Whether it's a commitment or not, we're going to have to judge
Mr. Kabila, as well as others in the region, on their actions. We'll be
watching the actions closely.
QUESTION: The other question is, how - also given the groundwork that
Richardson has supposedly laid -- how much cooperation are you getting from
Angola and Museveni and others who are in a position to put pressure on
Kabila to do what you want him to do, which is no bloodbath, democracy and
all that?
MR. BURNS: Yes, much of what Ambassador Richardson did this week, as you
know, was to travel to neighboring countries to reaffirm the view of the
United States as well as the United Nations that there ought to be peaceful
transitions, and that neighboring countries ought not to contribute to
continued warfare, but ought to contribute to a peaceful ending in Zaire.
We will have to judge some of those countries by their actions, as well, as
you know, because there have been widespread reports obviously of some of
these countries - not necessarily the ones you named -- but some
surrounding countries have been involved in the fighting, in running guns
to one side or another. We just think that all efforts in Africa, Central
Africa, these days ought to be turned towards a peaceful ending, a soft
landing, for the current government and for the transition.
QUESTION: So despite all of Richardson's efforts, despite the U.S.
holding up Museveni and others in the region as progressive, new African
leaders, it sounds, again, as if you have no real commitment from them. Or
you see no real evidence from them that they are encouraging Kabila to do
what you want him to do.
MR. BURNS: Well, I think the government that we would praise in Africa is
the South African Government, which has acted in the interest of preserving
-- of trying to re-instill peace, and to protect innocent civilians.
Millions of people are caught up in this civil war. The South African
Government has been true to its word and has really been the world leader
on this crisis.
We have tried to support the role of the South African Government.
I think other governments will have to live with what they are doing. We
will judge them, obviously. I think others will, as well, the United
Nations, on how they comport themselves. We don't think this is a time to
stimulate further fighting. We think this is the time to stimulate peace
and a peaceful transition.
QUESTION: Nick, have you all begun to focus on the issue of Mobutu's
assets and what should happen as he leaves, if he leaves? What should
happen to his assets in the United States; his assets perhaps in
Switzerland, which denied yesterday they had any?
MR. BURNS: I'm sure that's a question for Mr. Mobutu to ponder, as well
as for those who are going to be involved in the transition. I'm not sure
that the United States ought to have, or does have, any kind of direct
responsibility for that particular issue.
QUESTION: Do you know if he has assets here?
MR. BURNS: I do not know personally if President Mobutu has financial
assets or real estate in the United States. But you know, we have laws in
this country the govern the actions of any citizen or any foreigner who has
financial assets here.
I'm sure our laws will be upheld. But I am just not aware that the United
States Government sees itself as the primary actor responsible for
adjudicating that issue.
QUESTION: Are you looking into it?
MR. BURNS: Are we looking into that issue? I think really it is an issue
for Mr. Mobutu and for the Zairian Government.
It is obviously a very serious issue in Zaire itself, given the extent of
the financial empire of the Mobutu family. But it is not something, I
think, that the United States would publicly want to position itself on
right now.
I am sure that American diplomats have given this some thought, and I am
sure we have our views on this. I am sure we have talked to others about
our views. But I don't think it is appropriate for us to surface those
publicly.
QUESTION: Nick, why is Bill Richardson calling for a second summit
between Mobutu and Mr. Laurent Kabila? Did they fail to make a deal in the
first meeting on this transition of power and the safety of Kinshasa?
MR. BURNS: As you know, President Mandela announced, after the first
meeting on the South African naval vessel, that there ought to be and he
hoped that there would be a second meeting.
We believe that in meeting, the two leaders might be able to agree on a
transition that would avoid bloodshed in Kinshasa and save people's lives,
and make sure that a transition preserves at least what Zaire has now
physically and in their people, rather than subject the population any
further to civil war. That is a very compelling reason to seek a second
meeting.
QUESTION: No such arrangement was made, then, in the first meeting on the
ship?
MR. BURNS: I would just draw you attention to President Mandela's public
comments, and Deputy President Mbeki's public comments at the time, and
Ambassador Richardson's.
QUESTION: Nick, there has been reporting that there are large numbers of
Zairians who are getting ferries and planes out of Kinshasa these days. Do
we know the degree to which Mobutu's backers, families, government
officials may be leaving the country?
MR. BURNS: There have been widespread reports that a number of government
officials have left or are considering leaving Kinshasa by a variety of
means. I don't think it's our responsibility or, frankly, our position to
report on who those people are and what they're doing. It's not our - we
don't want to get in the way of anyone's personal security.
QUESTION: Are there people there to pick up the phone when the U.S.
Embassy calls the government of Mobutu?
MR. BURNS: Yes, I can tell you that Ambassador Simpson, in recent days,
has had high-level meetings with the most senior officials in the Zairian
Government, and even since President Mobutu departed for Gabon. So there
are people answering the phones. The government is working. It's not
working very well, obviously, under the circumstances. It hasn't worked
well for a number of years. But under the current circumstances, the
government is obviously stretched thin. We do want this transition to take
place peacefully and in an orderly way and, again, because that helps the
people of Zaire.
QUESTION: Do you think that there will be a second meeting if, as you
predict, Kabila's troops take Kinshasa? What would be the point of him
meeting with a dictator who's obviously powerless?
MR. BURNS: Well, I think we all have to face reality here.
As John said yesterday, we have to face reality, and the reality is the
rebel alliance is on the verge of a total military victory in Zaire.
That's the reality. But there is going to be a transition.
Now, how that transition proceeds is now the key question. Rather than a
continued military march on the capital city, with the attendant loss of
life and bloodshed, we would like to see a transitional period worked out
by meetings between either President Mobutu and Mr. Kabila, or their
advisers. If the South Africans can engineer such a meeting that would
avoid a military barrage of Kinshasa, that would be something the United
States would strongly favor and support.
QUESTION: But, as you and others have pointed out, this government of
Mobutu is, in effect, history. What role would he play in a transition,
since he has no power? He has no --
MR. BURNS: I think Mr. Kabila has set the terms publicly.
He has said, Kabila has said if President Mobutu is not willing to leave,
there will be a fight for Kinshasa. If he is willing to leave, there's a
possibility of a peaceful transition. Therefore, meetings at this point -
diplomatic meetings - ought to be the order of the day -- the wisest and
most rational way for everybody to proceed. A way has to be worked out
between the current government and the alliance to make a transition of
political power and economic power and governance. That ought to be done
in a meeting, peacefully, rather than through a fight.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - just if he doesn't go back?
MR. BURNS: Pardon?
QUESTION: Would there be a transition - because it almost sounds as if -
I'm a little confused --
MR. BURNS: Whether President Mobutu remains in Gabon or travels elsewhere
or goes back to Kinshasa, there has to be some kind of discussion to work
out a peaceful transition of power.
If there isn't that kind of discussion, then we assume that the war will
continue and that more people will die. That can't be in anyone's
interest.
QUESTION: With or without Mobutu in Kinshasa?
MR. BURNS: That's correct, because Mobutu's government is in power in
Kinshasa.
QUESTION: What happens if it leads to bloodshed? What will be the
consequences for Kabila and his government if there is bloodshed?
MR. BURNS: I don't want to assume there is going to be one. I don't want
to answer a hypothetical question based on that. I would draw you back,
Carol, to one of the first things that I said and something that was said
much more eloquently by Ambassador Richardson today; and that is that
there's a lot at stake for the people of Zaire, and the rebel alliance will
be judged on how they comport themselves in the days ahead and the weeks
ahead.
QUESTION: But if you are so vague how - I mean, how can you possibly
expect these kinds of words to have resonance there if you are just so
vague?
MR. BURNS: Because we have not been vague in private, where it counts, in
meetings with Mr. Kabila. I think he understands what is at stake here.
There have been a lot of questions about what happened in Kisangani.
Fortunately, the United Nations is now doing a superb job - the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees - a superb job of bringing those refugees out of
Zaire.
Mr. Kabila understands what is at stake for him and his reputation.
He now needs to think about being a responsible person who can lead a
government. In anticipation of that, he needs to think about ways to
preserve life.
QUESTION: But we --
MR. BURNS: I should say, I think to be fair, the people who remain in
Kinshasa, who have not left and who are currently officials of the Zairian
Government, they also have the same responsibility.
They need to act in such a way that they preserve human life, preserve
order and peace, as much as that can be preserved in this transitional
period.
QUESTION: But didn't you state that the American and international
companies in Zaire and its mineral resources, I mean, if Kabila takes power
in a way that is, you know, you consider inappropriate, I mean, is the
United States going to be able to block, you know, World Bank loans and
other kinds of investment in the country? Will you deny aid to reconstruct
Zaire? I mean, it's important.
MR. BURNS: But, Carol, you are asking me to answer a hypothetical
question, a worst-case hypothetical, and I can't do that. It is not in my
interest to do that. Why would I want to answer a question like that? We
have to see what Mr. Kabila does first.
What we hope is that he is going to act in a democratic fashion, in a
civilized fashion, with due regard for human life and for peace. That is
the standard that needs to be met here. If he meets that standard, we will
tell you. If he doesn't meet that standard, we can have this discussion.
But I don't want to anticipate negative behavior on his part or by the
rebel alliance. We hope that they have learned some lessons and are ready
to act in a decent way.
QUESTION: Nick, but the long and short of it is, you are willing to
accept Mr. Kabila as the leader of Zaire, a rebel leader who has taken -
overthrown the government by force of arms?
MR. BURNS: Sid, that is not our choice here. The United States does not
have a vote, last time I checked, in Zaire. We are not going to determine
who winds up as the leader of Zaire. I don't know who it is going to be,
who will emerge from a transitional period as the leader of Zaire after the
era of Mobutuism has finally ended.
That is not for us to decide. But we have enough interest in Zaire,
political and economic and historic and others, to assert a strong U.S.
presence throughout this period in our Embassy, and to assert a strong U.S.
interest in seeing Zaire get back on its feet.
We would like to see elections. We would like the see the people of Zaire
be given a choice for once. They have never been given a choice in the
history of the country as to who is going to lead them. We think that
there ought to be a free and fair election, and the best person should win
that election, obviously.
We hope it is a democrat. We hope it is someone who will want to take
Zaire to where South Africa is. That is a very tall test, but it is not
one that is unachievable. It can be met.
QUESTION: But there are ways to express yourself other than at that
ballot box, such as at the United Nations with sanctions, as you have done
against Burma and Serbia and so forth. Apparently Kabila's activities have
not met your threshold for distaste.
MR. BURNS: How could we possibly vote for UN or international sanctions
on a rebel movement that is in the bush? It is not yet a government. It
doesn't have a track record as a government, and you are asking me to say
the United States Government in July or August of 1997 will take the
following measures. I have never done that as spokesman. I'm not going to
do it now. You are asking me to answer a question that is unanswerable --
what is going to happen in Kinshasa? We don't know. So what I prefer to
do is tell you what we hope will happen, and it's a public encouragement to
those leaders from the United States.
QUESTION: But there are sanctions on the Sprska Republic, which is not a
nation. I mean, it's not unprecedented.
MR. BURNS: The Serbs - the Bosnian Serbs - have been for better or worse,
and almost always worse, the governing authority of the poor people who
have to live under its jurisdiction. They are - they have their hand out
for international aid, and we've not given them most of that aid because of
their reprehensible behavior. But they are a governing authority. The
rebel alliance has been mostly concerned with military tactics in a
guerrilla war. It's not a governing authority that anybody - any political
scientist - would recognize. Now, it may be in a week or two or three, or
somebody else may constitute that. We'll have to wait and see what happens
in the transition, who occupies the seat of power. We hope it's a democrat
- somebody devoted to elections, to cooperation with other countries, to
devote him or herself to the welfare of the people of Zaire, which has been
pretty much ignored for a long time.
QUESTION: It does, in fact, govern about two-thirds of Zaire right now.
MR. BURNS: I think govern is probably too strong a word to use. I mean,
it is a military force that occupies cities.
I think it intends to turn itself into a governing force, but I'm not sure
we give it that distinction yet.
QUESTION: Nick, would this government ask Mr. Kabila to have a cease-fire
to stand in place while these negotiations, the second --
MR. BURNS: Yes.
QUESTION: -- second negotiations are made?
MR. BURNS: Yes, yes, that is our position/
QUESTION: That is your position?
MR. BURNS: Yes.
QUESTION: And you would, I presume, prefer if, in fact, he is going to
take Kinshasa, he will walk in without bloodshed, rather than fight his way
in; is that your preference?
MR. BURNS: That's right. Bill, you've done it; you've summarized the
entire conversation.
(Laughter.)
Now we can move on to a much more productive discussion. Bill,
congratulations; it's good to see you back here. I'm so glad to be back in
this briefing room, talking about all these issues.
(Laughter.)
I missed all of you during our trip to Guatemala and Mexico and Russia.
QUESTION: Did Richardson or the U.S. - maybe I missed it - did they ask
Kabila to avoid bloodshed if and when he gets into Kinshasa?
MR. BURNS: Absolutely.
QUESTION: Thank you. I'm better off quoting you than --
MR. BURNS: To avoid bloodshed, yes, that's our main message.
QUESTION: And what was the answer?
MR. BURNS: Well, I mean, I can't quote back to you - Bill Richardson had
hours of conversation with him, and I can't quote back all the
conversation. We're going to have to judge Mr. Kabila - and we will judge
the others - by their actions.
QUESTION: You didn't get a yes.
MR. BURNS: Pardon?
QUESTION: If you got a clear yes, you wouldn't have to lay down these
admonitions, would you?
MR. BURNS: I think about two hours ago, at the beginning of this
conversation, I tried to answer that question by saying Mr. Kabila very
publicly said that he'd be willing to have a transition period as long as
President Mobutu stepped down. If President Mobutu did not step down, then
Mr. Kabila predicted a military offensive against Kinshasa. We're in favor
of a peaceful transition.
QUESTION: I heard that from Bill.
MR. BURNS: You mean our deputy government spokesman here.
QUESTION: Yeah, but I think you wouldn't quarrel then with the U.S. asked
Kabila not to use force - in fact, not even to try to get into Kinshasa; to
try to put his fate in negotiations with Mobutu next week, under South
African supervision, and you got an inconclusive answer. Is that fair
enough?
MR. BURNS: No, I don't want to agree to that characterization --
QUESTION: All right.
MR. BURNS: -- because I don't want to characterize Mr. Kabila's position.
I don't think that would be fair of me.
QUESTION: It wasn't yes or no, though, was it?
MR. BURNS: Well, it's a complicated situation, Barry, and what we hope is
that Mr. Kabila's forces and the government's forces will comport
themselves in a civilized way.
QUESTION: Yeah, I know what you'd like.
MR. BURNS: Dimitris.
QUESTION: Nick, we have an announcement yesterday in Athens about
discussions between Greece and Turkey, the committees of the wise men, as
they said; and also an announcement of a visit by a Cypriot Foreign
Minister here to meet Secretary Albright on June 6th.
MR. BURNS: Yes.
QUESTION: Do you have comment on either of these developments?
MR. BURNS: Yes, I can comment on both. First of all, the United States
does encourage Greece and Turkey to meet to discuss the many proposals that
have been made over a very long period of time to try to reduce tensions
between them. When Secretary Albright was Ambassador Albright, she visited
the Eastern Mediterranean, in July of 1996, and she put forward some
proposals for reduced tensions between Greece and Turkey. We hope those
and other proposals can be taken up.
Secondly, Secretary Albright will be very pleased to see the Cypriot
foreign minister -- Foreign Minister Kasoulides -- on June 6th.
They will discuss the current situation in Cyprus, the latest UN mediation
efforts - which we strongly support, by the way.
They will also discuss ways by which the United States can make a positive
difference in resolving the problems of Cyprus. I know that Secretary
Albright is looking forward to this, because she's intensely interested in
the Eastern Mediterranean. She wants to do whatever we can to help Greece
and Turkey reduce their tensions, and also to find a solution to the Cyprus
problem.
QUESTION: Can you say something on the mission by Carey Cavanaugh in
Athens - any readout on what's happened there?
MR. BURNS: Carey Cavanaugh is a fine diplomat. He's currently in the
region, in the Eastern Mediterranean, as one of his periodic trips to try
to see if the United States can be helpful to the parties.
QUESTION: Nick, new subject.
MR. BURNS: Yes.
QUESTION: There's a Reuter's story out of Tokyo, quoting Japanese
officials saying that the United States is now tying the issue of
humanitarian food aid to North Korea's willingness to join the four-party
talks. Is there such a --
MR. BURNS: I've not seen the Reuter's story, and with all due respect to
Reuters, which is a terrific news organization, has a wonderful
correspondent here in the State Department -- having said all that as
pretext to an answer, I can tell you the United States is not tying food
assistance to North Korea to the hope that the North Koreans might join the
four-party peace talks.
I would remind you that the United States is the lead contributor to the
current appeal by the World Food Program. We've said many times that if
there are future appeals by the World Food Program, we will take them very
seriously; and we mean that. We are not tying food aid in any way
whatsoever.
Now, there's been a lot of commentary out of Tokyo because there was a very
important trilateral meeting yesterday among the United States, the
Republic of Korea and Japan. Chuck Kartman, our Acting Assistant Secretary
represented the United States. They did discuss the worsening food
situation in North Korea in all of its dimensions.
The United States did not indicate at that meeting a change in policy on
this question of food aid. In fact, I know that the first ship, the
Galveston Bay, arrived at the port of Nampo yesterday.
It is currently off-loading many thousands of tons of corn and corn-soy
blend. The second ship will be arriving in just a couple of days. That is
from the first tranche of assistance that we pledged in February.
The second tranche of assistance, those ships will be underway soon, and a
total of $25 million in food aid will be delivered.
So we're going to continue with our commitments.
QUESTION: Nick, on Korea.
MR. BURNS: Yes.
QUESTION: Has the U.S. proposed alternative dates for the missile talks?
MR. BURNS: Well, that's what we plan to do. We plan to propose
alternative dates now that the North Koreans have said that the dates of
May 12th and 13th are inconvenient for technical reasons, whatever that is.
I can't explain that. Perhaps the North Koreans or someone else could
explain what technical reasons are. But we hope these talks can be
rescheduled. We want to have them because we're concerned about the issue
of missile proliferation.
QUESTION: You said you can't explain what technical reasons are. Do you
think this is a serious impediment, or do you have a sense the North
Koreans will come to the table in a few weeks?
MR. BURNS: Well, in the words of my former boss, Secretary Christopher,
the North Koreans are sometimes, perhaps most of the time, opaque. So
rather than try to give you a detailed answer as to why they've chosen to
postpone these talks, I think you should refer - perhaps if you tried to
tap into the website, the North Korean website, you could pose and e-mail
question to my counterpart, the North Korean Foreign Ministry Spokesman in
Pyongyang, and ask him what technical reasons are.
But we do hope that the North Koreans will accept our proposal to schedule
and to show up at missile proliferation talks, as well as to seriously
reflect upon the serious offer made by the United States and South Korea
for four-party talks. There's a lot on the table.
QUESTION: That's a much gloomier analysis, it seems to me, than what was
offered from that podium two days ago.
MR. BURNS: This podium?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. BURNS: No --
QUESTION: Not by you.
MR. BURNS: John and I have no - there's no difference in whether we're
gloomy or sunny. I think we almost always see eye to eye on these affairs.
QUESTION: Nick, how about --
MR. BURNS: I think maybe we're opaque on this. But in responding to an
opaque situation, sometimes the best thing is just to be straightforward.
QUESTION: Two days ago, it was put in terms of, hey, it's a technical
reason, we'll set another date.
QUESTION: And it will happen. And you're --
MR. BURNS: I completely agree with that brilliant statement by Mr.
Dinger.
QUESTION: Okay. Two days later now, the U.S. doesn't see any real hang-
up, nor does it understand what North Korea means by technical reasons; is
that correct?
MR. BURNS: I'm just saying I prefer not to tell you exactly why the North
Koreans chose to postpone the meeting because I'm not sure we know. They
cite technical reasons. All we know is that we want to have the meeting.
We think they ought to sit down with us because missile proliferation is a
very big issue of concern to us. But I thought John did a brilliant job
when I was away, yes, and I would gladly associate myself with the way he
described it two days ago.
QUESTION: Well, that's going off on a tangent. If you want to see --
MR. BURNS: I don't want to go off on a tangent.
QUESTION: If the U.S. wants to make sure they come to talk, one rather
obvious way is to propose new dates. Why can't you settle on new dates?
MR. BURNS: John, have we actually proposed new dates?
QUESTION: No, no.
MR. BURNS: We have. John says we have.
QUESTION: You haven't?
MR. BURNS: We have.
QUESTION: You have.
MR. DINGER: We proposed dates. We're working on it. We have proposed
dates.
MR. BURNS: We have proposed them. The North Koreans have not come back
and said we agree or disagree, right? We're in that stage of these --
QUESTION: You remember the word soon, two days ago? You proposed that
they meet soon; is that correct?
MR. DINGER: Within a few weeks hence.
QUESTION: Within a few weeks.
MR. BURNS: Within a few weeks hence.
QUESTION: Well, backwards would be impossible.
MR. BURNS: See, we're being - you never can say that the United States is
opaque; we're transparent.
QUESTION: Within a few weeks hence. Hence is unnecessary.
Within a few weeks would be good.
MR. BURNS: We're very transparent people and government.
QUESTION: All right.
MR. BURNS: We believe in transparency.
QUESTION: So in the meantime, have you kept an eye on what North Korea
may be doing in the way of proliferating? That could be a technical reason
- they've got a few jobs to finish off, a few packages to pack.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: The Washington Times is liable to find it out tomorrow, and
you'll have to deal with it anyhow, so -
(Laughter.)
MR. BURNS: God help us.
QUESTION: Have you been keeping tabs on their proliferation?
MR. BURNS: Barry, you're in a very suspicious --
QUESTION: Of North Korea? A little, yeah.
MR. BURNS: -- mood today.
QUESTION: A little suspicious.
MR. BURNS: Let me just tell you --
QUESTION: The U.S. Government thinks they're the world's number-one
proliferator. They've called off talks where you were going to have
difficult talks with them that you were going to call to their attention
your concerns about their proliferation.
You have no new date set. You don't know why they called off the talks.
So I wonder if you're keeping an eye on them and have picked up anything
disturbing.
MR. BURNS: We're keeping an eye on them --
QUESTION: Have you picked up anything disturbing?
MR. BURNS: -- as you would expect us to do, because we do find very
serious allegations about North Korea's missile program, obviously, and
some of its activities. That's why we want to have talks. We do have the
ability to monitor the activities of the North Koreans, and of course we do
that regularly and consistently because it's in our national interest to do
that. We hope, as John said, that the North Koreans will agree to the
resumption of the talks, to specific dates, and they will show up for the
talks. But I can't tell you the talks have been rescheduled until the
North Koreans agree to that.
QUESTION: Can I ask about the food thing?
MR. BURNS: Yes.
QUESTION: And in a non-prejuritive way. Nobody --
MR. BURNS: You mean your question or my answer?
QUESTION: Well, I am not - no matter how this question is interpreted.
MR. BURNS: Okay.
QUESTION: Is there any intention here to suggest the United States would
be so heartless as to condition delivery of food to starving people to the
political moves taken by their government?
Okay, so that's not the question. I distinctly remember --
MR. BURNS: I was about to answer that question.
QUESTION: Well, because you had said, we don't do that.
We are humanitarians.
MR. BURNS: It's true. We don't do that.
QUESTION: All right. Now, back in Korea, Secretary Albright said quite -
-
MR. BURNS: In February.
QUESTION: In February, when it seemed quite logical, that, indeed, the
political situation in Korea is likely to have a bearing on the food
situation. And I took that to mean, fairly obviously, that if North Korea
behaved better, there would be more of an inclination in the - they would
do better financially; economic conditions would ease. They would have
more money to buy food. They might get more food that way. Isn't that
what this is all about - without using the word tying? Isn't it true that
North Korea's political behavior has a lot to do with how much food they
will receive?
MR. BURNS: Well, I do remember Secretary Albright's comment.
I remember where it was made in the --
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. BURNS: -- right after lunch with the South Korean Foreign Minister.
That is not what Secretary Albright meant, and I have talked to her about
it a couple of times.
QUESTION: All right.
MR. BURNS: It's not what she meant at all.
QUESTION: Her pejorative. You understand.
MR. BURNS: No. I understand that. It's not what she meant. Let me tell
you just where I come from this morning. I just got back from Mexico last
night. I turned on NPR this morning. There was a very good report from
Tokyo by the very good correspondent there who said, essentially, the
United States has shifted gears and is now tying food aid to the four-
party talks.
I made inquiries this morning - John and I together - and we understand in
very clear terms that is not the case. Unfortunately, he's a very good
correspondent. I don't know what that correspondent heard from other
government officials, not U.S. but other governments.
But the United States is not tying food aid. We think we ought to respond
on a humanitarian basis.
Let me just give you the obvious evidence for that. We have not succeeded
yet in convincing the North Koreans to show up at four-party talks. We
haven't even succeeded in convincing them to show up at missile
proliferation talks. So we are not happy. We think they should have
showed up to both talks by now, and we hope they will in the future.
But we have not taken that unhappiness and changed our policy to deny them
food aid. We continue with the food aid. The Galveston Bay arrived
yesterday. There will be at least three more shipments arriving, totaling
$25 million. We remain open to further contributions should the World Food
Program say that that is necessary, even in the near future.
So I think we have made clear by our own actions that we are not tying food
aid - or any other word you want to use, Barry.
We are not linking it. We are not associating it, because there is a
humanitarian imperative here.
QUESTION: Nick, this discussion is a little bit misleading.
MR. BURNS: Well, not from my part, Carol. I'm sorry to just be very
quick to say that.
QUESTION: All right, that's not being critical of you.
I'm just - it's sort of by omission, really. On the one hand, the United
States does say it will proceed with its own humanitarian deliveries, and
it has. As you say, when the World Food Program asks, the United States
has responded. But it is also true that U.S. officials have said that
there will be no effort to - I mean, the amount of emergency food aid that
has gone to North Korea is very small compared to what the need is assessed
to be. And what U.S. officials have said is that there will no large-
scale effort, no systematic effort to deal with the food crisis in North
Korea until North Korea comes to the peace talks.
I mean, there have been a number of public comments that once North Korea
sits down at the peace table, then all things can be on the table. And so
there is a distinction here between the emergency food aid and the long-
term, larger effort, whatever that might be, to try to deal with this
issue.
MR. BURNS: Well, let's see if I can be helpful in clarifying --
QUESTION: I think that is what is confusing me.
MR. BURNS: -- in clarifying you - because I think you have asked a very
good question, and you have probably drawn it the way it should be drawn.
We do not favor the current economic system of North Korea, which is a
communist system, which has clearly failed the people. President Clinton
mentioned this a couple of weeks ago. We would like to see that system
changed because it's that system that has failed the North Korean people
and has led to the starvation and to the deprivation that millions of North
Koreans are now experiencing.
So are we going to put into North Korea billions of dollars of American, or
Western, or Asian money - either bilaterally or multilaterally to subsidize
a communist economic system? No way. We're not going to do that. But
that's not the question that we've been asked by the United Nation's World
Food Program. The World Food Program came forward with a limited appeal --
limited because it's not $5 billion, it's several hundred million. Excuse
me, no, it's not several hundred million, excuse me. Let's check the
figure. But it's a limited amount.
QUESTION: (Inaudible)
MR. BURNS: Let's check the figure, but it's a limited amount.
QUESTION: (Inaudible).
MR. BURNS: I think that was the figure and that rings true. We have
done, if you look at our $25 million contribution, the most of any country
around the world, and I think the World Food Program is satisfied by the
level of our assistance. So, we're going to respond on an emergency
humanitarian basis to try to get food to people who need it in a failing
system, but we are not going to spend billions of dollars of American money
to prop up a decrepit, ancient, oxymoron, which is communist economics.
There is the distinction that I think we can all draw for you.
Unfortunately, I think Barry's first question pertained to some of the
press reports coming out of Tokyo that we've decided even to hold up the
limited food assistance of that type of assistance, and that's what I heard
this morning in the press reports and I can tell you that's not the case.
So, I'd like to draw that distinction which I think is pretty clear.
QUESTION: Have American officials said to the North Koreans that if you
come to the four-party talks and if there is progress, et cetera, there
might be some assistance down the road?
MR. BURNS: What I think we've said, without betraying the confidentiality
of those negotiations, is that if you come to the four-party talks, many
things are possible in the relationship.
But I wouldn't just center on food aid. But I'd center on the future.
We'd like to eventually at some point have a more normal relationship with
North Korea. Now, that objective will really depend and be a function of
North Korea's ability to change and to adapt and to act in a way that is
consistent with international principles economically and politically.
It's a longer term objective.
QUESTION: Even if it were still communist North Korea?
MR. BURNS: We're going to continue to cooperate with North Korea on MIAs.
In fact, the talks are underway this week here in Washington headed by DOD
on that issue, on the Agreed Framework, on the four-party talks and on the
question of food.
There are possibilities, obviously, for cooperation that would emanate from
any kind of political normalization, but these are objectives that are far
in the future and that are going to be very difficult to achieve.
Yes? Still on North Korea?
QUESTION: I know that DOD has the lead in this issue, but can you report
on the progress on the MIA talks?
MR. BURNS: DOD has the lead, Mr. Wold, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense, is the lead on MIA issues. We have a State Department
representative there. I think I would prefer to let DOD characterize how
the talks are going. There are more than 81,009 cases of MIA from the
Korean War. There is an attempt to try to bring the families, some of the
American families together with a North Korean delegation this week here in
Washington and we hope that 50 years after the war - excuse me - 40-odd
years after the war, that might be possible to bring them together so that
the North Koreans can hear directly from American - New York - thank you -
the North Koreans can hear directly from American families what their
personal concerns are.
Thank you, Sid, for correcting me on that.
QUESTION: Does the United States have a voice on the World Food Program?
MR. BURNS: It's an agency of the United Nations. So, there are Americans
who work for it and since we're the largest financial contributor, yes, we
have a voice; but it is an agency of the UN and we work very well with it.
QUESTION: But the United States has input into the - has a voice on the
organization that determines how much is, in fact, an emergency ration of
food for the North Koreans.
MR. BURNS: Those decisions are made by the experts, by Ms. Bertini and
the experts on the World Food Program staff, so they are not in any way
dictated to by the United States or any other member country. We have a
voice in that Americans are in the organization, itself. In the annual
review of these organizations we can assess country by country whether we
are pleased by the performance of the organization. I don't want to
insinuate that somehow we're calling the shots of an independent UN
agency. We have a great respect for it because it has a very good track
record.
QUESTION: More on North Korea?
MR. BURNS: Still on Korea? Yes.
QUESTION: I understand that there are cases of missing Japanese citizens
allegedly kidnapped by North Korea. Did this issue come up in the trilat
talk in Tokyo? And is the U.S. willing to take some role in this issue,
perhaps, telling the North Koreans to take positive steps in this?
MR. BURNS: Well, that issue has come up in previous talks.
I know that Minister Ikeda raised it with Secretary Albright in Tokyo in
February when we were there. We have heard it many times from the Japanese
Government -- a description of this terrible problem that concerns many
people in Japan. It is an issue that the Japanese must work out, of
course, with the North Koreans and we would hope that the North Koreans
would be forthcoming in working with Japan.
If there is any way the United States could be helpful, I'm sure we would,
but I don't know if we have been asked to be a intermediary.
I don't believe we have. We very much hope that these very serious
allegations about young women being kidnapped could be put to rest or the
North Koreans could give some good answers to the Japanese Government about
what may or may not have happened. That is an issue clearly between those
two countries, but we are an ally of Japan and if we can be helpful, of
course, we would be. But that would be at the request of the Japanese
Government.
QUESTION: Just briefly. Nick, is it the policy of the United States in a
situation of famine in North Korea to intervene in a way to prevent
desperation on the part of that government or that populace, especially the
military in order to preserve peace on the Peninsula?
MR. BURNS: I'm not sure I understand the question, with all due respect.
(Laughter.) No, with all due respect.
QUESTION: It means, is it our policy really to, with food and everything,
to intervene, to keep people from becoming so desperate and the military
from becoming desperate -- as they are also starving -- that they might be
driven to take some kind of action against the South? That's the question.
MR. BURNS: Our policy is very simple and straightforward.
It is to try to help feed starving people. That is our policy.
QUESTION: Mr. Burns?
MR. BURNS: Yes, sir.
QUESTION: Mr. Burns, there has been a report in the Washington Times by
your good friend, Bill Gertz the other day --
MR. BURNS: Well, I probably would quibble with the relationship that you
described.
QUESTION: -- saying that --
MR. BURNS: I would quibble with it.
QUESTION: -- the arrest of a local DEA official in Islamabad amounted to
hostage taking. He was, of course, quoting the usual officials --
MR. BURNS: Right. The usual unnamed suspects.
QUESTION: -- who cannot be identified.
MR. BURNS: Right. Exactly.
QUESTION: And he said that this is going to affect this --
MR. BURNS: You mean they are so confident of their views that they can't
be identified.
QUESTION: So, he said the report said this was retaliation by the
Pakistanis against the arrest of an Air Force officer in New York on a drug
sting charge. And he also said this is going to affect - jeopardize, in
fact, the U.S.-Pakistan relations.
I was wondering if you have something on this?
QUESTION: On this, he quoted a State Department official.
QUESTION: A usual State Department official.
MR. BURNS: The usual suspects. They round up the usual suspects, yes. I
would refer you to the government of Pakistan for information on the
detention in Islamabad of Mr. Ayyaz Baluch.
He is a Pakistani national employed by the Drug Enforcement Agency in
Pakistan. The United States has expressed its concern for Mr. Baluch at
senior levels of the government of Pakistan and we are following this case
very closely. Pakistan has provided assurances to us that Mr. Baluch's
case will be handled in accordance with Pakistani law. I think it is a
very delicate, sensitive issue, the status of Mr. Baluch, and we will
continue to discuss this privately with the Government of Pakistan.
QUESTION: Let's get into an easy question. The Russian views on NATO
expansion.
MR. BURNS: Thanks, Barry.
QUESTION: Sometimes they get almost agreeable with the U.S. and sometimes
they get very disagreeable and very worrisome if they don't like what
you're doing. That seems to be the bottom line. But do you want to attach
a figure to how much of the charter has been completed and match notes with
Mr. Yeltsin, or what?
MR. BURNS: Well, let me just say, I note the United States is very
pleased by the very constructive discussions that Minister Primikov and
Secretary General Solana had in Luxembourg the other day. There is a next
meeting scheduled for May 13th. We have a lot of hope that more progress
can be made in that meeting.
Secretary Albright and Deputy Secretary Talbott are very, very much
concerned by this issue, following it very closely, talking to both the
Russians and to NATO officials about these negotiations.
We hope very much that it will be possible to work out an agreement between
NATO and Russia so that that agreement can be signed on May 27th in Paris.
If that is the case, that will be a considerable achievement along the road
that we are traveling, which is to set up a new relationship between NATO
and Russia.
Sometimes, whether we are 80 percent there, or 90 percent, or as President
Yeltsin said today, 95 percent of the way there, sometimes the last few
percentage points are the most difficult to negotiate. I think we are
involved in very difficult, very tough sensitive negotiations. I know that
Secretary Albright felt that she made progress last week in Moscow. I
think we understand that Secretary General Solana made further progress.
We have great respect for Mr. Primakov, as a negotiator. He is negotiating
in a very cooperative, good faith, constructive way. We want to work this
agreement out if we can, and that remains, I guess, the bottom line of the
American view right now, Barry.
QUESTION: Can you answer these questions, please (inaudible)
MR. BURNS: I'm going to answer. But let me just stay on Russia, if we
could.
QUESTION: I'm so sorry.
QUESTION: Is the May --
MR. BURNS: But I thought it was a brilliant answer.
QUESTION: Sorry.
QUESTION: Is the May 13th meeting a make-or-break meeting?
MR. BURNS: I wouldn't say it's make or break because we understand that
we need to work out an agreement before May 27th if there is going to be a
signing.
QUESTION: Right.
MR. BURNS: If people are going to get on airplanes and fly to Paris, you
have to leave before the 27th of May. I don't think we want to build up
the May 13th meeting and put that level of expectations on it.
We have made a lot of progress. I think the Helsinki meeting between
President Clinton and President Yeltsin was a break-through meeting back in
March because it clearly indicated that both presidents truly wanted a deal
and were willing to negotiate on that basis, a basis of good faith.
Secretary Albright's travel to Moscow last week was a very important trip.
It was well worth it, excellent discussions with Minister Primakov.
Although they didn't agree on all the issues, the tone was very good. So
we are hopeful, but we are not there yet. We need to keep our eyes focused
on the objective.
QUESTION: Speaking of the Helsinki meeting and the last meeting between
Albright and Primakov, I noticed none of the tension that might be
attendant with the 1962 Missile Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis. And Yeltsin
is reported from Moscow today as having said this whole issue - the NATO-
Russia confrontation - was the most serious dispute between the two
countries since then, since that crisis. Was that hyperbole for a domestic
audience? Or is there something more going on that we don't know about?
MR. BURNS: I don't wish to respond because I personally have not seen
that statement. I saw the other, more positive statements that were made
by President Yeltsin saying, we are 95 percent of the way there. So I
can't respond to that.
But I can say, Steve, I have been involved in U.S.-Russian relations for
seven years, and the tone is excellent. The cooperation between Minister
Primakov and Secretary Albright is about as good as it can be, given the
relationship between our two countries, which is a very good relationship.
There is no question on our part that the Russians are negotiating in good
faith, that this is a very difficult issue for them - given Russian history
in this century, given Russia's own conception of its national security
interests. The stakes are very high because what we are essentially doing
here is trying to reorient, secure the architecture of Europe in the next
century. It's a big, big issue, with considerable ramifications for all
the NATO countries, Russia, and all the countries in between, the Central
European countries.
I think that's why maybe sometimes you see statements and rhetoric that
have this sense of history attached to them. But we remain positive that a
deal is desirable, and it is possible, although we are not there yet. It
is absolutely true that very difficult, tough work needs to be done to
complete these negotiations. Yes, sir, all the way back.
QUESTION: Thank you. On G-8, apparently the community in Denver is not
entirely enthusiastic about having this going on and the McVeigh Trial
going on at the same time. I'm wondering if that is in whole or in part
the reason for the Secretary's visit there next week. And if so, what she
hopes to do to try to generate some additional enthusiasm.
MR. BURNS: Right. I don't think we have told everybody else about that
visit. Maybe now is a good time to do that. Secretary Albright intends to
travel to Denver, next Tuesday, where she will meet with the mayor, other
community leaders, organizers of the G-8, the Group of Eight Summit, in
Denver, and also make a public appearance and talk to some of the citizens
of Denver.
As you know, that is her home town, here in the United States.
That is where she spent the most time as a kid. It's where she went to
high school. It's where her father taught at the University of Denver. So
she has an attachment to the city and to the State of Colorado. So she is
looking forward to going back.
She does want to just take stock of how the preparations are proceeding for
the Denver Summit. It's a very, very important summit. Russia is going to
play a role at that summit that is elevated. That, I think, speaks to the
important relationship that all of us have in the West with Russia. She
wants to discuss specifically any way that we can further the preparations
for Denver. She is very much looking forward to the visit. I thought that
tomorrow I'd have more to say about this, and I will have more to say about
it.
QUESTION: No, it was out there already, I'm sorry.
QUESTION: It's been in both the --
MR. BURNS: Excuse me?
QUESTION: It's been in both the papers out there already.
MR. BURNS: No, it's fine. It's just --
QUESTION: Not through anything --
MR. BURNS: Listen, no problem. I just - no problem. Today is as good as
tomorrow. But she is looking forward to the trip.
QUESTION: Nick, can you address the question embedded in there about
concerns on the McVeigh Trial going on at the same time as the G-8? Is
that going to have --
MR. BURNS: When the decision was made last year - more than a year ago, I
believe - by the President and others and by Governor Romer and others - to
have the summit in Denver, I don't believe at that time - in fact, I'm sure
at that time that the judge had not made the decision to hold the McVeigh
Trial in Denver.
So we have to live with the McVeigh Trial. It's a very important trial for
the American people.
The summit can go on and the trial can go on simultaneously and effectively
and productively. We don't believe the trial is going to upset in any way
the planning for the summit or the implementation, the meetings that are
going to be held on the 21st and 22nd of June.
QUESTION: A senior Tibetan monk convicted. The Dalai Lama was here. You
talked to the Chinese for the umpteenth time about human rights. I know we
have a multi-faceted foreign policy.
But would you say that your pleas on behalf of Tibetan culture are
succeeding?
MR. BURNS: Well, we have obviously seen the report that a senior Tibetan
monk, Mr. Chadrel Rinpoche has been sentenced to six years in prison. The
United States is deeply disturbed by this decision. We would note that Mr.
Rinpoche has been detained for nearly two years, apparently, we think, in
violation of Chinese law - and detained before his conviction.
Under the provisions of the Revised Criminal Procedure Law which went into
effect on January 1st of this year, such a lengthy detention period of two
years would have required action by the National People's Congress Standing
Committee upon a request by the Supreme People's Procurator. That didn't
happen. He was held without being brought to trial for more than two
years, and that, to us, apparently is a violation of Chinese law.
We would also note that his trial was held in secret, without due process
safeguards, which, of course, does not meet international standards - any
notion of international standards. We were surprised to hear of the
conviction, frankly, because the events in question for which he was tried
took place many years ago.
We urge China to ensure full exercise of religious freedom, as set forth in
its own constitution. We urge China to release all people imprisoned in
China simply because they have expressed divergent religious or political
views from the Chinese Government.
We urge China to preserve Tibet's unique cultural, linguistic, and
religious heritage.
We also reiterate our call to the Chinese Government to address the
continuing concerns of the international community regarding the boy
designated by the Dalai Lama as the Panchen Lama, and we urge China to do
so that the boy and his family can receive visitors, if he and his family
wish to do so, and that this boy might be able to return to his home in
Tibet as a free person, and his family as a free family. That has not
happened. So we do have very deep-seated concerns about that is happening
in Tibet to people who simply want to practice their religion. Yes, sir.
QUESTION: Yes.
QUESTION: Okay.
QUESTION: Follow-up.
MR. BURNS: I think Sid wants to follow up just for a moment.
Yes.
QUESTION: Do you think the Tibetans should have the right to pick their
own religious leaders? Or do you agree that this arrangement between the
Chinese and the Tibetans on selecting the Panchen Lama is appropriate?
MR. BURNS: We have long believed that the mechanism for formally
recognizing or identifying a reincarnated Lama is a religious matter. It's
a religious matter. For that reason, we have not taken a specific position
on what should be the specific steps taken in identifying or recognizing a
reincarnated Lama. That we think is for the Tibetan Buddhists and others
to work out.
We have not taken a position on that.
But we clearly feel that since the Dalai Lama has recognized a reincarnated
Lama, a young boy and his family, that that young boy and his family have
been taken away from a normal practice of Tibetan Buddhism, that that boy
should be returned to Tibet and allowed to practice his religion, along
with his family's religion, freely. But we haven't said we think this
person or that person should occupy that position.
QUESTION: But you know that the practice is that the Chinese pick --
MR. BURNS: Yes, we are very well aware of that.
QUESTION: -- for the Tibetans, their religious leaders.
MR. BURNS: Yes, and the Dalai Lama objects to that, and what we have said
is that we think this problem, a very obvious problem, ought to be worked
out, and the steps to recognize a reincarnated Lama ought to be worked out
between the Tibetan Buddhists and the Chinese Government. We have not
identified an individual who we would recognize. We think the process has
not been followed very well because this young boy, identified by the Dalai
Lama himself, has been spirited away from Tibet and is not able to receive
visitors.
QUESTION: Not to belabor it, but why should the Chinese have any say at
all in who the Tibetans pick as their religious leaders? And why should
you say that they should have say?
MR. BURNS: Sid, I think I would prefer to make a different point, with
all due respect. You have asked a good a question.
It's a difficult one for someone like me to answer. This is a very
sensitive religious issue which has now political overtones, given the
problems in Tibet.
We don't believe that anyone's cause is going to be served if we become
part of the argument. We prefer to support the principle of religious
freedom, and support the right of a young boy to return to Tibet and
practice his religion freely. But we prefer not to inject ourselves into
the religious and political debate by preferring one person or another.
QUESTION: How does the U.S. rate its performance? I mean, you've made
your compromises. You compromise on this. You compromise by making these
declarations about Tibet's cultural rights, but being careful to say within
China, and you have the sentencing here. I mean, of course, nobody knows
how many other people would have been sentenced under different conditions.
Would you say the U.S. is making headway in human rights in China? All the
political opposition is in prison; what else is there?
MR. BURNS: I disagree with the way you've phrased your question and I
take issue with the premises of your question.
QUESTION: Well, there is a compromise here.
MR. BURNS: You name one country in the world, one country, any country,
Europe, North America, Latin American, Africa, Middle East, Asia,
Australia, name any country that has spoken out more boldly, more clearly
and more consistently for human rights in China. Name one country.
QUESTION: Name one country that has more leverage than the United States,
and chooses not to use it entirely.
MR. BURNS: And I would also reverse in my own view, reverse the way
you've asked the final question --
QUESTION: I mean, you know --
MR. BURNS: -- judge China.
QUESTION: Venezuela can't do anything to force China to change its human
rights policy.
MR. BURNS: -- judge the responsible governing authorities in Beijing
about whether people are free in China or not. It is not the
responsibility of the United States that there are no political dissidents
in China, that thousands of people are in jail.
QUESTION: Of course not.
MR. BURNS: It is our responsibility to speak to up for those people and
we do that.
QUESTION: I'm just saying how do you rate the success or lack of success
of the U.S.' carefully compromised policy?
MR. BURNS: It is very clear that China has a failed record.
China has a failed record on human rights. The United States is the major
defender of the human rights of the Chinese people and I'm not going to
submit to your question that somehow the United States is at fault, which
is implied, for the current situation.
QUESTION: I just - how are you doing?
MR. BURNS: How are we doing or how are the Chinese doing?
QUESTION: I'm just asking you. Do you think you're bending them? Do you
think you are getting them to --
MR. BURNS: The Chinese know that this issue will remain a central part of
our relationship, and it will continue to be a discussion at every
opportunity with the Chinese. We stand up for human rights around the
world, Barry, quite consistently.
QUESTION: I know you do.
QUESTION: I'm a little confused by your answer to the question.
MR. BURNS: On the Panchen Lama?
QUESTION: Yeah, if the selection of a Lama is a religious issue, why
shouldn't it be left to religious leaders?
MR. BURNS: Judd, I don't know any other spokesman around the world,
frankly, or government or ministry of foreign affairs that even comments on
this issue besides us. We comment because it is an important issue of
religious freedom. You have to make a tactical choice.
Does the United States want to inject itself as an actor in these
individual questions of human rights and say we agree with this decision,
we don't agree with that decision, we agree with this person and not that
person. It is clearly a religious dispute and a political dispute between
China and the Tibetan Buddhists.
We have enunciated a very clear principle of support for religious freedom.
But we chose not to say that we are going to back this religious leader
versus that religious leader - very clear.
QUESTION: Some of Turkish press claim that your terrorism report
described the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan as a frank, sincere and
trustworthy personality.
MR. BURNS: I don't remember that characterization on the human rights
report, frankly. I would think that that is not a fair characterization of
our report.
QUESTION: Okay.
MR. BURNS: He has not been on our dance card, as far as I can tell.
QUESTION: Okay, on the same report, some news items carry on that the
United States give the green light for the Turkey - have a dialogue with
the PKK. Do you have any --
MR. BURNS: You know, the United States has not given a green light in
Turkey just as we didn't give one in Israel for the Palestinians. We don't
give green lights. We think that terrorists ought to be hunted down and
apprehended for what they do to innocent civilians, whether it is in Turkey
or whether it is in Israel. We condemn the bombing of the Tel Aviv
Café.
We condemn terrorists acts in Turkey perpetrated by the PKK.
We have a common policy against terrorists around the world.
QUESTION: Nick, before we break up can you tell us about Dennis jaunting
around?
MR. BURNS: We have a couple of other questions. I'm not sure he's
jaunting around today. He's in very serious discussions.
He's met with the Prime Minister of Israel. He has met with Chairman
Arafat. He is going to have additional meetings with both of them. He
spoke publicly today and said that his goal is to try to re-instill some
confidence between them and to get their talks going again. We are going
to keep at it until that is accomplished.
I think he feels things have gone okay so far, but, of course, he is not at
the end of his trip.
MR. BURNS: Yes.
QUESTION: Yesterday a Senate committee failed to pass legislation to
reinstate extradition in Colombia. Do you have anything on that ?
MR. BURNS: We're very disappointed that the Colombian Congress has
apparently postponed further action on extradition, since the United States
believes that extradition would aid Colombia in its efforts to deal with
its narco-trafficking problem. We're very concerned that before the
Congress goes out of session, there be sufficient time for the government,
which does support extradition, the Colombian Government, to take this
issue back and to see if that 8-to-8 vote can be broken.
Extradition is important to fight the narco-traffickers. We want to work
cooperatively with the Colombian people and the Colombian Government.
Extradition would allow us to do so in a very meaningful way. We call upon
the Colombian Congress to do the right thing and to allow the Colombian
Government which wants to take this step to proceed in cooperation with us.
Yes.
QUESTION: If the extradition doesn't pass in Congress, is it going to
jeopardize the possibility for Colombia to be re-certified this year?
MR. BURNS: Well, certification of Colombia or decertification will be
made on the basis of the actions of the Colombian Government itself. The
Colombian Government, in this particular instance, is doing the right
thing. It is the right policy and we look forward to working with the
Colombian Government on this issue.
The Colombian Congress now needs to agree and that is a parliamentary
process and we hope very much will agree to extradition.
I can't forecast for you what our decision is going to be made on
certification.
QUESTION: But is it that important? I mean, how important is extradition
in the certification - in the conditions for Colombia?
MR. BURNS: It is one of many issues that will make up, that will
determine our decision on the certification issue.
QUESTION: I want to ask you about Perafan, the drug dealer that is still
captured in Venezuela. You have asked for his extradition.
Can you confirm that the U.S. has agreed not to give him a sentence beyond
30 years or a life sentence?
MR. BURNS: I would find that very hard to believe since the courts in the
United States are independent of the government, and the government - I
find that very hard to believe. Maybe what we should do is take the
question of Mr. Perafan and see what we can say about him, what we can and
cannot say. I think we say very little because extradition, of course, is
a process upon which we have very little to say. Yes, sir?
QUESTION: Mr. Burns, as I stated earlier, this was described as hostage
taking by the Pakistanis in retaliation against the arrest of the officer
in New York, and also that it will jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan relations. Do
you agree with that?
MR. BURNS: This is a very serious issue between the United States and
Pakistan, and we are going to keep our discussions private. I'm not going
to engage in any kind of negotiations in public on this issue.
Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 2:27 P.M.)
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