U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 95/10/02 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

From: hristu@arcadia.harvard.edu (Dimitrios Hristu)

U.S. State Department Directory

Subject: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 95/10/02 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN

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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

U.S. Support for Peace Implementation Force ...............14-18

Assistant Secretary Holbrooke's Mtgs. in Region ...........15

--Ceasefire Issue..........................................15-16

Expanded Mtg. of Contact Group in Rome ....................16

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MR. BURNS: Anything else on this issue? Bosnia.

Q Mr. Dole yesterday, Robert Dole, said that he got an impression on Friday from the briefing at the White House that U.S. troops would go to Bosnia as peace enforcers. He said that it's a bad idea right now because they would not go as peace-makers.

Nick, can you tell us anything about what Willy Claes had to say today, or what the Administration's policy is? Is it firmly against sending in U.S. troops to make peace in Bosnia? I understand also that Richard Holbrooke said that they're far from a cease-fire.

MR. BURNS: There are a couple of questions there. Let me deal with them, I think, in the order in which they were asked, Bill.

I think on the first one, the Administration has made a very clear case that we would support -- and we have said this now for a couple of years -- a peace implementation force, should the parties arrive at a peace agreement that needs to be implemented.

As the NATO Secretary General said just a few minutes ago upstairs, it is exceedingly difficult to define the nature of that operation when we don't even have the shape of the peace yet. They haven't decided on what basis they're going to make peace. They haven't decided -- and I'm talking about the parties now -- on who's going to have what part of the land. Until we know the answers to those questions, it will not be possible to know specifically what the mission is.

But I think in general what we're talking about here is a NATO-led force -- certainly, the core of it would be NATO and United States participation would be lodged firmly within NATO -- that would help the Bosnians and the Bosnian Serbs and the Croatians to implement a peace plan. In this case, these forces would be trying to keep the peace, the peace that would have been established at a peace conference. I think that's probably the appropriate way to describe it.

On your second question, Dick Holbrooke has been very active in his shuttle mission over the weekend. He was in Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo and Sofia in Bulgaria. He spoke to the Secretary this morning. I spoke to him just before coming out here. He had just finished a two-hour meeting with President Izetbegovic. Those talks focused on a cease- fire.

During this shuttle mission, he has put a cease-fire squarely on the table as the next great hurdle for the parties to this conflict. He said that they had had very substantive discussions on a cease-fire. Also a discussion of the constitutional principles that will be one of the bases for a peace conference.

He said very clearly to the press, as well as to us in private, that all of these countries and all the parties agree on the need for a cease-fire, but they disagree on how to achieve a cease-fire, which is a fairly important point.

So he's going to continue his discussions on this. He's going to be overnighting in Zagreb. He'll be in Belgrade tomorrow for a discussion with President Milosevic. He'll return to Sarajevo on Wednesday to meet with Izetbegovic and Silajdzic and the others in the Bosnian leadership.

On Thursday, there will be a Contact Group meeting, an expanded meeting of the Contact Group, in Rome. So I think you can see from his schedule that we're going to drive, we hope, forward this week to make progress on the issue of a cease-fire, which we think is terribly important to accomplish in order to prepare for a peace conference.

But I would like to note that we have said quite consistently that while a cease-fire is highly desirable, it is not, by itself, an American condition for the convening of a peace conference. There have been examples in the past -- certainly, Vietnam and Korea are two -- where peace talks have occurred while, unfortunately, fighting continued.

We would prefer to have a peace conference begin and end with a cease-fire. If it is not possible to reach that, we will still continue our objective towards a peace conference.

Q But, Nick, is a cessation of hostilities in the areas to be affected by the deployment of NATO troops, a complete cessation of hostilities, requisite by U.S. policy for our lending troops to a NATO effort?

MR. BURNS: That's a good question. It's also a different question. I was speaking about the convening of a peace conference. Clearly, it's not going to be possible to put an international military force into the area to implement a peace if there isn't a peace. Clearly, one of the conditions for a successful peace conference is a cease-fire; that the fighting will stop, and that the parties will agree to live together peacefully. That's a condition for the end of the peace conference, but perhaps not for the beginning of one.

Q Nick, Mr. Claes upstairs talked about the need for a robust U.S. presence in a peace -- the word was "peace something force" -- I want to use the right one -- "peace implementation force." Are you confident that the Congress will allow you to send a robust U.S. presence to take part in the peace implementation force?

MR. BURNS: The United States is the leader of NATO. The United States is the strongest military power in NATO. If NATO is to be the backbone of a peace implementation force, it must be led by the United States. The United States must contribute a substantial number of the forces. I believe the Pentagon has talked, certainly, about a substantial number that could approach 50 but would not exceed 50 percent of the force.

We have not made any specific commitments in terms of numbers, and I think will not until the outline of a settlement and the mission of a force are more clear. But, clearly, the United States cannot abdicate its responsibilities as the greatest power in the world, as the leading NATO power, and, clearly, as the country that has made the difference over the last two or three months.

The United States led the drive at the London Conference in July for a substantial NATO response. We formed the backbone of the subsequent NATO response -- our pilots, our aircraft -- in early September, and we are leading the peace initiative. Why would we lead the effort to stop the war -- successfully stop it in many respects -- lead the effort to lift the siege of Sarajevo, lead the effort to apply NATO airpower, lead the effort on peace -- why would we do all of that and then at the end of the day when peace was achieved, say we're going to go home.

It's not in our country's interest. It's not, I think, what the American people want us to do. The President and the Secretary had a very good meeting on Friday across the street from the White House with the congressional leadership. The President and Secretary made the case for a substantial United States involvement, and we will meet our commitments in that regard.

Q If I can just add that Senator Dole on one of the talk shows over the weekend said that he thought that U.S. presence in the air and on the water was all right, but he wasn't in favor of troops on the ground. He thought the Europeans ought to be able to take care of that, in what is, after all, Europe. How do you respond?

MR. BURNS: Trying to end the war in the Balkans has been exceedingly difficult, and it has required multiple uses of military force. Achieving a peace and consolidating a peace is not going to be done by air surveillance or naval presence alone. It will be done by people on the ground.

The United States, as one of the authors of a peace agreement -- if it happens -- will certainly have a responsibility and a self-interest to help to police the peace once it occurs. This is not a commitment that has been made lightly, but it's been made because we have very real interests here. The credibility of the United States is at stake. What kind of a leader of NATO would we be if we asked NATO countries to contribute troops as part of a NATO operation and then didn't show up ourselves.

Q Sri Lanka?

MR. BURNS: Before we get to Sri Lanka, any more on Bosnia? Okay.

Q Last week, there was a report that the (inaudible) attacked some civilian targets. Do you have any information on that?

MR. BURNS: I don't have any specific information for you. It's a question I'll be glad to look into, though, for you.

Carol.

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(The press briefing concluded at 2:5l p.m.)

END