U.S. Department of State 95/08/04 Daily Press Briefing

From: hristu@arcadia.harvard.edu (Dimitrios Hristu)

Subject: U.S. Department of State 95/08/04 Daily Press Briefing

Office of the Spokesman

CROATIA

  Military Attack on Rebel Serb Forces; US Policy ........  1-6

  Possible  Risk of Conflict Expansion ...................  1

  NATO Role, UNPROFOR, Rapid Reaction Force ..............  2

  Safety of UN Peacekeepers; Death of Dane, Poles Wounded   2

  Possible Air Strikes Against Government Forces .........  3-4

  Peace Talks, Package; Rebel Reinforcements .............  4-5

  Legal Interpretation of Croatian Military Action .......  5

  U.S. Contacts with Croats, Belgrade Serbs ..............  5-6

  Krajina Serb Troops Around Bihac .......................  6

  Bildt Comparison of Tudjman Actions & War Criminals ....  6-7

  Communications with Russia on Croatia Situation ........  14

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

  Resignation of Prime Minister Silajdzic ................  4

[...]

MR. JOHNSON: Is Mr. Gedda or Mr. Schweid doing the honors today?

Q What do you have on the situation in Croatia?

MR. JOHNSON: As you all, I am sure already know, the Croatian military forces this morning launched an attack on rebel Serb areas known as U.N. Sectors North and South.

The United States regrets this resort to force and we have called on all sides to exercise restraint and to respect the safety and rights of civilians, POWs, and especially peacekeepers. We've conveyed our views to the Croatian Government, to the leaders of the so-called Krajina Serbs, and to the Government of Serbia.

As we have made clear all long, we believe that the problem of reintegrating Serb-majority areas into Croatia should be resolved through political dialogue and not on the battlefield.

I'd note that the United States worked hard, especially in the person of Ambassador to Croatia Galbraith, to achieve a political solution. We regret very much that Croatia chose not to pursue this, and we would urge the parties to return as soon as possible to the bargaining table.

Q Do you have any far-reaching concerns about what this might lead to? Is this part of your Balkans domino theory?

MR. JOHNSON: I wouldn't describe it in quite those terms, but we've stated in the past that the risk of the outbreak of hostilities on this scale does risk a larger war and that is one of the many reasons we regret that this has taken place.

Q And is there any role for NATO to prevent the spread of conflict?

MR. JOHNSON: We have UNPROFOR on the ground; we have the Rapid Reaction Force on the ground. I think the President earlier today made a decision to provide another $l7 million of resources in order to help the Rapid Reaction Force deploy. But at this point we haven't had a request from the U.N., from the UNCRO, for any type of NATO support.

Q Do you have a report that some U.N. peacekeepers have been either surrounded or kidnapped, or whatever?

MR. JOHNSON: I don't have a report about any surroundings or kidnappings. I do know that one Danish peacekeeper has been killed and two Poles were wounded. These were peacekeepers attached to UNCRO, which is the successor in Croatia to UNPROFOR. I would note again that we condemn all hostile actions against U.N. peacekeepers, and we regret very much the death of the Dane and the wounding of these two Poles.

Q David, what information does the U.S. Government have about President Samper's links to the cocaine cartels --

Q Can we stay on Croatia for a moment?

MR. JOHNSON: Do you want to move off of Croatia?

Q For example, I'd like to ask you a question on what you just said on the --

MR. JOHNSON: We'll get to that later.

Q Does the U.S. know which side -- as a result of whose fire was this Danish person killed and to (inaudible)?

MR. JOHNSON: I do not. I don't think that we have much information at all about the circumstances of this man's death.

I would note that U.N. observation posts along the border of Croatia and Serb-held territory came under Croatian tank fire last night after they refused to stand down their posts. What I do not know is that the casualties that we're aware of were the result of that fire or not.

Q Is there any leverage other than exhortation that the United States has in reaching the Croatian Government to put pressure on them to pull back?

MR. JOHNSON: I think for the moment what we're trying to do is to urge them to pull back and to use our diplomatic resources to do so. I'm not going to exclude any other type of -- to use your word -- "leverage," but I think at this point we are concentrating on the diplomatic efforts that we have at our disposal.

Q Did you say "urge them to pull back"? Because that wasn't in your original statement when you talked about going to the bargaining table.

MR. JOHNSON: Okay, "to restrain themselves."

Q All right. Are you urging them to pull back, or aren't you?

MR. JOHNSON: I think that the language I'd prefer to use is "to urge restraint."

Q Okay. So you're striking that previous statement from the transcript?

MR. JOHNSON: We're not under Judge Ito's rules here (laughter), so I wouldn't use his language. But if you noted me having used a verb that I would -- I'd prefer to use the word "restraint" because it's the word that's in front of me on this piece of paper.

Q So you're not urging them to pull back?

MR. JOHNSON: We're urging them to exercise restraint.

Q Well does that mean pull back, or not pull back?

MR. JOHNSON: I think you can draw your own conclusions there.

Q No I can't. I'm totally unable to draw any conclusions whatsoever.

MR. JOHNSON: My apologies to you then.

Q David, ABC Radio reported this morning that UNPROFOR had, I believe, threatened the Croatian Government with airstrikes. Can you shed any light on this? Can you confirm that this has been done or not?

MR. JOHNSON: I have seen some wire reports, which are not terribly well sourced, about that. I'm unaware of any request that's come to NATO for any type of air activity related to this.

Q A request has not come to NATO?

MR. JOHNSON: I'm unaware of any request that's come to NATO for that.

Q David, the Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdic resigned today also, citing -- according to his statement -- the failure of the U.N. to come to the assistance of Bihac, and also expressed concern regarding eastern Bosnia. Do you have any statement on this, and what is the U.S. prepared to do with regard to Bihac in particular?

MR. JOHNSON: I have seen several reports of Silajdic's resignation and several reasons for it. The first report I saw was yesterday and not today, and they're not terribly clear. For that reason, we're currently trying to reach him. We want to have an opportunity to talk to him about his decision and the reasons for it. Until we have had an opportunity to talk to him directly, I'd like to reserve comment on the reported reasons for it, since they're not mutually consistent.

Q David, can you tell us, before the Croatian attack this morning, what was the status of Galbraith's peace effort? In other words, had the two sides -- as I understand, he was negotiating with one of the leaders of the break-away Serbs, and it wasn't clear whether or not the government in Knin had really accepted this peace offer.

MR. JOHNSON: I think you in many respects have described the problem. There was really no peace deal in hand yesterday. We had strongly urged all sides to deal with their differences through talks rather than war. But it looked to them as though prospects for serious negotiations had failed to materialize. Babic, the "Prime Minister" of the self-declared republic of Serb Krajina did tell Ambassador Galbraith on Wednesday that the Serbs would withdraw from Bihac; open an oil pipeline, and announce political talks.

On Thursday, however, the Krajina Serb delegation in Geneva failed to follow through on those signs and neither Babic's public statement nor actions on the ground corresponded to his promises. Instead, the Serbs reinforced their troops around Bihac and began to shell Croatian cities.

As you noted yourself, the Krajina Serbs have been badly divided by internal power struggles, and this appears to have been a factor in the developments at the negotiating table over the last several days.

Q What was the Croatian Government's reaction to Mr. Galbraith's peace package?

MR. JOHNSON: My understanding is that they were working on it, but I don't know what ultimately led them to decide to abandon the negotiating table and go to the field.

Q David, were the Croatians within their rights under international law in taking this action?

MR. JOHNSON: Interesting question. I'll ask our lawyers if they want to make a comment on it, but I won't purport to give you a legal opinion standing up here.

Q You've referred to the Serbs as the "rebel Serbs," and the United States presumably recognizes this territory as part of the territory of Croatia.

MR. JOHNSON: I don't take exception to either my characterization of the Serbs or our recognition of the territory as the territory of Croatia, but you're asking me to make a legal conclusion here, and in general when I try to make legal conclusions, I try to do it with legal advice.

Q I'm just trying to get at -- how do you describe this action? Is it an invasion? Is it an aggression against an ethnic minority? I mean, what --

MR. JOHNSON: We describe it as an action which we regret. We regret the resort to force. We believe that the differences between the Krajina Serbs and the Croatian Government are best resolved at the negotiating table.

Q David, still on the subject. Reuters reports this morning that the Krajina Serb capital of Knin was burning under steady Croatian artillery and missile onslaught. Does the State Department -- does this government believe that Knin is a military objective of the Croatian offensive, and that --

MR. JOHNSON: I'm not in a position to describe for you what their military objectives are. I can only go back and tell you how much that we have urged them to go back to the negotiating table.

Q Are you in touch with the Belgrade Serbs?

MR. JOHNSON: Yes.

Q What are you telling them?

MR. JOHNSON: We've conveyed to them as well as to the Croatian Government our position on this issue and our desire for the parties to return to the negotiating table.

Q Did you say a moment ago that the Krajina Serbs have not withdrawn troops from the Bihac area and in fact have reinforced their positions there?

MR. JOHNSON: I said that they had not in the course of these negotiations, even after noting on Wednesday that they would withdraw and open the oil pipeline and begin political talks. On Thursday they did reinforce their troops around Bihac and they began to shell some Croatian cities. Now whether or not they, at this very moment, continue to hold the territory around Bihac, I don't know. I thought that was the nature of your question as to whether at this very moment they continue to hold that territory, and that's something I'm not --

Q It sounds rather extraordinary for them to be trying to take Bihac while they're losing their hometown. It's unusual behavior. I mean --

MR. JOHNSON: You could draw that conclusion.

Q David, can you tell us what the Croatians in Zagreb said when our Ambassador delivered our message?

MR. JOHNSON: I can't. I don't have anything directly to their response.

Q Do you know if they responded at all or if they simply listened and said thank you very much?

MR. JOHNSON: I'd have to look into that further. I don't have anything to characterize as the response of any of the parties to our efforts to urge them to exercise restraint.

Are we finished with this topic?

Q Carl Bildt put out a statement in which he seemed to be suggesting that President Tudjman might be considered a war criminal for having attacked Knin. What does the U.S. think?

MR. JOHNSON: About?

Q It compared him -- he said that there's no difference between what Tudjman's forces are doing this morning and what the forces of the Krajina Serbs did when they shelled Zagreb, for which they were accused of war crimes -- for which their leader was accused of -- was charged with being a war criminal.

MR. JOHNSON: I'd like to look into that a little further before I associate myself with Mr. Bildt's remarks -- or Mr. Bildt's reported remarks. I'll put it that way.

[...]

(The briefing concluded at 1:39 p.m.) END