U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 95/07/17 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

From: hristu@arcadia.harvard.edu (Dimitrios Hristu)

Subject: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 95/07/17 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN

[...]

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

War in Bosnia

--Possibility of Use of U.S. Helicopters/Flight Crews .....12,16

--Report of U.S. Message to France ........................4,15

--U.S. Discussions with Allies ............................4-8,10-11

--Defense of Goradzde; Protection of Enclaves .............8-10

--U.S. Position on UNPROFOR ...............................7,9,14-17

--Dual Key Arrangement ....................................11-12

--Unilateral Lifting of Sanctions .........................12-14

--Congressional Consultations .............................14,16

[...]

MR. BURNS: Good afternoon, welcome to the State Department briefing. I see we have some special guests with us today. Welcome. How are you? Good.

I'd like to introduce Miss Anika Turner, who is an intern this summer in the PA front office, working with me and with Christine Shelley. She is a graduate of the University of Michigan, and she intends to pursue her graduate study shortly. Welcome, Anika.

Steve, do you have an introduction you want to make here?

Q My daughter, Ellen

MR. BURNS: Welcome. Are you going to ask questions? You're not. Okay. Just your dad, huh? (Laughter.)

Q (Inaudible)

MR. BURNS: You have a right to ask. If anything is unclear, just speak up.

Q (Inaudible) (Laughter.)

MR. BURNS: Okay. I have a few things, a few notices before we get to questions.

First, I just wanted to reaffirm how pleased all of us in the government are by the release of Mr. Daliberti and Mr. Barloon overnight, and to congratulate again Congressman Bill Richardson. Secretary Christopher phoned out to Amman this morning to our Ambassador's residence and he talked to both Mr. Daliberti and Mr. Barloon. I think you know the President also called and talked to them both. They are in great spirits. I think Mr. Daliberti is heading back to the U.S. and Mr. Barloon is to Kuwait where his family resides.

In addition to thanking Congressman Richardson, I think it's appropriate for all of us in the State Department to thank Mr. Ryszard Krystosik who is the chief official of the Polish protecting office in Baghdad. He is a veteran diplomat. He did an outstanding job for the United States and I think for the international community in trying to stay in touch with the two men over the last five months and in representing United States' interests, and we are very, very grateful to him and to the Polish Government.

Secondly, I wanted you all to know that the Secretary will indeed have a meeting on August lst in Brunei with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Foreign Minister Qian. We agreed with the Chinese this morning that this meeting would take place on August l. We are looking forward to this meeting. The Secretary believes that it presents an opportunity to talk through some of the major and important issues on the agenda of both the United States and China. This will be the ninth meeting between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Qian.

Third, the Secretary will be having dinner tomorrow night with the U.K. Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, and they will be having discussions as well on Wednesday morning here in the Department. This was a meeting that was scheduled more than a week ago, just after Mr. Rifkind assumed his post as Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, and of course presents an opportunity to talk about Bosnia in greater detail, but also about many other issues that are of concern to the United States and the United Kingdom.

Also I would like you to note the Secretary has asked Assistant Secretary of State Phyllis Oakley to travel to Bosnia for an on-sight look at the problems, the tremendous problems that are afflicting the refugees from Srebrenica. She left yesterday. She was in Geneva early this morning, and she traveled with Mrs. Ogata this morning into Tuzla, spent the day in Tuzla, and I believe is now heading back to Geneva, so we hope to have some impressions from her visit perhaps later on today.

The purpose of her trip is to gain a firsthand impression of the problems of the refugees, but I think more relevant to the United States, what we can do working through the International Committee and the Red Cross, the World Food Program, the UNHCR, and working through the relevant non-governmental organizations, what we can do to help respond to the very urgent and very grave problems of the refugees.

Finally, I think you all know the Secretary talked a little bit earlier this morning on NPR about his intention to travel to London on Thursday afternoon for the Bosnian meetings that have been called, suggested, by the U.K. that will take place on Friday. So he will be spending part of Thursday evening and Friday and probably into Saturday in London on those meetings.

And there is a sign-up sheet today that is available for any of you who would like to accompany the Secretary and his party to London, and it closes at noon tomorrow.

Q Nick, can you -- what is Phyllis Oakley Assistant Secretary of, please? And it sounds like she made an extremely short, extremely brief trip. Can you put it in hours, or was she there a whole day, or what?

MR. BURNS: I think she was there the better part of the day. Her title is Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration, and she has been in Geneva conferring with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Ogata. The intention was to fly in today, to talk to the officials of the international organizations who are on the ground dealing with the refugee problems, and to get a sense of what further assistance they need from the international community.

She will then spend the next two days in Geneva, where there is going to be a working group, a humanitarian issues working group, of all the organizations that are contributing money and services to the refugees in Bosnia, so that the international community can be united in what its response should be to this humanitarian situation.

Q You folks have been extremely clear about ruling out troops, and not to extend what will be a long briefing anyhow when we get to the Middle East among other things, what is the U.S. doing unilaterally, risk-free, without any need to send any troops into Bosnia? What is the U.S. doing on its own without waiting for an international consensus in behalf of these refugees in Bosnia?

MR. BURNS: Well, as you know, we don't have American Government personnel on the ground who are working with the refugees, trying to resolve the problems of the refugees. We are a financial contributor to organizations that do that work. So therefore it made sense for Mrs. Oakley to travel to Bosnia to look at the situation and talk to people on the ground, but also to go back to the headquarters of these organizations in Geneva in order to make some decisions about what further assistance is needed.

I don't think it is possible for the United States at this point to unilaterally intervene in a situation where you have three main international organizations working. I think it is much more effective to work through them since they have the infrastructure set up and the experience in the region.

Q What are the three? The High Commissioner for --

MR. BURNS: The UNHCR, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the World Food Program, and there are a number of non-governmental organizations, some of them American, some not American, that have specific contracts to work on this problem.

Q Nick, there is a report out of France that the United States has told the French that it would have to ask Congress to approve the use of helicopters in Bosnia for any operation that might be undertaken to strengthen Gorazde or any of the other safe havens. Is this accurate? Has the United States told the French that before it could provide that kind of transport, it would have to get approval from Congress?

MR. BURNS: That's the first I've heard of that, Carol. I'm not aware that we have passed any such message to the French Government. I can't know what all of our contacts have been, but I'm not aware that was a message that was passed yesterday.

Q At least in your discussions, you have not heard anyone talk about a legal requirement that -- or that the President couldn't make a decision like that without first --?

MR. BURNS: I have not. I'd be glad to look into that and check on it, but I have not. I think, you know, basically what we have done, to catch you up on events since Friday, is we continued our discussions with our allies throughout the weekend, and that was highlighted by the meeting that General Shalikashvili attended yesterday in London.

He is back. He had a meeting with Tony Lake, Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Albright this morning. I understand the President participated in that, and I think Mike will have something to say about that when Mike briefs, but he gave a firsthand report to all of those individuals about the meeting.

I think it is fair to say that it is going to be necessary for us to continue our discussions for the next couple of days with our NATO allies, with the other troop- contributing countries, to gain a more precise understanding of exactly what the French plan is, and also to work through some of the differences that are obviously out there among the troop-contributing countries on what the next best step is.

This will lead us to the meeting in London at the end of this week when both Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers meet, all of these countries to assess the future of the United Nations operation there, and assess what makes sense to do in a strategic and tactical military sense, particularly pertaining to the eastern enclaves and particularly Gorazde, what makes sense next.

But I think it is still true that we don't have yet a detailed sense of what the military plan is. We do have a number of questions about the plan, questions that need to be answered certainly before a decision can be made by the President, questions of a military nature about the resources that will be brought to bear, that are important to know before you can, I think, appropriately make a decision.

Q And is it the assessment of this government that you have that time, that you have several days to make this decision, and still be able to intervene in a meaningful way?

MR. BURNS: It's difficult, Carol, because I think everybody watching the conflict, whether on the ground or from afar, understands that every day does count, and that every day is a day where the Bosnian Serbs continue to persecute the refugees and where they continue as they do today to be aggressive militarily as they are around Zepa, so every day counts.

I would also say, however, that for the United States to be able to meet a request for military assistance is a very important undertaking. We would be putting our forces and our resources at the service of others, and we need to have a very real appreciation of what the request is. We also need to have, frankly, further talks to look at the position of other countries that are involved before we can, I think, make a decision to go forward or make a decision to do something else. And I believe that the time table that I have sketched out is probably the appropriate one.

Q Nick, you raise an interesting point there in your last statement, when you say "under the service of others." This referring to possible -- this operation will not be commanded by U.S. officers?

MR. BURNS: I wasn't referring to that. I was just referring to the central point that certain countries, namely France, Britain, the Netherlands, have troops on the ground right now as part of the UNPROFOR forces. We do not, and we are not intending to put American combat troops on the ground to join them.

Any request -- the requests to us have been more in the way of lift and transport services and things of that nature. That does not get me into the issue of command and control which is not my preserve, which is certainly a question that the Pentagon should answer, and not me. But I don't mean to cast doubt on that either. I said I am just not speaking to that point.

Q Okay, I mean not to draw too fine a line, but what did you mean by "under the service of others?"

MR. BURNS: I simply meant at the request of others. Maybe that would have been a better way to put it, maybe it would have been more clear. We are in a situation now where France, Britain, the Netherlands, are the countries that comprise the rapid reaction force, there is a request from the French Government for the United States and Britain and others now to contribute to an undertaking to defend Gorazde, and the United States is responding to that -- or attempting to respond to that request, but we need greater clarity about that request.

Q When you say "greater clarity," isn't that really just cover for the assessment that this meeting was a failure? After all, I think just from Thursday onward the United States Government was asking publicly for the French to clarify what they meant by their request. And then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff flew all the way to London for a specific meeting to find out from the French what they were asking.

He had a long meeting with the French on that very subject, and there still isn't clarity?

MR. BURNS: Well, it's certainly not covered in this sense, Steve, and that is, anytime the United States is asked to involve itself militarily in a conflict or to meet a request to allow others to do so on the ground, we have to take that request seriously. And have an obligation to the men and women who would carry it out, and we simply have an obligation to understand fully what the request is and what the impact would be on the United States.

And, I don't believe even after yesterday's meeting that is sufficiently clear yet.

I think it's much too harsh to say that yesterday's meeting was a failure. The fact is, we have a request. There will be an answer to that request sooner or later. And that answer was not - we were not able to produce that answer yesterday. And the countries that met yesterday were not able to agree on a final response to the situation, but that will also, we hope, emerge in the coming days.

So, to say it's failure, I think we're just in mid-stream here. We've got to wait and see what happens in the next couple of days.

Q (Inaudible) the U.N. peacekeepers are going to stay? Everything you've said, everything Christopher said this morning is within that context. There's another construction, of course -- that the French are bluffing and that they will eventually try to leave the allies out of Bosnia and then you will go along.

You're putting everything in a sense of bolstering the peacekeepers. Is there a threshold decision to keep the peacekeepers in Bosnia and bolster them?

MR. BURNS: Well, that's a question, I think, that's going to be central to the meetings in London on Friday.

Q You can't - that Friday, it won't be the beginning of the withdrawal of the peacekeepers?

MR. BURNS: We certainly hope not. But I was just getting to the second part of my response. I think that is a central question for Friday, Barry. I also think it's - I also know that it's clear that our position is that they should stay and that they should be bolstered. And that in our discussion with most of the troop-contributing countries, that's certainly the very real sense that we get.

Q Do any of the troop-contributing countries now favor withdrawal?

MR. BURNS: I don't believe that there are any that favor withdrawal right now.

Q How wide are the differences between the countries represented in London?

MR. BURNS: At yesterday's meeting?

Q Yeah.

MR. BURNS: Well, I can't speak with any degree of specificity about yesterday's meeting because I wasn't in the debrief that General Shalikashvili gave to the President and others this morning.

Obviously, these are exceedingly difficult problems. They need to be worked through, and there is not an agreement yet among the Western allies. We hope very much that there will be some kind of agreement by the end of this week.

Q Why can't the United States say at this point what it is willing to offer to such an operation?

MR. BURNS: Well, I'm just not going to go into the details of what General Shalikashvili did yesterday. I think that we've been clear in our private discussions with our allies what we might be prepared to do, but we also have a number of questions. And we've reserved the right to agree or not to agree based on the answers to those questions. And that's pretty much where we are right now.

Q Is there an assessment in the government whether Gorazde can be saved -- I mean, whether it is savable -- whether it should be saved, or whether it's going to take some American support to do that? I mean, can it be saved? Because time is obviously of the essence.

MR. BURNS: I think a much greater expert is Secretary Perry who took this question yesterday and I think answered in the affirmative. Of course, it can be saved; it can be protected. That is the mandate that the United Nations has. And, we believe that mandate should be taken seriously.

The question is, how can it be done? That's the question that Secretary Christopher posed on his media appearance yesterday, and that is the question that needs to be answered this week.

Q But, Nick, this morning -- I don't know the condition, one city against another. But this morning, Christopher said explicitly that it was never assumed that the U.N. peacekeepers in Zepa could save that city. That was never their mission. They're lightly armed. There was never -- I'm looking for the exact words. But he said there was never an assumption that the U.N. peacekeepers would save the city. They're not so equipped.

Do you think this city is different? Or do you think Friday's meeting which, I suppose -- whatever results would take further time to implement -- all would be done in time to (1) to bolster; (2) the city is savable, salvageable, by bolster-peacekeeping forces? Is that what you're saying?

MR. BURNS: I'm very well aware of what the Secretary said.

Q No, today, this morning; not yesterday.

MR. BURNS: This morning. I was listening as well, this morning, when the Secretary spoke on NPR.

Q (Inaudible) U.N. troops.

MR. BURNS: The Secretary was stating a fact, and that is that all of these U.N. peacekeepers are lightly armed. And their central mission over the last couple of years has been humanitarian. That is a different fact than the question that Roy brought up. And the question is, is it possible to protect Gorazde? And, the answer is, yes, it certainly is. We hope very much that it will be protected and defended against the Bosnian Serbs.

Q By the way, his quote was: "They were never intended to try to defend the area," meaning the U.N. mission was never to defend Zepa. There aren't enough people there --

MR. BURNS: I don't believe that's what the Secretary said. I don't believe it's fair to infer that from his comments.

Q I'm not saying anything -- he's speaking of the poor peacekeepers who don't have the weapons and don't have the armament to defend a so-called safehaven. That's all he's saying.

MR. BURNS: Barry, all I'm saying is that you've added a description of what you thought he meant by that. I'll tell you what I think he meant by that.

What I think the Secretary meant was exactly what he said: They are lightly armed.

Q Right.

MR. BURNS: And they are in a very difficult position to engage in full-scale military activities as lightly armed individuals. And, their central mission has always been humanitarian.

The United Nations also has a mandate to protect those safe areas. It failed in that mandate last week in Srebrenica, and we hope very much it will not fail in the other enclaves.

Q Isn't the essence --

Q If it can be saved, then the next question is, should it be saved? Is there a view in the Administration that Gorazde should be saved if at all possible?

MR. BURNS: We certainly think Gorazde should be protected. We certainly think the U.N. mandate should be seriously - a serious part of this calculation, and that the people of Gorazde have every right to think that the United Nations will protect them.

The question is a very difficult question. In unfavorable military circumstances, where the Bosnian Serbs are now emboldened to pretty much get their way based on the events of the last couple of weeks, how can the United Nations now strengthen itself or reconfigure itself to, in essence, to defend the mandate that it clearly has? That's the question that the United States, France, Britain, The Netherlands, and other countries, along with the United Nations, have to answer this week. And that's what was at issue in yesterday's meeting and will be an issue in Friday's meeting in London.

Q But the problem is, with all of the meetings you were describing earlier, all the discussions this week, everything seems like the United States is sort of asking questions and waiting for somebody else to answer.

If it can be saved; if it should be saved; if it's a matter of saving the U.N.'s honor, doesn't the United States have to take some kind of a leadership role in figuring out how to do it, and let the others ask you questions. Why aren't you giving out some answers and, in fact, taking the lead on this?

MR. BURNS: Look, Roy, I'm simply not going to be in a position to go into everything that's said in every private meeting. I can assure you, we are asserting views in those meetings.

The fundamental fact of this conflict, however, is that we do not have troops on the ground. If we want to save Gorazde, if we want to protect it and protect the U.N. mandate, others are going to have to bear the brunt of that work -- namely, the French, the British, the Dutch, and others. That's just a fundamental fact of life.

So therefore when we are requested to help them, it is entirely legitimate and it is imminently sensible of the United States to ask questions that would help us understand what the mission is and how we can best help that mission. You would certainly not expect the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint's staff to blindly agree to any request to do anything.

We have an obligation to our men and women in the service to make sure that their missions are carefully thought out. That is exactly what the United States is doing and has been doing for the past several days. And the answers have to be clear. We hope and expect very much that they will be clear as we lead up to Friday.

Q Isn't the essence of what you're talking about, the lack of agreement coming out of this meeting, isn't the essence of that that the British want to continue more or less under this current dual-key system which almost prohibits quick, reactive military tactics that the United States wants, if it goes along with this request, to be able to act as it sees fit and not ask the U.N. what to do, or if it may do it?

MR. BURNS: Steve, I'm just not in a position to go into private discussions we're having now with the British and French on issues like that.

Q But on the dual-key --

Q We listen to your words, all of us, very carefully. You are never -- not "you" just. But the U.S. Government is never critical of NATO, but they pass when the U.N. comes up.

So I guess one way to rephrase Steve's question is, is the U.S. still in favor of the dual-key arrangement?

MR. BURNS: I think, as --

Q You never fault NATO.

MR. BURNS: Nor should we fault NATO.

Q Right. I want to ask you if you fault the U.N.?

MR. BURNS: I think as Secretary Christopher said yesterday, if we had to do it all over again, we wouldn't agree, certainly, to a dual-key system. That is cumbersome and that has prevented resolute action in the past.

However, you can't rewrite history. We're not in a position to rewrite history at this point. We have very strong views on this issue but I'm just not going to go into the details of what we are saying in private at this point.

Q Technically speaking, does the dual-key just go on ad infinitum, or is it the type of an ad hoc arrangement that can be revised if there's a will to revise it?

MR. BURNS: It certainly today is part of the rules of the road for how the United Nations and NATO interact together. It is certainly not some kind of immutable law that can never be questioned. In fact, a lot of people think it should be questioned in the effort to strengthen UNPROFOR. I just can't go beyond that general -- that very general characterization.

Q Is the United States making efforts to get the dual-key arrangement changed before involving its helicopters or other aircraft?

MR. BURNS: I'm just not in a position to go into what we are saying in our private discussions.

Q Nick, is part of the question that still needs clarification the use of American flight crews on helicopters that might be supplied? Have you agreed that American flight crews will take part along with American helicopters?

MR. BURNS: There are a number of questions that we are asking; a lot of information that we are seeking so that we can make a decision. The Pentagon will be much more helpful to you in outlining what some of those military questions are. I think it's really appropriate for Ken Bacon and others to deal with that question.

Q Has that decision been made, notwithstanding who can answer it?

MR. BURNS: I just don't know if the decision has been made. I'm not sure we're that far along in the planning.

Mark.

Q Nick, between now and Friday, it's likely there will be a strong show of political support on Capitol Hill for lifting the arms embargo and subsequently withdrawing the peacekeepers. How will that affect the dynamic of Friday's meeting? And are you, in the meantime, contributing to a vacuum that the Congressional leaders can walk right into?

MR. BURNS: We're certainly not leaving a vacuum. Our position on unilateral lift is clear. We think it's very unwise. We think it would widen the war. It would lead to the withdrawal of the U.N. forces. That's what the U.N. troop-contributing countries have told us. We think it would cripple any chance for political negotiations which, at the end of the day, are really the only long-term hope to resolve this problem in Bosnia.

So we have a very firm position. As we go off to the meetings on Friday, our allies will know that the position of the United States is that we are against unilateral lift.

Q How can you argue that forcefully with the allies when a majority of Congress -- I can't guarantee it -- but a majority of Congress is likely to say otherwise?

MR. BURNS: We will argue it forcefully because it is the President's right to conduct foreign policy. The President and the Secretary and others believe that unilateral lift would cripple whatever chances are left for the United Nations to salvage some semblance of a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.

It's very important that we not walk out on our allies now, and that's essentially what "unilateral lift" would have us do -- walk out on our NATO allies. Our NATO allies have made it very clear that their preference is for the United States to stay engaged, support UNPROFOR on the ground, and now consider a further request -- at least, from the French Government. At a time when we are debating steps to strengthen UNPROFOR, it would not make sense to pull the rug out from under UNPROFOR's feet.

So I think you'll see that American leaders say that with a great deal of authority.

There was a time a couple of weeks ago when some in Congress were saying, "You can't assist the Rapid Reaction Force. You shouldn't obligate any money; you shouldn't deliver equipment; you shouldn't deliver lifts." The President felt it was important enough to go ahead on his own. He made it very public why he was doing that. We issued the text of his letter to the Congressional leadership. We've gone ahead with lift.

We are now lifting British and French troops into Split who will then go on to Bosnia to form the Rapid Reaction Force. We're delivering equipment, and we're going to deliver the other things that we promised -- intelligence and communication support.

I think this government is unified and determined to make sure that we do not leave our NATO allies unprotected as a unilateral lift would do.

Q Just one more question, Nick. Doesn't the absence of an agreement and the fact that the meeting of ministers will not occur until Friday create a four-day leadership vacuum that Congress is likely to try to fill?

MR. BURNS: Congress will do what Congress wants to do, and Congress has to make its own decisions. The Administration is making clear -- publicly clear and privately clear to members of Congress -- that we think unilateral lift would be a very serious mistake, contrary to the interests of the United States and contrary to the interests of our allies who have troops on the ground.

We couldn't have made it more clear, and if you watched Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry yesterday, they made it clear; we'll continue to do that. There will be no vacuum in the debate. We'll very gladly take part in the debate this week, and when we go off to London for the meetings on Friday, our allies will be clear about what the position of the United States Government is, as they were clear and are now clear on our position of aiding the Rapid Reaction Force.

Some in Congress said it would not be done. The President went ahead and did it.

Q What's your alternative, however, to unilateral lift? I mean, you have nothing to offer them, it sounds like, until Friday, if then. I mean, to offer Congress. How can you say that you have a better alternative when you don't have an alternative?

MR. BURNS: I guess I don't agree with the basis of the question. We are now considering a very serious request to strengthen UNPROFOR and to put the United Nations in a better position to live up to the mandates that it clearly has. And, as I said, those decisions sometimes cannot be made in a morning or even in a morning and an afternoon. Sometimes they do take days or a week to decide.

But once we've come to the point of decision, I think it will be very clear to the Congress what we're doing. If Congress wants to vote in the next couple of days, that's Congress' prerogative, but it certainly will not interfere -- our schedule, diplomatic and military -- to respond to the request of our allies and to work with them through these very difficult questions.

Q Do you understand if Congress votes that immediately the entire plan for strengthening UNPROFOR is off and that UNPROFOR simply decides to leave? I mean, is that your understanding of the allies?

MR. BURNS: There's more than just a Congressional vote here. There has to be a Congressional vote that then the Administration would respond to, and then there might be further action by the Congress. So this thing is not likely to be fully and finally answered whatever day this vote takes place, if it does, this week. The Administration simply does not have time to delay everything until that Congressional legislative process is finished. So we're going to go about our business of working with the French and the British and others to answer the very important task ahead of us this week.

Q Since the Serbs are rolling very fast and quick to topple all these safehavens and possibly another one will be falling today, you are talking about the UNPROFOR or the United Nations forces. Is there any consideration for changing the mission of the United Nations forces on the ground or peacekeepers on the ground from humanitarian to possibly, if not fighting, at least people who could defend or stand in the way of the rolling forces of the Serbs in other areas that could fall some time soon?

MR. BURNS: I think everybody agrees that UNPROFOR's humanitarian mission must continue to be carried out, and I think almost everybody agrees that UNPROFOR ought to be strengthened militarily. That's what the United States has been saying since the Noordwijk meeting, and that's what we'll say this week, and that's what our position will be going into these London meetings -- that UNPROFOR should stay in its humanitarian role and be strengthened militarily.

Q Could the French militarily carry out the mission or to defend against Serbs?

MR. BURNS: To strengthen itself militarily so that the United Nations can be an effective institution to stay on the ground, to continue its humanitarian mission, and to be true to the commitment that it has made to protect the enclaves. It failed to do that last week for a variety of reasons.

We would hope to put UNPROFOR in a position so that it could succeed and not fail in the future.

Q You said earlier in the briefing that you were not aware that there was a message in London that the Administration would have to consult Congress before providing transport for reinforcements of UNPROFOR, and that you knew of no legal requirement. Are you prepared to say that the United States did not tell its allies that it would have to consult with Congress before putting the Rapid Reaction Force in, and are you prepared to say that it will not consult -- it does not need to consult with Congress?

MR. BURNS: I didn't mean that. We always consult with Congress. We consulted with Congress on the question of funding for the Rapid Reaction Force. We had a difference of opinion with the Congress. We went out way. Congress went its way.

We'll certainly consult with the Congress, and I didn't mean at all to infer that we would not. The question, though, was somewhat different, and I tried to respond to the question. I'm not in a position to say categorically, yes, we've delivered this message. I'm not aware that we did. I'll certainly be glad to check on it, but I'm not aware that that message as quoted was delivered.

Q I shouldn't say "consult." I should say do you think that the Congress has a right to and should vote on whether or not Apache helicopters and troop carrier helicopters should be sent in or not?

MR. BURNS: That's up to the Congress to decide. It is certainly reasonable for the Congress to expect that the Administration would consult, meaning that we would talk to them. We'd explain our point of view. We'd explain the state of play in the Alliance as we go up to Friday and when we come back from Friday's meetings. That's reasonable. We will certainly do that.

The question of whether or not they should vote up or down on any prospective action is one that Congress has to decide. I'm not an expert on legislative prerogatives, and so forth, and I'm not a lawyer, so I don't want (inaudible).

Q The question I'm asking is what is the Administration's position? Does the Administration believe that the President could go ahead and take this action without a Congressional vote, does it believe that it would have to have one?

MR. BURNS: We believe it's certainly reasonable to consult with Congress. The President, I think, has shown in a number of cases but most recently in the case of the Rapid Reaction Force that when we think it's in our national interest to go forward to help allies, we do so, and we hope very much the Congress will support us on that.

Q Nick, do you have a figure of how much force -- how many personnel forces that are needed on the ground in order to bolster the mission of the United Nations from humanitarian to defend itself or to be able to repel any aggression by the Serbs?

MR. BURNS: That's a very good question. It's one of the questions that's being discussed in our meetings with the allies. I don't believe there's a final answer on that or a final agreement on that question.

Q Change the subject?

Q One more. Can you say whether you -- from what you have heard about this meeting in London, that the British are like-minded with the French that in the -- on the issue that if something isn't done now relatively soon, we're going to take our troops out as well. Because that was the French threat; do it. At one point, they were saying within 48 hours or agreed to it. Do the British think that way too?

MR. BURNS: I think it's better to let the British and the French speak for themselves, and to avoid my having to characterize a meeting in which I did not participate that was held in London yesterday.

[...]

(The briefing concluded at 2:l2 p.m.)

END