U.S. Department of State 95/07/06 Daily Press Briefing

From: Thanos Tsekouras <thanost@MIT.EDU>

Office of the Spokesman

[...]

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

  War in Bosnia

  --Rapid Reaction Force .................................  24-28

  --Secretary Christopher, A/S Holbrooke Contacts

  --Secretary Christopher, Bosnian FM Sacirbey Mtg. ......  25

[...]

[...]

Q Carl Bildt, I guess, after talking in Belgrade, said that negotiations, of course, remain the key to solving the problems in Bosnia, but that he didn't see any likelihood of success at the moment.

Given that rather dire assessment by him and others -- people who have been in Belgrade -- doesn't it make the Rapid Reaction Force look ever more like a rapid pullout force, because if negotiations go nowhere, how long can, in other words, UNPROFOR stay there doing what it's doing, and wouldn't the Rapid Reaction Force just be turning into a means of pulling UNPROFOR out?

MR. BURNS: The major countries behind the Rapid Reaction Force -- France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium -- have all said that this is not a force that is primarily designed to facilitate the ultimate withdrawal of UNPROFOR. They have all said and made clear to us for a good month now that the purpose of the Rapid Reaction Force is to strengthen UNPROFOR. All of them say that they want UNPROFOR to stay in the field. Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary General, reiterated that yesterday, as did President Chirac, in Geneva.

We take, of course, these governments at their word, and we are working with them -- the Administration is working with them to see how we can support the Rapid Reaction Force. I wouldn't give up on the negotiations yet. They're frustrating negotiations. They haven't borne the fruit that we thought they might. We thought we might have made progress earlier with Mr. Milosevic.

I think Mr. Bildt has now had a taste of just how difficult it is to work with some of the parties in the area. We have great confidence in him. Secretary Christopher had a good conversation with Mr. Bildt yesterday, who phoned in from Mostar. Dick Holbrooke has been in touch, I think four or five times, over the last couple of days with Mr. Bildt.

We think he's doing a fine job. We think that we are on the same wavelength in general about what should be done. We certainly don't want to give up on negotiations. The effort again is to keep UNPROFOR in play so it can serve its humanitarian mission, as well as serve, we hope, the larger mission and perhaps more immediate mission of protecting the enclaves.

That, of course, depends on the actions of the Rapid Reaction Force, which is now just, we think, nearing a critical mass in its own deployment in the field, and it may be that we don't know the answer to the ultimate mandate of the Rapid Reaction Force until they are operational -- fully operational.

Q Any plans for Frasure to go back any time soon? Any new diplomatic overtures from anyone in the works?

MR. BURNS: The Contact Group remains active. There was a meeting just last week. I think there will probably be another meeting soon when Mr. Bildt completes his current round of negotiations in the field.

We have no plans to send Ambassador Frasure. Right now we think that it's best for Mr. Bildt -- former Prime Minister Bildt -- to take the lead in these negotiations. He has our confidence. We'll see what can be accomplished. When he concludes this round, I'm sure we'll get an assessment from him over what the next steps should be, and we'll be glad to listen to that.

Carol.

Q Why is the Secretary meeting with Sacirbey today?

MR. BURNS: The Secretary is going to meet with the Bosnian Foreign Minister because they had pledged to each other that they would keep in close contact. There was a meeting ten days ago here in the Department. They meet today at five o'clock. Mr. Sacirbey has been up at the U.N. He spoke yesterday to the question of sanctions relief.

We are particularly interested in the views of the Bosnian Government on the role of the Rapid Reaction Force, on the situation on the ground in Bosnia -- specifically in Sarajevo and in a number of the embattled cities. We'd like to have Mr. Sacirbey's views on the diplomatic strategy that should now be employed to try to reach ultimately some day in the future a resolution of all these issues. He's an important person to keep in contact with.

I should also say Secretary Christopher, having worked with him closely, now that they're colleagues, has a great deal of respect for him; likes him very much. They had a very good meeting the last time the Minister was here and are looking forward to that again today.

Q Is France sending troops in for the Rapid -- you talk about these four countries and their firm commitment to a Rapid Reaction Force or a response force, not to a pullout force. Is France about to send troops in to show its commitment to this principle?

MR. BURNS: I understand that all of the --

Q (Inaudible) but I don't know that --

MR. BURNS: I understood that all of the countries were contributing troops to the particular force. I don't know, Barry, if there's a question of definition here -- whether there are troops that are being deployed from one unit in UNPROFOR to another or whether we're talking about new troops, but France is certainly contributing forces, troops, to this effort, as well as equipment.

To give France its due, we've worked well with France. France has been the leader -- among the leaders, certainly -- but I would say in many respects a diplomatic leader in trying to get this effort going. That was true at Noordwijk. Minister De Charette was the Chair of the meeting at Noordwijk. That was the crucial meeting, and President Chirac has shown good leadership on this issue as well.

Q Well, not to be argumentative that the French are also the leaders -- in the view that if this doesn't get done by, you know, the fall, perhaps -- let's not be there another winter, let's pull out --

MR. BURNS: That's something that the French will have to speak to. It's not our impression of current French policy.

Q (Inaudible)

MR. BURNS: It's still on Bosnia?

David.

Q Still on the Rapid Reaction Force. By what yardstick should its success or failure be measured in your view, and at what point are you going to have to start considering funding for a second six months?

MR. BURNS: The answer to the second question, I think we'll have to start thinking of funding for the second six months fairly shortly, at the end of this summer -- August, I would think, September.

In answer to the first question, the Rapid Reaction Force, in our view, cannot be more of the same. It cannot be the rules of the road and the posture that resulted in all the problems over the last couple of months in UNPROFOR's inability to meet its responsibilities. We believe that the value of the Rapid Reaction Force is that it will strengthen UNPROFOR -- strengthen UNPROFOR's ability

to defend the mandate that it has been given to deliver humanitarian aid and protect enclaves.

The U.N. can't do that right now, and so we hope the Rapid Reaction Force will make a positive difference and a substantial difference. That's our very clear view of the Rapid Reaction Force.

Q And are you satisfied that Mr. Akashi will not be able to stop it from rapidly reacting, if necessary?

MR. BURNS: I think we've made clear our view as to what the force should be. We've made clear our difference of opinion with Mr. Akashi about what the force should be, and our difference of opinion with him on sending a letter to the Bosnian Serbs in attempting to define the mandate of the Rapid Reaction Force.

There are lots of different views floating around, and we have one, Mr. Akashi has another. I think that it will probably stay in those respective positions.

Q Two weeks ago you were using the word "effective" to describe your aspirations for the Rapid Reaction Force, and now you're talking about strengthening it. I think there's a big difference between strengthening it and being effective. You could add two people to strengthen it, but that wouldn't necessarily make it effective. How come you've dropped the word "effective," or am I reading too much into this?

MR. BURNS: Thank you for reminding me of that, because I think maybe this is a useful service here. No, what we mean by "strengthening," George, is effective, meaning the ability to deliver food to 1.5 million to 2 million people, which is not now happening. A few convoys are getting through, mainly because of the courage of some French soldiers and the courage of the commanders on the ground.

But not enough food is getting through. There are now some reports of starvation in Srebrenica. There were two reports of starvation of a young child and an elderly man in Bihac. This is extremely serious. And we congratulate General Smith and some of the people who work for him and some of the very courageous French soldiers who have gone by night now over the last couple of nights to deliver food convoys to Sarajevo and other cities.

It clearly isn't enough. The cities clearly need more support, and so you're right. The relevant word here -- what we mean by "strengthening" is that the U.N. force will become more effective in carrying out the duties which

it has been assigned, and that I think is -- to get back to David's question -- the crucial yardstick here by which we would attempt to measure the Rapid Reaction Force.

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MR. BURNS: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 2:16 p.m.)

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