U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 95/06/28 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

From: Thanos Tsekouras <thanost@MIT.EDU>

OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN

[...]

Turkey--Renewal of Operation Provide Comfort ..............1-2

[...]

TURKEY

Operation Provide Comfort/Funding .........................3-4

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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

European Union Action Plan ................................11

Role of Carl Bildt/Contact Group ..........................11,12,13

Access to Sarajevo/Humanitarian Relief Plans ..............11

U.S. Role in Peacemaking Efforts ..........................11

Serbian Military Support to Bosnian Serbs/Units in

  Krajina .................................................12-13,14

UNPROFOR/Funding of Rapid Reaction Force ..................14-21

Protection of U.S./NATO Pilots ............................21-22

[...]

[...]

I have a statement on Turkey. The United States welcomes the June 27 decision by the Turkish Parliament to extend the mandate for Operation Provide Comfort for another regular six-month interval.

Provide Comfort helps deter renewed Iraqi aggression against its own citizens in northern Iraq. As host to Provide Comfort and an integral part of the Four-Power Coalition, Turkey plays a central role in the provision of humanitarian assistance and in enhancing security for the peoples of northern Iraq.

Turkey's continued willingness, at considerable cost to itself, to host Operation Provide Comfort demonstrates its enduring reliability as a partner and ally of the United States.

[...]

With that, I'll be glad to go to your questions.

Q A couple of these statements call for questions. Go back to the Turkey statement, please, if you will. What do you mean "cost to Turkey?" Trade with Iraq? What do you mean specifically? And is the United States doing anything to compensate Turkey for that "cost"?

MR. BURNS: Let me go to the second part of your question first, and I'll deal with the first part.

Barry, there is a Four-Power Coalition, as you know, in northern Iraq comprised of Turkey, the United States, Britain, and France. This coalition in northern Iraq has two major functions. One is to engineer an ongoing "no-fly" zone above the 36th Parallel; the second is to facilitate the provision of humanitarian relief, mainly through non- governmental organizations to the population in northern Iraq.

Turkey, of course, as, in effect, host of this operation plays a major role because of the responsibility that it has for providing security on the border, for participating in this mission at some cost to itself, and also because of some of the problems that have occurred along the border due to Kurdish terrorism.

This operation is now in its fourth year of existence -- we're beyond four years of existence. It's an unusual operations because there is an unusual situation. The situation has been produced by the fact that Saddam Husayn has shown himself to be irresponsible in his actions toward his own people.

Turkey has borne a major share of the responsibility for trying to provide for security and stability in that region.

The U.S. contribution, since April 1991, is well over $860 million. I can get you a specific figure. I checked this morning, and that is at least a ballpark figure. We have 50 American civilian and military personnel on the ground in northern Iraq. We have an additional 800 in Turkey who are supporting Operation Provide Comfort.

Q But does the U.S. reimburse Turkey? And, if so, to what extent?

MR. BURNS: I don't know the details of how the operation is funded -- for which expenses Turkey may be reimbursed and for which it is not. If you are interested, we can certainly get this information.

Q Turkey is at least nominally a Moslem country, and it's in an awkward position. I'm trying to get a sense -- you've reasonably enough cast them as being in a sacrificial position. But I'm wondering to what extent is there a financial loss to Turkey? Do you mean some psychological burden? I really don't know what you mean when you talk about -- when the statement there talks about a cost -- and if the U.S. is picking up the bill for a financial expenditure by Turkey, I just wonder what it's costing the American taxpayer to compensate Turkey? That's what I'm asking.

MR. BURNS: The provision of American funds is in our interest, as well as Turkey's. We think it's money well spent because we believe that we have an obligation, as well as the Turks, the British, and the French, to the people of northern Iraq after the events of March and April 1991.

Q But if we're reimbursing Turkey, then it isn't costing Turkey anything. And if we're not reimbursing Turkey, what is it costing Turkey? I know you don't have it at your fingertips.

MR. BURNS: Barry, I gave you a rough figure --

Q Well, you gave me the contours of the thing --

MR. BURNS: I gave you a rough figure for U.S. expenses. It doesn't mean that Turkey doesn't bear its own share of expenses. It certainly does.

[...]

Q Have you gotten briefed on the European Union action's plan on the Balkans, and is there one, or is this just a prepackaging of old ideas?

MR. BURNS: We've been briefed on the Cannes summit of EU presence that took place yesterday and some of the instructions that were given to Carl Bildt as a result of those meetings. The instructions have to do with the interest of the European Union's leadership in pursuing negotiations with Milosevic on the Contact Group's offer of limited sanctions relief in return for recognition, the Contact Group's offer to Pale for beginning general peace talks on the basis of the Map and Plan.

There was also an instruction for Mr. Bildt to see if he could make it possible to open up a land route into Sarajevo which we found particularly interesting, and we are trying now to get in touch with Mr. Bildt to have further conversations with him to see what he thinks this is all about. We think this is positive. It's one of the original U.N. responsibilities to try to keep Sarajevo supplied with humanitarian provisions.

It's not been the case over the last couple of weeks. I think only a couple of convoys have gotten in, and we think it's a very important mandate. We think it's also something that the Rapid Reaction Force should have as one of its mandates.

Q Could we get -- maybe it's a little early, but perhaps it isn't -- an idea of how the U.S. role might be now that Bildt, the Europeans and the U.N. are apparently going into some activity? You'll recall that before Bildt moved in, the Americans, basically Frasure, was the lead man, made the proposals with the others, supporting him.

Is the U.S. now, as it has many times before, in dealing with Bosnia -- is the U.S. now deferring to the Europeans to try their hand and be the lead in mediation and peacemaking efforts?

MR. BURNS: We're not deferring to the Europeans. We're working with them. Bildt's arrival in our view is very positive, both because we worked well with him when he was Swedish Prime Minister and because we think he's very able. He clearly has the confidence of the European Union leadership, and he's got the confidence of Secretary Christopher.

So we're pleased that he's active. What we would expect now is that he would be fully integrated into the Contact Group. He met with the Contact Group representatives over the weekend in Paris. There will be another meeting of the Contact Group in a couple of days.

He reported to them just a couple of days ago on his initial round of contacts in the region, and we would now like him to report on the results of the EU Summit. He is going to be now taking a second trip to the region beginning this weekend.

Q Where is Bob Frasure?

MR. BURNS: Bob Frasure is in Washington. He was in the Contact Group meeting last weekend. He's now in Washington.

Q Does he go with Bildt or --

MR. BURNS: No, he won't go with Bildt, but I was leading up to this.

Q I'm sorry.

MR. BURNS: Right now we think it makes sense for Carl Bildt to approach the Bosnian Serb leadership on the basis of the Contact Group Map and Plan, which is still the offer on the table. We also think it makes sense for him to take a shot at discussions with Mr. Milosevic on the offer of limited sanctions relief -- the offer that Frasure had been discussing with him -- and we're quite content to have Mr. Bildt in that position. We're working closely with him.

So I think it's more a case of making sure that the European Union's representative is closely integrated with the Contact Group. That was really not the case to any great extent before Mr. Bildt's arrival.

Q While we're on Milosevic, did you folks have a chance to look at the Financial Times' story, suggesting that Milosevic is arranging for conscripts to fight or at least be alongside -- I think fight -- alongside the Bosnian Serbs?

MR. BURNS: I didn't see that particular story, but the general issue is an important one for us. We have continued to look closely at possible support that the Serbian Government might be giving to the Bosnian Serbs in contravention of the sanctions.

Q Well, you know, we're all familiar with the border and the weapons, but this would be another violation, I suppose, of the promise he's taken to keep his distance. Is there any substance to the report that Milosevic is organizing volunteer forces in Serbia again, volunteer conscripts?

MR. BURNS: I don't have anything on that, but we're pursuing it.

Q You don't have anything on it?

MR. BURNS: No.

Q Can I follow on Carl Bildt?

MR. BURNS: Yes.

Q What does Carl Bildt bring to the table that his predecessor didn't, other than fresh blood? Is there something -- you seem to be very hopeful of his abilities in this current round.

MR. BURNS: He takes up his position at a time when everybody involved seems to think that we ought to give diplomacy another shot in the Bosnian crisis; that it's worth doing that, that we have to do that. He brings some fresh ideas and a fresh perspective. He's got the respect of the United States as well as the other members of the Contact Group, and I think he's got a clear mandate now from the European Union.

We work well with him, and we've had a good set of initial discussions. So we are glad -- to get back to Barry's question -- to see him tightly integrated with the Contact Group.

Q But the basic ideas are the same. I mean --

MR. BURNS: The basic ideas are the same.

Q It's the Map and Plan of the Contact Group, and it's the partial sanction relief for the Serbs. I mean, that hasn't changed.

MR. BURNS: That hasn't changed. Having said this, let me make a point, though, just to be clear. We have not given up our own ability and right to be an independent actor and to have bilateral consultations with the Serbs or others in the region outside the rubric of the Contact Group.

Other members of the Contact Group, most notably the Russians, in recent weeks have done that. We'll continue to do that, but right now we'd like to see Mr. Bildt give it a go.

Q You were talking about infiltration earlier. What do you know about the sending of new units into Krajina from Serbia, including tanks, APCs and manpower?

MR. BURNS: It's another question we've been looking at for a couple of days. We've seen press reports. We've heard other reports to that effect, and we're looking into it.

Q But you have no confirmation?

MR. BURNS: I have no independent confirmation of that right now.

Still on Bosnia?

Q Yes. What is the idea in the United States now for overcoming this impasse in Brussels, where NAC has been unable to agree on dual-key or non-dual-key? It seems that the United States and the French are at particular loggerheads. How are you going to get around that? As I understand it, this plan for extraction of UNPROFOR is now being sold as a lifeline that would keep them there, but with the lifeline not in place -- I mean, it seems like a confusing situation. How are you getting around that?

MR. BURNS: There's a lot going on in Brussels and elsewhere. On your second point, it's our very clear understanding that what NATO is looking at -- the plan -- is an extraction plan. It's contingency and it's hypothetical, but it's not a lifeline to keep troops there. It's a plan to bring troops out should that be necessary. That's what that plan is.

On the first question, the United States strongly believes that the United Nations and NATO have to arrive at an understanding of how we can work together to implement U.N. resolutions. The "no-fly" zone is a part of that, and we certainly want to get straight with our allies and with everyone concerned what the rules of the road are. There have been a number discussions to that effect.

In a wider sense, let me just say that in past weeks we've talked about this being a transitional period, and it certainly is. We have answered for ourselves a lot of questions. We see three basic options available to the United States. One is being proposed by Senator Lugar, and that is to basically have 100,000 or more American troops enter the situation and try to win a military victory on the ground and force the parties, in this case the Bosnian Serbs, to negotiations.

We think that particular option is not wise, because it simply wouldn't have the support of the American people, and it is not consistent with the level -- it's certainly not consistent with our view as to what kind of American interests are at stake in the region.

The second basic option, since many people believe that UNPROFOR has failed, is to simply seek the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and a lift of the arms embargo. That is an initiative that is being pursued by Senator Dole. We think that initiative runs the risk of Americanizing the war. It would give the United States the enormous responsibility of not only having to arm the Bosnian Government, if we chose a certain path, but also having to train the Bosnian Government's military. We don't think that makes sense. We think it would also probably kill any chance that Mr. Bildt or other people have to make progress on the political front.

That leaves us with another option, which is not the best of all possible options. It's not a perfect option, but the option is this, that UNPROFOR, having not done very well over the last couple of months, should be beefed up and strengthened to the extent that we may be able to put more pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate, and at the same time that Mr. Bildt and the United States and the Contact Group renew again the diplomatic efforts with Belgrade and Pale to try to seek a political solution.

Again, it's not the best of all possible alternatives, but measured against the other viable alternatives that have been suggested in our own country, we think it makes the most sense for American interests.

So having gone through this period, that's where we end up. We now have a lot of specific questions having to deal with the "no-fly" zone, the rules of the road for the Rapid Reaction Force, what its mandate will be, what its funding will be, and we are now trying with our allies and with the Congress to answer those questions.

Judd.

Q Has there been any progress on either front to defining the mandate and the funding?

MR. BURNS: On funding, we have just yesterday presented some ideas to the Congress about funding. As you know, we are pushing the idea of a voluntary fund that would rely principally on in-kind contributions; that would be a transfer of U.S. military equipment and services to the major troop-contributing countries of the Rapid Reaction Force. We're in the middle of discussions with the Congress and the congressional leadership right now on that.

On the mandate for the Rapid Reaction Force, I'll be frank, that we continue to hear in private varying descriptions from the troop- contributing countries of what the mandate will be. I think the way this is going to end up is that the force is beginning to arrive, in a couple of weeks it will probably be fully in place and perhaps somewhat operational, and it may be that only in going through the first rounds of activity will the Rapid Reaction Force in essence define itself.

Q I have a follow-up question. When the Rapid Reaction Force was announced earlier this month or the end of last month -- I forget exactly when it was -- there was quite a sense of urgency about it. The situation was deteriorating and so forth, and here we've gone almost four weeks and the funding hasn't been fixed and the mandate hasn't been set. Isn't time of the essence here? I mean, isn't the urgency still there?

MR. BURNS: There's certainly a sense of urgency when five, six, seven, eight civilians are killed every day in Sarajevo. A little boy was killed yesterday. There's a sense of urgency that comes from that, from the fact that convoys are not getting through to the enclaves; that the Bosnian Serbs continue to violate U.N. resolutions in their use of weaponry. There's a sense of urgency, yes.

The fact is that this is a process that involves the United Nations and a great number of countries. It has not been an easy process, because we have not had agreement over either mandate or funding, and we've had to negotiate our way through those disagreements, and that's just the reality of what this process has been.

Q You're looking for volunteers -- excuse me.

Q There is a third option, and that is that we aid our allies in getting their troops and materiel to the region. Are we involved in that?

MR. BURNS: That's part and parcel of the third option that I mentioned that we are now following. The option that I described, the course that the Administration has chosen to take, is to support the continuation of UNPROFOR and the strengthening of UNPROFOR, and we have given our pledge to our allies that we will help them lift their forces as necessary to the region. We'll help equip those forces. We'll help with intelligence, and we'll help with communications.

There were four specific functions that Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili committed to a couple of weeks ago in Paris at the Defense Ministers' meeting, and we're now doing that.

The remaining question for us is on the voluntary fund, what level of resources can we bring to this, and can we work out with the Congress an agreement on how the United States will actually fund this participation -- the provision of equipment and lift, and so forth. That's what needs to be funded right now. But that is part and parcel of the option that we are following.

Q Can you be more specific on exactly what we're doing in these areas?

MR. BURNS: I think it's for the Pentagon to be specific. I can tell you generally what we're doing, and that is that the British, the Dutch and the French have come to us with specific requests for equipment, for logistical support, for lift in some cases, and we are right now responding to those requests, and we are working with them on the requests. That's happening.

But before we can fully meet their requests, we have to have an agreement with Congress on the funding, and that has not yet been worked out.

Q When you talk -- I'm sorry, but it's right on funding. You made reference to voluntary. You know, "voluntary" means a lot of things. "Voluntary" in the sense that -- you refer to the countries that are participating -- are you asking for voluntary contributions only from countries that have peacekeepers in Bosnia, or is it a broader scheme than that --

MR. BURNS: It means that the United States --

Q -- which is my understanding.

MR. BURNS: It means that the United States would make a voluntary contribution of its own to help support the Rapid Reaction Force. That's what it means.

Q What about other countries? Would you look to other countries to make voluntary contributions?

MR. BURNS: We certainly would hope that would be the case, yes. But right now what we're concentrating on is figuring out what we can do, and we've got to have congressional consultations before we can fulfill that.

Q How can you ask Congress for money when you don't know what this force is going to do?

MR. BURNS: We know the force is going to buttress existing U.N. forces. We know that it will give the UNPROFOR forces additional capability than they now have to perform certain missions. What we don't know is what type of response the Rapid Reaction Force will make in regard to predictable situations.

If you look at the past couple of weeks and months when the Bosnian Serbs have routinely violated U.N. mandates and U.N. requests, what we don't know is how the Rapid Reaction Force would react when those things happen in the future, as they assuredly will happen in the future. So that's an unknown.

But the argument we're making to Congress, Roy, is the following. We've got to support our allies. They're NATO allies. They have troops on the ground, and the welfare of those troops is important, number one.

Number two, we think it makes sense to put more soldiers onto the scene so they have additional enhanced capability to react to certain situations, and we are being direct with the Congress in saying we're not exactly sure what the detailed, defined mandate of the Rapid Reaction Force will be in all situations. But we know we'll give the U.N. added capability which the U.N. needs.

So the argument is being made, if you will, rather generally that we need UNPROFOR to stay and be strengthened. The Rapid Reaction Force is the best possible way to do that at this point.

Q This sounds like incremental or -- it just sounds like escalation, and it has all the earmarks of, you know, the wrong thing. If you don't know precisely why you're going there or what you're going to do -- in fact, going back to your earlier remarks about opening the road to Sarajevo, it leaves me kind of baffled. Do they plan to open a land route or do they not, and do they plan to use force or do they not? Because if they're not going to use force, they won't have a land route.

MR. BURNS: What we understand from the EU meeting yesterday in Cannes is that they would like to open up a land route to Sarajevo. I'm not aware that they have told us how they think that can be accomplished. That is a key question that's got to be answered -- I agree with you.

In response to your larger question, we are not operating in a perfect world, and the option that we are following is certainly not the best possible option, but it's the only one that we think makes sense. I think it is convincing enough for the Congress and for anyone else to understand that a withdrawal of UNPROFOR now and a failure to support the Rapid Reaction Force is not in the interests of the United States.

Why? Because it would certainly lead, embolden the Bosnian Serbs to act in an even more unfettered manner than they have up to date. It would certainly lead to more civilian casualties, more fighting, and a breakdown of the political process as it currently exists. Those are all objectives that we think in the short term are worth meeting in this very imperfect situation.

Q Your arguments are all negative or double negative, you know --

MR. BURNS: They are.

Q -- you're trying to avoid something rather than accomplish something. If you have to send in a military force, don't you want them to accomplish something specific and positive and in a specific period of time and then to get out? I mean, that's the rule that the Pentagon keeps on citing. But in this case, everybody's suspended disbelief. It's hard to understand it.

MR. BURNS: Bosnia -- and you know this better than I do -- is a uniquely frustrating situation for our government and our allied governments -- uniquely frustrating, highly problematic. We do have goals that you might describe as being negative goals, but they're important in their application.

One of our goals is to limit the war, and there were 130,000 deaths in 1992 and 1993, and 2,000 deaths in 1994. That is a major difference, major positive difference for the people of the region. They are still being shelled. They are still dying. They are still being denied daily provisions. But at least UNPROFOR has been able to limit the war up til now, from 130,000 deaths in that '92-'93 period to 2,000 in '94. That's a rather compelling figure. That's important.

I'm just trying to answer your question. What is also important is that it feeds between 1.5 million and 2 million people a day. That's UNPROFOR. Those are major accomplishments. Should UNPROFOR withdraw, there would be no one to feed those people and no one to prevent the wider application of the war.

Now, has UNPROFOR succeeded in all respects? Certainly not. And we have a lot of problems that we have to deal with, but that is the nature of this problem and we've decided to stay in and support our allies who are also staying in.

Q But, you know, coming back to your claims which the President himself has been making also about 130,000 deaths in one year and down to 2,000. How can you claim that UNPROFOR has accomplished that? I mean, you know, there are so many factors in this. To lay it all at the credit of UNPROFOR begs credulity, and also to say that UNPROFOR is feeding 1.5 million to 2 million a day is probably inaccurate. You know, it's the relief agencies which are doing it, often without the help of UNPROFOR, and UNPROFOR has not been able to supply practically any of the enclaves now for weeks -- Bihac really for months.

You know, the whole argument you're making for UNPROFOR is really not backed up by facts, unless you have a fact sheet and can actually demonstrate that this is the case.

MR. BURNS: Roy, I disagree on both counts. I'd like to know an explanation for why the death toll has been reduced from 130,000 to 2,000 if not for the presence of UNPROFOR and the diplomatic activity of the troop-contributing nations and the United States.

Secondly, those NGOs -- those non-governmental organizations -- are in a large part funded by the United States and other countries. This has been the largest airlift in history, and it's been funded and organized by the United States and other countries.

There are some things that we can be proud of in this very terrible situation, and everything is not black. Some things are even gray. But I think you have to give UNPROFOR, the United States, a number of the other countries credit for having tried, for having accomplished certain things in the humanitarian area.

We're very well aware that there are other problems associated with this entire effort, but I think you do have to stand up and understand that certain things have been done.

Q Just back to the funding issue for a second. Correct me if I'm wrong. You said that the United States is now talking about an exchange of services and no cash. I seem to recall earlier in the week you were talking about $100 million and an exchange of services.

MR. BURNS: I did not speak from the podium about $100 million.

Q You did say $100 million.

MR. BURNS: No, I did not, and I'll be glad to check the record. I did not do that. What we have here is a voluntary fund that will be based on cash contributions and the provision of equipment, and that's what we've been briefing on the Hill. But I'm not putting a dollar figure next to it.

Q Okay, well, forget the dollar figure and use whatever dollar figure you'd like. Earlier in the week I seem to recall that the proposal was for cash and services. What I'm asking is, has there now been a change and it's all services and no cash.

MR. BURNS: No, I believe there's both components in the plan.

Q There will also be cash.

MR. BURNS: Yes.

Q Could I ask you --

MR. BURNS: More Bosnia?

Q -- another subject?

Q No, I have a Bosnia question. Several weeks ago Secretary Perry in Paris said that if he could not guarantee the safety of American pilots or NATO pilots or American NATO pilots after Mr. O'Grady was shot down, then they wouldn't be asked to fly the mission.

What has the United States done in order to protect American pilots or NATO pilots further? Is the United States pushing the concept of a pre-emptive air strike against Bosnian Serb radar and missile positions in a pre-emptive form, not the current situation where they can only respond if they're threatened?

MR. BURNS: Lee, that's a question for the Pentagon -- what steps we're taking to protect American pilots, military tactics. That's not the State Department's business. It's the Pentagon's business.

Q Is the Ambassador to NATO pursuing that?

MR. BURNS: The Pentagon is pursuing it, and it may be that the U.S. Ambassador to NATO is involved in some discussions, but the Pentagon has lead responsibility for our military forces.

[...]

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 2:05 p.m.)

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