U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING (May 25, 1995)

From: hristu@arcadia.harvard.edu (Dimitrios Hristu)

Subject: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING (May 25, 1995)

[...]

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

NATO Airstrikes ......................................14-16

Strengthening of UNPROFOR, Dual-Key Arrangement,

  Ceasefire, Political Negotiations ..................15-19

Zotov/Frasure Talks with Milosevic ...................15-18

Secretary Christopher Letter to FM Kozyrev ...........17

Bosnia Discussion at NATO Mtg. .......................18

[...]

[...]

Q Today's NATO airstrike. Two weeks ago, the UNPROFOR commanders on the ground in Sarajevo asked for such a strike. A strike under different circumstances was overruled by the civilian commander in Zagreb.

Can you tell us what has changed that made NATO strike today?

MR. BURNS: I can tell you that our position hasn't changed. Two weeks ago we thought there was a flagrant violation of the UN resolutions. We would have favored aggressive action at that time. We certainly would have favored an airstrike, and I think we said it at the time. We have said it all the way, everyday since then.

President Clinton commented upon this earlier this week. It was very clear from the President's statement this morning in the Rose Garden, and from the written statement that he issued, from Secretary Christopher's statement upstairs just a few minutes ago, that we have long favored this.

I can't tell you what specifically accounts for the change in attitude on the part of the UN authorities. But I can tell you, we're very pleased about it.

Yesterday's Bosnian Serb actions, of taking tanks down from the hills directly into the city of Sarajevo, were the most recent flagrant violation of the UN resolutions and very serious ones. So it could be that that was the final straw for the UN authorities on the ground.

We are pleased about today's action because it means that the United Nations and NATO, we hope, now have a concrete understanding that we've got to enforce the UN resolutions.

Q Were the Russians informed of the airstrikes?

MR. BURNS: I know that the Russians were informed. I believe it was done through NATO. I think Secretary Christopher spoke to this. He had a conversation with Secretary General Claes, the Secretary General of NATO, this morning. I believe the Russian Government was informed through that procedure. That's what I understand, yes.

Q Is there any agreement, though, on next steps? Because there's obviously a tit-for-tat and people are taken hostage, and so on. That's where the UN has fallen down on all the previous strikes. There's never been a real plan for what to do next. Do you have any sense it's different?

MR. BURNS: That better not happen. We certainly are not expecting or assuming that there are going to be reprisals against UN personnel. I know that was the pattern of behavior in the past when these strikes were launched. I think the UN authorities are certainly taking the necessary precautions and warning the people -- many of whom are exposed in isolated exclusion zones -- warning their people on the ground about this. But it better not happen because it would be completely inconsistent with what we think should happen now.

Let me just review that. There is an ongoing review of the status of UNPROFOR in the United Nations. We favor a strengthened UNPROFOR. We favor a strengthened dual-key arrangement. We favor a commitment by all the parties, led by the United Nations, assisted by the Contact Group, to try to achieve a cease-fire and some kind of commitment to political negotiations.

This links us, then, to the activities of Ambassador Bob Frasure in Belgrade over the last week. It links us to the standing offer that the Contact Group has put on the table for Mr. Milosevic. It links us to the offer that is still open to the Bosnian Serbs -- that is, to accept the Contact Group map and plan as the basis for negotiations. I want to use the verb "accept;" not to think about, reflect upon, consider, or wonder about it. But if they're able to accept it -- and that's the proper verb that has to be used -- then we're going to be ready for conversations with the Bosnian Serbs.

So I think we have in mind a series of steps that we hope it will be possible to undertake. But having observed this situation now for several years, I'm simply not in a position to say that's what is going to happen. We're going to have to wait and see what happens, what the reaction is. But I can tell you what we want to have happen.

Q What is this strengthened dual-key that you're seeking?

MR. BURNS: Excuse me?

Q What is the strengthened dual-key arrangement that you would like to have?

MR. BURNS: That there will be a mutual commitment by the United Nations and by NATO to enforce the existing UN resolutions. It's as simple as that. The United States, as a leading member of NATO, has said for a very long time now that we are willing to support NATO actions that support UN resolutions.

Q If I understand, it's something like "strategic." I talked to Sarajevo 10 minutes ago. The Serbs continue shelling Sarajevo. This is true. No doubt about it. What is the next step -- tomorrow, for instance?

MR. BURNS: That is not a decision that will be made in Washington, D.C. It's a decision that will be made on the ground by the UN authorities and the NATO commanders in the area. That's how the dual- key functions.

I don't want to get into the details of that because it's really a question for those people on the ground. But I think I have signaled to you what we think is a proper posture for the United States and NATO and the UN to take. We have a very aggressive posture in this instance.

Q Is there a message that the Serbs should draw from the target of this strike, that it was right near the heart of their stronghold in Pale and that it wasn't the sort of searching for the broken down artillery piece in the field but it was their ammunition dump?

MR. BURNS: I think the message is clear.

Q Which is?

MR. BURNS: The message is that it's time to stop fighting and start negotiating for peace. There is a peace plan that exists that we think makes sense and is a good roadmap for the future. That's the message. It's an unmistakable message.

Q It sounds like they are continuing to retaliate. So they have ignored the message, it sounds like?

MR. BURNS: We're just going to have to see what develops over the next couple of days. I think you saw the comments by Admiral Smith this morning. General Shalikashvili was speaking as I came out here. I think a number of our military people have talked about the military side of this. I'm not competent to do that, so I'll leave it to them. But I think our political message also is quite clear here.

Q (Inaudible) for a next action, like today?

MR. BURNS: If there are continued violations. We certainly hope not, and don't expect that to be the case.

Q Nick, a few minutes ago you said, if I got you correctly, on the question of "If UN hostages are taken" -- there's a cycle; it's happened in the past -- "that that better not happen." It sounds like a threat, if I heard you correctly. What would happen --

MR. BURNS: It's not a threat, Charlie. It's just a statement. It's a plain statement. It shouldn't happen and it better not happen because it's not the correct course for the Bosnian Serbs to take and it's not in their interest to take that course.

Q With the loss of all this ammunition, resupply becomes an issue now for the Bosnian Serbs. Are the monitors along the border with Belgrade going to be sharpening their pencils, or whatever it is they sharpen -- keeping a closer eye on that? Does the U.S. think they should? Are they going to be watching --

MR. BURNS: We certainly support the enforcement of the sanctions regime. We support steps to strengthen the sanctions regime, and that is one of the issues that's being discussed in the review of UNPROFOR up in New York.

Q But beyond the reviewing? This is an issue that's going to happen in the next day or two, whether Milosevic decides to rearm his surrogates in Bosnia. Are we going to be watching that with greater attention now?

MR. BURNS: We always watch it with the greatest attention, and we'll continue to do that. Absolutely.

Still on Bosnia. Roy.

Q What about Mr. Zotov's talks with Milosevic? Are you being briefed?

MR. BURNS: I believe we are being briefed. I don't have any details I can share with you on his talks. I would just remind you that Secretary Christopher sent a letter to Foreign Minister Kozyrev more than 24 hours ago advising him about the basis of Ambassador Frasure's talks, how they ended up; the fact that we still think it makes sense to leave that offer on the table, and that we certainly would absolutely expect that Mr. Zotov would be in Belgrade to back up Ambassador Frasure, to support him, and to support the positions that he was putting in front of Mr. Milosevic. But I don't have any details about the Zotov talks to share with you.

Q Is there any indication that he strayed from that, or that he may be presenting a different position?

MR. BURNS: I don't have any indications of that in Belgrade, that in his talks he is, because I don't have any details. So I don't have any indications either way on that one.

Q What about the advice of the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade was giving Mr. Milosevic at the same time that Ambassador Frasure was there? Do you know what that advice was?

MR. BURNS: I don't know what advice the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade gave to Mr. Milosevic. I'm not privy to that information.

Still on Bosnia?

Q In terms of strengthening the dual-key arrangement you mentioned earlier, can you tell us where this will be in the priorities of discussions of next week's NATO meeting, and what specifically you might be seeking?

MR. BURNS: As Secretary Christopher mentioned upstairs when he was with Foreign Minister Kinkel, Bosnia, and all of the questions that we've been discussing today that surround the Bosnian issue, are going to be on the agenda for the discussions next week.

They're not the focus of the discussions. The focus of the discussions are European security, Russian NATO dialogue and NATO expansion. Since most of these people will be in Noordwijk in the Netherlands, this issue will certainly be discussed, and we look forward to those discussions.

Still on Bosnia. Judd.

Q Different subject.

Q One more --

MR. BURNS: One more on Bosnia, Jim.

Q When you talk about strength and dual-key arrangement, you seem to imply that there will be this double command issue or arrangement. However, there are people in this government, in this building, who are not enamored of a double command arrangement. They would rather have a much simpler single command arrangement. Is that now out of the question?

MR. BURNS: What we have in place as of today is a dual-key arrangement, and so therefore it's the only one I can really comment upon, and that's the only one that's really pertinent to the question of what happened today and what's going to happen tomorrow.

As for what happens in the UN review, we'll just have to see the reports that the UN Secretary General presents to the Security Council, and then we will weigh in -- the United States will weigh in with our own views. But I don't have anything to give you that this government is leaning towards ending the dual-key arrangement. I'm not saying that at all.

Bosnia? Anymore? Lee.

Q If the Bosnian Serbs did take UN peacekeepers hostage, would they face certain military retaliation?

MR. BURNS: I don't speak for the people who make those decisions, who are military people, but I certainly want to repeat what I said earlier. That should not happen. It better not happen. It's not what we expect to have happen.

[...]

(The briefing concluded at 2:20 p.m.)

END