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Cyprus News Agency: News in English, 04-04-20Cyprus News Agency: News in English Directory - Previous Article - Next ArticleFrom: The Cyprus News Agency at <http://www.cyna.org.cy>CONTENTS
[01] Security Council to discuss Annan's Cyprus report0945:CYPPRESS:01Security Council to discuss Annan's Cyprus report United Nations, Apr 20 (CNA) -- Security Council members will hold consultations on Cyprus in closed session at 2200 Cyprus time (1900 GMT) today, following the report submitted to the Council yesterday by UN chief Kofi Annan, in which he requested the Council to endorse the Foundation Agreement creating a new state of affairs in Cyprus, ban arms sales to the island and approve the mandate of a new UN operation in the country. The consultations on Cyprus in closed session have been included in the published agenda for today's work at the Security Council. The members are expected to be presented with a draft resolution prepared by Britain and the US, on which they are to vote either tonight or tomorrow. The draft resolution consists of a preamble and a three-part main body including decisions relating to the mandate of the new UN force for Cyprus and the arms embargo. The preamble of the draft resolution notes that implementation of the comprehensive settlement proposed by Annan on March 31, to be submitted to separate referenda among Greek and Turkish Cypriots on Saturday, will be in the interest of international peace and security in the region, ''and thus falls within the primary responsibility of the Security Council.'' It further notes that the scrupulous observance by all parties of the provisions and timetables contained in the comprehensive settlement, in particular those relating to security, ''will be of vital importance.'' The draft takes note also of Annan's recommendation for a strengthened UN operation to provide, inter alia, monitoring, verification and supervision of the implementation of the foundation agreement. Part A of the main text includes decisions by the Security Council to terminate the mandate of the current UN force in Cyprus and the setting up of a United Nations Settlement Implementation Mission in Cyprus (UNSIMIC) authorized to monitor and promote compliance with the foundation agreement, including the dissolution of all Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces, and the adjustment of Greek and Turkish forces and armaments to agreed equal levels. Part B is placed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and adopts compulsory measures preventing the sale, supply or transfer of arms to Cyprus. Part C includes a call by the Security Council upon all parties concerned to ''implement faithfully and fully'' all aspects of the comprehensive settlement within the prescribed timetables. [02] UN Secretary-General's Report on Cyprus (FULL TEXT)1000:CYPPRESS:02UN Secretary-General's Report on Cyprus (FULL TEXT) Nicosia, Apr 20 (CNA) -- United Nations S/2004/302 Security Council Distr.: General 16 April 2004 Report of the Secretary-General on Cyprus I. Political background 1. The Security Council will recall that I reported comprehensively on my mission of good offices in Cyprus in 1 April 2003 (S/2003/398). In that report, I stated that, despite the opportunity that had been missed to solve the Cyprus problem, the plan that I had submitted to the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, namely, the ''Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem dated 26 March 2003'', remained on the table. I indicated my readiness to resume my efforts if there was a clear and realistic prospect of finalizing negotiations, which I would judge to be the case if certain conditions set forth in my report were met. 2. In resolution 1475 (2003) of 14 April 2003, the Security Council gave its full support to my ''carefully balanced plan'' as a ''unique basis for further negotiations'', and called on all concerned to negotiate within the framework of my good offices, using the plan to reach a comprehensive settlement as set forth in my report. 3. Following communications and consultations that led me to believe that a new effort might be warranted, on 4 February 2004, I wrote to Tassos Papadopoulos, the Greek Cypriot leader, and Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, inviting them to New York on 10 February to resume negotiations. In that letter I reiterated the terms in my report for a resumption of negotiations and made a number of procedural suggestions to facilitate negotiation and finalization. Both leaders accepted this invitation. 4. After three and a half days of talks, the parties agreed, on 13 February, to resume negotiations on the basis of the plan to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem through separate and simultaneous referenda before 1 May 2004. To that end, they committed themselves, in a first phase, to seek to agree on changes and to complete the plan in all respects by 22 March, within the framework of my mission of good offices, so as to produce a finalized text. They further agreed that, in the absence of such agreement, I would convene a meeting of the two sides, with the participation of Greece and Turkey, in order to lend their collaboration, in a concentrated effort to agree on a finalized text by 29 March. As a final resort, in the event of a continuing and persistent deadlock, the parties invited me to use my discretion to finalize the text to be submitted to separate and simultaneous referenda on the basis of the plan. The parties also agreed to other suggestions contained in my letter of 4 February. 5. On 2 April 2004, my Special Adviser, Alvaro de Soto, briefed the Council on the negotiations that followed this agreement and on the culmination of the effort in the last week of March in Burgenstock, Switzerland. Negotiations in Cyprus produced enormous progress at the technical level but little at the political level. When the talks moved to Burgenstock, on 24 March, the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey joined to lend their collaboration. However, due to differing views as to the appropriate format for direct meetings, it did not prove possible to have face-to-face meetings. The United Nations therefore sought, as it had in Cyprus in the week before Burgenstock, to build bridges through consultations with all parties, in which it explored compromise suggestions and sought to ascertain the priorities of the parties and where they might be prepared to show flexibility to achieve them. Despite these efforts, there was little give and take. I joined the process on 28 March and submitted an overall bridging proposal on 29 March. On that day, the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey also joined the effort. Deadlock persisted, however, on key issues, as became apparent during consultations in the subsequent 48 hours. At that juncture, there was no reason to believe that further negotiations then or in the months to come would have produced a better result or different outcome. 6. On 31 March 2004, in Burgenstock, after consultations and as invited by the parties, I finalized the text of the ''Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem'', the text of which has been made available to the members of the Security Council and may be accessed at the web site www.annanplan.org. It was submitted under letters from me dated 31 March 2004 to the leadership on each side and the guarantors. As noted in those letters, and in accordance with the agreement of 13 February 2004, appendices A and B of the Comprehensive Settlement, namely the Foundation Agreement and the Constituent State Constitutions, are to be submitted by each side to referenda on 24 April. 7. In accordance with the plan, the parties are required to take a number of steps during April 2004, as set forth in appendix F. But, by agreement of the parties as stated in the plan, action is also required of the Security Council on three matters contained in appendix E, entitled ''Matters to be submitted to the United Nations Security Council for decision''. II. Matters submitted to the United Nations Security Council for decision (pursuant to Appendix E of the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem) 8. Appendix E provides that: ''By agreement of the parties, the
Security Council is requested to take decisions to enter into force
simultaneously with the Foundation Agreement, in which the Security
Council would: ''1. Endorse the Foundation Agreement and, in
particular: ''(a) Take formal note that any unilateral change to the
state of affairs established by the Foundation Agreement, in particular
union of Cyprus in whole or in part with any other country or any form
of partition or secession, is prohibited; and ''(b) Acknowledge the
political equality and distinct identity of Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots and the equal status of their constituent states in the United
Cyprus Republic; and ''2. Prohibit the supply of arms to Cyprus in a
manner that is legally binding on both importers and exporters; and
''3. Decide to maintain a United Nations peacekeeping operation in
Cyprus, which shall remain so long as the federal government, with the
concurrence of the constituent states, does not decide otherwise, and
shall be authorized to deploy and operate freely throughout Cyprus with
the following mandate: '''To monitor the implementation of the
Foundation Agreement and use its best efforts to promote compliance
with it and contribute to the maintenance of a secure environment; and
in particular: '''(a) To monitor political developments related to
implementation and provide advice and good offices as required; '''(b)
To monitor and verify compliance with the security provisions in the
Foundation Agreement, including: '''(i) the dissolution of the Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces, including reserve units, and the
removal of their arms from the island; and '''(ii) The adjustment of
Greek and Turkish forces and armaments to agreed levels; '''(c) To
monitor and verify compliance with the provisions in the Foundation
Agreement pertaining to federal and constituent state police; '''(d) To
use its best efforts to ensure the fair and equal treatment under the
law of persons from one constituent state by the authorities of the
other; '''(e) To supervise the activities relating to the transfer of
areas subject to territorial adjustment, including through assumption
of territorial responsibility for agreed areas and time periods prior
to transfer, without prejudice to local administration of the
population; '''(f) To chair, and provide administrative support to, the
Monitoring Committee to be established under the Treaty between Cyprus,
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom on matters related to the new
state of affairs in Cyprus; and '''(g) To implement its mandate
through, for example, conducting patrols and establishing positions and
roadblocks, as well as receiving complaints, making inquiries,
presenting facts, giving formal advice and making representations to
the authorities. '''a Observation: the United
Nations operation would not assume direct responsibility for the
enforcement of law and order.'''
III. Importance and timing of Security Council decisions
9. The settlement is an attempt to resolve a dispute that has been on
the agenda of the Security Council for 40 years, the oldest item
continuously on the Secretary- General's peacemaking agenda. While its
adoption is a matter for the people of Cyprus to decide upon, its
implementation would clearly be in the interest of international peace
and security in the region, and would thus fall within the primary
responsibility of the Security Council.
10. As envisaged in the Comprehensive Settlement, the Treaty on Matters
Related to the New State of Affairs in Cyprus would be signed into
force on 29 April 2004 by Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United Cyprus Republic.
Accordingly, the Treaties of Establishment, Alliance and Guarantee of
1960 remain in force and shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the new
state of affairs, in the context of the commitment of the parties to
international law and the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations. There are detailed timetables for the dissolution of Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces, withdrawal and adjustment of Greek
and Turkish forces, redeployment of forces from areas subject to
territorial adjustment and de-mining. The settlement also contains
detailed provisions relating to the timing of the handover of
administration of adjusted territory.
11. The scrupulous observance by all parties of the provisions and
timetables contained in the comprehensive settlement, in particular
those relating to security, is of vital importance. In this context,
the decisions requested of the Security Council are a crucial part of
the overall framework of the settlement. They would provide additional
assurance that the settlement will be implemented in the framework of
the principles of the United Nations, as set out in Article 2 of the
Charter, including the resolution of disputes by peaceful means and
refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State.
12. It will be noted that, as part of the package enshrined in the
plan, the parties request decisions to be taken by the Security Council
to enter into force simultaneously with the Foundation Agreement.
During the negotiations in 2002, the two sides indicated their
preparedness to accept certain points related to the system of
guarantees and the presence of moderate levels of Greek and Turkish
troops, on the understanding that the two sides would be assured in
advance of having to take the final decisions to accept the plan that a
United Nations operation with an appropriate mandate would be
authorized by the Security Council. The plan as first presented in
November 2002 reflected this understanding as to timing of Security
Council action and neither side requested any alteration to it during
the subsequent negotiations. When he succeeded Glafcos Clerides as the
Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Papadopoulos indicated that he would not
reopen issues already agreed upon. Accordingly, on 31 March, when the
plan was finalized, I informed each party that I would be proceeding to
refer these matters to the Security Council for decision.
13. In accordance with the plan, the Foundation Agreement would only
enter into force after approval on both sides at referenda and the
signature into force of the Treaty on Matters Related to the New State
of Affairs in Cyprus contained in the plan by Greece, Turkey and the
United Kingdom, after completion of their internal ratification
procedures. The Treaty enters into force upon signature. Should the
plan not be approved by both sides at referenda, or should any
guarantor not have completed their procedures and thus not be able to
sign the Treaty into force by 29 April, the Foundation Agreement would
be null and void and of no legal effect. I have received from all
guarantors a commitment that, should the referenda be approved on 24
April, they will, after completion of their internal ratification
procedures, sign the Treaty into force by 29 April.
14. Bearing in mind the understanding of the parties as reflected in
the plan, and the mode of entry into force, I would request the
Security Council to consider this submission in advance of the
referenda on 24 April, and I would hope that the Council could reassure
Cypriots, as they proceed to referenda, that the United Nations is
prepared to act to meet the responsibilities foreseen for it under the
plan. In accordance with the plan, the decisions would need to enter
into force simultaneously with the Foundation Agreement on 29 April.
Such decisions would naturally be contingent on entry into force of the
Foundation Agreement, and be moot, and therefore null and void, if it
did not enter into force for any reason.
IV. Proposed endorsement of the Foundation Agreement
15. The ''Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem'', which was
drawn up taking full consideration of relevant United Nations
resolutions and treaties, as stated in Security Council resolutions
1250 (1999) and 1475 (2003), provides for a new state of affairs that
is in full accordance with the Council's vision of a settlement.
16. Under the plan, the United Cyprus Republic is an independent State
with a single international legal personality, sovereignty and
citizenship, with union in whole or in part with any other country and
any form of partition or secession expressly prohibited. Its federal
government is designed to ensure that Cyprus speaks with one voice and
can protect its integrity and borders.
17. The plan also refers to the distinct identity and integrity of the
Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots and states that their
relationship is not one of majority and minority but of political
equality, where neither side may claim authority or jurisdiction over
the other. Within the limits of the Constitution, the two constituent
states, namely the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State,
sovereignly exercise all powers not vested by the Constitution in the
federal government, organizing themselves freely under their own
constitutions.
18. These carefully balanced provisions are designed to address the
worst fears of each side described in my report to the Security Council
of 1 April 2003 (S/2003/398, paras. 74-77). In accordance with the
agreement, the Council is requested to endorse the Foundation Agreement
and to take particular steps to reassure the two sides that the Council
is cognizant of their key concerns and endorses the means by which they
are addressed in the agreement. The Council is requested to take formal
note that any unilateral change to the state of affairs established by
the Foundation Agreement, in particular union in whole or part with any
country or any form of partition or secession, is prohibited. The
Council is also requested to acknowledge the political equality and
distinct identity of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and the equal
status of their constituent states in the United Cyprus Republic.
V. The proposed prohibition of the supply of arms to Cyprus
19. At key junctures in its history, the presence in, and flow to,
Cyprus of arms and related materiel has served to fuel conflict.
Conscious of this, at meetings held in mid-2002 the leaders agreed
that, in the event of a comprehensive settlement, the Security Council
should be requested to prohibit the supply of arms to Cyprus in a
manner that is legally binding on both importers and exporters. The
arms embargo is part of a broader understanding that Cyprus should be
demilitarized and is seen as an important factor in ensuring the
effective implementation of the Comprehensive Settlement and in
eliminating further threats to international peace and security in the
area. The embargo could be imposed until the Council were to decide
otherwise, based, inter alia, on a request from the United Cyprus
Republic and confirmation from the Secretary-General that the continued
application of an arms embargo is no longer necessary for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
20. The demilitarization foreseen in the plan includes the dissolution
of all Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces, including reserve
units, and the removal of their arms from the island. The plan also
provides for the withdrawal of all Greek and Turkish troops and
armaments in excess of levels permitted under the 1960 Treaty of
Alliance (950 Greek troops and 650 Turkish troops) in phases to be
completed by 2018 or at the point of Turkey's accession to the European
Union, whichever is earlier, and stipulates that there will be regular
reviews thereafter, with the objective of total withdrawal by mutual
consent. The plan further envisages that police personnel in the
federal and constituent state police and the Joint Investigation Agency
may only carry weapons appropriate for normal civilian police duties.
The federal constitution also prohibits all weapons, except licensed
sporting guns, and makes the supply of weapons a criminal offence.
21. Consistent with the plan, there would need to be exemptions from
the embargo to accommodate relevant provisions of the Comprehensive
Settlement and its appendices relating to the federal and constituent
state police and the Joint Investigation Agency, the Treaty on Matters
Related to the New State of Affairs in Cyprus, the Treaties of
Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance and the Additional Protocols
thereto, and the mandate of the United Nations operation.
VI. The proposed United Nations operation
22. As stated, the parties envisage an indefinite mandate that would
continue so long as the federal government of the United Cyprus
Republic, with the concurrence of both constituent states, does not
decide otherwise. The indefinite mandate is of crucial importance to
the overall security package contained in the plan. The fact that the
United Cyprus Republic would bear the bulk of the costs of the
operation (as described in paragraph 45) is designed to facilitate the
accession of the Security Council to this important request.
23. It must be stressed that it is up to the parties to shoulder their
responsibilities and to translate the Foundation Agreement into the
political life of the United Cyprus Republic. At the same time, the
agreement represents a delicate balance between the key concerns of the
two sides. It would be unrealistic not to expect stresses and strains,
given the violent past and the decades-long disconnect between the
institutions and officials on the two sides. In addition, it is likely
that some groups will continue to oppose the new state of affairs for
some time, until its benefits become fully apparent. In the
circumstances, a United Nations peacekeeping operation is seen on both
sides as an important confidence-building mechanism, which is expected
to play an effective role in helping them overcome difficulties.
24. The operation must therefore have the capacity to play a
substantive role and to stand firm in the face of challenges, including
violent ones. It would thus be quite different from the current United
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), whose main task is to
maintain a de facto ceasefire. The new operation would have a more
substantive political role and would work actively to promote the
implementation of a complex agreement, inter alia, by seeking to
identify issues at an early stage and taking the initiative to prevent
them from turning into intractable problems. It would also need to be
more intrusive than UNFICYP in order to carry out its task of verifying
the dissolution or adjustment of forces. The United Nations role would
not affect rights and obligations under the Treaties of Guarantee and
Alliance.
25. The United Nations peacekeeping operation must enjoy the privileges
and immunities, freedom of movement, communication and access, as well
as other facilities necessary for the performance of its tasks. As
envisaged in the Foundation Agreement, it would be authorized to deploy
and operate throughout the United Cyprus Republic, with particular
focus on the areas subject to territorial adjustment, ports and
airports, demobilization and disarmament sites and other areas of
interest. The United Nations would conclude a status-of-mission
agreement with the Government of the United Cyprus Republic as soon as
possible.
VII. Tasks of the United Nations operation
26. The overall task of the operation would be to monitor the
implementation of the Foundation Agreement in its entirety and use its
best efforts to promote compliance with it. The operation would need to
have the capacity to keep abreast of political, legal, judicial,
administrative and security developments. It would maintain close
coordination and cooperation with the relevant authorities of the
federal government, the constituent states and other actors, and would
require unhindered access to relevant information. In promoting
compliance with the Agreement, the operation would advise, support and
assist the authorities on the implementation of the Agreement, and
would provide good offices, as necessary. It would also chair the
Monitoring Committee, charged with monitoring the implementation of the
Agreement and making recommendations on developments that may endanger
its implementation. The Monitoring Committee brings together all the
main actors in the Agreement, representatives from each guarantor
power, the federal government, and each constituent state, to ensure
that issues are addressed and resolved before they become intractable.
It should be noted that, in accordance with the plan, the members of
the Committee undertake to cooperate with the United Nations operation
and to act in good faith on the recommendations of the Monitoring
Committee. They shall also request the United Nations to bring to its
attention any significant change the United Nations may wish to make in
the future to the operation. The operation would also chair the
Transitional Committee, which is to deal with issues relating to
territorial adjustment and the presence in a constituent state of
persons holding the internal constituent state citizenship status of
the other constituent state, as well as the Relocation Board. It would
also work closely with the Reconciliation Commission and the Committee
on Missing Persons.
27. In order to contribute to the maintenance of a secure environment,
including law and order, the operation would need to monitor
developments related to security throughout the island and aim to
pre-empt, prevent and deter the escalation of imminent security
threats, mainly through conducting patrols, including joint patrols
with the local police, and establishing checkpoints. It would also be
equipped to provide security assistance to the local police, as
required, as well as assistance in maintaining freedom of movement. The
operation would seek to assist in building confidence through its
presence on the island and the conduct of confidencebuilding
activities, including monitoring of the local police, receiving
complaints, making inquiries and ensuring prompt responses, giving
formal advice and making representations to the authorities, as needed,
as well as reporting. To accomplish this task, the operation would
formally liaise through established channels with the relevant federal
and constituent states authorities responsible for security and law and
order on the island at all levels. The maintenance of law and order and
public safety would remain the responsibility of those authorities but
the operation would assist and support them, if necessary.
28. In accordance with the mandate, the operation would monitor and
verify the withdrawal of forces from the ceasefire lines and related
areas in accordance with the agreed schedules; the dissolution of the
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces, including reserve units, and
the removal of their arms from the island, and the adjustment of Greek
and Turkish forces and equipment to agreed equal levels. To carry out
these activities, the operation would liaise closely with the federal
state authorities, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot authorities in
the constituent states, and the Greek and Turkish military authorities.
The United Nations operation would: require unhindered freedom of
movement and access to military locations in order to fulfil its
mandate; visit compounds of Greek and Turkish troops; visit assembly
areas and cantonment locations, for example for the storage of arms,
ammunition and military equipment; and monitor the points of
embarkation of personnel and material in ports and airports. It would
also verify the collection, destruction or other disposal of military
equipment, ammunition and explosives and provide technical assistance
for such activities, if required.
29. The United Nations operations would cooperate with and provide
advice to the relevant military forces, as they clear the areas that
they have mined. The operation would also receive from them and
maintain relevant records, technical information and maps concerning
such areas.
30. Once the dissolution of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
forces and reserve units and the adjustment of the Greek and Turkish
forces and equipment to the agreed levels have been accomplished, the
operation would monitor and verify the level and activities of the
Greek and Turkish forces remaining in Cyprus, as well as compliance
with the principle of demilitarization of the island and the
implementation of other security provisions by the parties, as
contained in the Foundation Agreement. The operation would contribute
to the control of the demilitarization of the island and the arms
embargo through liaison with relevant entities, monitoring of the
quartering of residual Greek and Turkish troops and cantonment
locations for the storage of arms, ammunition and military equipment.
31. To carry out its task of monitoring and verifying compliance with
the provisions of the Foundation Agreement pertaining to the police of
the federal and constituent states, the operation would monitor and
verify that police activities at both the federal and constituent state
levels are carried out in accordance with the Foundation Agreement and
the relevant constitutional and federal laws. The operation would thus
verify that police of the constituent states are stationed and operate
exclusively within their respective constituent states and that the
respective police services do not exceed the strength permitted by the
agreement and do not assume responsibilities beyond normal police
activities. It would also monitor the number and types of weapons held
by the police and their respective compositions, in accordance with the
Agreement. The operation would also monitor the enforcement by the
police services of the prohibition provided for in the Agreement on
arms held by the public. This would require that the United Nations
operation liaise closely with all police authorities and have free
access to all police and detention facilities, police records and
investigation files. The operation would also monitor and verify the
provisions of the Agreement relating to the Joint Investigation
Agency.
32. The operation would put forth its best efforts to ensure that the
authorities of the federal and constituent states provide fair and
equal treatment under the law of persons from one constituent state by
the authorities of the other, with a particular focus on police,
property, civil documents and status, returns, resettlement, special
measures for people in areas subject to territorial adjustment,
community affairs, freedom of movement, residency, representation in
the public service and other bodies, cultural and educational rights
and use of languages.
33. The operation would supervise activities relating to the transfer
of areas subject to territorial adjustment, with particular focus on
the handover of property, returns, resettlement of persons, freedom of
movement, crossing points, restrictions on residence and effective
redress of grievances, as well as security, demilitarization and the
appropriate marking of the areas as transfer takes place. It would also
ensure that special arrangements, as stipulated in the Foundation
Agreement, are put in place to safeguard the rights and interests of
current inhabitants of the areas subject to territorial adjustment and
their orderly relocation. The operation would promote compliance with
the provisions of the Agreement relating to the areas subject to
territorial adjustment, through its presence on the ground, its
supervisory responsibilities as well as its participation in the
Transitional Committee and the Relocation Board. The operation would
liaise closely with all relevant authorities and offer advice, support
and good offices, as necessary. The operation would also undertake
inquiries, upon complaints received, or of its own initiative, on
alleged non-compliance with the provisions relating to civilian matters
in the Agreement.
34. The transfer of the areas subject to territorial adjustment is to
take place in six phases. While the areas would be legally part of the
Greek Cypriot State upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement,
their administration would be entrusted to the authorities of the
Turkish Cypriot State for specified periods until the date for transfer
to the entitled Greek Cypriot State. During the last months of phases
three to six, supervision by the United Nations would be enhanced and
the Organization would assume territorial responsibilities in the area
concerned. This arrangement is designed to provide additional assurance
that the handover will take place on time and in good order. The United
Nations would deploy additional personnel in these areas as it assumes
more formal responsibilities, albeit without prejudice to the local
administration of the daily lives of the local population. During those
periods, the operation would have authority to give directives to local
officials, precluding a local official from duty in the area if
necessary; the operation's civilian police would have full powers in
the respective area and have the right to give operational instructions
to the local police.
VIII. Structure of the United Nations operation
35. To accomplish the tasks set forth above, the operation would
require a strong civilian component; civilian police, including formed
police units operating in accordance with police rules of engagement;
and a credible military force, including military observers. All
components of the operation, in addition to implementing their specific
tasks, would work together and support one another in carrying out the
overall mandate. The United Nations personnel and troops would be
deployed at common locations, wherever possible, with an emphasis on
mobility and flexibility. The military would support and back up the
civilian police in case of disturbances, subject to specific
arrangements.
36. The operation would be unified and integrated. There would be a
clear chain of command from the Security Council through the
Secretary-General to the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General, who would have authority to manage all activities of
the operation. The Special Representative would also have authority
over other United Nations activities in Cyprus in support of this
mandate and would provide coordination, political guidance and support
to them. A Deputy would be appointed to assist the Special
Representative, to act as head of mission in his absence and to perform
other substantive activities, as assigned.
37. The office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
would be supported by Political, Legal and Public Information Offices,
Mission Security, a Reporting Unit, a Best Practices Unit, as well as
Special Advisers on Human Rights, Gender, HIV/AIDS and Mine Action, and
the Resident Auditor. The Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General would supervise the work of some of these units, in
particular the Joint Mission Analysis Cell, which would collect and
analyse information from all sources in order to make informed
assessments and provide advice to the senior mission leadership. The
Special Representative of the Secretary- General's chief of staff would
be responsible for coordination within the operation, channelling
communication to and from the Special Representative to all the
components of the operation, and the day-to-day managing of the
office.
38. The mission would have four main components: (a) A civilian
component with three units: monitoring and promotion of the
implementation of the Agreement; supervision of territorial
adjustments; and civil affairs. The component would maintain field
offices, especially in the areas subject to territorial adjustment; (b)
A police component, which would be deployed in and patrol primarily the
areas subject to territorial adjustment, prospective return and
relocation areas and crossing points at the administrative boundary. It
would also maintain a presence alongside the federal and constituent
state police structures and local police headquarters at the district
and lower administrative levels, as necessary. The United Nations
civilian police officers would be unarmed, but would be supported by
formed, armed United Nations civilian police units, which would also
support the local police in case of civil disturbances. Those units
would operate in accordance with police rules of engagement; (c) A
military component, comprising four mechanized battalions, helicopter
and other support elements and unarmed military observers. All elements
would operate under a single chain of command. The military component
would provide security and support to the United Nations police, as
necessary. Upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement, the
troops currently assigned to UNFICYP would shift to a mobile concept of
operations island-wide; (d) A support component with units for
communications and other technical services, finance, procurement,
civilian personnel, general services and other related services.
IX. Support component of the United Nations operation
39. The initial task of the support component would be to establish the
essential infrastructure required to reach operational capacity within
90 days from the establishment of the operation and to maintain that
capacity throughout its different phases. Activity is expected to reach
its peak during the preparations for and transfer of areas subject to
territorial adjustment, that is, in the second and third year of the
operation.
40. While UNFICTP is being liquidated, full use will be made of its
support structure in the establishment of the new operation. Support to
military units operating out of Nicosia and the three sector
headquarters would follow United Nations standards for
self-sustainment. Civilian police, military observers and civilian
staff would be stationed in regional offices and various other
locations throughout Cyprus and would be supported accordingly, mainly
with office accommodation, security, medical services, communications
and transport.
41. Since the mobility of military and civilian police units would be
essential to the success of the operation, substantial transport assets
would be made available for this purpose. An airlift capability of up
to 40 personnel would also be provided in order to address emergency
situations that may arise, especially during the various phases of
territorial adjustment.
42. A financial commitment authority would be required to cover
anticipated expenditures until 30 June 2004. Initial requirements for
personnel and equipment would be met through the rapid deployment
mechanisms that the United Nations has put in place as a result of the
recommendations made in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace
Operations (S/2000/809), including the strategic deployment stocks, and
would be moved into theatre by a combination of strategic airlift and
sealift or through local procurement where time is of the essence.
Supplies such as fuel and rations would be drawn from existing UNFICYP
contracts modified for the new operation, as necessary, or by
establishment of new contracts.
43. The support operations would fully integrate the operation's
military, civilian staff and United Nations civilian police and would
be controlled and managed under the integrated support services
concept, whereby all military, civilian and civilian police support
requirements are pooled for optimal effectiveness and efficiency.
44. At full deployment, the operation would have 2,500 troops,
including 170 military observers, 330 civilian police and two formed
police units (120 police officers each), substantive international
staff and local staff from both constituent states, as well as the
required international and local support staff.
45. Should the Foundation Agreement enter into force, the United Cyprus
Republic would be committed to bearing half the cost to the United
Nations of the operations in the first three years, and two-thirds of
the cost thereafter. This arrangement would be reviewed in 2010.
X. Security for the United Nations operation
46. The security for the operation and its personnel would be primarily
the responsibility of the host country. In addition, the military
component and the formed police units could be called upon to provide
security for the operation. Currently, there is no security phase in
effect in Cyprus. Accordingly, ''No-Phase'' Minimum Operating Security
Standards (MOSS) requirements, as prescribed by the United Nations
Security Coordinator, will be met.
XI. Phases of the United Nations operation
47. From the entry into force of the Foundation Agreement, to the
deployment of core staff, including the senior management of the new
operation, UNFICYP would become the advance party of the new United
Nations peacekeeping operation. However, in contrast to UNFICYP, the
new operation would need to be far more mobile and proactive. Key
staff, in particular the senior leadership and its political and legal
advisers, as well as from the civilian component and the
administration, would be identified and deployed in key areas as early
as possible. They would support the senior staff in the planning and
conduct of the operation. The core group of United Nations civilian
police officers, including the Police Commissioner, the Deputy Police
Commissioner, the planning team, operations officers and support staff,
should also be deployed within the first weeks of the operation's
deployment.
48. Within 90 days of its inception, the operation would aim to reach
full deployment, in particular of the civilian personnel, which should
be at full strength. The operation would upgrade the current United
Nations military headquarters, deploy additional troops and establish
military observer and civilian police teams throughout the island. They
would immediately start implementation of the mandate with the
available resources. This would include verification of the security
provisions of the Agreement near the buffer zone, confidence-building
patrols throughout the island and support to the United Nations
civilian police, if required.
49. The first phase of territorial adjustment would be completed 104
days after inception and the second phase six months after inception.
Both phases will mainly affect currently uninhabited areas. The
following phases would affect increasingly large and more inhabited
areas: the third phase to be completed 15 months; the fourth, 30
months; the fifth, 36 months; and the sixth, and last, 42 months after
inception. During these phases, the operation would have to carry out
the enhanced supervisory functions necessitating that the operation has
deployed a strong presence at all levels during those periods.
50. The first 104 days would be fundamental to the establishment of the
new mandate and operation. It is envisaged that the period from 104
days after inception until the end of the territorial transfers would
be the most sensitive, given the wide range of mandated activities
concerning the areas subject to territorial adjustment, the dissolution
of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces and the adjustment of
the Greek and Turkish forces to agreed levels. At the end of this
period, the operation should be expected to focus more on the general
terms of its mandate, including monitoring the implementation of the
Agreement, to use its best efforts to promote compliance and to
contribute to a secure environment. At that time, the operation would
reassess its strength in light of the implementation of the Agreement,
compliance by the parties, security and public safety environment and
the process of territorial adjustment.
XII. Observations
51. In the 24 April 2004 referenda, to which the two sides committed
themselves in the agreement of 13 February, the people of Cyprus would
be pronouncing themselves on a plan that emerged from four years of
intensive negotiations and consultations. The consequences of the
decision they make, whatever that decision is, will be very
significant. The outcome is far from certain. The plan is complex and
delicately balanced. Inevitably, as in any negotiation, it is a
compromise. The presentation of the contents of the plan to the public
has not always been equally balanced. Even though finalized by me at
the invitation of the parties, the plan's core concepts and key
trade-offs, as well as the bulk of the many texts included, are largely
the work of Cypriots. The plan is the only available and foreseeable
route to the reunification of Cyprus. It must be judged as a whole,
bearing in mind the available alternatives and weighing the
consequences of deciding for or against. The decision before the people
is theirs alone to make.
52. Timely action by the Council would go a long way to reassuring the
people, as they vote on the future of their country, that the
settlement will have the strong support of the United Nations and that
its security provisions will be fully implemented.
Papadopoulos: ''I want assurances that commitments will be
implemented''
Nicosia, Apr 20 (CNA) -- Cyprus President Tassos Papadopoulos has
stressed the need for assurances that Turkey will implement the
commitments it has undertaken and are envisaged in the UN plan for a
Cyprus settlement, on which Cypriots are to vote in a referendum on
April 24.
In an interview with Time magazine's Europe issue, Papadopoulos said
implementation of ''some benefits'' gained by Greek Cypriots under the
plan presented by UN chief Kofi Annan on March 31 would take a long
time, while gains by Turkish Cypriots would have effect only 48 hours
after a positive outcome in the referendum.
''So we are buying hope,'' Papadopoulos said, reiterating a phrase he
used in his recent address to Cypriots in which he urged the Greek
Cypriot community to reject the UN proposals.
''I want assurances that those commitments will be implemented,'' the
Cypriot leader said in response to a comment by interviewer Andrew
Purvis that the Turkish side was undertaking binding commitments.
Greek American Organizations: Annan plan not in US interest
Nicosia, Apr 20 (CNA) In a letter to US President George Bush Greek
American Organizations state that the Annan plan for a Cyprus solution
is ''not in the best interest of the US''.
UEFA General Assembly begins session
Limassol, Apr 20 (CNA) -- The UEFA General Assembly working session
began here today with a meeting of the Meridian Project Board, which
dealt with assistance to African countries for their infrastructure and
the maintenance of their teams, Costakis Koutsokoumnis, President of
the Cyprus Football Federation (KOP) said.
US wants UN resolution on Cyprus prior to referenda
Nicosia, Apr 20 (CNA) - US Secretary of State Colin Powell said today
that the US is working with the UN Security Council on a resolution
that it would like to see acted upon this week, which should give
encouragement to Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots that the UN will
be putting its weight behind a Cyprus settlement, in view of referenda
on both sides on April 24 to approve a solution plan proposed by UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan.
Powell, who was speaking after a meeting with EU High Representative
for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, noted that the US
is concentrating on doing everything possible to get a positive vote in
the referenda, adding that as both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
examine the terms of the Annan plan, they will come to the realisation
that it is in the interest of both parties to vote ''yes''.
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