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RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 5, No. 149, 01-08-08Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Newsline Directory - Previous Article - Next ArticleFrom: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty <http://www.rferl.org>RFE/RL NEWSLINEVol. 5, No. 149, 8 August 2001CONTENTS[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA
[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
[C] END NOTE
[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA[01] STRIKE BY ARMENIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WORKERS AVERTEDAfter receiving their April salaries on 7 August, the staff of the Medzamor nuclear power station withdrew its threat to strike, RFE/RL's Yerevan bureau reported. They had said last week they would do so unless they received four months' salary arrears by 7 August. The outstanding May salaries will be paid by 10 August and the remaining arrears by the end of the year. LF[02] AZERBAIJANI LEADERSHIP CONCERNED THAT FORMER PRESIDENT MAY ATTEMPT TO UNITE OPPOSITIONAn article in the daily newspaper "Alternativ," which has close ties to the presidential administration, suggests with alarm that former Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov, together with Major General Vagif Huseinov, who served as Azerbaijan's KGB chief in the late 1980s, are planning to unite all opposition political forces in Azerbaijan in order to try to seize power there, RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service reported on 7 August. Huseinov was identified by "Nezavisimaya gazeta" in 1999 as a member of Russia's Council for Foreign and Defense Policy. Meanwhile, prominent Azerbaijani political figures have rejected an offer by former presidential aide Eldar Namazov to act as mediator between the Azerbaijani leadership and opposition, according to "Yeni Musavat" on 6 August, as cited by Groong. LF[03] CONTRADICTORY REPORTS ABOUT MALARIA IN AZERBAIJANMore than 50 families in a displaced persons' camp in Saatly Raion have contracted malaria, RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service reported on 7 August, citing the independent daily "525-ji gazeti." But Turan on 7 August quoted a UN official in Baku as claiming that due to the Azerbaijani leadership's concern at the possibility of malaria spreading through displaced persons' camps, the incidence of malaria in those facilities is lower than elsewhere in the country. LF[04] GEORGIAN ARMY COMMANDER RESIGNSGeorgian President Eduard Shevardnadze on 7 August finally accepted the resignation of Georgian army commander Major General Djemal Chumburidze, Caucasus Press reported. Chumburidze asked to be relieved of that post in late May following the abortive protest action by national guardsmen, but Shevardnadze at that time refused to comply with that request (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 30 May 2001). Koba Kaladze has been named to replace Chumburidze, who has been appointed head of the National Army Bureau. LF[05] OSCE DENIES REPORT OF INCIDENT OF GEORGIAN-CHECHEN BORDERThe OSCE mission in Georgia has rejected as untrue a report that members of its monitoring group on the Georgian-Chechen border shot and wounded two armed Georgians who attacked that post late on 6 August, Caucasus Press reported (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 7 August 2001). The OSCE pointed out that its monitors on that border are unarmed. Meanwhile, members of the Georgian border guards have admitted responsibility for injuring the two Georgian assailants. LF[06] GEORGIAN OFFICIAL SAYS NO PROOF OF CLANDESTINE CHECHEN RADIO STATION EXISTSGeorgian National Communications Control Commission official Temur Dzagnidze told Caucasus Press on 8 August that his agency has been unable to trace the Chechen radio station that Russian officials claim is broadcasting to Chechnya from the Georgian village of Duisi (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 20 July 2001). Dzagnidze said either that radio station does not exist, or its signal is so weak that it could be traced only by local radio engineers in eastern Georgia. LF[07] KYRGYZ NGOS DEMAND RELEASE OF IMPRISONED OPPOSITION POLITICIANMore than 10 NGOs and independent journalists in Kyrgyzstan on 7 August appealed to President Askar Akaev to release imprisoned opposition Erkindik party leader Topchubek Turgunaliev in connection with his past services to the country, his deteriorating health, and the upcoming 10th anniversary of Kyrgyzstan's declaration of independence, RFE/RL's Bishkek bureau reported. Turgunaliev, who turned 60 last month, is serving a six-year sentence on charges of having plotted to assassinate Akaev. He was recently hospitalized. LF[08] OPPOSITION PARTY BANNED IN TAJIKISTANTajikistan's Supreme Court on 7 August complied with a request by the country's Justice Ministry (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 10 July 2001) to ban the Adolatkhoh (Justice) Party, Asia Plus-Blitz reported. The Supreme Court had suspended the party's activities late last year for a period of six months on the grounds that it had violated the Law on Political Parties by including in its membership lists persons with no connections with the party (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 3 January 2001). Under the Law on Political Parties, they must have no less than 1,000 members and regional organizations in most administrative districts. Vavorud on 8 August quoted Adolatkhoh Secretary-General Abdurahmon Karimov as saying that on 21 July he appealed to the Justice Ministry to postpone for six months a decision on banning the party in order to enable him to reregister members. He said the party had not yet succeeded in doing so because of financial constraints. Karimov claimed that Adolatkhoh has 1,200 members in Konibodom (northern Tajikistan) and a further 6,000 members elsewhere in the country. LF[09] TURKMEN PRESIDENT LAUNCHES EXPERIMENT IN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENTTwo weeks after unveiling a new economic project in the environs of Ashgabat (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 30 July 2001), President Saparmurat Niyazov on 6 August announced that in future the local councils of that region will be subordinate not to the national government but directly to the parliament and the president, Interfax reported. They will also be empowered to pass local regulations and laws, introduce taxes, and build roads. He added that if the experiment proves beneficial it will be extended to other regions of the country. But while the comparatively well- to-do districts near Ashgabat may be able to afford to finance their own highways from local taxes and thus ease the strain on the national budget, rural districts are likely to find it impossible to follow suit. Also on 6 August, Niyazov criticized senior government officials for nepotism and fined Deputy Prime Minister and Central Bank Director Seyitbai Gandymov one month's salary for engaging in that practice, Reuters reported. LF[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE[10] NATO GIVES MACEDONIANS 'ASSURANCES' ON DISARMAMENTHansjoerg Eiff, who is NATO's ambassador to Macedonia, and Peter Feith, NATO's special envoy in the Balkans, met with President Boris Trajkovski in Ohrid on 7 August, RFE/RL's South Slavic Service reported. The two envoys gave the Macedonian leader "verbal guarantees" from NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson that peacekeepers will follow a clear timetable in collecting the weapons, uniforms, and ammunition of the ethnic Albanian fighters of the National Liberation Army (UCK) (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 7 August 2001). A rebel commander told Reuters, however, that "the percentage of implementation [of a political settlement] achieved will decide the percentage of disarmament." Vatican Radio suggested on 8 August that the demand for guarantees is an attempt by ethnic Macedonian political leaders "to undermine the peace process." In any event, talks resumed on 8 August, AP reported. PM[11] WHAT ROLE FOR AMNESTY IN MACEDONIA?AP reported from Ohrid on 7 August that the ethnic Macedonian parties in the political talks agreed to an amnesty for UCK fighters, except for individuals who committed "crimes that the United Nations war crimes tribunal deals with" (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 7 August 2001). It is not clear whether the Macedonians intend to prosecute such individuals themselves or send them to The Hague. PM[12] REPORTS OF VIOLENCE IN MACEDONIAGovernment spokesman Antonio Milosovski told AP on 8 August in Ohrid that the UCK ambushed an army convoy in northern Macedonia, killing 10 soldiers and wounding three. Dpa reported that nine soldiers died and that the attack took place near Karpalok between Skopje and Tetovo and that the highway linking the two cities is blocked. PM[13] HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH SAYS MACEDONIAN KILLINGS WERE 'EXECUTION'"The Washington Post" reported on 8 August that an investigator for Human Rights Watch has rejected the Macedonian Interior Ministry's statement that the recent killing of five ethnic Albanian rebels took place because the men resisted arrest (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 7 August 2001). The investigator and the daily likened the killings to a "summary execution." PM[14] UKRAINE TO 'SUSPEND' ARMS DELIVERIES TO MACEDONIAReuters reported from Kiev on 7 August that the Ukrainian authorities have agreed to "suspend" exports of heavy weapons to Macedonia. The U.S. asked Ukraine recently to end arms deliveries, but the cash-strapped state is not enthusiastic about losing a customer. PM[15] KFOR DETAINS MORE MACEDONIAN GUERRILLASU.S. peacekeepers detained five suspected ethnic Albanian guerrillas near the border with Macedonia, KFOR said in a statement from Camp Bondsteel on 8 August (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 31 July and 6 August 2001). Peacekeepers also discovered a small arms cache. PM[16] SERBIAN MINISTER WANTS HAEKKERUP OUTEchoing recent remarks by Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 27 July 2001), Serbian Justice Minister Vladan Batic wrote UN administrator Hans Haekkerup in an open letter that he has "openly sided with Albanian separatists," who have set up ethnically pure areas in Kosova, "Vecernje novosti" reported on 8 August. Batic called on Haekkerup to resign. Batic added: "Kosovo always has been, and will be, part of Serbia. Because you do not accept that, you should leave Kosovo, the sooner the better" (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 23 January, 23 February, and 1 May 2001). On 7 August, UN police and KFOR peacekeepers closed a Yugoslav and Serbian government "office" that opened in Gracanica, saying that the Serbs had not sought the UN's permission to open the office, RFE/RL's South Slavic Service reported. PM[17] SERBIA TO SACK AMBASSADOR TO U.S.?"Blic" reported on 8 August that Yugoslav Ambassador to the U.S. Milan Protic is holding political consultations with other members of the governing Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition in Belgrade. Protic, a political figure in his own right, criticized Kostunica's recent visit to the U.S. as being poorly planned and hence ineffective (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 13 March and 15 May 2001). In response to a question as to whether the DOS or Kostunica plan to fire him, Protic said that he does not know if they want to do so or are willing to try. He added that "it won't be easy to remove me." Kostunica has publicly criticized the outspoken ambassador as being too Americanized. Protic, a professor of Balkan history by profession, studied and taught for years in California, and has a familiarity with the American idiom and culture that few in Belgrade can rival. PM[18] POLICE PROTESTS IN CROATIAMany of the 3,100 police and other cashiered Interior Ministry employees demonstrated on 7 August to protest the government's plans to fire them outright or reassign them to other jobs, RFE/RL's South Slavic Service reported (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 7 August 2001). Demonstrations took place in Bjelovar, Pakrac, Okucani, Zadar, and Vinkovci. The union representing government employees promised to take legal action against the authorities. A police strike remains a possibility. Officials of the opposition Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) called for a special session of the parliament to discuss the sackings, saying that the government's decision will lead to reduced safety and security for citizens. On 8 August, a protest continued. PM[19] FORMER BOSNIAN SERB LEADER: KARADZIC'S BODYGUARDS PAID BY CROOKS IN CUSTOMSMilorad Dodik, a former Republika Srpska prime minister and the leader of the Independent Social Democratic Party, said in Banja Luka on 7 August that unnamed "criminal organizations" provide the money to pay the bodyguards of Radovan Karadzic, RFE/RL's South Slavic Service reported. Dodik added that the criminals are former members of the secret police and current customs officials who engage in smuggling. PM[20] ROMANIAN MINE BLAST KILLS 14A powerful blast at the Vulcan mine in the Petrosani area in western Romania killed 14 miners and injured three on 7 August, Romanian media reported. The blast was most likely caused by an electrical spark in one of the mine's galleries combined with a massive gas buildup. Premier Adrian Nastase interrupted his holiday and formed a governmental commission to investigate the incident. The commission is led by Interior Minister Ioan Rus and Labor and Social Solidarity Minister Marian Sirbu. The government will offer 75 million lei ($2,500) in aid to the victims' families, while children of the victims are to be helped with "scholarships or other aid," Nastase said. ZsM[21] ROMANIAN GENERALS' SENTENCES TO BE RESCINDED?According to an appeal made on 7 August by Attorney General Tanase Joita, a court will reconsider the sentence delivered to Generals Victor Athanasie Stanculescu and Mihai Chitac for their roles in repressing the December 1989 revolt in Timisoara, Romanian media reported. The two were originally sentenced by the Supreme Court to 15 years in prison. The military intervention in Timisoara resulted in 72 dead and 253 wounded. Joita argued that formal and basic procedures were breached during hearings on the generals' cases. The Supreme Court is now to approve the attorney general's decision. Joita did not contest the sum of 37 billion lei (some $1.3 million) in damages that Stanculescu and Chitac were ordered to payto the families of victims of the repression. ZsM [22] FORMER JUSTICE MINISTER QUESTIONED ON DUBIOUS PRIVATIZATIONRomanian police on 7 August questioned former Justice Minister and opposition National Liberal Party Chairman Valeriu Stoica on the selling of the Romtelecom state-owned telephone company, Mediafax reported. Police are investigating a $9 million consultancy fee paid by the former privatization agency to the Goldman-Sachs company. Stoica said that as a member of the privatization committee he had no right to approve such payments. Romanian Privatization Minister Ovidiu Musatescu said in June that the payment of the fee had no legal basis, and that "in the best situation," the fee should have been paid by Romtelecom and not the privatization agency. Police have already questioned several former high-ranking officials and are to conclude their investigation by questioning former Premier Radu Vasile. ZsM[23] BUSH SPEAKS ON MOLDOVA'S FUTUREIn a letter sent to Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, U.S. President George W. Bush said he "agrees that Moldova's future is Europe and the Trans-Atlantic Community," Flux reported. He added the U.S. looks forward to cooperating with the Moldovan government, as Chisinau works toward "important democratic reforms, oriented to a market economy and necessary for full integration into the international community." Bush said he understands Moldova's problems with the breakaway Transdniester region and with the presence of the Russian army there. He said the U.S. administration will continue to support the withdrawal of Russian troops in accordance with the provisions of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul summit agreement. ZsM[24] FORMER BULGARIAN PRESIDENT DECLARES WILLINGNESS TO RUN AGAIN"If those who may wish to put up my candidacy [for the presidency] change the constitution, vesting more powers in the president, we can discuss it," former President Zhelyu Zhelev told the web magazine Mediapool in a recent interview, BTA reported on 8 August. Hristo Markov, a member of the Democratic Party, which is a partner in the ODS coalition, caused a stir following a separate recent interview with Mediapool in which he said that the National Movement Simeon II will not back Peter Stoyanov for re- election as president, and would likely throw its support behind Zhelev. According to an opinion piece in "Sega" on 7 August, a second term in office would make Stoyanov more independent, a scenario that would not please Premier Simeon Saxecoburggotski. In his comments to Mediapool, Zhelev went on to say that he is in favor of increasing the powers of the presidency, and that "I will even support Simeon if he wants to become president with broadened powers, because Bulgaria needs it." MES[25] BULGARIAN-U.S. TEAM TO SEARCH FOR ORIGINS OF NOAH'S FLOODActing on the basis of a new theory that Noah's Flood was the result of an ancient Black Sea deluge, an underwater expedition team has assembled in Varna to begin searching for evidence. The expedition is being led by Dr. Robert Ballard, best known for finding the wreckage of the Titanic in the North Atlantic, along with marine geologist Dwight Coleman and the Bulgarian Academy of Science's Professor Petko Kimitrov. Should the team uncover any evidence that the great flood originated in the Black Sea, the team will return in 2003 to begin underwater archeological excavations. MES[C] END NOTE[26] RUSSIAN PRESENCE IN FORMER REPUBLICS DECLINESBy Paul GobleThe number of ethnic Russians in the 11 former non-Russian Soviet republics and the Baltic states has declined from 24.8 million in 1989 to fewer than 19 million today, an absolute decline that has reduced their percentage of the population in every one of these countries. That trend reflects the more general Russian demographic collapse, as well as the assimilation and outmigration from these countries to the Russian Federation. And it seems certain both to continue and to have important consequences for these countries and their relationships with Moscow. A recent article published in "Nezavisimaya gazeta" surveyed census results from six of these countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Estonia, and Turkmenistan) as well as population estimates prepared by the governments of the other countries in the region. And it reported on the number of ethnic Russians found in all these countries in 1989 by the last Soviet census and the number reported in more recent censuses and in estimates for 1999. In the Baltic region, there were 474,800 ethnic Russians in Estonia in 1989 and 353,000 a decade later. In Latvia, the equivalent figures were 905, 500 and 710,00 and in Lithuania, the numbers were 344,500 in 1989 and 280, 000 in 1999. In the former Soviet West, there were 1,342,100 ethnic Russians in Belarus in 1989, and 1,141,700 there in 1999. In Ukraine, the numbers were 11,355,600 and 9,100,000; and in Moldova, the figures were 562, 100 and 501,000 respectively. In the southern Caucasus, there were 51,600 ethnic Russians in Armenia in 1989 and 8,000 there a decade later. In Azerbaijan the equivalent numbers were 392,300 and 141,700; in Georgia, 341,200 and 140,000. As for Central Asia, there were 6,062,000 ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan in 1989 and 4,479, 600 a decade later. In Kyrgyzstan, the figures were 916,600 and 603,200; in Tajikistan, 388,500 and 145,000; in Turkmenistan 333,900 and 240,000; and in Uzbekistan, 1,653,500 and 1,150,000. According to the Moscow newspaper, the current situation is even more "catastrophic" with respect to the overall number of ethnic Russians and their number in each of the countries involved. But even these figures for the 1989-1999 period point to three important conclusions: First, the absolute number and percentage of Russians in the population are declining in every country. On the one hand, this pattern resembles the end of empire elsewhere and the almost inevitable sorting out of populations that takes place when an empire dies. But on the other hand, it calls into question the assertions of some Russians and others about the supposed special nature of the territory of the former Soviet Union and the future role of Russia and Russians in these countries. Second, the numbers suggest that ethnic Russians are leaving those countries which face the greatest amount of social instability and even open conflict rather than those about whom Moscow has complained most regularly. Russians are not "fleeing" from what Russian officials often describe as "oppressive" government actions in Estonia and Latvia at greater rates than from "fraternal" countries like Ukraine, Armenia, or even Belarus. Instead, individual ethnic Russians appear to be making choices on the basis of economic opportunity and cultural affinity rather than on the basis of the Kremlin's political calculations. And third, the declining number and percentage of ethnic Russians in these countries mean that Russians seem certain over the coming years to play a smaller role in the social, economic, and political lives of these countries and that Moscow may not be able to count on a stratum of ethnic Russians who will for cultural and other reasons be especially prepared to advance the interests of the Russian Federation. Whatever their current difficulties, these countries are likely as a result of this demographic shift to become ever more the expression of the dominant nationality in them rather than of a survival of the past like the Soviet mindset. In some of them, that may lead to a new nationalism and heightened ethnic tensions, but in others, the exit from the scene of the ethnic Russian community may reduce ethnic tensions and open the way to a more genuinely civil society. But perhaps the most important consequence of this demographic trend is likely to be felt not in these 14 countries but in Russia itself. Many Russians, themselves facing a demographic decline widely predicted to reduce the population of their country by more than a third over the next half century, may view the decline in the numbers of Russians in neighboring states as a harbinger of things to come, a development that could help power Russian nationalist or perhaps Eurasianist parties in the future. At the very least, they are likely to see this trend as reducing still further Russia's role in the world, even if Moscow continues to promote the return of ethnic Russians from these countries to address economic needs in the Russian Federation. And the Russian government itself almost certainly will have to revise its approach to these countries as a result. In some cases, that may lead Moscow to step up criticism of the governments involved, just as it has done of late with regard to the treatment of ethnic Russians in Ukraine. But in others, it may mean that the Russian authorities will be forced to deal with these countries ever more as countries rather than as remnants of a former Russian empire. In that event, this demographic development will certainly have fateful consequences even if, as always, demography is not destiny except in the very long run. 08-08-01 Reprinted with permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
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